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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the presence of counter-terrorist security within the everyday life of 
cities. It emerges from, and contributes to, ongoing debates concerning the place of security 
in contemporary urbanism, and discussions regarding the increased saturation of urban 
spaces with a diverse range of security interventions. Drawing on this work, this thesis 
argues that in order to better understand the urban geographies of security, instead of 
exclusively conceiving security as only imposed on urban spaces, we must ask how 
processes of securing cities are ʻlivedʼ. In doing so this study responds to the lack of 
attention to the complex relations between processes of security and lived everyday urban 
life. This thesis explores the neglected everyday life of security through a case study of an 
emerging form of counter-terrorist security apparatus within cities in the UK, examining the 
broadening of the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom and the continuing 
development of CONTEST, the United Kingdomʼs counter-terrorist strategy. Taking London 
as a named example, the study concentrates on the security interventions of two research 
sites, the Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank, and the Victoria Line of the 
London Underground, to examine how security addresses the everyday life of the city and 
how such practices are experienced as part of lived everyday urban life. In sum, this thesis 
focuses, first, on the processes through which the everyday city is secured and, second, it 
draws attention to and describes how those processes of securing are encountered and 
enacted, as they become part of the everyday life of cities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Two police officers stroll languidly along the footpath underneath Waterloo Bridge - I 
have observed their steady progress since they passed the OXO tower: a mixture of 
the two talking, laughing, pausing to look at the river, exchanging smiles with passers 
by or an infrequent ʻafternoonʼ, and on one occasion providing directions. Now they 
have stopped. It appears something has attracted one of them. Speaking quietly to his 
colleague he turns and gestures right, his outstretched arm pointing towards a 
wooden bench. The officers start for the bench, hurrying their pace as they approach. 
Stopping and standing near but not next to the bench they stare at a tidily assembled 
collection of six large, bulky shopping bags. Then, looking intently around, they scan 
the surrounding area, neither speaking. Close to this, a young woman poses for a 
photograph. Noticing the now stationary officers her posture straightens and she 
indicates their presence to her partner, a young man, who lowers his camera and 
turns swiftly to face them. He smiles as he calls to the officers: 
 
Itʼs okay theyʼre ours. 
 
The young woman is now smiling, still looking in the direction of the officers. The 
young man eagerly turns back to face her speaking to her as he does, only to be 
stopped by a loud, exasperated rebuke: 
 
You canʼt do that. You canʼt leave them there. They could get stolen or make a 
security scare. You shouldnʼt ever leave things like that. Think how it looks. 
 
The officer points firmly at the bags and then gestures toward the couple. As he talks 
his voice grows louder, it betrays annoyance verging on anger, mirrored in his 
furrowed, tightening expression and reddening face. The second officer stands 
silently, frowning as he glances once more at the bags before fixing his eyes on the 
couple. The young man has turned back to face them once again, both he and the 
young woman appear as an awkward mix of bemusement and civility. He offers a half 
smile before, in an apologetic tone, responding: 
 
Iʼm sorry, we didnʼt think about that. We can see them and weʼre … 
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The officer interrupts, speaking aggressively over the young man. The attempt to 
apologise and explain only appears to have added further aggravation: 
 
Well it doesnʼt matter alright? You canʼt, you canʼt do it because it looks suspicious, 
thatʼs why weʼre checking it. It doesnʼt matter if you can see, you donʼt do that, okay? 
What if we thought it was something suspicious, something serious? 
 
The couple no longer smile as they offer further apologies and words of regret, 
moving to stand with the officers. With all four now stood together, the speaking officer 
first shakes his head in a somewhat exaggerated manner and then proceeds to 
address the couple. No longer shouting, but still visibly irked, he gesticulates, raising 
both hands, directing them along the footpath. Finally he stabs a finger repeatedly 
toward the bags, his face creased into an awkward glower. After this short but 
animated exchange the couple repeat exaggerated apologies and assuring that their 
mistake wont be repeated. To this, both officers react by shaking their heads before 
final words are exchanged. The officers walk on, muttering to one another as they do. 
The couple talk quietly as they watch the officers, they pull faces and laugh before 
stepping away from the bench, once more leaving their shopping bags idle in order to 
take photographs. All of a sudden the young man grabs his partner, pulling her close 
to him with feigned antagonism. He scowls theatrically, she laughs as his face breaks 
into a smile: 
 
You canʼt take photos now because weʼre so paranoid about terrorism, okay? 
 
(Observant participation, South Bank, 29.12.08) 
 
Introduction 
 
In this example from my research diary, a form of security becomes momentarily 
present. This passage describes an encounter, an incident where I witnessed two police 
officers walking on the South Bank, stopping to investigate what appeared to them as a 
ʻsuspiciousʼ collection of items, and the exchange that ensued between the two police 
officers and a couple who identified themselves as the owners of the offending, ʻsuspiciousʼ 
bags. This thesis pays attention to how a specific form of counter-terrorist security 
apparatus is primed to be part of everyday life in different ways. Attending to the presence 
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of different counter-terrorist security mechanisms within urban spaces, it discuses how the 
various interventions of this particular security apparatus are enacted as part of the 
background of cities and urban life and then to the instantiations through which security 
interventions change form and become more intensified presences. Through this thesis it is 
argued that attending to the ways that security is encountered and enacted through the 
everyday use of urban space extends existing debates concerning urban security towards a 
fuller appreciation of the where and how of security within the everyday life of cities. It is 
argued here that in order to better understand the urban geographies of security we must 
move to witness and describe how security becomes part of urban life in different, often 
unexpected ways, to attend to security as it is lived. 
This research is focused on the presence of security within the everyday life of cities 
and with the diverse range of security interventions that are now deployed throughout cities 
in order to, in Dillonʼs (2007) terms, ʻgovern terrorʼ. It argues that instead of exclusively 
conceiving security measures as only imposed on urban spaces in relation to abstract 
ʻprinciplesʼ of state formation (see Agamben, 2002), we must ask how processes of 
securing the everyday city are ʻlivedʼ and become part of, what de Certeau elegantly terms 
“a proliferation of aleatory and indeterminable manipulations within an immense framework 
of socioeconomic constraints and securities” (1984:40). This research thus focuses on the 
processes through which the everyday city is secured and on how the various materialities 
that make up those processes of securing are encountered, enacted, experienced and lived 
as they become part of everyday urban life. To this end, I offer a conceptual vocabulary for 
describing the everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured. 
This introductory chapter sets out the context for this research by introducing the 
background for works that have considered counter-terrorist security responses in urban 
spaces and the present lack of attention afforded to how security interventions are 
encountered and lived through the everyday life of cities. After this, I outline the two London 
based sites that serve as the locations that are combined to provide the case for this 
research, before presenting the questions and aims around which the research project has 
been developed. Finally, the chapter explains how the thesis is structured and provides an 
outline of each of the subsequent chapters. 
 
1.1. Research context: securing urban space, securing life 
 
It has been widely argued in both academic and non-academic domains that cities are 
increasingly becoming the key strategic sites where terrorism occurs and is countered (see 
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Davis, 2001; Dudley, 2007; Graham, 2002a, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Glaeser and Shapiro, 
2001; Gray and Wyly, 2007; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Marcuse, 2006; Mitchell, 2003; 
Savitch, 2003, 2008; Sorkin, 2008a). Commenting on what they describe as the ʻurbanising 
of the security agendaʼ, Wekerle and Jackson provide a concise summation of these 
arguments, contending that “anti-terrorism is such a hegemonic project that it insinuates 
itself into the interstices of everyday life” (2005:46). In the UK, as elsewhere, the spaces of 
civil life are progressively becoming saturated with a variety of security and surveillance 
mechanisms in response to the perceived threat of further terrorist attack and the apparent 
vulnerabilities of cities to a range of ever changing terrorist threats and tactics1. The 
presence of a variety of counter-terrorist security responses throughout the spaces of civil 
life are deemed necessary, for it is widely accepted in the UK, as in many other cities 
throughout the world, that a situation has arisen where it is not only economic and military 
targets that are under threat of attack. Indeed, as the UK Government concedes, 
increasingly the spaces of civil life and the “places where people live and work” (HM 
Government, 2009a:56) are understood to be at high risk from and vulnerable to the threats 
of terrorism and to the ʻevent of terrorʼ in particular. The threats posed to cities and urban 
life by contemporary forms of terrorism have established significant new challenges for how 
we understand security, and the very means by which it can be provided. Integral to these 
emerging landscapes of security, and to contemporary urbanism, are the various processes 
of securitisation that aim to reduce the occurrence and impact of a terrorist attack, through 
which the city and everyday urban life have become a ʻreferent objectʼ of security (see 
Dillon, 2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). 
Much has been written regarding security as a key factor in contemporary urbanism. 
Various now well established discussions have developed that focus on the vulnerabilities 
of cities to terrorism, and to the various ways that counter-terrorist security is then 
imbricated with the city through “attempts to ʻdesign out terrorismʼ (or perhaps more 
correctly to ʻdesign-inʼ counter-terrorism)” (Coaffee, 2009a:6; see also Coaffee, 2000, 
2003a, 2004a, 2004b; 2009b; Coaffee and OʼHare, 2008; Coaffee et al, 2008; Dudley, 2007; 
Flint, 2005; Little, 2004; Nasr, 2003; Vale, 2005). There is a considerable body of work that 
examines how this takes place, and discussions abound regarding the resources and the 
constraints that cities have to deal with the threats posed by terrorism, as well as the 
processes of securitisation through which these mechanisms become present within urban 
spaces. Research has thus far tended to focus primarily on the processes through which 
                                                
1 It is important to acknowledge that what are categorised as ʻnewʼ and ʻunconventionalʼ terrorist threats and tactics in the West 
are not so in other contexts (see Bishop and Roy, 2009; Coaffee, 2009b; Coaffee et al., 2009; Wills and Moore, 2010). 
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security measures are imposed on cities, the technical and instrumental dimensions of 
specific mechanisms of securitisation, and how such processes result from, or exemplify, 
contemporary changes in governance (see Benton-Short, 2007; Coaffee, 2003a, 2009a, 
2010; Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006a; Coaffee et al., 2009; Graham, 2004b, 2011; 
Gregory and Pred, 2007; Light, 2002; Mueller, 2010; Swanstrom, 2002). 
Alongside work that has sought to map new urban geographies of security, have been 
a series of claims that security interventions within everyday urban settings are intrusive 
and disruptive. It has been the contention of both academic and non-academic sources that 
counter-terror security practices often constitute dangers to the very life of the cities that 
they claim to protect. What has emerged are a set of persistent claims within literatures on 
counter-terrorist security that ʻprotectionist reflexesʼ, characterised by “regulatory 
management, fortification and surveillance to categorise, divide and control” (Coaffee and 
Murakami Wood, 2006:7) are widely adopted and that such security apparatuses are to the 
detriment of cities and urban life. These processes of security are repeatedly described as 
enacting a form of counter-terror response that has been characterised as highly obtrusive 
as well as contentious. There are certainly examples where these claims are true (see for 
example Graham, 2002a; Marcuse, 2002), in particular in those writings reflecting on the 
various counter-terrorist responses that were adopted in the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks on September 11th 2001. However, the prevalence of this form of counter-terror 
security apparatus has been overstated and has been documented at the expense of other 
urban contexts and examples where security apparatuses and counter-terrorist 
interventions are perhaps more “considered and considerate” (Vale, 2005:38). 
Notwithstanding the persistence of these claims, research focused exclusively on one 
specific form of counter-terrorist security apparatus does not account for the continued 
developments in approaches to counter-terrorism, the changing environments of threat and 
counter threat, nor the complex array of landscapes and security spaces that have emerged 
and continue to change. Indeed, as this thesis will discuss, it is imperative that we consider 
the localised and distinctive character of security challenges and counter-terrorist 
responses. The well established and rehearsed claims that detail and critique styles of 
ʻfortress urbanismʼ (see Coaffee, 2003a; 2004b, 2009a), practices of ʻbarricadingʼ (see 
Marcuse, 2002) the city and the ʻcitadelisationʼ (see Marcuse, 2004) of supposed public 
spaces, although not without substance and certainly of continued importance, neglect other 
counter-terrorist security apparatuses, failing to recognise the many and varied ways in 
which security becomes part of cities and which can in many cases demonstrate how 
security and urban spaces and the life of cities are brought into forms of reconciliation. This 
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thesis will demonstrate that such general characterisations are naïve and extremely 
problematic given that counter-terrorist security responses are necessarily spatially 
contingent. It will also be argued that the rationalities of security are not those of fixity; 
security is expected and required to change in order to address the evolving terrorist threat 
and shifting perceptions and calculations of threat and risk. Additionally, and importantly, 
the security agendas of many western cities now display more rigorous attempts to develop 
more ʻproportionateʼ, ʻappropriateʼ and ʻacceptableʼ security interventions. These have 
become central tenets in the rationality of the form of counter-terrorist security apparatus 
that is emerging in the UK and that will be traced through the course of this thesis. It is 
important, therefore, to acknowledge this variation and to specify these differences through 
a more nuanced account of the range of security challenges and processes that emerge 
across cities and in multiple and different urban contexts. 
Central to this thesis is the contention that whilst the prevailing focus on the resources 
that cities have to deal with the threats of terrorism and the imbrications of security with 
cities are important contributions to the study of urban security, debates concerning the 
transformations of urban space and urban life have been somewhat circumscribed. The lack 
of attention to how security measures are encountered once they become part of the 
everyday life of cities means that too much can come to be assumed about both their 
efficacy and about the resultant nature of urban life. Where ʻlifeʼ does feature, in academic 
and non-academic accounts, it is all too often assumed that what ʻlifeʼ is or might be is 
already known. Where it has been considered, it is predominantly figured as ʻlife as 
securedʼ, where cities and everyday urban life are conceived exclusively as a ʻreferent 
objectʼ of security. This thesis extends these investigations through a more concerned focus 
on the complex and variegated impacts of security on the spaces of urban life and through a 
discussion of the relations between security and lived urban life itself. In doing so, this 
thesis argues that where urban spaces and everyday urban life become a ʻreferent objectʼ 
of security, not only is it important to question how specific counter-terror security 
apparatuses and security practices are adopted, it is also necessary to consider the impacts 
of security on the everyday city and everyday life more thoroughly. The research will 
therefore focus on how security measures know and imagine the everyday city, and 
examine how various counter-terror security measures become part of the everyday city in 
different ways. In addressing these concerns, this thesis contributes to and develops 
understandings of the urban geographies of security as it questions more directly how 
security becomes part of urban spaces, how the measures of security are encountered and 
how security is experienced and ʻlivedʼ through the everyday use of cities. 
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1.2. The everyday life of security 
 
There are examples of work that has begun to engage with the relations between 
security and lived everyday experience, however, this thesis contends that an explicit 
connection has not thus far been made. Where work has signalled the importance of 
examining the relations between everyday life and the securitisation of cities, there has then 
been a tendency to be overly reliant on a set of implicit assumptions about how the 
materialities of security have been, or might be, encountered and experienced as part of  
everyday life (see Boddy, 2008; Coaffee, 2009a; Davis, 2001; Farish, 2004; Grosskopf, 
2006; Katz, 2007; Marcuse, 2008; Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Rice, 2010 Sorkin, 2008a). 
For many writing on the relations between security and everyday life, the construction of 
fear and attendant insecurities have become intertwined with and materialised in security 
interventions that are said to act as “an always already presence of terrorism in our midst” 
(Katz, 2007:350). Security interventions and counter-terrorist security apparatuses are then 
paradoxically cited as ʻremindersʼ and ʻreinforcersʼ of terror and terrorism (see Katz, 2007). 
It has become an awkward yet established convention that different forms of security and 
the ubiquity of counter-terrorist security practices within urban spaces articulate, contribute 
to and even sustain the widespread insecurity and ʻculture of fearʼ that is said to have 
become symptomatic within cities, as well as reproducing the conditions that have given 
rise to the common claim that western societies live in an ʻage of anxietyʼ plague (see 
Graham 2006; Robin 2002; Bauman 2006). Swanstromʼs claim that the main threat to cities 
“comes not from terrorism but from the policy responses to terrorism” (2002:135), has 
proved enduring and widespread in both academic and non-academic debates. 
In this thesis I seek to develop existing debates concerning the everyday life of 
security, and in particular I will examine the ways that security is encountered and enacted 
through daily practices in order to provide a more nuanced account of the everyday 
landscapes and everyday experiences of the form of counter-terror security apparatus 
which serves as the case study for this thesis. I maintain that within works that have begun 
to engage with the relations between everyday life and security, ʻeveryday lifeʼ and the 
ʻeverydayʼ have remained under theorised. Too often the conclusions that have been drawn 
from these debates are reliant on a set of implicit assumptions of how security is enacted as 
it becomes part of lived everyday urban life, even when it is claimed that it is a central. 
Through a focus on examining practices of everyday encounters with security in urban 
settings, this thesis provides an account which is more attentive to how security addresses 
the everyday life of the city and how it becomes present in lived everyday urban life. This 
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then enables this study to consider both the presence of the materialities of security within 
urban spaces and in the lived everyday life of cities. It therefore addresses the complex 
relations between processes of security and the enactment of lived everyday urban life. 
Additionally, through its focus on the ways in which security becomes part of a lived, 
everyday urbanism, this thesis discusses the implications for UK cities of the UK 
Governmentʼs National Security Strategy (NSS) (Cabinet Office, 2008a, 2009a; HM 
Government, 2010a) and CONTEST, the UK Governmentʼs counter-terrorist strategy (HM 
Government, 2006, 2009a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b). In the UK, and through the broadening of 
the NSS and the ongoing development of CONTEST, urban spaces and urban life have 
become a ʻreferent objectʼ of security, where the spaces of cities are figured by the UK 
Government as ʻvulnerableʼ, ʻpreferredʼ, ʻlikelyʼ and ʻhigh profileʼ targets for terrorist attacks 
(HM Government, 2009a:16-17). The spaces of civil life, the spaces where people ʻliveʼ and 
ʻworkʼ, are spaces that the UK Governmentʼs CONTEST strategy states cannot be subject 
to more traditional forms of counter-terror security without the risks of radically changing 
public experience or undermining public use of public spaces, for these are everyday 
spaces where the UK Government has stated that security must “allow people to live 
normally, free from fear” (HM Government, 2009b:5). What is required in this context is a 
specific form of counter-terrorist security apparatus, primed to be part of and embedded in 
urban space and urban life in different ways. The aims of this form of security are 
biopolitical, to enable a set of ʻfreedomsʼ and to foster ʻgoodʼ circulations that sustain a 
certain form of valued life in the context of cities in the UK, ultimately to let life live (Foucault, 
2007). In the UK, this biopolitical security apparatus is increasingly centred around 
rationalities of ʻappropriatenessʼ and ʻproportionalityʼ that involve the reconciliation of 
security with urban life and require approaches tailored to different urban contexts. I am 
interested in how a biopolitics of security can be utilised to extend discussions of the 
processes aimed at securing urban spaces and the efforts to protect of a certain form of 
ʻvalued lifeʼ. With reference to the expressions of life that are enacted through a biopolitics 
of security, I will argue that in urban contexts different expressions of life coalesce as the 
city becomes the ʻreferent objectʼ of security. There are then implications for how security 
understands, secures and indeed enables a certain form of ʻvalued lifeʼ through the 
protection and facilitating of particular processes and circulations that come to define liberal-
democratic life. 
In the context of a discussion of the everyday life of security, this thesis will 
demonstrate how contemporary urban counter-terrorist security apparatuses are designed 
to oscillate between invisibility and response to events. It will be argued that invisibility is 
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now central to how new ways of securing public space function. More specifically, the thesis 
will trace how forms of ʻinvisible securityʼ (see Briggs, 2005), that I will argue now dominate 
attempts to secure everyday urban life, become part of the life of everyday life. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that there has been work that has begun to engage with this shift, we still 
know little about how forms of ʻinvisible securityʼ are practiced nor how these interventions, 
which are embedded into the ordinary spaces and happenings of cities, are then 
encountered and lived in the context of particular apparatuses of security (although see 
Boddy 2008; Briggs 2005; Coaffee et al. 2009; Nemeth 2010). In addition to the steps that 
are taken to embed security into urban environments, in and through everyday life, security 
becomes a normalised and often background presence. This requires that we draw 
attention to the mechanisms through which forms of security are encountered as a 
background presence and then appreciate how these various mechanisms can take on a 
heightened presence to disrupt the life of everyday life and how security as present within 
everyday life is experienced. This thesis maintains that the geography of security is a 
geography of absences and presences. 
The issue of difference and identity in everyday life and for the everyday life of 
security is a significant and recurring theme in both existent academic research on the 
subjects and with respects to how security is practiced (see Bari, 2011; Bentham, 2011; 
Greer, 2010; Hickman et al. 2010, 2011; Hillyard, 1993; HM Government, 2011c; Liberty, 
2004, 2011; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Travis, 2009). There are longstanding debates 
regarding the ways in which forms of security differentiate, and critiques of how difference is 
enacted in and through different forms of violence that are inherent in various security 
apparatuses. It is commonly argued that security apparatuses are discriminate, critiques 
have focussed on how processes of differentiation are enacted and how in different security 
apparatuses differentiation is, or has been, based on forms of racial, class, gender, sex, 
codings and means of classification. There have been further and more specific issues 
raised in relation to difference and identity and counter-terrorism security, in the context of 
the UK and elsewhere. These include widespread concerns regarding the ways that 
counter-terrorist security apparatus differentiate, in particular via forms of ʻprofilingʼ that 
enact specific codings to establish threat and a non-threat. Whilst acknowledging the 
importance of these issues and associated debates, the focus of this thesis lies elsewhere, 
and as such these themes are not addressed directly here. As a result it is acknowledged 
that the thesis is largely, and deliberately, blind to the difference that social differences 
makes to everyday encounters with urban security practices. Accordingly, as far as is 
possible bodies are positioned in this thesis without difference or as neutral. 
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This thesis offers a more thorough investigation of how the materialities of security are 
encountered and how security is experienced as part of the everyday life of urban space. In 
so doing I seek to provide a more nuanced set of geographies that witness and describe the 
encounters and enactments of security interventions in everyday urban settings. This is an 
argument which is made in the context of a case study focusing on a specific security 
apparatus, the CONTEST strategy, and how a range of counter-terror security measures 
become part of everyday urban spaces. 
 
1.3. Research location 
 
In this thesis I discuss the emergence and the everyday life of a specific form of 
security apparatus, that of contemporary counter-terrorist security in cities in the UK. More 
specifically, this study is interested in the processes of securing urban public spaces and 
the UK Governmentʼs category of so-called ʻcrowded placesʼ (HM Government, 2009a). I 
provide a case study of this form of counter-terror security, its rationalities and the presence 
of a range of distinct security mechanisms within urban spaces that are intended to ʻgovern 
terrorʼ (see Dillon, 2007). I then question how these different security interventions are 
encountered and become part of ʻlivedʼ everyday life. The discussion of the everyday urban 
geographies of this form security is traced through a study of the rationalities of current 
counter-terror security policy in the UK, via the NSS (Cabinet Office, 2008a, 2009a; HM 
Government, 2010a) and CONTEST (HM Government, 2006, 2009a, 2010b, 2011a, 
2011b), and the enactment of counter-terror security through interventions located in 
London and within two research sites, the Victoria Line of the London Underground (see 
Figure 4.1), and the Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank (see Figure 4.2). 
The focus of this study on London, and its attention to public spaces within the city, 
responds directly to the broadening of the UK Governmentʼs NSS (Cabinet Office, 2008a, 
2009a) and the continued iterations made to CONTEST (HM Government, 2006, 2009a, 
2010b, 2011a), and in particular to the inclusion of the so called ʻsoft targetsʼ of cities and 
civil life and the category of so-called ʻcrowded placesʼ (HM Government, 2009a). Civil 
spaces have emerged as a category of ʻinsecureʼ space, increasingly considered by the UK 
Government to be ʻvulnerableʼ, ʻpreferredʼ, ʻlikelyʼ and ʻhigh profileʼ targets for terrorist 
attacks, these ʻcrowded placesʼ include “places where people live and work” (HM 
Government, 2009a:16-17, 56, my emphasis). In order to attend to and then discuss the 
emerging urban geographies of threat and of this form of counter-terror security, London 
provides an ideal case. Whilst this form of security involves a rationality of site specificity, it 
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remains widely accepted that the increased trends towards counter-terror security have 
emerged most notably in cities that are regarded as economically and/or strategically 
important locations, such as London. In addition, the examples that the UK Government has 
provided in its recently published guidance papers are predominantly drawn from the 
experiences of counter-terror security as it is enacted in spaces and contexts within London 
(HM Government, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e). 
The two research sites, the Victoria Line of the London Underground, and the 
Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank, were then selected as a combined case 
through which to explore the material implications of these recent shifts in UK counter-terror 
policy. These two sites allow the thesis to consider a form of counter-terror security 
apparatus which responds to an emerging category of ʻinsecureʼ public space in UK policy, 
namely ʻcrowded placesʼ (HM Government, 2009a). It is stated by the UK Government that 
ʻcrowded placesʼ remain the preferred target for international terrorists and the “most likely 
target for a crowded places attack is one which is easily accessible, regularly available and 
offers the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone” (Cabinet Office, 2008b:25). 
The two sites offer examples where these rationalities and this emerging counter-terrorist 
security apparatus are enacted via a range of security interventions. The Victoria Line and 
the South Bank permit this thesis to examine the ways in which public spaces have been 
refigured as ʻinsecureʼ, as ʻthreatenedʼ and as at ʻhigh riskʼ from and ʻvulnerableʼ to terrorist 
attack. It is then the task of this thesis to witness and describe how the different security 
interventions within the two research sites become present in everyday life and are 
experienced. In addition, the two sites raise interesting and important questions regarding 
the relationship between freedom and circulation, and freedom and security within public 
spaces. As such, the case study draws on both sites as it contributes to debates concerning 
how security can be reconciled with the requirements of openly accessible public sites of 
circulation. This raises questions both in the study of contemporary counter-terror security 
and for practical matters concerning security interventions in urban environments. 
The two sites do not form a comparative study. Instead, the Victoria Line and the 
South Bank develop a case study allowing this thesis to discuss a specific and emerging 
contemporary counter-terrorist security apparatus. The case then serves as a means of 
providing a more nuanced and more context specific account of the implications of this form 
of security apparatus for and within urban contexts. With reference to these two research 
sites I examine how the interventions of this specific counter-terrorist apparatus are 
experienced as they become part of the everyday life of cities. 
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1.4. Research aims, objectives and questions 
 
In summary, and in light of this context, this thesis develops an approach that 
explores how new forms of counter-terrorist security are practiced in urban spaces and 
provides a more detailed investigation of how the materialities that make up processes 
these apparatuses of security are encountered and enacted as they become part of ʻlivedʼ 
everyday urban life. This allows the thesis to examine how a particular apparatus of security 
is imbricated into the spaces and happenings of urban life so that it is lived, in the double 
sense of the life of security and life as secured. In so doing this thesis aims at 
supplementing recent conceptualisations of security as exclusively, or primarily, functioning 
as ʻprinciplesʼ of state formation (see Agamben, 2002). This focus is for two reasons. First, 
existing research on securitisation tends to concentrate on the processes of securing rather 
than how security measures are encountered and experienced through the everyday use of 
urban spaces. The result is often, if not exclusively, the reproduction of a vision of cities as 
dominated and manipulated by a set of ʻtop downʼ forces that contrasts with the emergence 
of what Amin and Thrift (2002) describe as an ʻeveryday urbanismʼ. Second, despite the 
relative lack of attention to everyday use, it has been argued that central to understanding 
security measures has been a set of implicit assumptions about how they have, or might, be 
encountered within everyday life. However, an explicit connection has not thus far been 
made. To this end, the thesis asks three questions: 
 
1. How is the everyday city imagined, governed and secured as it becomes the ʻreferent 
objectʼ of security in terrorist orientated processes of securing the spaces of urban life? 
 
2. How are the visible, if mundane, materialities of securing, CCTV cameras, traffic bollards 
and blockages, police officers for example, habitually (or otherwise) encountered and 
enacted in the everyday use of urban spaces? 
 
3. How, in the context of these complex relations between the securitisation of urban 
spaces and the life of everyday life, to theorise the relations between everyday life and 
security? 
 
In sum, this thesis focuses, first, on the processes through which the everyday city is 
secured and, second, it describes how those processes of securing are encountered and 
enacted as they become part of everyday urban life. 
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1.5. Thesis outline 
 
Chapter 2 moves to establish this thesis within the wider context of recent theoretical 
debates concerning biopolitics, security and urban security. Together with Chapter 3, 
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework for the thesis. In the first section of Chapter 
2 I focus on the biopolitics of security in relation to a particular problem, that of securing 
urban spaces. Here I consider works on biopolitics and the biopolitics of security inspired by 
Michel Foucault, to consider how this body of work might contribute to discussions of urban 
security and everyday life. The first part of this section thus discusses Foucaultʼs account of 
biopolitics. The second part then moves to a discussion of more recent developments and 
updates of this body of work, in particular the reappraisal of Foucaultʼs work and the 
development of a ʻbiopolitics of securityʼ by Michael Dillon. The final part of the section 
takes this work forward, offering a reassessment and rethinking of biopolitics in relation to 
security and contemporary urban space, and considering the potentials for using these 
approaches for analysing security, cities and the everyday life of security. This leads to the 
second section of the chapter, which turns its focus more directly to recent work that has 
concentrated on issues and practices of the securing of contemporary urban spaces, and in 
particular counter-terrorist security responses. In reviewing these contributions I consider 
the predominant focus on the forms, techniques and functions of security in the city, the 
technical and instrumental dimensions of security practice, the presence and efficacy of 
techniques, and their relation to changes in contemporary governance. Here I suggest that 
whilst such work is of considerable utility, it has only begun to hint at the complex relations 
between security and everyday life. As such, the chapter concludes by asserting that 
everyday life is often under theorised, also contending that where lived experience does 
feature, the relations between security and the everyday life of cities is overly reliant on a 
set of implicit assumptions. 
Having drawn out the problem of the lack of explicit attention to ʻeveryday lifeʼ, in 
Chapter 3 I then develop a conceptual framework that can address security and its relations 
to everyday life and lived experience. Developing this theoretical framework allows this 
thesis to challenge the somewhat narrow conceptions that have emerged in existing 
discussions regarding security and its relations to lived everyday urban life. Firstly this 
chapter introduces and discusses the work of Georges Perec whose writings and reflections 
on the everyday form the conceptual foundation for this thesisʼ engagement with the 
everyday life of security. Perec is of considerable utility in this regard as his writings 
encourage us to attempt to approach, to register and to describe the commonly unnoticed 
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and unthought-of of the everyday, the ʻinfra-ordinaryʼ, as well as the more excessive 
happenings of daily life. The second section of this chapter further develops a sense of the 
lived everyday life of security through an examination of three conceptual devices: 
encounter; affect | emotion | feeling; and attention | distraction. Questioning whether the 
terms ʻthe everydayʼ and ʻeveryday lifeʼ, and similar, are too broad as the analytic with which 
to understand the everyday life of urban security, this section disentangles and 
differentiates within these and similar terms. Through the three parts of this section I 
suggest three analytic devices with which to further develop the framing of this study and 
engage with the distinct problem of security as part of everyday life and lived experience. 
Taken together, the two theoretical chapters are integrated with one another to explore the 
theoretical issues and offer a review of the literatures that develop and provide the 
conceptual framing of this thesis. 
The conceptual approach outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 necessitated a 
particular set of methods. Chapter 4 presents and poses a discussion of the methodology 
developed and practiced in this study. This methodology is designed to permit an 
engagement with the dispositifs of security and with everyday practices, to consider both 
the presence of an emerging security apparatus in the city and how security is experienced 
day-to-day. As such in this chapter I outline and explain the methodological strategy used to 
research counter-terrorist security in the context of urban public spaces within the UK, the 
incidence and imbrications of security within the two research sites, and the relations 
between security and lived experiences. The first section of this chapter outlines the 
rationale for the methods practiced, describing some of the practical and conceptual issues, 
as well as concerns and problems that researching the everyday, and in particular the 
everyday life of urban security, pose. The second section then outlines the methodological 
approach itself. I begin by outlining the two research locations, explaining the case study 
approach and the rationale for the choice of the two research sites. Following this 
discussion I outline each of the methods used. For the sake of clarity this is divided into two 
parts: dispositifs of security; and the everyday life of security. This is a pragmatic distinction, 
and in light of the theoretical imperatives, each of the methods work together following 
Lawʼs (2004) example of a method assemblage. This method assemblage serves to allow 
this study to address and to present everyday practices and encounters, counter-terrorism 
policy and the work of security professionals. The third and final section of this chapter 
offers a brief discussion of the processes of analysis, description and presentation in the 
chapters to come. 
15 
Chapter 5 situates the specific form of counter-terror security apparatus which 
establishes the case study of this thesis in the context of public spaces within cities in the 
UK. The chapter also provides a discussion of how, through this emerging apparatus of 
security, the everyday city and urban life become a ʻreferent objectʼ of security (see Dillon, 
2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). The chapter begins by examining CONTEST (HM 
Government, 2006; 2009a; 2011a), the UK Governmentʼs counter-terrorist security strategy, 
before focusing on cities as a particular problem for contemporary security, with reference to 
London as a named example. The second section provides a discussion of how counter-
terrorist security practices have been translated into action within the spaces of urban life. 
This section examines how urban spaces are imagined and the issues of how rationalities 
of ʻappropriatenessʼ and ʻproportionatelyʼ are increasingly central to counter-terrorism as it is 
incorporated into cities and practiced day-to-day. The final section of this chapter is divided 
into two parts, focusing on the two research sites, to consider how in relation to the 
particular problematics identified in the first two sections of this chapter, security becomes 
present within specific urban spaces. Importantly this does not form a comparative study, 
the chapter concludes that the two sites are figured and imagined as a referent object of 
security in remarkably similar ways. The two sites provide a case study of a specific form of 
security in order to discuss how these new ways of securing public space are enacted 
where the aim is to ensure a set of ʻfreedomsʼ and to foster ʻgoodʼ circulations that enable a 
ʻvalued lifeʼ to be enabled and lived. The following two chapters draw from the interviews, 
diaries and observant participation to describe how the materialities of a security apparatus 
that is primed to be part of everyday life are encountered and enacted in specific ways. 
In Chapter 6 I pay attention to the conditions of encounter – where bodies enact 
security as it becomes part of everyday life. I suggest that one of the generic ways in which 
security is present within the everyday life of cities is as part of the infra-ordinary 
background of urban life. As such, the chapter explores the very ordinariness of security 
and the ordinary ways in which it is encountered and enacted. We see here how security 
moves from being a set of mechanisms to something lived, and how everyday life shifts 
from being an object of security to that within which security lives. The chapter begins by 
developing the idea of security as a part of the infra-ordinary background of the city and the 
ordinary ways security is encountered and enacted through everyday practices. Following 
and extending this analysis, the second section considers some of the implications of this 
infra-ordinariness in the context of a structure of expectation that urban spaces will always 
be somehow secured. Third, I explore the ambiguous role of security within the everyday life 
of cities. In the final section of this chapter I then move to discuss the ways in which security 
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as a background presence is experienced as a background feeling, as an affective 
atmosphere. In sum, this chapter argues that with respects to the form of the security 
apparatus described in the previous chapter, invisibility is increasingly central to these new 
ways of securing public space. Whilst it is true that mechanisms of security are ever more 
ubiquitous, security is not as omnipresent as has previous been claimed. Having explored 
the conditions of encounter, the chapter maintains that through the everyday use of urban 
space, security becomes and is so often enacted as background, as a sunken part of that 
which is truly daily in our daily lives. 
To extend the analysis of Chapter 6, in Chapter 7 I focus on the second generic way 
in which security is present within cities, that is, those moments where security emerges as 
a more intensified presence and is enacted as a more heightened presence within everyday 
life. Here my analysis moves to the particular mechanisms through which forms of security 
within the two research sites are encountered and take on an intensified presence to disrupt 
the life of everyday life in different ways. My aim here is to develop the analysis of the 
previous chapter in order to examine how security changes form and becomes present, 
then considering how security interventions are encountered and enacted as more intensely 
present within the everyday life of urban space. In order to explore security as it changes 
form and how the interventions of security become more intensely present, the chapter is 
structured around two substantive sections: the birth to presence; and the presence of 
presence. The first section investigates the birth to presence of security; it will discuss the 
rips to the fabric of the infra-ordinary as security changes form and becomes present. The 
second section describes how security can become an intensified presence and how these 
changes in its form are experienced and the affects of security as present. By focusing 
more closely on the ways in which security is encountered as it emerges as a heightened 
presence, and then how these security materialities are enacted, this chapter argues for a 
more nuanced account of the life of security. In so doing this chapter argues for an account 
of contemporary urban security that disrupts and moves beyond current claims that the 
ubiquity of the security induces widespread insecurity. It also poses a challenge to the 
assumption that security is always somehow already present within the life of everyday life 
Taken together with the previous two empirical chapters, I maintain that the biopolitics of 
security in cities is not only a matter of how the everyday becomes the ʻreferent-objectʼ of 
security, it is about how the materialities of security can and do themselves become part of 
everyday life. 
In the final chapter I provide an evaluation and an overview of the research as a 
whole. This concluding chapter offers a summary of the main theoretical and empirical 
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contributions made in this thesis and the implications of this study for work in geography 
and in particular for the urban geographies of security. Here I discuss the central themes of 
this research project through a summary of the major features of the specific security 
apparatus that the thesis discusses. The first section of the chapter summarises and 
addresses the key themes of this research. It presents the principal characteristics of this 
form of counter-terrorist security and how it becomes part of the everyday. Following this, in 
the second section I discuss three implications of this study, firstly focusing on 
contemporary counter-terrorism, secondly on the life of security and lastly for work on 
everyday life. In the final section of this concluding chapter I provide a set of closing 
reflections that present and discuss a set of possibilities that this research offers for further 
work. 
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2. Theorising Urban Security 
 
Introduction 
 
Conceptually, this thesis offers an alternative means of thinking about and 
researching urban security. In particular it provides a contribution to how we might think the 
everyday life of security as it lived and folded into everyday experience. This chapter, along 
with Chapter 3, offers a review of academic literatures and provide a conceptual overview 
for the thesis in order to set up the theoretical debates that inform this work. Then, these 
two theoretical chapters address the problem of the lack of explicit attention paid to 
ʻeveryday lifeʼ within existing works on security and the securitisation of cities, and the 
concomitant absence of theoretical and empirical accounts of the complex relations that 
emerge between urban life and processes of securitisation. 
In the first section of this chapter I engage with works on biopower and biopolitics 
inspired by Michel Foucault (1978, 2003, 2007, 2008). In so doing I consider how this body 
of work might contribute to discussions of urban security and everyday life. The first part of 
this section focuses on Foucaultʼs account of biopower and biopolitics, considering his 
development of these concepts. The second part then presents and examines more recent 
ways in which biopower and biopolitics have been used by Michael Dillon (2004a, 2004b, 
2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009), in particular his 
updates and development of Foucaultʼs works into the 21st century and through the 
ʻbiopolitics of securityʼ. The final part of this section returns to Foucaultʼs (2007) discussion 
of the space of the town to explore Foucaultʼs dispositif (apparatus) of security as a 
conceptual and methodological tool for analysing security, cities and lived experience. Here, 
following Foucault and arguing for the utility of biopower and biopolitics, I am interested in 
the problematic of contemporary forms of security framed as problems of circulation and the 
aleatory, which Dillon (2005; see also Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008) in his development 
of Foucaultʼs work on biopolitics has argued are characteristic of a biopolitics of the 21st 
century. In particular I am interested in how biopower, biopolitics and the biopolitics of 
security can be utilised in the contemporary analysis of the securing of urban spaces. In 
addition, I discuss how these conceptual tools can engage with the securing of a form of 
ʻvalued lifeʼ framed and enacted in terms of the coalescing of ʻbiologicalʼ life and urban ʻlifeʼ 
as it is deferred and constituted by other elements. The task of security becomes that of the 
regulation and protection of these elements, enabling certain processes and circulations, 
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whilst regulating and securing against more ʻdangerousʼ elements, in order to secure ʻlifeʼ. If, 
as Foucault (2007) contends, biopolitics involves the administration of bodies and the 
calculated management and regulation of life, here and leading to the following section of 
this chapter, I question how security understands and secures a ʻvalued lifeʼ whilst crucially 
ʻletting life liveʼ. In so doing, I address issues of security and freedom as attempts are made 
to bring them forms of reconciliation. As with Dillonʼs Foucault-inspired contribution, I 
acknowledge that Foucaultʼs original work on the spaces of the town requires updating in 
order to reflect and offer a useful analytics of the security landscape of the contemporary 
city and develop the conception of a ʻlifeʼ as the ʻreferent objectʼ of security. 
Following this, the second section of this chapter poses a discussion of recent work 
that has concentrated on issues and practices of the securing of contemporary urban 
spaces, and in particular with work that has engaged with issues concerning forms of 
counter-terrorism security. In reviewing literature that are concerned with matters of security 
and the securitisation of urban spaces, I examine the prevailing focus on the forms and 
functions of security in the city, arguing that this is largely a body of work which comments 
on and debates the presence and efficacy of security techniques, mapping the geographies 
of security, as well as examining how these result from and reflect changes in contemporary 
governance. As such, and reflecting the literature itself, this section considers urban 
landscapes of security and defence, with a particular focus on discussions of urban security 
post September 11th 2001. Through this section, and as will become clearer in the Chapter 
3, I argue that work that has focused on the spaces of security and on the securitisation of 
everyday life has only begun to hint at the complex relations between security and everyday 
life. Notwithstanding the importance of existing work, due to the overwhelming focus on the 
presence and efficacy of security techniques, the imbrications of security and the city, the 
mapping of the geographies of security, and debates over how to achieve more secure 
cities, everyday life has been under theorised, all too often assumed, and frequently 
overlooked altogether. The conceptual framework developed within this chapter and 
Chapter 3, and the empirical study it informs within this thesis, addresses this lacuna. 
 
2.1. Biopolitics and security 
 
2.1.1. Biopolitics 
 
For Michel Foucault one of the most significant phenomena of the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the emergence and development of ʻbiopoliticsʼ 
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and ʻbiopowerʼ. Dillon succinctly frames the task undertaken by Foucault, writing that 
biopolitics may, in general, be said to be “the interrogation of what happens to politics and 
power when the biological properties of the human species become the referent object of 
politics and power” (2010:62). Foucault (1978, 2003, 2007, 2008) traces the emergence of a 
new form of politics which he suggests signifies the incorporation of life, and the dimensions 
and processes that are said to define life, into modern forms of politics. This is a politics 
which relates to “what it means to be a living species in a living world: biology is drawn into 
the domain of power and knowledge” (Marks, 2006:333). The most noted and oft used 
translations of Foucaultʼs accounting of biopower and biopolitics appear in the final lecture 
of Society Must be Defended, and in the final chapter of The Will to Knowledge entitled 
ʻRight of Death and Power over Lifeʼ. A more thorough and extensive account is developed 
through the lecture courses devoted to this theme delivered by Foucault at the Collège de 
France recently translated and published as Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of 
Biopolitics. Through this series of lectures and writings biopower and biopolitics are 
introduced, developed and changed by Foucault2. 
Foucault endeavours to trace the emergence of biopolitics and biopower, arguing that 
starting in the seventeenth century, power is situated and exercised at the level of life, 
coming to be exercised over the individual body and the collective body of the population of 
which they are part. Foucault examined the emergence of questions of population and the 
problem of ʻspecies lifeʼ and how these came to be “problematised in the field of political 
thought”, and through “the analysis of political power” (Foucault, 2003:241), leading to an 
“explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and 
the control of populations” (Foucault, 1978:140). As Foucault observes within the final 
chapter of The Will to Knowledge, the emergence of biopolitics represents a dramatic shift 
in the “configurations in which forms of power take shape and function” (Collier, 2009:80) 
and the patterns of correlation between different forms of power, between the mechanisms 
of sovereignty and those of the disciplinary society, to techniques of government which 
situate and exercise power over life, “a power whose highest function was perhaps no 
longer to kill, but to invest life” (Foucault, 1978:139)3. According to Foucault, from the 
seventeenth century, power over life evolved and was situated and exercised through forms 
                                                
2 It is worth remembering, as Rabinow and Rose note, that “Foucault promised to flesh out his sweeping generalizations” 
however, “[t]hat promise was not fulfilled” (2006:196). 
3 As Foucault argues: “There is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to 
disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do not replace 
disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced juridico-legal mechanisms”. Rather, “you have a series of complex 
edifices in which … what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between 
juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security” (2007:8). 
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of discipline, regulatory intervention and control, seeking to “invest life through and through” 
(1978:139). Describing how historically “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced 
by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1978:138, original 
emphasis), Foucault, in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, explains that this 
modern power over life developed in two different yet interlinked forms: 
 
In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in 
two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical however; they constituted rather 
two poles of development, linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. 
One of these poles—the first to be formed, it seems—centered on the body as a 
machine: its disciplining, the optimisation of capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the 
parallel increase in its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of 
efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that 
characterised the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body. The second, 
formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the 
mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, 
births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the 
conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an 
entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population. 
The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two 
poles around which the organisation of power over life was deployed (Foucault, 
1978:139, original emphasis) 
 
Foucault thus describes a bipolar diagram of power, through which he illustrates how 
biopower has taken control of the body, population and life itself. Foucault states that this is 
“the power to ʻmakeʼ live and ʻletʼ die” (2003:241), though he explains that the logic of 
biopower is one of production: “It exerts a positive influence on life, endeavours to 
administer, optimize, and multiply it” (1978:137). As Ojakangas argues, in the case of 
biopower “it is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of 
distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Its task is to take charge of life that 
needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism” (2005:6). This represents a move 
towards the management of the well-being and life of the population, through mechanisms 
capable of ensuring its regulation and control. The emerging focus of biopolitical power is 
thus, for Foucault, centered on bodies and on populations. The regulation of the individual, 
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the modern subject, itself becomes connected with the strategic needs of the population and 
society: 
 
For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the 
additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics 
places his existence as a living being in question (Foucault, 1978:143) 
 
Foucault describes how the supervision and regulation of the population began to be 
effected through an entire series of interventions, techniques of management and regulatory 
controls through which existing and entirely novel methods and technologies of power are 
re-deployed and recombined in diverse assemblies of biopolitical government. As Lazzarato 
explains, from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards, “the dispositifs of power 
and knowledge begin to take into account the ʻprocesses of lifeʼ and the possibility of 
controlling and modifying them” (2002:99). The biopolitics of the population and the 
regulation and management of species life became the ultimate end of government, where 
“power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large 
scale phenomena of population” (Foucault, 1978:137). For Foucault, biopolitics, understood 
as specific strategies of power situated and exercised over the population, thus concerns 
the collective mass, but simultaneously necessitates the regulation of its depths and its 
details: 
 
The exercise of power is not a naked fact, an institutional right, nor is it a structure 
which holds out or is smashed: it is elaborated, transformed, organised, it endows 
itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the situation (Foucault, 
1982:224) 
 
Biopolitics is “power exercised over living beings – applied at the level of life itself; it 
was the taking charge of life” (Foucault, 1978:143), and it is this ʻtaking charge of lifeʼ which, 
for Foucault, gives power its access to the human body and its capacity to effect forms of 
regulatory management of the population. 
Power is now understood to be situated and exercised at the level of life, marking the 
advent of the society of government and “the genesis of a political knowledge that was to 
place at the centre of its concerns the notion of population and the mechanisms capable of 
ensuring its regulation” (Foucault, 1997a:67). The governmentalisation of the state, rather 
than witnessing the cessation of a society of sovereignty or discipline, consists of a triangle 
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that incorporates “sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which has 
population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism” 
(2007:107-108)4. Foucault demonstrates that an entirely new series of interventions and 
regulatory controls were established that addressed the emergence of the questions of 
population and the problematics posed by humans figured as ʻliving beingsʼ, this represents 
“a shift of accent and the appearance of new objectives, and hence of new problems and 
new techniques” (Foucault, 1997a:67). These, Foucault (2007:10-11) states, support the 
general economy of power in a society which is becoming the domain of security. 
Power, Foucault claims, now has the function of administering life, that is, managing 
the population and ensuring species survival. It is the emergence of security which for 
Foucault provides “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the 
human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power” 
(2007:1). Foucault (2007:29) contends that the mechanisms utilised to deal with such 
issues, constitute a dispositif of security rather than a juridico-disciplinary system. Foucault 
details his desire to trace the emergence of biopolitics and biopower, particularly through a 
concern for “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, 
power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of 
knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 
2007:108). This is a task which has been taken on in order to offer an account of biopolitics 
and theorisations of the relations between biopolitics and modern security and 
governmental practice. 
The original articulation of biopolitics forwarded by Foucault was presented over thirty 
years ago and his genealogical account provides examples of power situated and exercised 
over life over a period spanning in excess of two hundred years. Any consideration of what 
the analytic might offer today needs to take account of how it has been translated and 
appropriated in the intervening period. Whilst some have deviated significantly from 
Foucaultʼs account of biopower and biopolitics, other thinkers, such as Michael Dillon, have 
                                                
4 Collier (2009) provides a thorough and detailed discussion of the conceptual and methodological shift Foucault undertakes in 
his approach to biopolitics, in particular within the lectures of Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics. Collier 
suggests that the lectures of 1978-79 are “notable first of all for the fact that they scramble the periodizing structure of 
Foucaultʼs prior work. They break down Foucaultʼs sometimes epochal claims concerning a shift from a society of sovereignty 
to a society of discipline (in Discipline and Punish) or normalisation (in Society Must be Defended); and they cut off any 
suggestion that the rise of security should be read in similarly epochal terms” (2009:88). Collier argues that Foucaultʼs 1978-79 
lectures question was how “these figures of sovereignty, discipline and security are combined in ʻcomplex edificesʼ, ʻsystems of 
correlationʼ” (2009:95) or, as Collier proposes, topologies of power. Expanding on and explaining his choice, Collier writes: 
“Terms like ʻpatterns of correlationʼ, ʻconfigurationʼ or simply ʻtopologyʼ seem preferable to ʻsystemʼ because they emphasize a 
definite principle of relationality among heterogeneous elements without suggesting any global logic of the whole that they 
form” (2009:103). An approach that adopts a ʻtopologicalʼ analysis provides a more flexible approach to the different 
configurations, relations and transformations in and through which forms of power, their techniques and mechanisms take 
shape and function. 
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sought to take on and develop these originary works so as to make Foucaultʼs biopolitical 
project relevant to the 21st century, developing and extending Foucaultʼs theses. I restrict 
the following section to the significant engagement of Dillon whose Foucault-inspired works 
offer considered analyses of contemporary biopolitical power relations and biopolitical arts 
of government to provide a ʻbiopolitics of the 21st centuryʼ. 
 
2.1.2. The biopolitics of security in the 21st century 
 
 Michael Dillon (2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008, 2009) has sought to extend Foucaultʼs work on biopower and the 
biopolitical, developing a ʻbiopoliticisation of securityʼ which he states demonstrates the 
transformation and change of the subject in the 21st century. There are a number of clear 
parallels between Dillonʼs work and that of Foucault, however, and as I will detail below, 
Dillonʼs contribution is also marked by divergence, developments that Dillon contends 
“theorises beyond Foucault” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:265). Dillon seeks to trace 
biopower and biopolitics and its development in the 21st century, extending Foucaultʼs 
genealogical analysis of the heterogeneous domains of modern power relations. In 
concentrating on contemporary biopolitical practices he poses an analytics of the ways 
“apparatuses or technologies of modern power and governance work” (Dillon, 2010:62). 
 For Dillon, Foucaultʼs account addresses the biopolitics of security as a ʻpoliticsʼ of 
security. As a result, for Dillon the central question becomes: “What happens to politics and 
power when the biological properties of the human species become the referent object of 
politics and power” (2010:62). Dillonʼs Foucault-inspired engagement with the biopolitical is 
produced by the “profound transformation” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:269) undergone 
by the referent object of biopolitics since Foucault. It involves asking “what has happened to 
population as well as to ʻlifeʼ in the interim between Foucaultʼs initial interrogation of the 
biopolitical economy of biopower and the biopolitics of the 21st century” (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008:266). As Dillon (2007a) rightly contends, different discourses of danger 
revolve around different referent objects of security, these referent objects give rise to 
different kinds of governmental technologies and political rationalities. According to Dillon, 
security “is not a fact of nature but a fact of civilization. It is not a noun that names 
something, it is a principle of formation that does things” (1996:16). Following this, it 
becomes necessary to question security as a process, to secure “is not a state but a 
process, a doing” which “both invents and changes whatever is so secured” (1996:122): “In 
short, for something to be secured it must be acted upon and changed, forced to undergo 
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some transformation through the very act of securing itself” (1996:122). For biopolitics, 
different problematisations of security depend on how ʻlifeʼ and how ʻspecies lifeʼ are known 
and classified, as well as what power/knowledge techniques and political rationalities are 
employed (Dillon, 2004a:78). 
 Dillon states that the contemporary politics of international relations should 
necessarily be viewed as a biopolitics of liberal governance that requires extensive 
apparatuses of security (see Dillon 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; 
Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2001). Dillonʼs is an exploration of the 
biopolitical ways in which liberal regimes of power have come to operate, a vision of liberal 
biopolitics dedicated to power over life: “a biopolitical project in pursuit of the propagation of 
population welfare, rather than the more traditional strategic goals associated with 
sovereignty, the control of territory and the sequestration of resources” (2004a:76, original 
emphasis). For Dillon, the importance of biopolitical as well as geopolitical concerns has 
meant that both, and the changing interplays between bio- and geo- politics “now drives 
western security politics” (2007a:9). As such, according to Dillon, both must now be 
addressed when discussing problematics of contemporary security. 
In order to undertake his analysis, Dillon relies on and utilises Foucaultʼs works on 
biopower and biopolitics, yet his understanding and articulation of biopolitics, the regulation 
of population, the ways in which power is exercised and situated at the level of species life, 
as well as his appreciation of dispositifs of security often diverge from Foucaultʼs work. 
Dillon is of course concerned with questions of global governmentality and the biopolitics of 
states and thus apprehends biopolitics and questions of populations and species life at an 
entirely different level of analysis to that addressed by Foucault. In addition, and 
importantly, Dillon is seeking to write a ʻbiopolitics of the 21st centuryʼ, an extension and 
update of Foucaultʼs investigations of the emergence and rise of biopolitics, that can clarify 
and further develop Foucaultʼs original analytic and offer a contemporary analysis of the 
operations of biopower, biopolitics and security, tracing its development into the 21st 
century. Dillon thus draws directly on Foucaultʼs works in order to question the mechanisms 
and technologies that are presently deployed by those power relations that take life as their 
referent object. 
Dillon writes of the need to broaden the scope of the concerns of biopolitics, following 
his belief that “biopower is developing a deep concern with the science of systematic 
behaviour not simply of biological bodies, but also of hybrid and cyborg-like assemblages, 
or complex adaptive systems” (2004a:82). Within his writings on the subject, Dillon 
consistently demonstrates a belief that advances in the bio-medical sciences, the life 
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understood within molecular biology, as well as developments in the technological sciences 
that have produced forms of digitalised intelligence, mean that biopolitics cannot avoid 
incorporating different versions of ʻlifeʼ. ʻLifeʼ is to be understood as molecular, digital, and 
also include ʻlife-likeʼ elements, which fold into the concerns of contemporary dispositifs of 
security and biopolitics (Dillon, 2005a:39; see also Dillon and Reid, 2001:49-51; Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009). In so doing, Dillon is in the process of instigating a new 
description of species life, one which is different to that understood by Foucault. 
Dillon is correct in his assertion that “whatever life is now, it is no longer the original 
biologised life of early biopolitics” (2005a:39). However, in many ways Dillon overstates the 
role of molecularisation, information, digitalisation and advances in the biomedical sciences 
in his account of contemporary biopower, biopolitics and the securing of species life. 
Notwithstanding Dillonʼs claim that this work should be read as a revision of Foucaultʼs 
original theses, extended “to the analysis of the political rationalities and technologies of 
security which are now common among regimes of biopower which increasingly 
characterise the 21st century” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:269), it risks overwhelming 
and so losing sight of other characterisations and expressions of what ʻlifeʼ is or might be. 
There is a danger of losing sight of how, in different contexts, different expressions of life 
are simultaneously the referent object of the biopolitics of security in the 21st century. The 
turn to the digital, information and the molecular as ʻlifeʼ is too quick in its dismissal of 
Foucaultʼs original focus, and I would argue that this is of limited utility for discussions of the 
ʻlifeʼ which is the referent object of security operating within cites and found in the examples 
in the section to follow and in this thesis more broadly. In his original analysis, the objects of 
this biopolitics of population identified by Foucault, are cited as the biological phenomena of 
ʻspecies lifeʼ (the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity, and so on), Foucault also indicates 
the importance of “whole series of related economic and political problems” that were, 
Foucault says, biopoliticsʼ “first objects of knowledge and the targets it seeks to control” 
(Foucault, 2003:243). As Dillon himself notes, “biopolitically, species life may be determined 
in all sorts of ways, furnishing principles of formation for different kinds of power relations” 
(2004a:82), thus changing the character of ʻlifeʼ as the referent object of the biopolitics of 
security. 
Attempts to demonstrate how species life may be determined in a variety of ways will 
inevitably lead to changes in the concerns and aims of biopolitics. If ʻlifeʼ is taken to be 
digital, the bio-molecular or even constituted via ʻlife-likeʼ elements, as is presented by 
Dillon, biopolitics will necessarily begin to involve an entirely new and different series of 
problematics. Not all milieus require that life be understood at the level that molecular 
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biology now permits, nor do ʻlife-likeʼ elements necessarily have to be incorporated into our 
understandings of ʻlifeʼ as the object of contemporary security apparatuses. In the context of 
this thesis, and as Chapter 5 will show, the protection and preservation of different versions 
of life coalesce and are enacted within contemporary counter-terrorist security strategies. In 
the context of UK cities, and written into the NSS and CONTEST, these are broadly figured 
in terms of human species being; a way of life; and through the processes, circulations and 
interdependencies that make up a valued life and allow it to be sustained. These different 
characterisations of ʻlifeʼ are then inseparable as they coalesce and are expressed as a 
form of ʻvalued lifeʼ that is taken as the ʻreferent objectʼ of security and becomes the fulcrum 
through which security is expected to operate. 
Dillon supports Foucaultʼs analysis of the role of biopolitics and securityʼs willingness 
to permit, even accentuate circulation, an indication that biopolitical governance 
necessitates and is to be reconciled with forms of freedom: “freedom is nothing else but the 
correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security” (Foucault 2007:48). Dillon 
recognises the clear benefits of circulation and the relationships between security and 
mobility, yet he raises a series of concerns regarding global circulation. Dillon (2005b:2) 
states that when analysing security and questions of international circulation, it is impossible 
to escape the problems posed by disparate and numerous interdependencies and flows that 
emerge, suggesting that circulation itself poses a seamless web of interdependent 
problems. Dillon contends that circulation translates the new global security problematic 
from a ʻgeo-strategicʼ into an ʻecologicalʼ problem “characterised by the escalatory dynamics 
of complex interdependencies” (2005b:2). Dillonʼs interpretation of contemporary biopolitics 
addresses circulation as a particular problem for international security agendas, rather than 
as something that must be regulated and fostered, as Foucault proposes. For Dillon, 
circulation is a distinct and dangerous problem that must be controlled, even prevented. 
Dillon certainly draws on Foucaultʼs understanding of circulation and the milieu here, writing 
of the need to foster good forms of circulation within a space of security. Yet in his 
extension of Foucaultʼs analysis, he is more concerned with addressing what he deems the 
many dangers of ʻglobal systemsʼ of circulation, proposing that security apparatuses must 
consider the potential and ability to be connected, to be drawn into global circulations of 
various kinds, and the existence of circulations, in somewhat negative, dangerous terms. 
This is in contrast with Foucaultʼs proposal of the capacity of security to promote freedom 
and to enhance and regulate living through facilitating ʻgood circulationʼ, whilst addressing 
and where necessary securing the ʻbadʼ. 
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The question of circulation ultimately leads Dillon to his assertion of the seminal 
importance of contingency as a contemporary biopolitical concern, as well as his contention 
that the contingent has become the central problematic for contemporary international 
security. For Dillon, global circulation is intimately and inescapably bound with the 
contingent, for “contingency is what complex global systems of circulation circulate–massive 
and dynamic sets of spatio-temporal conjunctions and correlations” (2005b:2). Again, the 
dangers of interconnection and flow are brought to the fore, as contingency is presented as 
the consequence of ʻbadʼ circulation, an effect that must be secured against. Dillon warns of 
the dangers presented by complex systems of circulation, stating that interdependence and 
connection raise risk and uncertainty, as “the very smallest perturbations or anomalies in 
one system of circulation can have the potential to cascade into large-scale crisis” 
(2005b:2). Rather than founding the relationships of circulation and contingency as the 
basis of constructing the milieu as the space of security as Foucault sought, Dillon renders 
the contingent as that which must become the object of biopolitics and so the referent object 
of dispositifs of security. 
For Dillon, in his interpretation of biopolitics, contingency has succeeded ʻspecies lifeʼ 
as the referent object of security. Dillonʼs reading of Foucaultʼs analysis of biopolitics 
centres on the contingent as the most important feature of dispositifs of security and indeed, 
for biopower and biopolitics more generally. Dillon even goes so far as to state that 
Foucaultʼs own observations about biopolitical governance “revolves around what he calls 
the contingent or ʻaleatoryʼ features that are displayed by populations” (2007b:41). Dillon 
situates contingency as the central concern for contemporary global biopolitics, 
simultaneously rendered as the primary apprehension for international security. This follows 
from Dillonʼs assertion that the contingent has now become the primary strategic principle of 
formation for the generic securing of life which liberal governmental rule now pursues 
globally: “Having to take into account the autonomous nature of the thing to be governed 
biopolitics seeks to govern through contingency since contingency is what characterises its 
very object” (2007b:46). There is a large degree of disparity between Foucaultʼs use of the 
term ʻaleatoryʼ and the ways that Dillon deploys ʻcontingencyʼ. 
The aleatory and chance are, for Foucault, an inevitable factor of life, thus, when 
governing through biopolitics, the aleatory is unavoidable: Foucault argues that a dispositif 
of security “lets things happen” (2007:45) and then reacts to this reality in a certain way in 
order to limit or even neutralise its more random, aleatory effects (2007:46-47). Thus the 
aleatory is understood as a thing that must be secured and governed through process of 
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strategic elaboration, yet it is ultimately ʻlifeʼ itself which remains the object of security or 
government. 
 
The phenomena addressed by biopolitics are, essentially aleatory events … security 
mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population 
of living beings so as to optimise a state of life” (Foucault, 2003:246). 
 
The contingent, for Dillon retains the sense of the aleatory as subject to chance as in 
Foucault, but additionally, and importantly for his account of biopolitics, Dillon suggests that 
an event or series of events occurs only if certain other circumstances are present. Dillon 
takes the randomness or chance that is found in Foucault, and develops this through his 
work on radical relationality to suggest that if entities are conceptualised to be the product of 
relations, then by definition, these entities are contingent (dependent) on their relations: 
“Contingency does not mean pure arbitrariness, it means being critically dependent upon 
the detailed correlations of time and space” (2005b:2). In Dillonʼ account of biopolitics, 
contingency becomes similar to ʻlifeʼ for Foucault, essentially a regulatory thing in a system 
of biopolitics. The contingent becomes an object of calculative government, the problem to 
be secured is contingency: “Arguably, the contingent has now become the primary strategic 
principle of formation for the generic securing of life which liberal governmental rule now 
pursues globally” (Dillon, 2007b:46). 
Although his contribution is mainly focused on politics and international relations, 
Dillonʼs analytic retains its utility for distinguishing the contemporary security landscape and 
highlighting concerns which develop the biopolitical and the work of Foucault. Dillon 
forwards an account of the emerging field of the ʻbiopolitics of securityʼ as he traces the 
development of biopower and biopolitics into the 21st century. His account demonstrates the 
importance of differentiating between the different spaces at which biopolitical processes 
occur, and the different ways these processes must be analysed. Dillon identifies circulation 
and contingency within his work on biopolitics, these retain their importance for this thesis, 
but they need to be reworked and rearticulated in the context of urban security and the 
problem of the urban. For the purposes of this thesis, we find more useful starting points by 
returning to Foucaultʼs original biopolitical project and Foucaultʼs work on examples of the 
town and town planning in particular. Here the problem with Dillonʼs work is twofold, firstly 
although I support his attempts to attend to the transformation of life, in its presumption of 
molecularised, digitised life, and the ʻlife likeʼ, Dillonʼs biopolitics and his ʻbiopolitics of 
securityʼ overlooks and downplays the ʻlifeʼ which is the ʻreferent objectʼ of the dispositif of 
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security which forms the case study for this thesis. And second, Dillonʼs account of the 
contingent is too different from the aleatory and the event in Foucault, and should not be 
seen to surpass life as the referent object of security at all levels of analysis. 
 
2.1.3. General features of security apparatuses: the spaces of security ~ the 
example of the town 
 
In this section I return to Foucault in order to offer a reassessment and rethinking of 
biopolitics in relation to security and contemporary urban space, building on Foucaultʼs 
ideas of dispositifs of security, and in particular his examples of the general features of 
apparatuses of security discussed through the spaces of security and the ʻtownʼ (see 
Foucault, 2007; Pløger, 2008). Foucault (2007:245) remarks that the population is 
essentially an urban problem and as Elden suggests, the themes of Foucaultʼs works on the 
biopolitical and his concern for security raise questions of what it is that actually allows “the 
functioning of everyday life, particularly in the urban environment” (Elden, 2003:241). 
Indeed, Foucault goes so far as to write that “from the eighteenth century on, every 
discussion of politics as the art of government of men, necessarily includes a chapter or 
series of chapters on urbanism, collective facilities, on hygiene, and on private architecture” 
(1984:240). For an examination of the securitisation of contemporary cities and the securing 
of urban life, whilst Dillonʼs ʻbiopolitics of the 21st centuryʼ remains salient, returning to 
Foucaultʼs examples of the town is of considerable utility for examining contemporary urban 
governance and security, and the everyday life of security. 
The opening lectures of Security, Territory, Population are concerned with dispositifs 
of security, of which Foucault gives three examples: town planning; food shortages; and 
vaccination campaigns. These are intended to illustrate four general traits: the spaces of 
security; the treatment of the uncertain, the aleatory; the form of normalisation specific to 
security; and the correlation between techniques of security and population, as the moment 
of the emergence of the question of population (Foucault, 2007:11)5. Foucault explains that 
the concept of security differs in three important ways from discipline. First, discipline is 
essentially centripetal; it isolated, concentrated, and enclosed space. Dispositifs of security 
                                                
5 When asked to explain his understanding of the meaning and methodological function, of dispositif, Foucault replies: What 
Iʼm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions … Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can 
be established between these elements. Secondly what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the 
connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements … In short, between these elements, whether discursive or 
non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely. 
Thirdly, I understand by the term ʻapparatusʼ a sort of … formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment 
that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function” (1980b:194-195). 
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“have the constant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal … Security therefore involves 
organising, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits” (Foucault, 2007:45). 
Second, whereas discipline by its definition regulates everything, allowing “nothing to 
escape”, the dispositif of security “ʻlets things happenʼ. Not everything is left alone, but 
laisser-faire is indispensable at a certain level” (2007:45). Third, discipline divides 
everything according to a code of the “permitted and the forbidden”, seeking to eliminate 
and eradicate the forbidden completely, a ʻgood disciplineʼ “tells you what you must do at 
every moment” (2007:46). Security involves “standing back sufficiently so that one can 
grasp the point at which things are taking place, whether or not they are desirable … 
grasping them at the level of their effective reality” (2007:46-47). Security works with this 
reality, trying to use it as a support, to optimise its components to function in relation to each 
other and to regulate to the most advantageous level fundamental in dispositifs of security. 
Of particular interest in the theoretical framing of this thesis is Foucaultʼs (2007) case 
of the town, examined as an example of spaces of security, one of the general features of 
security apparatuses. The town, as the space of security, is developed by Foucault through 
three examples of planning urban space and models for the management of towns in the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Alexandre Le Maîtreʼs La Métropolitée; 
Richelieu; and Nantes. The key question Foucault addresses through these examples 
concerns the space of security and the operation of biopolitics and circulation, specifically 
questioning the ways mechanisms of security operate in a spatial order “to be a perfect 
agent of circulation” (2007:17). Foucault contends that whilst discipline operates through the 
enclosure and circumscription of space, and sovereignty capitalises a territory, biopolitical 
apparatus and mechanisms of security are concerned with the facilitation and organisation 
of circulation, allowing things to be in motion, and so security requires the opening up and 
release of spaces, to enable, to regulate, to organise and ultimately to secure circulation: 
 
we see the emergence of a completely different problem that is no longer that of fixing 
and demarcating territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling 
them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, 
constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a 
way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out (Foucault, 2007:65) 
 
As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero observe, Foucaultʼs use of circulation refers to 
“circulation in the widest and most generic sense of the term” (2008:279). Indeed, Foucault 
states that in his use of the concept he means circulation understood “in a very broad sense 
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of movement, exchange and contract, as form of dispersion, and also as a form of 
distribution” (2007:64)6. At the same time Foucault identifies a set of more technical issues 
regarding circulation, as the problematic of biopolitics and circulation includes diverse 
modes of circulation and not just the things that circulate. Accordingly, circulation emerges 
as both the key instrument and target of biopolitics (see Aradau and Blanke, 2010; Dillon 
and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Lobo-Guerrero, 2007, 2008): 
 
by ʻcirculationʼ we should understand not only this material network that allows the 
circulation … but also the circulation itself, that is to say, the set of regulations, 
constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the 
circulation of men and things (Foucault, 2007:325) 
 
Foucault argues that the ʻinsecurityʼ of towns was to be met by technologies of 
security with the objective of “organising circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, 
making a division between good and bad circulation and maximising the good circulation by 
diminishing the bad” (2007:18). This raises what Foucault identifies as ʻthe problem of 
circulationʼ: “the problem being: How should things circulate or not circulate?” (2007:64). 
The purpose of biopolitics is fundamentally, therefore, the facilitation and optimisation of 
ʻcirculationʼ: “Circulation is concerned with flows, but flows have to be monitored and 
regulated” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:268). Following this, the security problematic of 
circulation for biopolitical security is posed by Foucault in terms of differentiating good 
circulation from bad circulation, requiring the knowledge of circulation and interventions that 
regulate and organise the flows of circulation and provide the means to distinguish between 
good and bad circulation. Indeed, as Adey observes, “the continual calibration of circulation 
is organised in order to protect that circulation from strangling life” (2010:12). As a 
consequence, security faces the challenge of knowing and coping with the emergence of 
bad circulations, diminishing and eliminating dangerous elements. This is, as Dillon and 
                                                
6 It is important that Foucaultʼs concept of circulation is not confused with other similar concepts, in particular it should not be 
read as equivalent to ʻmobilityʼ or ʻmovementʼ. Indeed as Adey observes, in Security Territory Population Foucault makes a 
distinction between mobility and circulation, treating the two concepts quite differently when he “positions mobility alongside 
uncertainty with his understanding of ʻcirculationʼ” (Adey, 2009a:277). Foucaultʼs use of the concept of circulation is particular 
to his framing of biopolitics and the security of species-being, it should not therefore be read as, nor assumed to be equivalent 
to other similar concepts. Circulation is understood here in the context of Foucaultʼs development of biopolitics, circulation is 
the core problematic of biopolitics, both its key instrument and its target: “every aspect of how species-being circulates and 
every circulation that affects the welfare of species-being, including every conceivable transaction and exchange by means of 
which it is capable of being related to every other form of matter both actual and virtual” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009:11, 
my emphasis). Furthermore, it is important not to confuse Foucaultʼs use of circulation with mobility given the upsurge of 
interest in mobility and mobilities. This interest and new approach to the study of mobilities has resulted in what Hannam et al. 
(2006) refer to as the ʻnew mobilities paradigmʼ and a ʻmobile turnʼ (Urry, 2007) being declared or advocated. This concept is 
now recognised as important within geography as well the wider arts and social sciences (see Adey, 2006, 2010; Bissell and 
Fuller, 2010; Büscher et al., 2010; Cresswell, 2006, 2010; Cresswell and Merriman, 2010; Elliot and Urry, 2010; Kaufmann, 
2002; Sheller, 2011; Sheller and Urry, 2006; Urry, 2000, 2007). 
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Lobo-Guerrero (2009) note, closely related to the problem of governing too little and 
governing too much. Security tries to incite and preserve circulation, though Foucault 
maintains that regulation and intervention should be minimal, biopolitics requires that all 
remains in motion “but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are 
cancelled out” (2007:65). Consequently, power does not operate by prohibition but by the 
“delimitation of phenomena within acceptable limits, rather than an imposition of a law that 
says no to them” (Foucault, 2007:66). The ultimate aim and central problematic of 
biopolitics and the purpose of dispositifs of security, following Foucault, is the facilitation and 
optimisation of circulation, to get and to keep things moving. 
Foucault (2007) contended that the exercise of power through biopolitics and 
apparatuses of security involved planning and intervening in a ʻmilieuʼ, this he suggested 
could be called the ʻspace of securityʼ7. Foucaultʼs (2007) use of the term ʻmilieuʼ describes 
a concept that is both the space and the target of apparatuses of security. As such, 
following Foucault a milieu can be understood as the ʻʻspace in which a series of uncertain 
elements unfold”, then as both ʻʻthe medium of an action and the element in which it 
circulates” (2007:20). The milieu as the space of security is not equivalent to the 
ʻcapitalisingʼ of a state, territory or province as in sovereignty, or a space of discipline 
(Foucault, 2007: 20, 22). Instead a milieu as the space of security is: 
 
what is needed to account for action as a distance of one body on another ... The 
milieu is a certain number of combined, overall, effects bearing on all who live in it. It 
is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since 
an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another (Foucault, 2007:20-21) 
 
Whilst Foucault (2007:29) defines the milieu as the field of intervention of an 
apparatus of security, he stresses that the concept also describes a set of ʻartificialʼ and 
ʻnaturalʼ givens. As Anderson (2010a) notes, these ʻmaterial givensʼ and elements pre-exist 
techniques of security. In this way Foucault evokes and uses one of the more literal 
definitions of ʻmilieuʼ, in English as in French, where it is taken to describe ʻsurroundingsʼ or 
ʻenvironmentʼ, precisely the sets of ʻmaterial givensʼ and the medium of an action, “that in 
which circulation is carried out” (Foucault, 2007:21). Foucaultʼs use of the concept of milieu 
thus refers to and combines both the collections of these ʻmaterial givensʼ, as well as the 
                                                
7 Foucault states that the concept of the ʻmilieuʼ is drawn from biology with Lamarck and in physics, as was employed by 
Newton and the Newtonians. A fuller explanation as provided in footnotes 36 and 37 (Foucault, 2007:27). He transports this 
notion from physics and biology and discusses it in relation to general features of an apparatus of security through the 
example of town planning in the 16th and 17th century. 
34 
contingent configurations of the series of relations between them, and the enactment and 
entrainment of these through security practices and through apparatuses of security. 
Foucault states that an apparatus of security acts as the regulator of a milieu “above 
all and essentially, making possible, guaranteeing, and ensuring circulations: the circulation 
of people, merchandise, and air, etcetera” (2007:29). The milieu is the planned space of 
security where “a series of possible events” and “a series of uncertain elements unfold” and 
are regulated (2007:20). It is then “that in which circulation is carried out” and involves and 
relies on a mix of natural (rivers, marshes, hills) and artificial (an agglomeration of 
individuals, houses, etcetera) ʻgivensʼ (2007:21): 
 
Security will rely on a number of material givens … It is simply a matter of maximising 
the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of 
minimising what is risky and inconvenient … while knowing that they will never be 
completely suppressed” (Foucault, 2007:19) 
 
Politically, Foucault explains, the milieu is also a “field of intervention in which … one 
tries to affect, precisely, a population” (2007:21). The mechanisms of security are brought to 
bear on a population and “the conjunction of a series of events produced by these 
individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around them” 
(2007:21), rather than the sovereign territory or disciplinary space of previous models of 
political power. 
Through his discussion of the milieu, Foucault acknowledges the impossibility of 
eliminating insecurity altogether, instead the dispositif of security is presented through its 
relationship to the event, as the art of governing and the treatment of the uncertain, the 
aleatory. Security is oriented towards a future that is “not exactly controllable, not precisely 
measured or measurable”, good management therefore “takes into account precisely what 
might happen” (Foucault, 2007:20). Foucaultʼs insistence of the centrality of the aleatory 
demands that any investigation of security takes into account the problems of planning a 
milieu and effecting security mechanisms that are installed around the random element 
inherent in a population. Foucault argues that security “lets things happen” (2007:45) and 
then reacts to this reality in a certain way in order to limit or even neutralise its more 
random, aleatory effects. This is a technique that Foucault states is organised by reference 
to the problem of security: 
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In short, I think we can speak here of a technique that is basically organised by 
reference to the problem of security, that is to say, at bottom, to the problem of the 
series. An indefinite series of mobile elements: circulation, x number of passers-by, x 
number of thieves, x number of miasmas, and so on. An indefinite series of events 
that will occur … And equally an indefinite series of accumulating units: how many 
inhabitants, how many houses, and so on (Foucault, 2007:20) 
 
For Foucault, security and the dispositif of security do not attempt to plan everything, 
rather, it is a concern for the management of inevitable processes which are neither good 
nor bad in themselves. 
Dispositifs of security must allow everyday life to function, circulations to move, as 
such a dispositif of security is faced with the paradox of enforcing regulation or 
management tasked with permitting circulation. This produces, as Huxley writes, “the 
conditions in which (regulated) freedoms are exercised” (2007:189). Within Security, 
Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault presents the tension of security 
and freedom, and those of government, security and liberalism: “The whole question of 
critical governmental reason will turn on how not to govern too much” (2008:13). There is a 
need to protect and regulate through security, whilst at the same time fostering and letting 
ʻlife liveʼ. Freedom is central to biopolitics, as Foucault explained: 
 
An apparatus of security … cannot operate well except on condition that it is given 
freedom, in the modern sense that it acquires in the eighteenth century: no longer the 
exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, 
change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things (Foucault, 
2007:48-49) 
 
The dispositifs of security in the contemporary city necessitates a move away from 
Dillonʼs account of life as molecular and digital, and from the intrusion of ʻlife-likeʼ elements 
into biopolitics. For contemporary urban space and questions of the securing of cities, ʻlifeʼ, 
and ʻspecies lifeʼ, should be understood in ways similar to those provided in Foucaultʼs 
original lectures. How to govern cities and the population remains a question of how to 
facilitate its life, movements, flows, private life and everyday life through space and for 
security (Foucault, 2007:11-18). In Foucaultʼs usage ʻbiopoliticsʼ referred to state 
involvement in problems of ʻsocialʼ life and not only ʻbiologicalʼ life. The objects of biopolitics 
are described by Foucault as the phenomena of ʻspecies lifeʼ – “the birth rate, the mortality 
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rate, longevity, and so on” – but also a “whole series of related economic and political 
problems” that were, Foucault says, biopoliticsʼ “first objects of knowledge and the targets it 
seeks to control” (2003: 243): 
From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new realities in the 
sense that they are pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space 
within which and regarding which one must act (Foucault 2007:75) 
 
Foucaultʼs concern rests with biological factors, but also include the problems of 
ʻsocialʼ and what he calls the populationʼs ʻpublicʼ attributes (see Johnson, 2002). Foucault 
states that the public: 
 
is the population seen under the aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of 
behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements … The population is 
therefore everything that extends from biological rootedness through the species up to 
the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public. From the species to the 
public; we have here a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are the 
pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and 
regarding which one must act (Foucault 2007:75) 
 
Addressing security and urban space, it is necessary to consider how ʻlifeʼ and the 
population are deferred, constituted by other elements, where the task of security becomes 
that of the regulation and protection of these elements, enabling certain processes in order 
to secure ʻlifeʼ. Here ʻlifeʼ is figured as biological and framed as a form of ʻvalued lifeʼ. 
Foucault maintained that the dispositif directs attention to the configurations of 
heterogeneous elements as well as the relations between them. In the context of urban 
security, I contend that what is required is an appreciation of the ways in which through 
biopolitics, quite longstanding techniques of security, as identified by Foucault, are 
redeployed, intensified and returned to in order to regulate and protect the city and urban 
life. What emerges is a conception of cities and urban life as the referent object of security. 
Here ʻlifeʼ is characterised both in terms of the biological of human species being, alongside 
and inseparable from the processes, circulations and interdependencies that make up a 
ʻvalued lifeʼ. In accordance with Dillonʼs writings, different problematisations of security will 
inevitably be comprised of different discourses of danger and so will revolve around different 
referent objects of security, requiring and so generating different kinds of governmental 
responses, different dispositifs. In drawing out, and by returning to Foucaultʼs lectures, we 
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can see how he frames the problematic of circulation and the necessary reconciliation of 
security with freedom. I now discuss contemporary work on urban security and consider the 
differences that this theoretical background on biopolitics can make to that contemporary 
work. 
 
2.2. Security, the city and everyday life 
 
This section turns its focus to recent work on everyday security practices and the 
impacts of security on spaces within contemporary cities. Increasingly the subject of critical 
attention, I contend that the study of urban security and the securitisation of cities has 
yielded a fairly narrow means of thinking the relations between security and cities, and the 
complex processes of urban security, regulation and governance. Although existent work is 
varied in its aims and objectives, in this section, and in keeping with the broad themes of 
this thesis, I consider the predominant tendency to research the forms and functions of 
security, as well as the technical and instrumental dimensions of specific mechanisms of 
securitisation and how such processes result from, or exemplify, contemporary changes in 
governance to explore the ways that security is imbricated with cities. It has been widely 
accepted that security has become an important driving factor in contemporary urbanism, 
however debates concerning this transformation are focused primarily on technical and 
instrumental dimensions of the urbanisation of security and the concomitant securitisation of 
cities. This section discusses concerns for how best to achieve more secure cities against a 
range of ʻtraditionalʼ and more ʻunconventionalʼ terrorist threats. Ultimately, and 
notwithstanding the importance of the work detailed here, it is my contention that the 
relations between lived urban life and processes of security, and so the everyday life of 
security, has been routinely overlooked. 
 
2.2.1. Urban security 
 
Until recently, the focus of academic and policy debate, almost without exception, has 
rested on how security professionals and emergency planners design and plan landscapes 
of security in order to protect and defend ʻcore global citiesʼ from what are often loosely 
termed a range of ʻtraditionalʼ and ʻunconventionalʼ terrorist attacks. These conceptions of 
security, conflict and terrorism have evolved to take into account an increasingly complex, 
interdependent security environment. Notwithstanding the importance of these 
contributions, the exclusive conception of processes security, specific security interventions 
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and apparatuses of security as being only imposed on urban spaces in relation to abstract 
ʻprinciplesʼ of state formation (see Agamben, 2002) has come to overshadow other 
interpretations of what security might do within cities and within urban life. 
Cities are increasingly drawn into security imaginaries, conceived as threatened and 
targeted sites. Graham, for example, argues that recent counter-terrorist strategies 
represent the effects of security practices where “civilian and domestic spaces of urban civil 
societies emerge, or in many cases reemerge, as geopolitically charged spaces” (2004a:5, 
original emphasis; see also Dudley, 2007; Farish, 2003; Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001; 
Graham, 2002b, 2004b, 2004c, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011; Light, 2002; Gregory and Pred, 
2007; Luke, 2004; Savitch, 2003, 2008; Warren, 2002; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005; 
Warren, 2002; Williams, 2003). Contemporary terrorism and counter-terrorism policies are 
brought together in the ways policymakers, security strategists, urban designers, architects 
and planners, and others think about, plan and manage cities and urban spaces, resulting in 
the increased securitisation of everyday life (see Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Sorkin, 2008a; 
Weber and Lacey, 2010; Yacobi, 2009). Indeed, Wekerle and Jackson argue that the 
extension of “the arm of the state through domestic anti-terrorism policies … highlights the 
resurgence of national security issues and their influence on daily life” (2005:46). 
Responding to the increase in urban terrorism in the 1990s, Pawley (1998) asserted 
that urban areas were punctuated by what he termed an ʻarchitecture of terrorʼ: “The 
architecture of terror comes from the universally acknowledged need to protect the highly 
serviced and vulnerable built environment of the modern world from attacks that fall short of 
declared war” (1998:148). He suggested that cities would come to reflect the total 
domination of space through martial and security strategies where a society retreats behind 
ever more restrictive forms of security. More recently Coaffee (2004a) is amongst a group of 
urban critics to suggest that sentiments similar to the ʻarchitecture of terrorʼ are found in a 
form of ʻfortress urbanismʼ, a rationality of security that is argued to have “out of necessity, 
been commonplace after September 11th”. Similarly, Graham (2002a) has described the 
significance of September 11th 2001 and its impact on urban governance, city planning and 
design. He writes that after September 11th 2001, “issues surrounding international military 
and geopolitical security now penetrate utterly into practices surrounding governance, 
design, and planning of cities and urban regions” (Graham, 2002a:589; see also Coaffee, 
2005; Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006; Little, 2004; Marcuse, 2004; Murakami Wood, 
2010; Savitch, 2003; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001; Vale, 2005). Elsewhere Graham has 
contended that “in the wake of 9/11 and other catastrophic terrorist acts of the last few 
years, the design of buildings, the management of traffic, the physical planning of cities and 
39 
neighbourhoods, are being brought under the widening umbrella of ʻnational securityʼ” 
(2004a:11). Cities and urban sites are increasingly, it is claimed, mirroring security concerns 
as contemporary political violence operates in and through the sites, spaces and life of 
urban life that are characterised as “intrinsically threatening or problematic necessitating 
political violence, militarized control, or radical securitisation” (Graham, 2011:xxix). This is a 
position supported by Marcuse (2004) who suggests that measures to secure the city, and 
other acts of ʻcounter-terrorismʼ, have had the most significant impact on the design of cities 
since September 11th. Furthermore, Marcuse claims that current counter-terrorism 
measures represent a continuation of tactics present prior to September 11, now “reinforced 
and aggravated by the cover given by the so-called ʻwar on terrorismʼ” (2004:264). Rather 
than considering security after September 11th as representing a new age, it is more useful 
to analyse the diverse ʻassemblies of biopolitical governmentʼ which have taken shape and 
now function in processes and rationalities of security. Empirically, as Briggs observes, 
although “physical defences have been stepped up somewhat since September 11th, there 
is no evidence to suggest this constitutes more than a gentle reinforcement of existing 
measures; an evolution rather than a revolution … British cities are merely consolidating 
what they already have in place” (2005:71). It is more prudent, therefore, to think in terms of 
the broad configurational principles through which new formations of security are 
assembled. 
It is true that security is responsible for the transformation of cities and urban spaces. 
Indeed, throughout history, cities have been shaped and reshaped by security as urban 
spaces themselves become expressions of changes in governance. Foucaultʼs (2007) own 
biopolitical work of course utilises examples of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
century towns and town planning to provide a careful and thorough working and analysis of 
developments of regulatory power and apparatuses of security. Through these examples, 
Foucault demonstrates differing configurations of techniques of power expressed and 
combined in biopolitical governance. As Coaffee rightly asserts, contemporary cities are “no 
different from their predecessors in terms of making explicit attempts to use defence to 
structure the urban landscape and to ʻdesign out crimeʼ and fear of crime” (2005:447). 
However, what has changed in terms of security and its relation to cities and urban life is 
the extension of security “beyond fears of assault, robbery, and drug dealing that prompted 
the earlier calls for defensible space” (Vale, 2005:38). There has been a tendency within 
literature on design and counter-terrorism practices to offer a vision of biopolitical power as 
domination, as an actor acting over and in relation to the exertion of domination of subjects 
in and through disciplined space. This is an articulation of biopolitical power as disciplinary, 
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an approach to security that is reliant on an analysis of those mechanisms and devices 
operating according to a disciplinary logic. Whilst there are instances where this is the case, 
I am critical of the dominant concept of discipline deployed in this work. The persistent 
claims that critique styles of ʻsecurity architectureʼ (Kornberger and Clegg, 2004:1102), 
ʻfortress urbanismʼ (see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004b, 2009a), practices of ʻbarricadingʼ the city 
(see Marcuse, 2002) and the ʻcitadelisationʼ (see Marcuse, 2004) of urban space work with, 
and are reliant on, a vision of power as disciplinary. There is little sense of how other 
biopolitical techniques are or might be deployed and combined, and how ʻtacticsʼ of power 
are able to arrange, control, regulate and at times discipline. I maintain that it is not the sole 
aim of security practices to discipline bodies and spaces, as a result of this focus, these 
accounts have largely bypassed the freedoms that security insists on and regulates. We 
should instead consider a more nuanced approach which addresses how biopolitical forms 
of power work in conjunction with each other. 
 Foucault argues that how well power regulates, manages and indeed fosters domains 
of life through security involves the balance between regulating too little and regulating too 
much. The task of governing and of security becomes that of discovering how much 
regulation is enough for successfully promoting life in pursuit of making life live (Foucault, 
2007). Turning to biopolitics and to Foucaultʼs work on power offers a more nuanced 
account of power and its operation through security and in relation to cities and everyday 
urban life. As Deleuze observed:  
 
A control is not discipline. You do not confine people with a highway. But by making 
highways, you multiply the means of control. I am not saying this is the only aim of 
highways, but people can travel infinitely and ʻfreelyʼ without being confined while 
being perfectly controlled (Deleuze, 1998:18) 
 
 What is required is a more nuanced approach that considers how freedom and 
security are currently reconciled, and the site specificity of this in security practice. Rather 
than equating security as discipline, what is needed is a more “supple analysis of the 
configurations in which forms of power take shape and function” (Collier, 2009:80), one able 
to attend to and describe intensifications of different types of security practices and 
redeployments of different mechanisms, techniques and processes in specific apparatuses 
that imbricate with one another. 
The impact and response to security within urban areas has, of course, “been spatially 
contingent, reflecting both the history and geography of different cities” (Coaffee, 
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2004a:202)8. The more ʻtraditionalʼ urban defences against terrorism are described as 
involving territorial interventions that seek to enclose and thus close off parts of the city. A 
style of disciplinary territorial control where “discipline operates through the enclosure and 
circumscription of space” (Elden, 2007:565) subjecting these spaces and the subjects within 
to increased control and surveillance. Coaffee contends that the post September 11th city is 
shaped by the “inevitable growth in the popularity of physical or symbolic notions of 
boundaries and territorial closures – for example, enclosed defensive enclaves around 
residential gated communities, airports, civic buildings or major financial districts” 
(2005:449). Unlike many commentators (see Marcuse and van Kempen, 2002), I am 
dissatisfied with speculations that the threat of terrorism has led to a process of increased 
urban fragmentation. Although there can be no disputing that this has occurred (see 
Nemeth, 2008; Nemeth et al, 2008), the frequency and styles of such responses should be 
questioned. As will be demonstrated and discussed in Chapter 5, developments in UK 
policy, in addition to the interventions and pressures of urban planners, architects as well as 
security professionals, and a variety of academic and non-academic sources, has sought to 
mitigate and annul this trend. As such, it is important to emphasise the contingent nature of 
urban counter-terror security. In addition, taking spatial contingency as a starting point is 
more prudent than broad and generalised characterisations, given that threat and counter-
threat are constantly shifting. Furthermore and related, it is now more relevant to consider 
how security processes and interventions are being reconciled with the circulations and 
freedoms of urban life, rather than presenting a single account of security as imposed on 
cities through disciplinary rationalities. 
A number of critical accounts have developed concerning recent domestic 
apparatuses of security, and in particular counter-terrorist security practices, measures and 
associated policies, centring on the processes of ʻfortificationʼ (see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004a; 
2004b, 2009a; Davis, 1992; Newman, 1972), and urban ʻmilitarismʼ and the ʻmilitarisationʼ of 
urban space (see Farish, 2003; Graham, 2002b, 2004c, 2006, 2009, 2011; Light, 2002; 
Warren, 2002). Urban ʻfortificationʼ and associated denunciations describing and critiquing 
ʻthe fortress cityʼ have explored the relationships between defensive architectures, urban 
planning and design, and desires for ever more secure urban environments in 
contemporary Western cities that are characterised by “explicit attempts to use defence to 
structure the urban landscape” (Coaffee, 2003a:3). Elsewhere, there has been a diagnosis 
of intensified trends toward an ʻurban militarismʼ and the attendant increased ʻmilitarisationʼ 
                                                
8 For examples of differing counter-terrorist responses post September 11th 2001 as well as examinations of European and 
Asian responses to the ʻwar on terrorʼ, see the 2007 special edition of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 
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of urban space, that is said to be characterised by the “deepening crossover between 
urbanism and militarism” (Graham, 2011:xxix). Not only is it alleged that warfare is being 
urbanised, it is claimed that cities are becoming militarised, where urban spaces are the 
terrain, instruments and targets of “permanent and boundless war” which is “radically 
intensifying the militarization of urban life” (Graham, 2011:60). Through the lens of urban 
ʻmilitarismʼ, cities are seen as “intrinsically threatening or problematic places” (Graham, 
2011:xviii), necessitating the reorganisation and restructuring of the city through forms of 
contemporary warfare, political violence, militarised control, or radical securitisation that 
have penetrated utterly the sites, spaces, infrastructures and permeate the life of everyday 
urban life all of the time (see Graham, 2004c, 2009, 2011). 
These particular visions of urban ʻmilitarismʼ and ʻfortificationʼ are further highlighted 
through commentatorʼs discussions of the technical and instrumental dimensions of specific 
mechanisms of securitisation, and discussions of the role of ever advancing technology in 
the ʻwar against terrorismʼ. Whilst there exists a wide a varied work focussed on a range of 
technical and instrumental practices and dimensions, particular and keen attention has 
been paid to the developments in and the increased use of disparate forms of digitalised 
and algorithmic surveillance. There now exists a well rehearsed set of discussions 
concerning the apparent omnipresence of surveillance in our daily lives, as well as detailed 
accounts addressing the complex and multiple ways in which surveillance and urban society 
have interacted (see Ball and Murakami Wood, 2006; Levin et al., 2002; Lyon, 2001, 2003; 
Murakami Wood 2009a, 2009b; Murakami Wood and Webster, 2010). 
It is accepted that what can be loosely termed more ʻconventionalʼ terrorist attacks 
were directed at economic, military, political and symbolic targets, with the primary aim of 
inflicting disruption and gaining media coverage rather than causing large numbers of 
casualties. Now ʻlifeʼ itself is recognised to be under increased threat and as a result, 
increasing attention is being paid to the complex and localised impact of a range of security 
and defensive strategies upon social, political and economic life. The result, as Coaffee and 
Murakami Wood explain is a situation where security is necessarily “becoming more civic, 
urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home” (2006:504). The more ʻtraditionalʼ 
range of targets, such as governmental or financial buildings and districts, critical national 
infrastructure and military targets, are now accompanied by more unfamiliar and more 
everyday spaces. The changing terrorist methods and ever evolving terrorist tactics sees 
ʻsoft targetsʼ and so-called ʻcrowded publicʼ places as viable targets (see HM Government, 
2009a, 2010c). The UK Government, for example, now considers all public spaces to be at 
risk from attack, this will be discussed at length in Chapter 5. As Coaffee has observed, 
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these ʻcrowded placesʼ and areas of civil life are often described as ʻsoft targetsʼ, cited as 
sharing “common vulnerabilities such as their lack of access control, and this has led to a 
largely reactive and protective counter-terror response in many western cities through the 
employment of overt security features” (2009b:345). Whilst iconic buildings, financial, 
political and military spaces, as well as specific hubs such as airports and railway stations 
have long been identified as targets for terror attacks, a more general reading of public 
places as emerging ʻinsecure spacesʼ within counter-terror security is required if security 
and resilience are to be enhanced. The message from governments in many western states 
appears clear: “defence of the city – of the places where people work, relax and live – is 
promoted as being central to wider national security” (Coaffee, 2009b:345). 
There is a suggestion that a dominant rhetoric of inevitability now drives counter-
terrorist security practice. This finds its legacy in prior international threat scenarios, and 
has come to hone feelings of vulnerability which necessitate the subsequent requirement for 
additional and enhanced security and increased resilience: “it is not a case of whether a 
major city will be targeted but where, when and how – a situation that often requires pre-
emptive anticipatory planning” (Coaffee, 2009b:344). Anticipatory logics have emerged as a 
key driver of a reconceptualised western security policy as security and then attendant 
processes of resilience are sought against an array of traditional and unconventional 
threats. Anticipatory action is considered increasingly important to the ways that cities and 
urban life are secured through the myriad of ʻhardʼ engineering and design solutions and 
ʻsoftʼ governance and management arrangements available. The language of ʻinevitabilityʼ 
must be understood through its relation to the emergence of discourses of risk that follow 
probability calculations; there can be no complete alleviation of risk, no safe or secure 
future. Dillon (2008) argues that risk has become a prevailing biopolitical security practice, 
arguing that risk commodifies contingency by first making it ʻcalculableʼ and then ʻfungibleʼ. 
Security, it seems, no longer relies on rendering the future fully knowable, instead it focuses 
on the aleatory and on the contingent in order to reduce vulnerabilities, to mitigate the 
consequences of a successful attack and to recover from an attack should one take place. 
Counter-terrorist experts now talk of a ʻnew normalityʼ where “risks can only be managed, 
not completely eradicated”, requiring a series of “active anticipation and ʻreflexiveʼ risk 
management strategies” (Heng, 2006:70) and contingency planning. 
Urban resilience, as the activity of securing and protecting against, and then planning 
responses to a range of security challenges, “refers to both the design alterations 
(structural, architectural, land-use planning) and managerial and governance measures that 
seek to prevent or mitigate the physical and social vulnerability of areas, ultimately to 
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protect life, property and economic activity” (Coaffee and OʼHare, 2008:173). Little has 
contended that there is a recognised need for a ʻholisticʼ strategy for urban counter-terrorist 
security, arguing that the challenge of “ensuring the continuity of vital services in the face of 
terrorism and other hazards is more complicated than just the protection of physical assets” 
(2004:52). The turn to resilience demands a focus on more than just the physical assets, 
and greater attention is now paid to systems and infrastructures, the complex interplay of 
activities, institutions, people as well as the assemblages of all manner of bits and pieces 
that make up sites and spaces which are to be made (more) resilient. As Anderson (2010a, 
2010b) notes, in the UK context, the aim has been to develop anticipatory logics and 
security practice “build the capacity of ʻresilienceʼ into the very life that is to be secured” 
(Anderson, 2010b:791). Discourses of resilience produce and foster specific subjectivities 
that are themselves aimed to be adept at responding to and recovering from disasters, 
these subjectivities are produced by contemporary governmental practices and 
ʻcomplementʼ the structural forms of resilience (see Zebrowski, 2009). 
It is important to develop a more variegated sense of the different spatialities of 
security that are understood to be operating in concert within cities, in particular the different 
spatialities of security which emerge and coalesce in relation to a dispositif of security (see 
Law and Mol, 2001; Mol and Law, 1994). We might think here in terms of a space of 
circulation; the space of the zone; the space of the cordon; the space of the sphere; the 
space of the network; the space of the assemblage and so on (see Klauser, 2010). It is 
important to consider the different spaces of security as different spatialities and how these 
different spatial forms can hold together in a dispositif of security. These different types of 
spatialities are not fundamentally separate, but neither are they necessarily collapsed into 
one another, they coexist, and their forms of coexistence is what enables a particular 
dispositif of security to exist. Following Foucaultʼs example of the dispositif allows us to think 
how these different spaces and the different discursive and non-discursive properties of 
security can be brought into relationships but remain heterogeneous. The dispositif should 
still be understood as Foucault explained: 
 
a resolutely heterogeneous grouping composing discourses, institutions, architectural 
arrangements, policy decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophic, moral and philanthropic propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said, 
these are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself if the network that can 
be established between these elements (Foucault, cited in Rabinow and Rose, 
2003:xvi) 
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Such an approach questions the distribution of security within a city or a milieu, and 
the specificity of a delimited site in relation to articulations of threat and danger and security 
responses. Taking on the task of describing the spatialities of security offers a route beyond 
the accounts detailed above, to analyse how these complex spaces interact, are layered, 
assemble, how they identify and respond to problems and how within one ʻsiteʼ there are 
multiple spatialities. Considering the different spatialities of security as well as taking 
Foucaultʼs account of dispositifs and the relations between heterogeneous discursive and 
non-discursive elements in an apparatus offers a means of conceiving how security 
operates. An approach which discusses how the spatialities of sites and spaces change 
and the spatialities of security, is one which is also open to other things and other 
happenings, the aleatory. This would help to explore ideas of security as centrifugal, as 
continuously expanding to incorporate new elements and would avoid assumptions of fixity 
and inertia. 
Academic work, as well as the work of those concerned with the practical dimensions 
of security, must find ways of conceptually and empirically engaging with these new and 
emerging spaces of security, so far it has been slow to address and conceptualise this 
broadening of the security agenda. I agree with Collier and Lakoff who suggest that what is 
needed “is not an overarching critique of the ʻmilitarisationʼ or securitisation of civilian life but 
an analytics that allows us to distinguish between different processes underway in the 
complex field of contemporary security” (2008:25). In the context of this research, and as 
the empirical chapters will demonstrate, it is not that rationalities of urban ʻmilitarismʼ or the 
ʻsecuritisationʼ of urban spaces characterised by the aggressive reorganisation of cities and 
forms of aggressive political violence, dominate security. Different logics of security emerge, 
are enacted and a variety of security rationalities configured so as to meet the various 
challenges of securing cities and different enactments of threat. Foucaultʼs work on 
dispositifs of security, and his ʻtopologicalʼ approach offer a more appropriate set of 
methodological and conceptual tools for analysis of the configurations of security and the 
operations of biopolitical power. This would offer an analytics which follows Collier and 
Lakoffʼs call to “identify specific kinds of security problems and the schemas that have been 
developed to manage them in a given context” (2008:25). 
Following Collier (2009), it is important not to take one set of security practices in one 
particular place as a generic model for contemporary security in 21st century liberal 
democracies. The idea of topologies of power demonstrates that whilst it is appropriate in 
many cases to describe a disciplinary apparatus, it is essential these descriptions of 
ʻdisciplineʼ are not the sole means of describing complicated and disparate geographies of 
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security. There are also important questions of what it is that security is acting on, and the 
spaces it operates within, Foucaultʼs dispositif is of considerable utility here. The 
problematic of urban security is not simply that of securing circulation. Whilst circulation and 
freedoms may be prime concerns, security itself is not always prioritised within cities. In the 
UK for example, and as Chapter 5 will go on to discuss, whilst counter-terror security is 
capable of being a material consideration, this is not written in the statute. Questions of site 
and site specificity are, in the context of the form of security this thesis is interested in, 
increasingly important to how security is enacted. Security becomes an articulation of 
different kinds of circulations and interdependencies. As such, we can take on Foucaultʼs 
example of the milieu, as the planned space where possible events or elements are 
regulated, and as the space of natural and artificial givens which make up a dispositif and 
are secured by it. Taking on Foucaultʼs biopolitical project allows for an examination of how 
security practices act as a relation between a body and a site, or objects and other objects. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through this chapter I have provided an overview of Foucaultʼs biopolitics, as well as 
some of the recent debates that have emerged within literatures on contemporary biopolitics 
and the ʻbiopolitics of securityʼ. I have also discussed works that have engaged with security 
and the securing of contemporary cities. In addition I have considered the contribution that a 
biopolitical orientation can offer to researching contemporary urban security, both in terms 
of conceptual framing and informing empirical directions. First, I presented work on 
biopolitics and particularly the biopolitics of security inspired by Michel Foucault, also 
examining recent developments of this body of work by Michael Dillon. In this opening 
section I have also argued that whilst the work of Dillon certainly offers much to the study of 
biopolitics and security, for biopolitics and its relation to cities, a return to Foucaultʼs 
discussions of the spaces of the town and dispositifs of security is essential. The second 
section discussed recent works which have addressed contemporary security practices and 
processes of urban securing. The dominant focus of this body of work has rested with the 
presence of security techniques, reflecting changes in forms of governance, as well as 
discussions of the efficacy of security practices and processes. I have moved through a set 
of recent works that focus on security practices and the protection of cities against 
ʻtraditionalʼ and more ʻunconventionalʼ terrorist threats, arguing these offer a narrow range of 
approaches. I then discussed the contribution that biopolitics, and the related conceptual 
vocabulary, offers to geographies of security. 
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Here I have offered a different biopolitical focus to that presented in the work of 
Foucault and in the recent development offered by Dillon. I have suggested the importance 
of returning to the lectures in Security, Territory, Population, particularly where Foucault 
examines the space of the town and town planning. Although I suggest that security has 
certainly moved on and that the referent object differs in many respects, the account 
presented in this thesis has more in keeping with these lectures. As such, the concerns that 
I am working through here retain the original focus as forwarded by Foucault. Where Dillonʼs 
aim is to update Foucault and provide a biopolitics of the 21st century, here the conceptual 
work seeks to update Foucault, but in different ways to Dillon, and in the context of cities 
and contemporary practices of urban governance through security. Dillonʼs is a biopolitics of 
the 21st century, one which offers an analytics of security in the context of international 
relations, this thesis requires a reframing of biopolitics in the context of urban spaces and 
the securing of everyday life. It is therefore concerned with the ways in which quite long 
standing techniques of security have been redeployed, have been intensified, have been 
returned to in ways that demonstrate continuities with previous ways in which certain threats 
and circulations have been secured. 
Utilising Foucault and biopolitics provides a means of framing this research. This has 
a number of interrelated implications. Understanding that practices of security intervene in 
life, through power penetrating “ʻsubjectsʼ very bodies and forms of life” (Amin and Thrift, 
2002:28), is to consider how security seeks to protect biological life and attempts to protect 
and intervene in the ʻtaking-placeʼ of lived experience through the staging of a milieu. Whilst 
Dillon is right to assert that life is increasingly known and intervened in as molecular, 
information, as digital and as ʻlife likeʼ, ʻlifeʼ continues to be figured through the original 
biologised life, the life of species being and social life, of Foucaultʼs early biopolitics. The 
ʻlifeʼ of biopolitics must distinguish between cases, as both Foucault and Dillon show, 
referent objects of security change over time and across space. In the city, species life, the 
protection and preservation of life is central to security practices, particularly in the context 
of terrorism. At the same time, security is tasked with protecting the freedoms of ʻsocialʼ life, 
which involve attempts at the engineering of experience, of intervening in the taking-place of 
lived everyday life itself and the composition of a distinct ʻway of lifeʼ. In the context of cities, 
the securing and protection of both biological life and social life can be understood through 
reference to a particular form of ʻvalued lifeʼ. Security operates through the deferral of life 
and the population, understood and constituted by other elements and processes, 
protection “aims to stop the effects of an event disrupting the circulations and 
interdependencies that make up a valued life” (Anderson, 2010b:791). 
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In keeping with Foucaultʼs original project, the ʻlifeʼ that is taken as the referent object 
of security in this thesis is that of the population. However this is extended and understood 
as caring for, regulating and securing life as both biological and a particular form of ʻvalued 
lifeʼ of a public and society. This is a ʻlifeʼ conceived by the UK Government in its 
broadening of the NSS and through CONTEST which is then figured and enacted through 
reference to a ʻnormal way of lifeʼ, ʻordinary lifeʼ and ʻbusiness continuityʼ, ʻfreedomʼ, secured 
through reference to and through the deferral of life and the population, constituted by other 
elements and processes. There are important questions concerning what security is acting 
on, and it is not always people, as such we must develop an analytics to identify specific 
kinds of security problems and the schemas that have been developed to manage them in a 
given context: “The question, then, is not whether something is being securitised, but what 
type of security is being discussed. What is being secured? Through what kinds of 
interventions? And with what political implications?” (Collier and Lakoff, 2008:25). 
Following Foucault, security is understood to open spaces up in ways that lets things 
happen, to preserve and protect the complex circulations and interdependencies of a valued 
life and the city, through limited interventions. Foucaultʼs example necessitates 
considerations of how contemporary urban security practice regulates in ways which 
intervene in and through circulations. Moving away from describing security through 
disciplinary modes of securitisation that treat mobility and circulation as incipient risks to be 
limited and enclosed. Security organises and reconciles mobility, planning and intervening 
circulations through the milieu. Security should be understood through its relation to sites 
and circulations in terms of fixity and flux. This requires that we are more attentive to the 
form or perhaps the forms of circulation, and how these differ. This also encourages means 
of distinguishing the differences and spatial contingency of security as it is enacted in urban 
settings. 
Whilst the works discussed in this chapter have contributed much to describing the 
imbrications of security and the city, the lack of attention to how security measures are 
encountered means that too much can come to be assumed about both their efficacy and 
about the resultant nature of urban life. The everyday is too often presented in accounts of 
urban security as something which already known, it is therefore too regularly assumed, 
presented as significant but then left under-explored and under-theorised. These accounts 
do little to address the everyday other than offering hints towards it, often assuming that the 
reader will know and understand what ʻeveryday lifeʼ is. In addition, and as Gandy rightly 
observes, in accounts of security, and within readings of the biopolitical inspired by 
Foucault, “the physicality of the body retains a somewhat ambiguous position … the 
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emphasis on the discursive production of the body has tended to occlude any clear 
engagement with the lived experience of space” (2006:497). The following chapter will 
begin with a discussion of the complexity and sheer breadth of understandings of ʻeveryday 
lifeʼ, before it develops the conceptual framework that, in the context of the aims and 
objectives of this thesis, can address security and its relations to everyday life and lived 
experience. To overcome the neglect of the everyday, and to consider security as a range 
of presences and absences, the following theoretical chapter provides a more explicit focus 
on the everyday life of urban security and the range of everyday encounters and practices 
through which security is enacted and experienced through the life of everyday life. 
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3. Everyday Life and Urban Security 
 
Introduction 
 
Question your tea spoons. 
What is there under your wallpaper? 
How many movements does it take to dial a phone number? 
(Perec, 2008a:210-211) 
 
This chapter turns its attention to developing a conceptual framework that can 
address security and its relations to everyday urban life and lived experience. The everyday 
has been established as a field of interest and research in its own right, with the proliferation 
of texts dedicated to the study of ʻthe everydayʼ and ʻeveryday lifeʼ (see for example, Felski, 
1999-2000; Gardiner, 2000; Gardiner and Seigworth, 2004; Highmore, 2002a, 2002b, 2011; 
Jacobsen, 2009; Johnstone, 2008; Moran, 2005; Sheringham, 2006, 2007). This everyday 
literature is large, variegated and at times contradictory. As Felski, in a critical reappraisal of 
the use of and approaches to ʻthe everydayʼ and ʻeveryday lifeʼ in theory, comments, 
“Because it has no clear boundaries it is difficult to identify” (1999-2000:15). My interest in 
this chapter is with the everyday and everyday lived experience, and I turn from the more 
traditional perspectives on security and the accounts that have focused on examining 
security in everyday life discussed in the previous chapter, to a more specific theoretical 
perspective that can offer a conceptual vocabulary for examining and describing the 
everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured. 
There can be little question that security is increasingly ubiquitous within cities and the 
spaces of urban life; indeed it is difficult to imagine urban spaces without thought for 
security practices, processes and materialities. The presence of security within cities and 
urban life has of course come under intense scrutiny from both academic and non-academic 
sources. As Coaffee et al. rightly observe, “security policy can have a tangible impact upon 
the spaces in which we live, work and socialise (and how we do so)” (2009:507). Whilst I 
am in agreement with this and similar statements, the relations between security and lived 
everyday urban life have been largely under theorised and there has been a tendency to 
presume the life of the everyday and the relations between security and everyday life 
without thorough nor sustained engagement. In this second theoretical chapter my purpose 
is to consider how security moves from being a set of mechanisms as it is lived and 
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experienced day-to-day, and how everyday life shifts from a ʻreferent objectʼ of security to 
that within which security lives. This chapter builds on and develops the theoretical work of 
Chapter 2 and locates the specific empirical study to follow, it does so through two sections. 
Within the range of theorists who have conceptualised and attended to the everyday 
and everyday life, here I engage with the writings and thought of Georges Perec9. The 
elusive category of the everyday is a thread that runs throughout Perecʼs career, a theme 
that comes to be explored through his diverse output of descriptive, theoretical and creative 
texts. However, Perecʼs contributions to the study of the everyday and everyday life remain 
remarkably underused in Geography as well as in the wider arts and social sciences. Here I 
offer a sustained engagement with Perecʼs thought and writing, doing so in order to further 
develop a conceptual vocabulary for describing both the everyday life of security and how 
the everyday is secured. Perecʼs array of resourceful approaches and writings, as 
Sheringham (2006) observes, through their remarkable inventiveness, wove together and 
extended ways of thinking about and interrogating the everyday. Perec attempts to ʻthink 
throughʼ the everyday and it is his insistence that the quotidien requires fastidious attention 
at its own level, and his use of an extensive array of ʻpractical exercisesʼ to make possible 
such a quixotic empiricism, that are developed within this thesis. Additionally, through his 
extreme and quixotic modes of witnessing and his undertaking of what he himself 
                                                
9 Georges Perec was born in Paris on 7th March 1936, he died of lung cancer four days short of his forty-sixth birthday in Paris 
in 1982. In spite of his desires to become a writer, as Sturrock suggests, Perec seemed not to have sufficient confidence in his 
abilities and success to become “a writer pure and simple” (1999:xvi), and so for most of his life Perec worked full-time as an 
archivist in a scientific research laboratory only giving up his position four years before his death to concentrate solely on his 
writings. On Perecʼs life see David Bellosʼ (1999) comprehensive biography Georges Perec: a Life in Words. On Perecʼs works 
see Schwartzʼs (1988) Georges Perec: Traces of His Passage and Motteʼs (1984) The Poetics of Experiment: A Study of the 
Work of Georges Perec. As a writer Perec was polymathic, original and highly productive, by the time of his death he was the 
author of one large book, Life a Userʼs Manual, and several short books – Things: A Story of the Sixties; A Man Asleep; W or 
The Memory of Childhood; A Void; The Art and Craft of Approaching Your Head of Department to Submit a Request for a 
Raise; and the unfinished 53 Days. In addition Perec produced a catalogue of other pieces, including poetry, scripts for 
television and film, radio plays, book and art reviews, translated works, pastiches of literary and scientific language, essays, 
articles, collections of crosswords, puzzles and brain teasers. Perec also co-founded the sociological journal Cause Commune 
– determined to undertake ʻan investigation of everyday life at every level, in its folds and caverns that are usually disdained or 
repressed – and was an enthusiastic member of the Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle (OuLiPo) (see James, 2009; Motte, 
1986; Motte and Arnaud, 1998). Although much of Perecʼs oeuvre remains to be translated into English, as well as the above 
list of translated works, other examples include Species of Spaces and Other Pieces, Thoughts of Sorts, and An Attempt at 
Exhausting a Place in Paris. Perecʼs work is marked as much by its originality as by its variation. This should not be surprising, 
for as he reflects in his literary self portrait, the essay Statement of Intent, his real ambition was “to run through the whole 
gamut of the literature of my age without feeling I was going back on myself or treading ground I had trod before, and to write 
every kind of thing that it is possible for a man to write nowadays” (2009:4). Versatile and innovative, Perec likened his 
idiosyncratic and ambitious literary itinerary to a method of cultivation: “As I see it, I should rather compare myself to a farmer 
with many fields” (2009:3). The four main ʻfieldsʼ of enquiry, Perec suggests are: the sociological – the ordinary and the 
everyday; the autobiographical; the ludic (usually relating to Oulipian constraints); and the novelistic (2009:3-4). Perec 
acknowledges that this distribution is arbitrary, as each of the main ʻfieldsʼ is importantly and inescapably interconnected: 
“Rather than remaining separate categories, these dimensions of Perecʼs work exist in complex interaction with one another, 
an interaction that is articulated differently in different works” (James, 2009:199). It is the first of these modes that I draw on 
primarily in this thesis, the sociological, and in particular Perecʼs fascination with and careful attention to the everyday and 
everyday life. The elusive category of the everyday is a thread that runs throughout Perecʼs career, explored through a variety 
of literary forms. Many of Perecʼs literary projects, as Becker rightly suggests, form “ethnography as generalized fiction” 
(2001:6), however it is in his shorter works and essays, for example those collected in Lʼinfra-ordinaire (1989) and the short 
but exemplary text An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris (2010), that Perec is able to apprehend, to attend to and to 
present the everyday and lived experience in its rawest form: to live, to witness, to describe the rest instead. 
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acknowledges is an impossible task, that of observing and describing ʻeverythingʼ, Perec 
achieves something that social scientists often do not do very well, descriptions of the 
ordinary, the essential, the taken for granted, background noise, as well as the event(al), 
the truly extraordinary, the ʻbig eventʼ etcetera. Perecʼs polymathic approaches and diverse 
outputs are intended to be read as modest contributions, studies of the everyday and 
everyday life that should necessarily be read as attempts to apprehend and witness 
experience and space as it is ʻtaking-placeʼ. Perecʼs contributions are examples of extreme 
empiricism marked by limits, always acknowledging and struggling, albeit playfully, with the 
complexities of an everydayness that is “endlessly forming and reforming” (Sheringham, 
2007:205). 
In the first section of this chapter I offer a sustained engagement with Perecʼs thought 
and writing. My concern in this section, as with Perecʼs thoughtful and practical 
engagements with and investigations of the everyday and everyday life, is to ask, what of 
the rest? To offer an account that apprehends and is attentive to the more excessive 
moments within the everyday and that at the same time witnesses and describes the 
ordinariness of everyday life, in particular considering how although the ordinary is always 
the already-known, it is rarely acknowledged (see Sheringham, 2000)10. Importantly in 
Perecʼs works, as James rightly observes, the “tension between ʻbackground noiseʼ and 
ʻeventʼ, between the infra-ordinary and the extraordinary, is not a conflict between clearly 
defined opposites; rather, the two poles are constantly shifting in relation to each other” 
(2009:210). Here, and anticipating the empirical chapters to follow, I focus on what Perec 
describes the ʻinfra-ordinaryʼ, the things that we do everyday and the places we do them in 
without thought or acknowledgement, the largely unnoticed background of everyday life that 
requires a kind of quixotic or excessive attention: “one or another of the miscellaneous 
elements that comprise the everydayness of life” (Perec, 2008a:12): the rest instead. This is 
the realm of everyday life that is so often written out or underplayed, where “nothing 
happens – and yet an awful lot happens as well” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:94). Perec 
questions and describes the ʻinfra-ordinaryʼ through quixotic attention to everyday spaces, 
happenings and things which, according to Emerson, “anchor his writing within the real 
world” through the development of a “phenomenological method that would accurately 
reflect observed reality in language” (2001:95). Interested in thinking of security as a part of 
                                                
10 As Weiss acknowledges, it should be remembered that what counts as “ordinary experience for one individual can be 
extraordinary experience for another and vice versa” (Weiss, 2008:1-2); the parameters of ʻordinarinessʼ vary and can be 
“irrevocably disrupted at any point in time” (2008:1). This is a fundamental problem for Perec, however, he is aware of the 
ambiguity which lies at the heart of his project, and is “nevertheless not paralysed by the impossibility of expressing the infra-
ordinary in its pure insignificance and nothingness” (James, 2009:201). 
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this background, of “the world hidden in plain view” (Highmore, 2005: no pagination), as well 
as attending to moments where security is a more foreground and intensified presence, and 
of how we might think these presences and absences of security as practiced, experienced 
and lived, I firstly present an account of the everyday and everyday life inspired by Perec. 
The second section of this chapter develops a sense of the lived everyday life of 
security through an examination of three conceptual devices. Acknowledging and accepting 
the enormous variations within the use of ʻeveryday lifeʼ and the ʻeverydayʼ, as well as the 
diverse range of alternatives and cognate expressions (Sheringham, 2000), this section 
recognises that such terms are too broad as the analytic with which to understand and 
conceptualise the everyday life of urban security. In this section I thus disentangle and so 
differentiate within these notions of ʻthe everydayʼ and consider three interrelated themes 
that are used in order to explore the distinct problem of security as part of everyday life and 
lived experience: encounter; affect | emotion | feeling; and, attention | distraction. Firstly I 
take encounter, considering how in witnessing and describing the everyday life of security 
and in acknowledging the infra-ordinary we develop a sense of the ways in which security is 
encountered and enacted through the taking-place of practices and everyday lived 
experience. This draws on non-representational theories and on the ontology of an 
ʻeveryday urbanismʼ (Amin and Thrift, 2002). Attending to encounters is a move to take 
seriously the realm of practice and lived experience, advancing understandings of the world 
as ʻmomentaryʼ, ʻconstantly generativeʼ and ʻalways in the nowʼ (Thrift, 2000a:556). 
Secondly, and intimately bound with encounters, I consider affect | emotion | feeling. Here I 
am interested in the intensities of encounters and given how security and affects, emotions 
and feelings are and have been witnessed and described previously, I wish to advance a 
more differentiated and nuanced set of geographies. In addition, here and in the thesis more 
broadly, I present and discuss ʻ(in)securityʼ as a nuanced range of a background intensities 
that following Williams are often “at the edge of semantic availability” (1977:134). These are 
discussed through the concept of affective atmospheres (see Anderson, 2009a; Bissell, 
2010; McCormack, 2008, 2010; Stewart, 2011). The final part of this section moves to 
consider attention | distraction, again following from encounters, experiences and everyday 
transactions with security. I am interested in how attention | distraction and acts of noticing 
take place in and through embodied engagements with the city and with security. Here, and 
in the context of the empirics to follow, I am keen to avoid ocularcentrism, as such this part 
of the chapter addresses attention | distraction as tactile, haptic, sensual and embodied. 
Read together with Chapter 2, this chapter explores the theoretical issues and offers a 
review of the literatures which develop the conceptual framing of the empirical study. 
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3.1. The infra-ordinary: what happens when nothing happens, what passes when 
nothing passes 
 
DATE: 18 OCTOBER 1974 
TIME: 12:40 PM 
LOCATION: CAFÉ DE LA MAIRIE 
tens, hundreds of simultaneous actions, micro-events, each one of which necessitates 
postures, movements, specific expenditures of energy: 
conversations between two people, conversations between three people, 
conversations between several people: the movement of lips, gestures, gesticulations 
means of locomotion: walking, two-wheeled vehicles (with and without motor), 
automobiles (private cars, company cars, rented cars, driving school cars), 
commercial vehicles, public services, public transport, tourist buses 
means of carrying (by hand, under the arm, on the back) 
means of traction (shopping bag on wheels) 
degrees of determination or motivation: waiting, sauntering, dawdling, wandering, 
going, running toward, rushing (toward a free taxi, for instance), seeking, idling about, 
hesitating, walking with determination 
body positions: 
seated (in buses, in cars, in cafes, on benches) 
standing (near bus stops, before a shop window (Laffonte, funeral parlor), next to a 
taxi (paying it)) 
Three people are waiting near the taxi stand. There are two taxis, their drivers arenʼt 
there (hooded taxis) 
All the pigeons have taken refuge on the gutter of the district building. 
A 96 passes by. An 87 passes by. An 86 passes by. 
A 70 passes by. A “Grenelle Interlinge” truck passes by. 
Lull. There is no one at the bus stop. 
A 63 passes by. A 96 passes by. 
A young woman is sitting on a bench, facing “La demure” tapestry gallery; she is 
smoking a cigarette. 
There are three mopeds parked on the sidewalk in front of the café 
An 86 passes by. A 70 passes by. 
Some cars dive into the parking lot. 
A 63 passes by. An 87 passes by. 
It is five after one. A woman is running across the square in front of the church. 
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A deliveryman in a white smock comes out of his van parked in front of the café de 
glaces (food) where he is making a delivery on rue de Canettes. 
A woman is holding a baguette in her hand 
A 70 passes by 
(it is only by chance that I can see 84s pass by at the other end from where Iʼm sitting) 
Automobiles follow obviously privileged traffic routes (one-way) from left to right where 
I am); itʼs much less noticeable with pedestrians: it would seem that most are gong to 
rue de Canettes or coming from it. 
A 96 passes by. 
(Perec, 2010:10-11) 
 
On three successive days, Friday 18th, Saturday 19th, and Sunday 20th October 1974, 
Georges Perec spent a number of hours in the Place Saint-Sulpice in central Paris, 
observing from the vantage points of three cafés – the Tabac Saint-Sulpice, the Café de la 
Mairie and the Fontaine Saint-Sulpice – located on different sides of the square, and on one 
occasion from a bench set in the middle “RIGHT IN THE SUN, AMONG THE PIGEONS, LOOKING IN THE 
DIRECTION OF THE FOUNTAIN (SOUNDS OF TRAFFIC BEHIND)” (Perec, 2010:32). After a short 
preamble, An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris [Tentative dʼépuisement dʼun lieu 
parisien]11 consists of a written-up transcript of the notes Perec took over the three days as 
he attempts to observe, to apprehend, to register and to describe what is going on around 
him, an attempt to record everything that happens, everything as it happens. In the prelude 
of An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris, Perec begins with a statement, “There are 
many things in place Saint-Sulpice”, he then composes a list of these ʻmany thingsʼ: 
 
There are many things in place Saint-Sulpice; for instance: a district council building, a 
financial building, a police station, three cafés, one of which sells tobacco and stamps, 
a movie theatre, a church on which Le Vau, Gittard, Oppenord, Servandoni, and 
Chalgrin have all worked, and which is dedicated to a chaplain of Clotaire II, who was 
bishop of Bourges from 634 to 644 and whom we celebrate on 17 January, a 
publisher, a funeral parlour, a travel agency, a bus stop, a tailor, a hotel, a fountain 
                                                
11 In the afterword of the English translation Marc Lowenthal states that Perecʼs An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris is a 
“cornerstone to his oeuvre” (2010:49): “Attempt was one of Perecʼs clearer efforts to grapple with what he termed the ʻinfra-
ordinaryʼ: the markings and manifestations of the everyday that consistently escape our attention as they compose the 
essence of our lives—ʻwhat happensʼ, as he puts it here, ʻwhen nothing happensʼ. Whether it was by recording, composing, or 
transforming these substrate of experience, Perec utilized the infra-ordinary throughout the majority of his books” (Lowenthal, 
2010:51). An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris belongs to a group of writings for which formed part of a larger unfinished 
body of such projects of description named Lieux (for examples see Perec, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d). 
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decorated with the statues of four great Christian orators (Bossuet, Fénelon, Fléchier, 
and Massillon), a newsstand, a seller of pious objects, a parking lot, a beauty parlour, 
and many other things as well (Perec, 2010:3) 
 
Only to suggest that these are already too significant, too obviously noteworthy: “A 
great number, if not the majority of these things have been described, inventoried, 
photographed, talked about or registered” (Perec, 2010:3). Most of this initial list may seem 
already insignificant enough, for as Adair attests, “by their banality, by their quotidian 
ʻinvisibilityʼ”, the majority of such items appear to constitute Perecquian “commonplaces (or 
ʻcommon placesʼ)” (2009:184). Perec however is dissatisfied with this initial attempt, the 
preamble continues and Perec writes that he intends in the pages to follow to describe what 
remains, what is happening even when nothing is happening, what passes when nothing 
passes, nothing noteworthy, nothing but everything, “the rest instead” (2010:3): 
 
that which is generally not taken note of, that which is not noticed, that which has no 
importance: what happens when nothing happens, other than the weather, people, 
cars, and clouds” (Perec, 2010:3). 
 
Not only does Perec intend to describe ʻthe rest insteadʼ, in keeping with his task of 
describing the everyday life of a space, he is to convey what was there, these common 
things, as neutrally as possible: Lʼinfra-ordinaire — the infra-ordinary12: 
 
Whatʼs really going on, what weʼre experiencing, the rest, all the rest, where is it? How 
should we take account of, question, describe what happens every day and recurs 
every day: the banal, the quotidian, the obvious, the common, the ordinary, the infra-
ordinary, the background noise, the habitual? (Perec, 2008a:209-210) 
 
Through various descriptive, theoretical and creative texts Perec undertakes an 
always incomplete interrogation and a common fascination with the quotidian, for Perecʼs 
interest in the everyday and with everyday life is elaborated through a distinctive concern for 
the markings and manifestations of the everyday that consistently escape our attention. As 
his friend and collaborator Virilio notes, Perec teaches us “to watch what we would not 
normally watch, listen to what we would not otherwise hear” (2001:136). Perecʼs texts 
                                                
12 The term ʻinfra-ordinaireʼ was in fact originally coined by Paul Virilio when used as the title for issue 5 of Cause Commune 
published in February 1973 | Lʼinfra-ordinaire, Cause Commune n° 5, Février 1973, Seuil: Paris | 
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associated with the infra-ordinary and his everyday project comprise an eclectic mix that 
were, as James reminds us, “written for a variety of purposes and audiences” (2009:199). 
His is a project that seeks to resist the temptation of focusing on the exceptional, the 
sensational, the extraordinary and the spectacular, a move away from the ʻbig eventʼ, 
through the fascination with which it can appear “as if life reveals itself only by way of the 
spectacular, as if what speaks, what is significant, is always abnormal” (Perec, 2008a:209). 
As Perec suggests, rips of and disruptions to the infra-ordinary when they occur are what 
often catch and hold our attention. Importantly, as he acknowledges, these need not be “the 
historic, significant and revelatory” events that hold public attention such as “[t]idal waves, 
volcanic eruptions, tower-blocks that collapse, forest fires, tunnels that cave in, the 
Drugstore des Champs-Elysées burns down” (2008a:209). Following his example we must 
not leave aside the ʻcommon thingsʼ (Perec, 2008a) and those moments that Stewart 
describes as the “more ordinary disturbances of everyday life” (2007:74). Perec encourages 
us to attempt to approach, to witness, to register and to describe the unnoticed and 
unthought-of of the quotidian, the infra-ordinary background of everyday life. As Perec 
insists, “In our haste to measure the historic, the significant and revelatory, letʼs not leave 
aside the essential” (2008a:209). 
The project detailed in An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris is a part of a much 
broader task undertaken by Perec. The infra-ordinary was a recurrent theme throughout the 
majority of Perecʼs writings, however, it is in his shorter works and essays — particularly 
those essays collected posthumously in Lʼinfra-ordinaire (1989) — that Perec presents it in 
its rawest form; a form of extreme empiricism, focused quixotic attention on what he would 
argue we commonly, and without thought, take for granted (Lowenthal, 2010). As Virilio 
explains in the context of Perecʼs involvement in the periodical Cause Commune: 
 
Our approach to the city … no longer connected to traditional notions of urban 
geography (cadastral survey, social classes, concentration, density and other 
phenomena); rather, it connected to what we termed the ʻinfra-ordinaryʼ, i.e. what we 
do when we do nothing, what we hear when we hear nothing, what happens when 
nothing happens (Walker and Virilio, 2001:15) 
 
It is the oft unnoticed that is subjected to the keenest reflections, what Virilio described 
elsewhere as investigations on the theme “living the inhabitual” (1972-74:13-16, cited in 
Schilling, 2009:198). 
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As Highmore (2002a) observes, Perec uses the neologisms ʻinfra-ordinaryʼ and 
ʻendoticʼ to describe an everyday that is neither ordinary nor extraordinary, neither banal nor 
exotic, the rest instead. Virilio further explains, “In the city there is never a void. There is 
always background noise, there is always a symptom, a sign, a scent. So we are interested 
precisely in those things which are the opposite of the extraordinary yet which are not the 
ordinary either – things which are ʻinfraʼ” (Walker and Virilio 2001:15). Perec uses the term 
ʻthe endoticʼ in opposition to the exotic, “emphasising the unfamiliarity of what is inside 
(endo), rather than the strangeness of the outside or the other” (James, 2009:200, original 
emphasis). The infra-ordinary is, for Perec, “first and foremost the opposite of the 
extraordinary, of that which immediately leaps to our attention. It does not entirely 
correspond to the ordinary, but rather, as the prefix suggests, to what lies hidden beneath 
the surface of ordinariness” (James, 2009:198, original emphasis). Here Peerec explores 
the everyday life usually disdained and repressed, for the infra-ordinary is, the things, 
places, events, happenings, spaces and practices that people do not normally notice, that 
are seemingly unremarkable, ostensibly unimportant. These are, as his translator John 
Sturrock (2008) declares in the back matter of Species of Spaces, “the things we do 
everyday … and the places we do them in without giving them a momentʼs thought”: 
 
to see not just the rips, but the fabric (but how to see the fabric if it is only the rips that 
make it visible: no one ever sees buses pass by unless theyʼre waiting for one, or 
unless the Paris City Transport Authority pays them a salary to count them … ) 
Also: why are two nuns more interesting than two other passersby? (Perec, 2010:33-
34) 
 
With the resolve to be exhaustive rather than selective Perecʼs works demonstrate a 
commitment to interrogating the infra-ordinary, and the belief Perec had “that we none of us 
give enough attention to what is truly daily in our daily lives, to the banal habits, settings and 
events of which these lives almost entirely consist are all but an unnoticed background. The 
infra-ordinary is what goes, literally, without saying” (Sturrock, 1999:xiv). Perecʼs task then 
is to apprehend and uncover, to render the infra-ordinary, albeit fleetingly, noticed and in so 
doing to foreground what is so often taken for granted, overlooked and left over in everyday 
life: the rest instead. This approach, Highmore (2002a) contends, demonstrates the 
possibility of a ruthless, systematic attention that is yet to differentiate between the 
significant and the insignificant. In so doing, Perec foregrounds that which is “continually 
overlooked when traditional notions of significance are applied” (Highmore, 2002a:176). As 
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such, whilst ordinary events, spaces and objects are necessarily and inevitably transformed, 
Perecʼs works attempt to “resist their own sense-making enterprise and question their mode 
of organising the real” (James, 2009:190). 
The problem is, as Perec observes, that we are not accustomed to such 
interrogations, precisely because we are so habituated to what happens every day and 
recurs every day13. While it might initially seem that Perec “sets out to passively and 
randomly record objects and events around him, without any particular order or hierarchy”, 
his project in fact “requires a method of training the gaze to notice things that might 
otherwise escape attention” (James, 2009:202). And so, through many of his writings Perec 
takes on the challenge, asking how should, or perhaps given his fondness for experiments, 
puzzles and play, how could, we uncover, apprehend, witness, take account of, question, 
interrogate, inventory, and describe what happens when nothing happens, what passes 
when nothing passes, what would otherwise escape us, the rest instead: 
 
the banal, the quotidian, the obvious, the common, the ordinary? … We donʼt question 
it, it doesnʼt question us, it doesnʼt seem to pose a problem, we live it without thinking, 
as if it carried within it neither questions nor answers, as if it werenʼt the bearer of 
information. This is no longer even conditioning, itʼs anaesthesia. We sleep through 
our lives in a dreamless sleep. But where is our life? Where is our body? Where is our 
space? (2008a:210) 
 
Perhaps it is a matter, Perec suggests, of the reinvention of ethnomethodology. He 
reflects on this in the essay Approaches to What? suggesting that the task is that of 
                                                
13 Perecʼs turn towards the unspectacular of everyday life aimed, at times, to draw attention to routine practices and processes 
of habituation: “This is experience at ground level, what you might call background noise. Itʼs experience grasped at the level 
of the setting in which your body moves, the gestures it makes, all the ordinariness connected with … your daily routine, with 
exploring your space” (2008:131-132). He seeks to find ways of describing habits so that they can be recognised for what they 
are, anaesthesia as he puts it, as we sleep through our lives in a dreamless sleep. Macgregor Wise (2000:302) states that 
habit is “a series of actions that become automatic and seemingly divorced from conscious thought”, which for Beckett “is a 
compromise effected between the individual and his environment, or between the individual and his own organic eccentricities, 
the guarantee of a dull inviolability, the lightning-conductor of his existence” (1987:18-19). Habit and habituation lend a 
consistency to everyday life, “sets of techniques for on-going coping of and within given forms of life” (Harrison, 2000:512). We 
might think of Perecʼs ʻanaesthesiaʼ through Thriftʼs (1996:37) acknowledgement that subjectʼs understandings of the world 
come from the ceaseless flow of conduct, which, rather than coming from deliberately and intentionally moving through 
spaces, often comes from ʻabsorbed copingʼ, ʻengaged agencyʼ, or ʻcomportmentʼ. There is then a problem, for as soon as a 
habit is recognised then it is broken, by definition. However, deformations of habit within the everyday are themselves 
important to Perec, for whilst insisting that we describe the habitual for what it is, he also acknowledges that the quotidien 
involves change, variation and evolution. Encouraging the disruption of habit, Perec suggests, will allow us “to rediscover 
something of the astonishment” (2008:210) which has been lost in and through habit, the habitual and habituation questioning 
what happens when habits break down, how this takes place and what accompanies these changes. In Perec this reveals the 
tensions between distributions of attention, habit and newness, difference and repetition, and the erosion of permanence. 
These deformations need not be compelled by the ʻbig eventʼ, the ʻuntowardʼ, the ʻextra-ordinaryʼ, they can be and are ordinary 
disruptions, infra-ordinary happenings – our habits are revealed to us through a stumble that awakens us from absorbed 
walking, an awkward realisation as we find that we have driven somewhere without remembering how we got there, something 
out of place draws us out from habituation. 
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“[founding] our own anthropology, one that will speak about us, will look in ourselves for 
what for so long weʼve been pillaging from others. Not the exotic any more, but the endotic” 
(2008a:210). These ʻdistracted thingsʼ, as Harrison observes, are “of the very close, the 
familiar, and the habitual” (2000:497). The difficulty, as Perecʼs work and his own struggles 
demonstrate, is to look critically at what is (infra-)ordinary, the fact of its very ordinariness 
makes it invisible and elusive, for as Highmore explains, “the everyday (yours, mine, and 
theirs) often exists in the shadows, relatively free from our own scrutiny (Highmore, 2005: 
no pagination)”. Perec (2008a) suggests that learning to witness the infra-ordinary world 
would be tantamount to a reinvention of academic enquiry. 
 
Nothing strikes you. You donʼt know how to see (Perec, 2008a:50) 
 
As Perec notes, “What speaks to us, seemingly, is always the big event, the 
untoward, the extra-ordinary: the front-page splash, the banner headlines” (2008a:209). 
Daily newspapers, Perec (2008a) humorously observes, are misnamed as they are 
concerned with and recount everything except what is actually daily in our daily lives. There 
are occasions in An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris, when something exceptional 
(exceptional in this context) impresses into Perecʼs awareness. These moments Perec 
dutifully notes, occasionally offering a commentary on his becoming distracted and not only 
of what it is that attracts him, but also crucially how it is that he is drawn from his task. In 
one observation Perec recognises Paul Virilio, his friend and colleague, who crosses the 
square to see the film version of The Great Gatsby, or as Perec refers to it, “The Lousy 
Gatsby” (2010:33, original emphasis), at the local Bonaparte cinema; on another occasion 
Perec describes an individual, “shaken, but not yet ravaged, by tics (movements of the 
shoulder as if he were experiencing a continual itching in the neck” (2010:19), Perecʼs 
curiosity drawn by virtue of him holding his cigarette in the manner that Perec imagined that 
only he himself did, between the middle finger and the ring finger: “itʼs the first time Iʼve 
come across someone else with this habit” (2010:19). For the most part Perec records the 
happenings of Place Saint-Sulpice as “dispassionately and democratically as a train spotter, 
displaying towards its each and every manifestation an ecumenical favouritism, a 
favouritism equally extended to all” (Adair, 2009:185). Nothing is accorded precedence over 
anything else, in keeping with Perecʼs frustrations with tendencies towards and obsessions 
with the momentous and the unexpected, the ʻeventʼ. Perec argues that “natural cataclysms, 
or historical upheavals, social unrest, political scandals” (2008a:209) leaves aside and omits 
the essential. And so Perec, thinking with and through the infra-ordinary is concerned with 
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the common, distracted things, with the “passing impression of (almost) imperceptible 
events” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:136): 
 
To question what seems so much a matter of course that weʼve forgotten its origin … 
To question that which seems to have ceased forever to astonish us. We live, true, we 
breathe, true; we walk, we open doors, we go down staircases, we sit at a table in 
order to eat, we lie down on a bed in order to sleep. How? Where? When? Why? 
(Perec, 2008a:210) 
 
For Perec, locating the infra-ordinary consists in refusing, above all else, “the 
dislocating effects of the extraordinary, the draw of apparent singularity that destroys a city 
more surely than any bombardment” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:136). The infra-ordinary is a 
world that we are so inured to that we often inhabit it as if anaesthetized, wandering 
distractedly in, as Perec observes, a kind of ʻdreamless sleepʼ: “A very large layer of such 
stuff – buses going by, people putting up umbrellas, pigeons flying, letters on the sides of 
trucks – surrounds us all the time” (Becker, 2001:71). Perec contends that we become 
aware of this infra-ordinary everydayness only when something appears ʻout of orderʼ, in its 
movement somehow ʻout of the ordinaryʼ – a bus is late, an umbrella is raised and it is not 
raining, a flying pigeon defecates close by. As Virilio explains, “We were very much aware 
that there are unknown things concealed by what is visible, things that are hidden not in the 
obscure but in the obvious” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:17). Perec asks how to trouble this, 
how to reveal what is obscured in the obvious, to foreground the ʻbackground noiseʼ of the 
everyday? To extract the quotidian of our daily existence from the disregard of distraction 
Perec problematises the ordinary and transforms the overlooked, the background, into a 
series of questions: 
 
How are we to speak of these ʻcommon thingsʼ, how to track them down rather, flush 
them out, wrest them from the dross in which they remain mired, how to give them a 
meaning, a tongue, to let them, finally, speak of what is, of what we are (2008a:210). 
 
These questions posed by Perec in the essay Approaches to What? emphasise the 
unfamiliarity of the infra-ordinary, indicating the “illusive and hidden nature of [Perecʼs] 
object” (James, 2009:201). 
 In An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris and elsewhere, Perec undertakes an 
impossible task, for as Blanchot observes, “Whatever its other aspects, the everyday has 
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this essential trait: it allows no hold. It escapes” (1987:14). What continues to preoccupy 
Perec is precisely what escapes, for him ʻwhat remainsʼ, what is left when everything else 
has been observed, recorded. James suggests that the object of investigation as the 
“interrogative ʻwhat?ʼ” in the title of Approaches to What? “indicates that the object of is not 
predefined. This object is, in fact, bound to flee the writerʼs grasp at every turn” (2009:200-
201). As Lowenthal writes, this is a “noble exercise in futility”, the “attempt to communicate 
everything, to describe everything — to exhaust everything — is always a sympathetic 
effort, however doomed to failure it may be” (2010:50). Resigned to the fragmentary and 
potentially trivial nature of undertaking this style of research, in An Attempt at Exhausting a 
Place in Paris and through his other pieces, Perecʼs responses are both playful and artful, 
emphasising a projects own arbitrariness and his disposition toward the rest instead, the 
unfinished, the incommunicable, the and, the … . Often we find with Perec that he is 
frustrated at his apparent failure to reproduce space and to pursue time in total: “the mere 
inventory – and it could never be exhaustive – of the items of furniture and the actions 
represented has something truly vertiginous about it” (2008a:41). However, and in spite of 
his chagrin, Perecʼs systems always and necessarily point beyond themselves and remain 
open. For example, Perecʼs enumerations rarely claim to be exhaustive, “the ʻetc.ʼ remains 
implicit”, these enumerations are for Perec “merely attempts at exhaustivity or drawing up 
inventories” (James, 2009:212, my emphasis). 
As Sheringham notes, Perecʼs task involved apprehending and describing the present 
and how it is in its “[c]easeless ʻémergenceʼ” (2006:263), that is to say, as it takes place. 
The infra-ordinary is presented through provisional narratives – fragmentary, temporary 
modes of illustrative understanding, which describe, without pretence of exhaustion, the 
world as it is observed, as it becomes, as it exceeds and escapes in its emergence which, 
and crucially for Perec, leaves the task of apprehending the everyday as always unfinished. 
This openness recognises that “the world does not add-up. The world does not resolve or 
come to rest” (Dewsbury et al., 2002:437, original emphasis). The attempt to communicate 
everything, to describe everything, is always sympathetic and faithful, however doomed to 
failure it may be. The series of one off observations that Perec composes, as Sheringham 
(2006) observes, reminds us of the way apparent sameness is in fact ever changing and 
that we ourselves are part of this constant process: “Time, unarrestable, works against his 
project, though, and he is diverted from his observations by an effort to observe what has 
specifically changed in his field of view … seemingly nothing, but then again, yes … what 
will, in fact, eventually become everything” (Lowenthal, 2010:49). Perecʼs texts are always a 
struggle against elusive space and time. His writings are the “residue of a singular 
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expérience” (Sheringham, 2006:265, original emphasis), for as Beckett observed, “the 
creation of the world did not take place once and for all time, but takes place everyday” 
(1987:19, cited in Dewsbury et al., 2002:437): 
 
I would like there to exist places that are stable, unmoving, intangible, untouched and 
almost untouchable, unchanging, deep-rooted; places that might be points of 
reference, of departure, of origin … 
 
Such places donʼt exist, and itʼs because they donʼt exist that space becomes a 
question, ceases to be self-evident, ceases to be incorporated, ceases to be 
appropriated. Space is a doubt: I have constantly to mark it, to designate it. Itʼs never 
mine, never given to me, I have to conquer it. 
 
My spaces are fragile: time is going to wear them away, to destroy them. Nothing will 
resemble what was … Space melts like sand running through oneʼs fingers (Perec, 
2008a:91) 
 
Perec achieves something that social scientists do not do very well, descriptions of 
the ordinary, the infra-ordinary, descriptions of everyday experience as it is ʻtaking-placeʼ 
(see Anderson and Harrison, 2010a). Perecʼs goal, in An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in 
Paris and elsewhere, as Sheringham points out, is “to make the everyday visible not as an 
objective reality but as something in which we participate” (Sheringham, 2006:268). He 
achieves this through his playful and artistic use of description, commendable, for as Amin 
and Thrift rightly observe, “there is a problem of description. Often we do not seem to have 
the vocabulary to make the everyday life of the city legible; so much seems to pass us by” 
(Amin and Thrift, 2002:5). In the Lieux project, An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris, 
Still Life/Style Leaf and elsewhere, Perec uses “ʻraw descriptionʼ as a fundamental device 
by which ʻrealityʼ is given to the reader” (Becker, 2001:73). Perecʼs descriptive tasks 
develop and undertake experimental methods that can speak of the infra-ordinary, the 
essential, of what we are. Given our anaesthesia, Perec proposes methods to “exit this 
insensitivity: all preconceived ideas must be expelled; nothing should be taken fro granted. 
Perec interrogates his space, establishing elementary distinctions” (Emerson, 2001:93). 
Perec presents neutral, often enumerative descriptions of places and spaces, and attempts 
not to interrogate these, as “banality is the ideal to which the texts aspire: what is seen is 
what is, and nothing more” (Leak, 2001:31). As Virilio explains, “our goal was to be 
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journalists of that which did not seem to interest anybody, to talk about things that were not 
obvious” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:15). Perec accepts that such a project will be 
“fragmentary, barely indicative of a method”, suggesting that for him these should seem 
trivial and futile because “thatʼs exactly what makes them just as essential, if not more so, 
as all other questions by which weʼve tried in vain to lay hold on our truth” (2008a:211). 
This approach and Perecʼs focus on the way things happen is demonstrated in 
Species of Spaces, presenting itself as the ʻjournal by a user of spaceʼ. Perec offers a 
series of projects, exercises in perception and description, that “introduce, for the first time, 
enumeration or lists as an alternative to realist description” (Emerson, 2001:92). These are 
experimental, playful and gentle modes of witnessing and questioning, different styles of 
enquiry and investigation that revel in devices such as list making, enumeration, orientating, 
classifying and above all description. It is important to note, and particularly for Perecʼs 
works on the infra-ordinary, that whilst Perec sought to ʻrecord everythingʼ, at the same time 
he acknowledges the need to be drastically selective. As Sheringham concedes, “given the 
profusion of simultaneous events, leads him to classify and analyse, diverting his attention 
along specific channels, away from any sense of totality” (2006:269). As Perec himself 
declares, “You must set about it more slowly, almost stupidly. Force yourself to write down 
what is of no interest, what is most obvious, most common, most colourless” (2008a:50): 
 
We live in space, in these spaces, these towns, this countryside, these corridors, 
these parks. That seems obvious to us. Perhaps indeed it should be obvious. But it 
isnʼt obvious, not just a matter of course (Perec, 2008a:5) 
 
In his essay Approaches to What? Perec describes the infra-ordinary and the 
difficulties posed by the task of apprehending and observing the rest instead. Perec 
demands that we must go about this task more slowly, almost stupidly, learning to ʻsee 
more flatlyʼ. He contends that we must learn to question that which we take most for granted 
about the everyday, that which is ʻinfra-ordinaryʼ – “bricks, concrete, glass, our table 
manners, our utensils, our tools, the way we spend our time, our rhythms” (2008a:210). For 
Perec, the implications of seeing and writing more flatly meant that prose would avoid, as 
far as possible, “adjectival and adverbal excesses: such adjectives as there are, do indeed 
tend to be as neutrally constative as possible: the colour of objects, their dimensions, their 
form, their relative positions” (Leak, 2001:29). To see flatly involves questioning how we 
might attend to the everyday not as “the closed realm of empty repetition and routine, nor 
yet the site of authenticity, but a space whose enigmatic character is revealed little by little, 
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by our homing in on it, rather than delving behind it” (Sheringham 2006:94). To question the 
habitual. But thatʼs just it, we are habituated to it: 
 
What we need to question is bricks, concrete, glass, our table manners, our utensils, 
our tools, the way we spend our time, our rhythms. To question that which seems to 
have ceased forever to astonish us. We live, true, we breathe, true; we walk, we open 
doors, we go down staircases, we sit at a table in order to eat, we lie down on a bed in 
order to sleep. How? Why? Where? When? Why? 
Describe your street. Describe another street. Compare. 
Make an inventory of you pockets, of your bag. Ask yourself about the provenance, 
the use, what will become of each of the objects you take out. 
Question your tea spoons. 
What is there under your wallpaper? 
How many movements does it take to dial a phone number? Why? 
Why donʼt you find cigarettes in grocery stores? Why not? 
It matters little to me that these questions should be fragmentary, barely indicative of a 
method, at most of a project. It matters a lot to me that they should seem trivial and 
futile: thatʼs exactly what makes them just as essential, if not more so, as all the other 
questions by which weʼve tried in vain to lay hold on our truth (Perec, 2008a:210-211) 
 
In his essay The Street, Perec puts forward a programme for the study of the 
everyday life of a street, at once appealing to the readerʼs participation he writes:  
 
Observe the street, from time to time, with some concern with a system perhaps. 
Apply yourself. Take your time … Note down what you can see. Anything worthy of 
note going on. Do you know what is worthy of note? Is there anything that strikes you? 
Nothing strikes you (Perec, 2008a:50) 
 
This essay is one example of Perec turning to ʻpractical exercisesʼ, experimental 
methods and modes of enquiry. Here he advocates interrogating, inventorying, and 
describing – traditional modes of ethnographic enquiry – but through the project of the infra-
ordinary, these are here addressed to unfamiliar objects: “In Perec, the enumerative 
ʻenquêteʼ [investigation] does not aim at statistical truth or description, but at apprehending 
daily experience in its flow, its rhythm, its ʻémergenceʼ” (Sheringham, 2000:194). 
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Through many of his projects Perec attempts to ʻthink throughʼ the quotidien, 
embracing “the paradox that the compelling interest and pertinence of the everyday lies in 
its resistance to abstract definition and classification and the necessity to explore it at its 
own level” (Sheringham, 2007:205). Perec questions what it means to attend to the 
everyday, and acknowledges the difficulties of doing so, emphasising innovation and 
novelty within his experiments and projects which are open-ended and necessarily 
provisional, for the everyday “comes into view — is invented (Certeau), acknowledged 
(Cavell), and affirmed (Nancy) — when it receives attention” (Sheringham, 2007:205). In 
establishing and working through ʻpractical exercisesʼ Perec composes “the contingent 
ground-rules and stipulations [that] serve to open up rather than close the field of enquiry” 
(Sheringham, 2000:199): 
 
Carry on 
Until the scene becomes improbable 
until you have the impression, for the briefest of moments, that you are in a strange 
town or, better still, until you can no longer understand what is happening or not 
happening, until the whole place becomes strange, and you no longer even know that 
this is what is called a town, a street, buildings, pavements … (Perec, 2008a:53) 
 
At the same time that Perec describes and catalogues things, he remains attentive to 
happenings, what we might call the ʻtaking-placeʼ of lived everyday life (see Anderson and 
Harrison, 2010a); “the present, alive with the force of lived but uncategorizable experience” 
(Sheringham, 2007:203-204). I am in agreement with Sheringham (2006) who writes that 
Perec goes someway toward providing and producing, at times, and in a variety of ways, 
descriptions of ʻlived experienceʼ. There is certainly evidence in An Attempt at Exhausting a 
Place in Paris that points to “a crucial feature of [Perecʼs] project, that its aim is not to arrive 
at abstract knowledge but to explore the lived experience of an individual subject seeking to 
apprehend a dimension of his own reality that is inseparable from his participation in the 
wider circuits of the everyday” (Sheringham, 2006:271). In Penser/Classer, a text he wrote 
about the provenance of the objects on his writing desk, Perec described the project as “a 
way of marking out my space, a slightly oblique approach to my everyday activities … an 
attempt to grasp something that belongs to my own experience, not at the level of its distant 
reflections, but at the core of its ongoing emergence” (Perec, 1985:23 cited in Sheringham, 
2006:263). As Sheringham notes, the texts are devices based on present perception, in the 
context of the exploration of the quotidien, for appropriating the space in which one lives, 
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and of grasping experience as process. They are the “record, the log, of an experience, not 
its summation, and one of the most striking features of [An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in 
Paris] is that to read this experiment in forms of attention is to reduplicate something of the 
experience itself” (Sheringham, 2006:266). Sheringham (2007:204) contends that an 
additional strength of Perecʼs writings are found in his ability to skilfully devise ways of 
exploring both individual experiences and the commonalities of collective everyday life. 
Perecʼs texts thus bear a fascination not only with things, but with the ways things 
happen, with practice and the ways in which spaces are lived. He considers how 
happenings are situated, and offers clues within his methods for marking time as it unfolds. 
His projects, through their versatility, present examples of where and how life is lived and 
experienced in its taking-place: “the ʻgrowing of the realʼ. That is, to see the ʻrealʼ grow out 
of the ʻpresentʼ” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:17). The descriptive texts, through their attention 
to detail capture experience as process and they highlight “quintessence of the experience 
… that which knots together the basic connective tissue of our lives - it is that towards which 
Perec is concerned to turn our attention” (Adair, 2009:181-182). Perec on occasion reflects 
on the experience that he is undergoing, his records punctuated intermittently by bodily 
sensations and changes of mood further revealing how his descriptive texts served as a 
way of marking out his spaces, his activities and everyday experiences at its emergence. 
 
Iʼm drinking Vittel Water, whereas yesterday I was drinking a coffee (how does that 
transform the square? (Perec, 2010:30) 
 
This sense of ceaseless emergence is present throughout his work, as Perec 
attempts to register what is going on around him, faithful to the impossible task of an 
observer, the witness who finds himself wrapped amidst and seeking to exhaust 
interminable unfolding. Perec admits that he is exhausted: 
 
(fatigue) (Perec, 2010:24, original emphasis) 
 
The simultaneous orientating, questioning, commentating, observing, inventorying, 
cataloguing, classifying, describing, experiencing, as well as other playful encounters 
permitted and forced Perec to go into the cityʼs spaces, “looking, seeing, observing and 
writing, all within the same act” (Emerson, 2001:93). For Emerson this meant that both 
Perec and the place of his excursion are “physically present on each occasion, giving him 
the opportunity to interrogate the space within and through the description. Ultimately, 
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Emerson writes, Perec would appropriate the places by a slow and repeated immersion 
within them, noting everything” (2001:93). This was necessary, as for Perec, attending to 
the everyday involves “chipping patiently away” (Lowenthal, 2010:54) at spaces and times, 
which is a challenging and endless task. Through his oeuvre, emerge a set of meticulous 
“elliptical investigations into the ʻbackground noiseʼ of our existence” (Clucas, 2000:11) 
which problematise the everyday, as they track it down, flush it out, wrest it from the dross 
in which it remained mired. Perec apprehends the (extra-) (infra-)ordinary, seeking out 
problems and questions that would allow him to pursue and describe what remains. 
The rest instead. 
 
DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1974 
TIME: 1:05 PM 
LOCATION: CAFÉ DE LA MAIRIE 
For quite a while now (half an hour?) a cop has been standing, without moving, 
reading something, on the curb of the plaza, between the church and the fountain, his 
back to the church. 
A taxi two mopeds a fiat car whose make I donʼt know 
A man running 
Sunny spell. No car. Then five. Then one. 
Oranges in a string bag. 
Michel Martens, with a geranium umbrella 
The 63 
The 96 
A health service ambulance (Paris hospitals) 
A ray of sunlight. Wind. A yellow car in the distance 
A police car. Some cars. An Atlas Reisen car … 
A dark blue Volkswagen crosses the church square (Iʼve seen it before) 
Rarity of complete lulls: there is always a passerby in the distance, or car passing by 
The 96 
Tourists are photographing each other in front of the church 
The church square is empty: a tourist bus (Peters Reisen), empty, crosses it 
The 63 
It is five to two 
The pigeons are on the plaza. They all fly off at the same time. 
Four children. A dog. A little ray of sun. The 96. It is two oʼclock 
(Perec, 2010:45-47) 
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3.2. Differentiating the everyday 
 
Perecʼs constant fascination with the quotidien, his careful attunement with the 
background noise, the humdrum, the infra-ordinary of the everyday and his assertion that 
what is ordinary can so often itself be ʻscandalousʼ, provides an important and influential 
contribution to thinking about and apprehending the everyday. At the same time Perec is 
attentive to more intense happenings, to the event(al), to the truly extraordinary, the ʻbig 
eventʼ, and the ordinary disturbances of everyday life. Given the concern here for how 
security is encountered and enacted as it moves from a set of mechanisms to becoming 
lived and experienced day-to-day, Perecʼs work is an invaluable resource for a more explicit 
theoretical and empirical engagement with the everyday life of security than has been 
previously undertaken. Perec provides a means of attending to security as it is encountered 
as it is absent and/or present within the everyday life of the city so as to apprehend the 
fabric of the infra-ordinary as well as the ʻripsʼ where security is encountered as a more 
intensified presence. In addition, and as Sheringham observes, Perecʼs rich and illuminating 
approaches go someway to nullifying distinctions between theory and practice, “combining 
brain-work with legwork, grasping everydayness at the level of movements, gestures, 
practices” (Sheringham, 2000:187). This provides a supplement to accounts of urban 
security that have tended to focus exclusively on the imbrications of security and urban 
space and on the various security interventions that now populate cities. It also offers a 
means of moving beyond work that has only considered urban security practices as 
principles of state formation. Perecʼs attempts to ʻthink throughʼ the quotidien and his 
experimental methods and styles of presentation offer particularly useful conceptual devices 
which can extend the work of theorising and attending to the complex relations between 
processes of security and the enactment of everyday life. 
Attending to and theorising the everyday, even through the diverse range of creative 
and versatile methods Perec proposes, continues to be problematic. Felski (1999-2000) is 
right in her assertion that in spite of its apparent self-evidence, ʻeveryday lifeʼ as a 
theoretical and analytical concept is unclear, difficult to identify and delimit: “At first glance, 
everyday life seems to be everywhere, yet nowhere. Because it has no clear boundaries” it 
is “the most self-evident, yet the most puzzling of ideas” (Felski, 1999-2000:15). These 
sentiments echo those of Maurice Blanchot whose essay Everyday Speech, ominously 
subtitled ʻThe Everyday: What is Most Difficult to Discoverʼ, warns that the everyday “allows 
no hold”, arguing that it always escapes as “it belongs to insignificance” (1987:14). Blanchot 
writes that the instability of the everyday, that it exceeds through its “inexhaustible, 
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irrecusable, constantly unfinished” nature, means that it “always escapes forms and 
structures” and such is inaccessible to “panoramic vision”; therefore we cannot “introduce it 
into a whole or ʻreviewʼ it” (1987:14). Learning from these warnings and accepting the 
enormous variations within the use of these concepts, as well as the diverse variety of 
alternative categories, there is a question as to whether the terms ʻthe everydayʼ and 
ʻeveryday lifeʼ are too broad as the analytic with which to understand the everyday life of 
urban security. There is a need to disentangle the ʻeverydayʼ and ʻeveryday lifeʼ, and to 
differentiate within these and similar terms. I propose the use of more precise analytic 
vehicles to develop the work of the previous theoretical chapter, Perecʼs account of the 
infra-ordinary and the overall conceptual framing of the empirical study. In this section I 
differentiate within this notion of ʻthe everydayʼ considering three interrelated themes in 
order to explore the distinct problem of security as part of everyday life and lived 
experience: encounter; affect | emotion | feeling; and, attention | distraction. 
 
3.2.1. Encounter 
 
… how the worlds are, given that encounters are all there is, and their results 
cannot be pre-given (Thrift, 2008:2) 
 
Here, and drawing on non-representational theories, I am interested in the practices of 
everyday life and with how we might think the ʻtaking-placeʼ of security – the many and 
different ways security is encountered and enacted, and how it happens day-to-day. The 
approach adopted here is similar to that forwarded by Amin and Thrift, a conception of cities 
which “strives to be close to the phenomenality of practices, without relapsing into a 
romanticism of the everyday, and of action for itself” (2002:4). This offers a means of 
thinking of security as a range of materialities, practices and processes as well as 
intensities — I will explore this final point further in the section to follow. 
Encounters are a vital concept in this approach to cities and to an analysis of the 
everyday life of urban security. Central to this thesis is a concern for how security measures 
are, or might be encountered, enacted and experienced, as a range of absences as well as 
presences, through the everyday use of urban spaces, and through a range of daily, mostly 
ordinary practices. Taking Perecʼs diverse range of experimental approaches as a starting 
point, this involves asking how we might attend to the many and different ways in which 
security is encountered, of what happens in and through these encounters and of how these 
encounters take-place. Then it is to witness the outcome of such encounters, remembering 
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that places “must be seen as dynamic, as taking shape only in their passing” (Thrift, 
1999:310). Following from the previous section, security is understood as not always 
ʻpresentʼ, it is not always part of the foreground of the city, nor is it at the fore of our 
attentions. So often security is encountered, enacted and experienced as a part of the 
known but rarely acknowledged background of everyday life, the unnoticed infra-ordinary: 
the rest instead. Therefore it is essential to examine those encounters where security is 
enacted as a range of presences, but also as something that can be a part of the 
background of everyday life, as absent. It also recognises the transactions, the movements 
between absence and presence, between presence and absence and considers how these 
take place, and the outcomes of such movements (see Ophir, 2005). 
Embracing an “ontology of encounter” and emphasising the principles of “connection, 
extension and continuous novelty” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:27), I approach cities and lived 
everyday experience through an understanding of spaces as relational, marked by 
processes and importantly as unfinished: 
 
In other words, encounter, and the reaction to it, is a formative element in the urban 
world. So, places, for example, are best thought of not so much as enduring sites but 
as moments of encounter, not so much as ʻpresentsʼ; fixed in space and time, but as 
variable events; twists and fluxes of interrelation (Amin and Thrift, 2002:30) 
 
Cities and urban sites are thus conceived as moments of encounter, made up of 
encounters, or associations, within and between all manner of things, peoples, images, and 
events that come together in specific networks or assemblages. Here I am interested in how 
objects by definition partake in multiple assemblages. For security this means that multiple 
assemblages will always emerge through encounters, some of which are related to security, 
some of which are not. These are brought together, assembled, through a diverse range of 
encounters, some of which are expected, anticipated and planned for as part of security 
architectures and dispositifs, whilst others are unplanned and unforeseen, often 
unforeseeable. 
Security can then be understood as overdetermined, “continually and differentially 
constituted” (Gibson-Graham, 1996:16), simultaneously in more than one set of relations 
where “every entity or event exists at the nexus of a bewildering complexity of natural and 
social processes” (Gibson-Graham, 1996:29). As Rose (2002:462) explains, in an 
overdetermined world, the objects and identities we engage with are never defined by their 
inherent properties. Rather, and as Gibson-Graham (1996) suggests, they are determined 
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by the contexts within which they are used. Rose states that the key to a theory of 
overdetermination is recognising that the “determination of an object, concept, norm, etc., 
does not move sequentially from one context to the next but is always defined by multiple 
operations at the same time” (2002:462), the process of world making is never conclusively 
determined or foreclosed. Things are determined by the multiplicity of overlapping contexts, 
“they are always taking shape as they are expressed differently through different practices” 
(Rose, 2002:462). This necessitates that we consider the potential for security to be 
enrolled in experience, and the actual outcomes of these encounters. This depends on 
conceiving and bearing witness to the world as “associational, as an imbroglio of 
heterogeneous and more or less expansive hybrids” (Thrift, 1999:317): 
 
– Fleeting slogans: “De lʼautobus, je regarde Paris [From the bus, I look at Paris]” 
– Ground: packed gravel and sand. 
– Stone: the curbs, a fountain, a church, buildings… 
– Asphalt 
– Trees (leafy, many yellowing) 
– A rather big chunk of sky (maybe one-sixth of my field of vision) 
– A cloud of pigeons that suddenly swoops down on the central plaza, between the 
church and fountain 
– Vehicles (their inventory remains to be made) 
– Human beings 
– Some sort of basset hound 
– Bread (baguette) 
– Lettuce (curly endive?) partially emerging from a shopping bag (Perec, 2010:5-6). 
 
This is an approach that conceives places, and in the context of this research 
security, less as somehow stable and fixed, but as involving “billions of happy and unhappy 
moments of encounter” (Thrift, 1999:302). Adopting this approach appreciates that any 
security measure, practice, process, dispositif, will always be a multiplicity made up of all 
manner of heterogeneous bits and pieces. The forwarding of such an approach accepts that 
the world is made up of all kinds of things that are continually and ceaselessly brought into 
relation with one another “by many and various spaces through a continuous and largely 
involuntary process of encounter” (Thrift, 2008:8). As Thrift writes, things are folded into the 
human world in all manner of “active and inseparable ways and most especially in the 
innumerable interactions between things and bodies which are placed at particular 
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locations” (1999:312). These sentiments are echoed in Perecʼs writings, where he 
foregrounds an understanding that requires us to acknowledge not only our experiences of 
space, but also how “ʻthingsʼ take place, just as events do” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:16). 
Through everyday practices and encounters we come into contact with the thingly world, our 
ordinary lives are lived out “in the midst of things … most of the time they receive our ʻdaily 
inattentionʼ. We donʼt notice them, but we do interact with them” (Highmore, 2010:58; see 
also Stewart, 2003, 2007). As a range of materialities, we encounter security objects as 
absences and presences, knowingly and unwittingly, through day-to-day practices, and it is 
important to consider the materialities that constitute security practices and the spaces in 
which they are found through a focus on objects, materialities and their organisation. 
An ontology of encounter and togetherness foregrounds the practised, emergent 
nature of space and the daily, often (infra-)ordinary associations with and within spaces. 
Non-representational theories are concerned with everyday practices, with what humans 
and/or non-humans do, and with the flow of everyday life understood as ʻin processʼ and 
ʻopen endedʼ (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010a; Thrift 1996, 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2004b, 
2008). Following Thrift (2008; see also Anderson and Harrison, 2010a) this is a geography 
of what happens. Non-representational theory, Thrift suggests, is about “practices, 
mundane everyday practices, that shape the conduct of human beings towards others and 
themselves in particular sites” (1997:142). Developing non-representational theory is not a 
project obsessed with “representation and meaning, but with the performative 
ʻpresentationsʼ, ʻshowingsʼ and ʻmanifestationsʼ of everyday life” (Thrift, 1997:126-27)14. 
These approaches align with Perecʼs notion of the infra-ordinary and “what happens when 
nothing happens” (2010:3), through their engagements with the taking-place of practices, 
things and events. Whilst Perecʼs projects certainly explore lived experiences and attend to 
everyday practices and happenings, his approaches do not take encounters as their explicit 
focus. Non-representational theories concern for everyday practice allows for an 
appreciation of the various styles of encounter and enactment of security and the 
transactions and exchanges between absence and presence that take place as we 
encounter security measures of different kinds. And this permits us to engage with and 
intervene in life as it is lived, the taking-place of practices “which allows us to become 
caught up in the rhythms of diverse and moving materialities” (McCormack, 2006:332; see 
                                                
14 As Dewsbury et al, explain in one of the first commentaries on non-representational theory, representations become 
understood as presentations, as performative in themselves; as things, as doings and events that enact worlds, rather than as 
“masks, gazes, reflections, veils, dreams, ideologies, as anything, in short, that is a covering which is laid over the ontic”. Non-
representational theory takes representation seriously, “representation not as a code to be broken or as an illusion to be 
dispelled rather representations are apprehended as performative in themselves; as doings. The point here is to redirect 
attention from the posited meaning towards the material compositions and conduct of representations” (2002:438). 
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also Latham, 2003; Latham and McCormack, 2004). Returning here to Perec and the infra-
ordinary, these are approaches that encourage forms of engagement that are able “to see 
not just the rips, but the fabric” (2010:33-34). This is a commitment to engaging with and 
presenting the “undisclosed and sometimes undisclosable nature of everyday practice” 
(Cadman, 2009:456) and recognises the impact and importance of the infra-ordinary, the 
momentary, the fleeting and the partial. 
Cities are practiced and composed of habitual practices of walking, looking, moving, 
talking, hearing and so on, security measures are, therefore, understood as being engaged 
with primarily through a range of everyday practices, accidentally, habitually as well as more 
purposefully and consciously. Non-representational geographies, through attempts to 
engage “more actively with the heterogeneous entanglements of practice” (Latham and 
Conradson, 2003:1901), have sought to grasp these taken for granted background 
practices and embodied dispositions through a renewed interest in the taking-place of life, 
attending to the routinised, habitual, the mundane, the ordinary as well as the more intense 
practices and moments of lived experience. Importantly in the context of security, this 
approach acknowledges that so many encounters pass unnoticed, or at least 
unacknowledged. It is through the many day-to-day, ordinary encounters, ordinary 
exchanges and the accumulation of these sorts of relations, between a body bypassing, or 
enacting security through an ordinary exchange, that Perecʼs fabric of the infra-ordinary is 
composed. This is where the ordinary happens as it were, the taking-place of Perecʼs infra-
ordinary. It is from this position that we can appreciate the transactions, or transition points, 
between the habitual and the conscious, where habits and states of distraction are broken, 
attentions focused and where security moves from the background to the foreground. I will 
consider this process further in the final two parts of this section. 
Importantly given the framing of power in the previous chapter, this is an approach to 
cities and to everyday practice which accepts that cities are sites of security, regulation and 
control. Importantly it is recognised that whilst “urban practices are in many ways disciplined 
… these practices constantly exceed that disciplinary envelope. Each urban encounter is a 
theatre of promise in a play of power” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:4). Although places may be 
designed to elicit particular practices, and whilst security is enrolled in regulatory and 
disciplinary projects, these give way to the unintended and unexpected outcomes and 
practices as all kinds of other practices take place which “they were never designed to 
admit” (Thrift, 1999:311). Taking seriously the more ordinary, unintended encounters of and 
with security acknowledges that security is enrolled in multiple assemblages and has 
multiple potential futures about which we can know very little, only some of which involve 
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security acting as security. Bennett encourages us to engage with what she describes as 
ʻvibrant matterʼ and ʻlively thingsʼ, explaining: “By ʻvitalityʼ I mean the capacity of things – 
edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede or block the will and designs of 
humans but also to act as quasi-agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or 
tendencies of their own” (Bennett, 2010:vii, 2001, 2005; see also Anderson and Tolia-Kelly, 
2004; Anderson and Wylie, 2009; Aradau, 2010a; Latham and McCormack, 2004). Security 
as both background and foreground, as absent and present, can be encountered and 
enacted in much the same way as other things, other absent and present elements, and at 
once has the potential to be/act as security, as ʻlivelyʼ. It is therefore essential that we 
appreciate and acknowledge that “the ʻbackgroundʼ itself is hardly inert” (Anderson and 
Harrison, 2010b:9). 
An ontology of encounter acknowledges and gives space to the complexity and 
indeterminacy of the everyday. For an account of the everyday life of security, and in 
considering how security becomes part of the everyday life of cities, this engages with and 
through the different associations that emerge. This serves to witness the absences and 
presences of security, and the capacities for bodies to enact security in different ways as a 
more heightened presence and as part of the background, as a presence to secure and as 
another type of thing entirely. Non-representational theories share a fidelity to emphasising 
the flow of practice in everyday life as “embodied, as caught up with and committed to the 
creation of affect, as contextual, and as inevitably technologised through language and 
objects” these are approaches “concerned with the on-going creation of effects through 
encounters” (Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000:415), following this approach allows for both a 
collective and personal account of the everyday life of security. 
 
3.2.2. Affect | emotion | feeling 
 
An ontology of encounter both encourages and is attentive to everyday geographies 
and forwards an urbanism that can respond to the taking-place of life, to everyday practice 
and performance, and importantly in the context of this research, to embodiment and “how 
the various modalities of the more than/less than rational, including affects, emotions and 
feelings, compose urban life” (Anderson and Holden, 2008:145). This involves the 
valorisation of the “seemingly ephemeral, transient, incorporeal, and inorganic status of 
everyday life”, which are granted equal status with “the presumably much harder and faster 
world of materiality and corporeality” (Seigworth, 2000:257). Here, I am interested in the 
embodied practices through which human bodies encounter and enact security through day-
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to-day practices and how we might develop an affective, emotive and felt urbanism which, 
following Anderson and Holden, is “adequate to the complexity and indeterminacy of 
modern cities” (2008:145). 
As I have described in previous sections of this chapter and in Chapter 2, despite the 
relative lack of attention to everyday life it has been routinely argued that central to 
understanding security measures are a set of implicit assumptions about how they have, or 
might, be encountered and experienced day-to-day. Coaffee et al. are not alone in their 
claim that the manifestations of security policy “within the built environment can transmit 
powerful messages, both intentionally and unintentionally, eliciting a range of subjective 
emotional responses” (2009:507). Elsewhere Adey (2008) and Thrift (2004c) have written 
more persuasively of how spaces are designed, and architectures and technologies 
deployed instrumentally in attempts to actively engineer affect and emotion with particular, 
often politicized aims. Amin and Thrift suggest that this ʻengineeringʼ is centred around 
biopolitics and in particular biopolitical practices of “engineering the body and the senses – 
and life more generally – so as to produce governable subjects. Power penetrates subjectsʼ 
very bodies and forms of life” (2002:28). Whilst I agree that the state and business 
increasingly attempt to engineer the body and ʻcast spells over the sensesʼ, it is important to 
remember that no matter what the affective, emotive and felt reactions intended to be 
stimulated or engineered, there is no guarantee; security does not necessarily produce the 
affect that it names. Rather, “manipulation, where it is achieved, is always a fragile and 
contingent achievement” (Anderson and Harrison, 2010b:11), that is, “prone to failure and 
always reliant upon being continually reworked in … creative responses” (Ash, 2010:655). 
In the context of researching the everyday life of security and how security is experienced, it 
is important to develop an understanding of the multiple ways in which affectivity and the 
emotive life of cities comes to matter in collective and more personal accounts of the 
everyday life of security. 
As with biopolitics and everyday life, affect, emotion and feeling have been 
understood in various ways and have a variety of theoretical foundations15. There is no one 
vocabulary nor a stable definition of affect, emotion and feeling, so is the “diverse literature 
on affect and emotion within geography and other social sciences” (Anderson and Harrison, 
                                                
15 As well as acknowledging the disagreements around how to theorise ʻaffectʼ and ʻemotionʼ within geographical writings, 
Anderson and Harrison (2010b:16) write that “the debate about affect, emotion and their interrelation have turned around three 
points of concern and critique; the apparent distinction between emphasising an impersonal life and the embodied experience 
of subjects; the relation between affect and signification; and the crypto-normativism that has arguably been smuggled into 
work on the politics of affect” (see Anderson and Harrison 2006; Barnett, 2008; Bondi, 2005; McCormack 2006; Thien, 2005; 
Tolia-Kelly, 2006). There is an ʻaffective turnʼ occurring beyond Human Geography where similar issues have become 
important concerns (see for example Clough, 2007; Stewart, 2007). 
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2006:333). The distinction used here emerges from and draws on the works on affect in 
non-representational geographies (see for example Anderson, 2004, 2005, 2006; Anderson 
and Harrison, 2006; McCormack, 2003, 2008; Thrift, 2004c). Following Anderson, thinking 
through affect begins from an attunement to affect as “a transpersonal capacity which a 
body has to be affected (through an affection) and to affect (as the result of modifications” 
(2006:735, original emphasis). Affect is ʻunqualifiedʼ, and, as such, “not ownable or 
recognizable” (Massumi, 2002:28). Affects emerge as pre-personal, unformed and 
unstructured intensities, as the intensity of relations between bodies, where bodies are not 
necessarily human. As Massumi states, “affect is autonomous to the degree to which it 
escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is” 
(2002:35). Affects may be felt as intensities in the body, or find “corporeal expression in 
bodily feelings” (Anderson, 2006:736). Feeling can be described as the sensed registering 
of this affective intensity in a body, as sensation, a corporeal expression checked against 
prior experiences and labelled; it is personal and biographical as every person has a distinct 
set of previous sensations from which to interpret and label their feelings: “Movements of 
affect are expressed through those proprioceptive and visceral shifts in the background 
habits, and postures, of a body that are commonly described as ʻfeelingsʼ” (Anderson, 
2006:736). Both affect and feeling can be further distinguished from emotions. Emotion is 
understood as sensed intensity articulated and expressed in a socially recognisable form of 
expression. Following Massumi, an emotion is a “subjective content, the sociolinguistic 
fixing of the quality of an experience which from that point onward is defined as personal” 
(Massumi, 2002:28). Emotion is “qualified intensity”, it is “intensity owned and recognized” 
(Massumi, 2002:28) and is therefore related to an “already established field of discursively 
constituted categories in relation to which the felt intensity of experience is articulated” and 
therefore “conceives experience as always already meaningful” (McCormack 2003:495). It 
is important to make this distinction for as Latham and McCormack note, to speak of the 
affective materiality of the urban is to “speak of the intensity of the relations in and through 
which it consists, relations that are always more than personal and are always playing out 
before the reflective event of thought kicks in” (Latham and McCormack, 2004:706). This 
cannot therefore be reducible to the emotional experience of the city, it operates prior to the 
personal qualities of emotions: “Affect is a felt but impersonal, visceral but not neatly 
corporeal, force of intensive relationality” (Latham and McCormack, 2004:706). 
Working with this line of thought, and distinguishing between different modalities of 
the more than/less than rational, I take cities to be made up of multiple, differentiated 
affects, feelings and emotions: 
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Within each of these modalities are numerous differences both in degree and in kind. 
Such an attention to constant qualitative differentiation begins to foster an everyday 
urbanism attentive to the taking place of affects, feelings, and emotions that avoids 
assuming that cities have, or could have, a single or dominant identifiable, affective 
register” (Anderson and Holden, 2008:145). 
 
Acknowledging the importance of this last point is integral to bearing witness to and 
then providing a more nuanced sense of the affective and emotive geographies of security 
and involves appreciating that multiplicity is key to everyday geographies of affect and 
emotion. Cities are the sites for the generation of all kinds of affective and emotive 
experience. Here security as a condition and the emphasis on being-(in)secure is 
suggestive of a variegated affective landscape of engagement and encounter with security, 
which cannot be reduced to the naming of a set of simplified positive (safety, confidence) or 
negative (anxiety, fear, terror) affects. Secondly, affect and emotion are only contingently 
related to security, they are overdetermined by other things. Thirdly, these affective 
presences have a strange durability, they come and go, they are fleeting, they are 
transitory, following Mussumi (2002), they are autonomous. As such, they mesh with one 
another, they interfere with one another, they resonate with one another, they are 
transmitted and they have consequences for what people do, for their actions and this then 
feeds back into how they engage with the space and with security. 
Taking this seriously and thinking security and its relation to everyday life, and to 
peoples experiences takes us away from the preoccupation with the security ʻeventʼ and of 
understandings of security as somehow and always already present within cites and urban 
life, to explore the more nuanced ways in which security is enacted both in the infra-ordinary 
and as a range of more intense presences. The infra- and more extra- ordinary are 
significant to a description of the role and ways security are encountered and the difference 
security makes. Doing so questions the many ways in which, through everyday encounters, 
security presses upon us in qualitatively different ways, or goes by unnoticed, but still taking 
seriously the moods, experiences and energies of the perceiving subject. Affect, emotion 
and feeling are important to address life lived ordinarily, following Perec, the infra-ordinary is 
a realm of existence which, like background noise, goes all but unnoticed precisely because 
it is unremarkable involving “an event to which we may not have paid any attention, that we 
may not even have perceived” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:17). This approach to affect, 
emotion and feeling, and in taking the relational seriously, is useful when it is acknowledged 
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that “most of the time in most of our everyday lives there is a huge amount we do, a huge 
amount that we are involved in, that we donʼt think about, when asked about, we may 
struggle to explain” (Anderson and Harrison, 2010b:7). 
Affective and emotive experience consist, in part, of distributed atmospheres and 
intensities that circulate through and register differentially in bodies and agencies of various 
kinds (see Anderson, 2009a; Bissell, 2010; Böhme, 1993, 2002; McCormack, 2008; 
Stewart, 2011; Zumthor, 2006). This provides a means of thinking not only how an 
atmosphere, or more collective public feeling takes place, but also how these are 
experienced intimately. Utilising the concept of affective atmospheres in order to discuss 
and reflect on the everyday life of security considers the role of security in both foreground 
and background affective and emotive life. Thinking here of how atmospheres “can pull the 
senses into alert or incite distraction or denial” (Stewart, 2011:453). Atmospheric pressures 
can be such that they demand engagement, they also “become the live background of living 
in and living through things” (Stewart, 2011:453, my emphasis), the infra-ordinary. The 
concept of atmosphere is interesting and useful in the context of this research precisely 
because it “holds a series of opposites – presence and absence, materiality and ideality, 
definite and indefinite, singularity and generality – in a relation of tension” (Anderson, 
2009a:77). Here I question how atmospheres envelop, surround and press upon life, 
following Anderson (2009a) this is a move to consider more closely the sense of 
atmospheres as collective affects ʻin which we liveʼ. 
It is the holding together of opposites, in tension, that is interesting here. Security as a 
range of presences and absences, encountered and enacted through a range of everyday 
practices. Returning to the infra-ordinary, this considers the background sense as a sense 
of ʻsecurityʼ, precisely as an atmosphere. It is that sense of security which need not 
necessarily ever be present to the person experiencing it, it is not necessarily known or 
knowable, it is always there somewhere, somehow, somewhen, as a background feeling 
and affective atmosphere: “enigmas and oblique events and background noises that might 
be barely sensed and yet are compelling” (Stewart, 2011:453). The term atmosphere 
expresses something vague, “it evades definition” (Preston, 2008:7), refusing capture, yet 
pervasive, everywhere but nowhere, atmospheres rest “at the very edge of semantic 
availability” (Williams, 1977:134). Although affective atmospheres express something 
vague, something which “hesitates at the edge of the unsayable”, at the same time, “the 
affective qualities that are given to this something by those who feel it are remarkable for 
their singularity” (Anderson, 2009a:78, original emphasis). McCormack describes affective 
atmospheres as “something distributed yet palpable, a quality of environmental immersion 
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that registers in and through sensing bodies whilst also remaining diffuse, in the air, 
ethereal” (2008:413). These dynamic qualities allow us to consider the idea of this being a 
feeling but not quite a feeling, named but not nameable, there but not there – this is central 
to this account of urban security and emerges through encounters, affect, emotion and 
feeling. 
Tears, pulls, rips in the infra-ordinary background, of varying intensities, may change 
atmospheres, and atmospheres “may interrupt, perturb and haunt fixed persons, places or 
things” (Anderson, 2009a:78). Security becomes present, or more intensely present in 
relation to atmospheric movements, as an affective state, as a background atmosphere 
coalesces around events which push at the background, bringing it to the fore, punctuating 
it, reshaping it, a “scene in which the sense of something happening becomes tactile” 
(Stewart, 2011:453). Here it is helpful to think of affective atmospheres following Bissell, as 
a “propensity: a pull or a charge that might emerge in a particular space which might (or 
might not) generate particular events and actions, feelings and emotion” (2010:273, original 
emphasis). Returning to Perec, such events need not be spectacular nor somehow extra-
ordinary, a myriad of ordinary disturbances, encounters and transactions, seemingly 
incidental mundane happenings can and do tear the fabric of the infra-ordinary as it is 
constantly forming and reforming. Here the focus falls on a consideration of the 
intensification of presence, and the production of what Ophir (2005) terms an excitation, the 
where the presence of the encounter overshadows the presence of what is encountered – 
whether greatly or slightly: “the intensification of a presence that makes present the 
experience of presence itself for one who is presented with something … An excitation is an 
event in which the presence of some thing acts upon one-who-is-present such that the 
encounter with that thing is shifted from background to foreground” (Ophir, 2005:211). This 
is to ass how people become attuned to or sense the emergence of atmospheres, how 
these endure and resonate, and also how they can become diffuse and unstable. As Bissell 
contends, when producing accounts of the qualitative effect of these intensities “we should 
keep in mind that intensity in this respect can and should be considered as a sliding scale” 
(2008:1699). This allows us to consider how intensities can be either intensified or 
diminished, finished and unfinished. Atmospheres move, continually “forming and 
deforming, appearing and disappearing … They are never finished, static or at rest” 
(Anderson, 2009a:79). Atmospheres “are always being taken up and reworked in lived 
experience” (Anderson, 2009a:79), they are always in the process of emerging and 
transformation. 
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3.2.3. Attention | distraction 
 
Apply yourself. Take your time … 
Anything worthy of note going on. Do you know what is worthy of note? Is there 
anything that strikes you? 
Nothing strikes you (Perec, 2008a:50) 
 
The above extract from Perecʼs essay The Street is a reminder that everyday 
attentions, distractions and practices of noticing are far from straightforward. As Thrift 
writes, “The question is not so much do we notice (attend to) the city? No doubt we do. 
Rather the point is how do we notice it?” (2000c:398). Here I am interested in exactly this 
question, how attention and acts of noticing take place in immediate embodied 
engagements with the city and with security. In this regard Perec is again of value, for as 
Sheringham states, An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris indicates “the sheer 
mulitiplicity of the channels with which we engage with the world” by making us aware of 
“the concrete presence of the experiencing subject” (2006:268-269). As Thrift continues, 
“for long periods of time, I suspect we notice very little at all, at least in the accepted sense 
of the term. Rather ʻweʼ are very small parts of a ʻtranshumanʼ field of activity which ebbs 
and flows. Our urban world, in other words [is] there and not there, only fitfully attended to” 
(2000c:398). The task, as with that undertaken by Perec above, involves trying to 
understand how we notice the city, even if only fitfully, and following both Perec and Thrift, 
how it notices us. Theorists of modernity, of everyday life in the city, such as Walter 
Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, and Georg Simmel, have described the difficult situation of 
the modern subject in terms of attention and distraction. Here I consider this situation and 
how attentions are distributed in everyday life, how attentiveness is heterogeneous and 
complex, echoing Craryʼs notion of an ʻoverloaded fieldʼ (2001:365). I am concerned with 
how we might think the relations between attention and security, both when security is a 
part of the infra-ordinary and the intensification of a presence when security is more 
foregrounded, as well as attentions implication in the continuous transactions and 
exchanges between absences and presences. 
An ontology of encounter necessitates a move away from understandings of attention 
as primarily, and often purely ocular, to consider attention as embodied, haptic and multi 
sensory (see Ingold, 2000; Latham, 1999a, 1999b; Middleton, 2010, 2011; Paterson, 2009; 
Simpson, 2009; Steinbeck, 2004; Taussig, 1992, 1993; Thrift, 2000c): “my gaze, my touch 
and all my other senses are together the powers of one and the same body integrated into 
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one and the same action” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:317-318). Following Thrift, embodiment is 
central to understanding how attentions are practiced, due to the “power of bodies to get a 
hold of the world”, emphasising sensed and tactile appropriation where embodiment 
“articulates and is articulated by a whole range of senses” (2000c:402). Drawing on Ingold 
(2000) this intends to question how the whole body perceives through its involvement and 
movements in an environment, understanding that attention and “embodiment makes no 
sense taken apart from the ʻobject worldʼ” (Thrift, 2000c:402). 
Following this, it is important to consider how shifts and movements in attention take 
place and what is involved when one comports ones body to attend to something, as one 
turns towards it, what kind of modes does comporting to something take? 
 
If we turn our head in one direction, then in another, we donʼt even manage to see 
completely everything there is around us; we have to twist our bodies round to see 
properly what was behind us (Perec, 2008a:81) 
 
In An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris, as Perec shifts his attention his writings 
demonstrate how he moves through a range of bodily comportments and gestures, altering 
the angle of his vision, moving from one café to another, or to the bench in the centre of the 
square. Following Ash, this concentrates on the materiality of bodies, seeking to attend to 
“the practices of spatial orientation as constructed by bodies through their own movements” 
(2010b:415). Orientation and attention must be considered “in coordination with, the bodyʼs 
physical and profoundly tactile knowing of a space” (Latham, 1999b:463). We routinely 
speak of our attentions being drawn, fixed and so on, but too often think little of how these 
movements take place, or how they involve the whole body brought together in the action of 
its involvement in an environment (see Ingold, 2000).  
Everyday practices of attention relate to the ways things happen and take place, as 
much as peopleʼs engagements with their environment, coming together in specific 
assemblages, a process which Taussig describes as an “unstoppable merging” (1992:25). 
As Thrift contends, [t]hings are such a vital part of the world that they cannot be separated: 
they are a vital part of embodied perception” where “[o]bjects are not inanimate; they are a 
part of what it is to be animate” (2000c:402). This is as much about the things, security 
objects, materialities, intensities, human and non-human bodies that make up everyday 
situations as the dynamic attentions of bodies who enact them through a diverse range of 
everyday encounters, where there is “a palpable, sensuous connection between the very 
body of the perceiver and the perceived” (Taussig, 1993:21). Perec (2010) concedes that 
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he is drawn to the unusual wherever and whenever it occurs, his observations reflect this as 
on occasion he turns from the infra-ordinary in unexpected directions. Perec is fascinated 
by the “mechanisms of perception and interpretation, by the ways in which the insignificant 
is drawn to our attention, by the shifting boundaries of vision” (James, 2009:201). Following 
Perecʼs example, this is a move to address the different ways that presences emerge 
through encounters and through disruptions, transactions between absence and presence. 
This is better posed as a question of attunement and engagement involving attentions and 
the coming to presence and the departure from presence of security in the context of 
diverse shifts in attention. 
There are moments in An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris where Perec 
describes the difficulties in remaining attentive, the text is, as the title suggests, an attempt 
and thus serves as “a lesson in the impossibility of the kind of aimless description Perec 
aimed at, and so it is a lesson in how and why investigators have to focus their attention on 
something” (Becker, 2001:72). Perecʼs experiments demonstrate the capacity to switch 
attention from one space to another whilst acknowledging that any encounter with the object 
of ones attentions is always with additions and exclusions within an ʻoverloaded fieldʼ as 
identified by Crary (2001:365). Security is received whilst attentions are channelled 
elsewhere, ʻpaying attentionʼ involves “a disengagement from a broader field of attraction” 
we will inevitably encounter and enact security whilst our attentions are otherwise occupied 
as “our lives are so thoroughly a patchwork of such disconnected states” (Crary, 2001:1). In 
addition, and in the context of urban security, questions of attunement must consider how 
dispositifs of security aim to utilise and even manipulate attentions and distractions. 
Attempts to cultivate absences and presences, to engineer attentions and distractions 
become integral to landscapes and practices of everyday urban security – where some 
security techniques and technologies are deliberate, their efficacy relying on prominence, 
for others discretion is key. 
Perec is “conscious of how chance determines what he may or may not see, but also 
of how attending to one level of phenomena renders others invisible” as a result, he 
repeatedly “realises that something has happened within his field of vision (a car has 
parked, someone has gone by), but outside his provisional frame of attention – occluded by 
other claims, or by a temporary absence of mind” (Sheringham, 2000:198). Attention is 
always in competition, and in any number of ways, “attention inevitably reaches a threshold 
at which it breaks down” (Crary, 2001:47): 
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Obvious limits to such an undertaking: even when my only goal is just to 
observe, I donʼt see what takes place a few meters from me (Perec, 2010:15, 
original emphasis) 
 
Returning to Thriftʼs (2000c) supposition that for long periods we notice very little at 
all, and Perecʼs insistence that we must finds new ways of attending to the city and to the 
everyday precisely because we are so habituated, reveals that our urban world is there but 
not there, absent and present, familiar but not necessarily known, experienced and 
negotiated through distraction. Sheringham suggests that the way we read and discover 
more and more in An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris “matches the way observing 
the everyday brings about a transmutation of attention, making visible something that was, 
according to Perec, disguise by the narrowness of our habitual modes of seeing” 
(2006:268). Indeed, Perecʼs everyday writings and investigations are often concerned with 
questioning “the tenacity of perceptual habits and writingʼs ability to question and transform 
these habits” (James, 2009:199). Benjaminʼs (1992, 1997; Latham, 1999b) writings on cities 
propose the distracted and habitual as our means of ʻunderstandingʼ the city, styles of 
everyday knowing where the appropriation of space is ʻtactileʼ and ʻopticalʼ, based in ʻuseʼ 
and ʻperceptionʼ. These descriptions of distracted, everyday knowledges do imply the lack 
of attention, rather they present “a different, more flexible mode of perception” (Caygill, 
1998:115) and conditions of reception which highlight the many and different ways that 
cities can be noticed. As Harrison, drawing on the writings of Benjamin, observes, 
distraction “absorbs architecture into the body, and vice versa, via tactility … An embodied, 
geohistorically specific, sensuous knowing (enacting) of the everyday” (2000:511). 
Everyday encounters are often enactments that take place through our distracted, tactile 
ʻknowingʼ, which for Taussig constitute an everydayness not of “sense so much as 
sensuousness, an embodied and somewhat automatic knowledge that functions like 
peripheral vision, not studied contemplation, a knowledge that is imageric and sensate 
rather than ideational” (1992:141). These are the practical knowledges that Thrift 
(2000c:402) suggests provide the means by which cities keep going. Such accounts are 
significant for they allow us to think in terms of how the focusing of attention in and through 
distracted encounters take place, part of everyday life which is so often “unreflexive and not 
necessarily amenable to introspection” (Anderson and Harrison, 2010b:7). 
Attention and distraction are understood here as inseparable and should be thought of 
as always existing on a single continuum, rather than as dichotomous opposites constitutive 
of different states: “a continuum in which the two ceaselessly flow into one another, as part 
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of a social field in which the same imperatives and forces incite one and the other” (Crary, 
2001:51). This reveals the importance of thinking about attenuation, and questions of the 
“economies of rest and indifference” (Latham, 1999a:162) with which attention, arousal and 
interest are intertwined. Following Crary, attention is “a dynamic process, intensifying and 
diminishing, rising and falling, ebbing and flowing according to an indeterminate set of 
variables” (2000:47). As Sheringham writes, Perecʼs notations “make us privy to the 
processes, the vicissitudes, of his attention, relayed to us directly by the intermittent record 
of bodily sensations and changes of mood; and indirectly by constant fluctuations in his way 
of articulating what is happening” (2000:197). An attentiveness to particular objects implies 
a parallel disengagement from other stimuli, following this we can “consider how, during 
these durations where attention is directed, other objects in the proximate environment are 
excluded from the perceptual field” (Bissell, 2009a:52). Processes of attention are therefore 
understood to oscillate between passive and more active interrogative styles, according to 
indeterminate variables and involving the “dynamics of engagement and disengagement 
within urban space” (Latham, 1999a:161). 
Weiss is correct in asserting that “when life is running smoothly and predictably most 
people are usually less inclined to question the status of the familiar” (2008:1). As has been 
acknowledged, there is a difficulty in looking critically at what is infra-ordinary, the fact of its 
very ordinariness makes it invisible to critical attentions and to the attentions of everyday 
practice, experienced through the dreamless sleep of Perecʼs anaesthesia. As Crary writes, 
so often “we are in a dimension of contemporary experience that requires that we effectively 
cancel out or exclude from consciousness much of our immediate environment” (2001:1). 
The apparent ubiquity of security further complicates an account of attention in and through 
structures of expectation that make up everyday urban experiences. As with other familiar, 
taken for granted and expected urban presences, security of one form or another, has come 
to be known, come to be expected as always somehow already present. In the introduction 
to his Everyday Life Reader, Highmore writes that things become everyday precisely when 
they no longer hold our attention, as such security can be said to become ʻeverydayʼ by 
“becoming invisible, unnoticed, part of the furniture. And if familiarity does not always breed 
contempt, it does encourage neglect” (2002:21). 
Security will, at times and according to an ʻindeterminate set of variablesʼ attract 
attention, become the subject of our interest, of our distractions stimulating engagements, of 
different styles and varying degrees of intensity. Perecʼs descriptive texts demonstrate the 
work of attention along specific channels, also highlighting how attention oscillates, between 
relative passivity and more active forms of interrogation, fluctuating on a continuum in which 
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attention and distraction ceaselessly flow into one another. Following Bissell (2009a:57), at 
times ones perceptual field will be overloaded, whilst at other times it might be calmer, or 
more attenuated, each having the potential to bring about particular embodied effects. Our 
attentiveness to security is far from consistent, and far from straightforward, it is important 
therefore to produce “new senses of how the city can be noticed” (Thrift, 2000c:403), and 
noticed in new ways. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The theoretical material developed through this and the previous chapter offers a 
conceptual framework through which this thesis addresses processes of counter-terrorist 
urban security and the complex relations between security and everyday lived experience. 
In doing so this conceptual work enables this thesis to analyse and describe issues around 
the securing urban public spaces, discussed in depth in Chapter 5, as well as how this 
specific form of security apparatus and the related array of counter-terrorist security 
interventions are then encountered through different day-to-day practices within everyday 
life, as developed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. To this end, this chapter and Chapter 2 offer 
a conceptual vocabulary and a theoretical framework that enables this thesis to describe the 
everyday life of security and attend to how the everyday is secured. 
As I have insisted, the everyday has been repeatedly under theorised and often 
overlooked altogether in accounts of urban security, often in spite of claims or hints to the 
contrary. Considering the everyday life of security following Perec provides a means of 
theorising the infra-ordinary and how security comes to be submerged, enacted so often as 
a part of the background of everyday urban life. At the same time Perecʼs attention to the 
event(al), to more ordinary and extraordinary happenings allow this thesis to acknowledge 
and then witness security interventions as more animated and as a range of intensified 
presences: “to see not just the rips, but the fabric” (Perec, 2010:33). This appreciates and 
attends to the shifting complexities of an everydayness which is endlessly forming and 
reforming in and through encounters. An empiricism which is responsive to the more 
evental, extra-ordinary tears and which can intervene in, witness and describe the 
background (infra-)ordinary fabric also. 
Following Seigworthʼs example, an approach which draws on Perec and non-
representational theories provides a conceptual framework that has “its attention directed 
toward ʻLifeʼ – not merely in its immediacy … but life in all of its sticky and slack 
human/nonhuman, inorganic/incorporeal, phenomenal/epiphenomenal, and banal/intense 
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everydayness” (2000:246). This provides a means of attending to security as it is 
encountered, as it is absent and/or present within the everyday life of the city, practiced and 
enacted as a range of absent presences and present absences. 
This contributes to our understanding of how a form of biopolitical security is 
developed and operates as it seeks to intervene in, to regulate and indeed to promote the 
everyday city and urban life. Not only does this question the efficacy of security as it takes 
cities and the life of cities as its referent object and the enactment of the threats of terrorism, 
it also addresses the ways in which this form of security becomes part of urban life. This is a 
form of security which is expected to operate within and be reconciled with the conditions of 
the everyday city. It is primed to become part of urban spaces and the everyday happenings 
of urban life so as to become a background presence, then intended to emerge in response 
to a security event. Counter-terrorist security interventions are required to be ʻproportionateʼ 
to a changeable threat environment whilst ʻappropriateʼ and so more sensitive to different 
and spatially contingent urban sites, I will discuss this at greater length through the course 
of Chapter 5. This is to be achieved against and in the context of biopolitical aims, to 
regulate and to promote the ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-democratic life and enabling the ʻgoodʼ 
circulations and interdependencies of urban sites. 
The following chapter demonstrates how the conceptual approach outlined here leads 
to particular invocations for method and the development of a methodological approach that 
can attend to and examine the securing urban public spaces, as well as how security 
interventions are encountered and lived through everyday life. 
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4. Methodology: Researching the Life of Security 
 
Introduction 
 
Following the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this chapter 
explains how the methodological approach for this study was developed and undertaken. 
The methodology provides “vantage points above, below and in between the surfaces of 
cities” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:7) in order to examine the processes through which security is 
enacted in cities whilst attentive to, describing and intervening in the taking-place of 
practices, events and things, as spaces and security emerges through practical enactment. 
The first section of this chapter outlines the rationale for the methods practiced, 
describing the practical issues, concerns and problems that researching the everyday and 
the everyday life of security pose. These necessitated a methodology that was experimental 
in approach. It draws inspiration from Foucaultʼs work on dispositifs; Perecʼs work on the 
everyday, particularly his ʻpractical exercisesʼ; and non-representational geographies 
commitment to developing established and more traditional approaches to methodology, 
addressing the “methodological timidity” (Latham, 2003:1993; see Thrift 2000a) that social 
research has been accused of. Following this, the second section outlines the 
methodological approach, discussing the research sites and the case study approach, and 
the series of qualitative research methods used, describing how these were practically 
undertaken. For the sake of clarity this section is divided into two parts: dispositifs of 
security; and the everyday life of security. This is a pragmatic distinction, and it should be 
remembered that each of the methods work together following Lawʼs (2004) example of the 
method assemblage. The methods are practiced in ways that condition and inform each 
other, responding to and intervening in the complexities of the research process and the 
study of the everyday life of security. The third and final section concludes this chapter 
through a brief discussion of the processes of analysis and presentation. 
 
4.1. Encountering everyday urban security everyday 
 
4.1.1. Researching the everyday life of security 
 
The methodology outlined here follows a commitment to embracing the openness of 
the world. As Dewsbury et al. (2002) maintain, this involves practicing methodologies and 
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producing accounts that leave a space for something else to happen. As such, and 
following Law (2004), rather than attempting to uncover and present a singular reality, our 
task is to find the best ways of thinking through and intervening in the unfolding of complex, 
diffuse and messy everyday worlds. Engaging with and accounting for the everyday and 
everyday life as it is lived then requires a modest empiricism which will be partial and 
always unfinished: “The world is more excessive than we can theorise” (Dewsbury et al., 
2002:437, original emphasis). This is an important stance for researching the everyday life 
of security, for where the world is taken to be processually emergent, security certainly does 
not resolve or come to rest, landscapes of security are shifting, and dispositifs of security 
whilst marked by specificity and circumstance, are centrifugal. Attending to the concerns of 
this research does not present a call for the complete dissolution and disavowal of fixities, 
rather as with everyday life, security practices and processes, events, materialities and so 
on can be more obstinate, more stable and we must welcome this situation also, 
questioning how things hold together, if only momentarily. As Law, citing the work of 
Michael Serres, states “the real – the solid and the fluid – endlessly intersect”, as such the 
methodology practiced in this study recognises this complexity, and understands that 
realities are composed of “flux, fixity, and also their intersection” (2004:117, original 
emphasis). 
Responding to this, the methodological practices employed here are a modest attempt 
at appreciating some of this complexity, “pointing to and articulating a sense of the world as 
an unformed but generative flux of forces and relations that work to produce particular 
realities” (Law, 2004:7). Dewsbury calls this stance a kind of ʻwitnessingʼ that is orientated 
towards being “in tune to the vitality of the world as it unfolds” (2003:1923), attentive to, 
intervening in, apprehending and describing the taking-place of practices: 
Hospitable then to whatever happens; to whosoever or whatever arrives. And 
importantly, in the meantime, hospitable to the potential for such encounters, even 
now a space left empty for encounters which may contain the potential to unfold 
things otherwise, each with its varied accounts and styles of expression for speaking 
and writing; each enacting a world, again and again (Dewsbury et al., 2002:438) 
 
In their recent progress report, Davies and Dwyer (2007; see also Crang, 2002, 2003, 
2005; Davies and Dwyer, 2008, 2010; Lorimer, 2005, 2007, 2008) argue that although many 
of the practical procedures of qualitative research remain the same, in place of the pursuit of 
certainty found in generating representations of the world, geographers now recognise that 
“the world is so textured as to exceed our capacity to understand it, and thus to accede that 
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social science methodologies and forms of knowing will be characterised as much by 
openness, reflexivity and recursively as by categorisation, conclusions and closure” 
(2007:258). This shift to more pluralistic accounts is also acknowledged by Latham, who 
commends those who have committed themselves to undertaking “methodologically 
innovative research which is pushing the boundaries of established conventions”, praising a 
willingness to experiment with established and more traditional methods through the 
creation and practicing of “innovative, insightful methodological hybrids” (2003:1993). 
Within non-representational theories there has been, as Anderson observes, a 
“nascent experimentation with research methods, as well as diagrammatic and narrative 
forms of presentation, that take as their task to learn to witness the ongoing taking-place of 
life” (2009b:505; see also Anderson and Harrison, 2010b; Dewsbury, 2000, 2003, 2009; 
Dewsbury et al. 2002; Thrift, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e, 2008; Thrift and 
Dewsbury, 2000). It is acknowledged that such commitment to innovation and 
experimentalism goes some way to providing methodological approaches that can better 
cope with “our self-evidently more-than-human, more-than-textual, multisensual worlds” 
(Lorimer, 2005:83). There is then a commitment to describing, to bearing witness and to 
attending to the embodied, the affective, the sensuous and the performative as well as the 
purely cognitive and reflexive (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010a). Non-representational 
approaches share a commitment to avoiding what Dewsbury et al. refer to as an 
ʻembalming obsessionʼ and ʻvampirismʼ where “events are drained for the sake of orders, 
mechanisms, structures and processes” (2002:438). Instead these, and other approaches, 
are committed to attending to life and thought as practiced, ʻin processʼ and ʻopen endedʼ. 
Such approaches, as Whatmore suggests, offer a supplement to the familiar repertoire of 
methods that largely rely on and generate text and talk, with innovative and experimental 
practices that “amplify other sensory, bodily and affective registers and extend the company 
and modality of what constitutes a research subject” (2006:606-607). 
Whilst its focus is in part on the taking-place of everyday urban experiences, paying 
greater attention to the relations between bodies and objects (see Bennett, 2004, 2005, 
2010; Whatmore, 2002), the methods developed through this research are also committed 
to understanding the governing and securing of particular contexts and sites. Studies of 
urban security have tended to involve the mapping of an emerging security apparatus in the 
city, presenting understandings of the geographies and geopolitics of urban security through 
talk of technologies, techniques, processes, architectures and disciplined territorialities. 
Whilst such work is necessary and the  ʻview from on highʼ (de Certeau, 1984) important, it 
is argued here that these debates have been rather circumscribed and must be 
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supplemented through considerations of the constitution and practices of security, of the 
variegated spatialities and of dispositifs of security, and how the materialities that make up 
these processes are encountered as they become part of lived urban life. As such, and 
following Rabinow and Rose, who draw on Foucaultʼs methodological approach, this 
proposes a form of empiricism that is “attentive to peculiarities, to small differences, to the 
moments when shifts in truth, authority, spatiality or ethics make a difference for today as 
compared to yesterday, reveals configurations that do not conform to the images provided 
by our philosophers” (2006:205). The methodological practices here seek to address the 
rationalities of the specific forms of a security apparatus that is traced through the case 
study within this thesis, that of the emerging urban based counter-terrorist security in cities 
in the UK. This involves attending to and acknowledging the differences in how this 
apparatus of security emerges and is enacted as it is practiced in the context of the 
securing of urban space. In so doing it addresses the configurations of a heterogeneous 
ensemble, elements of the apparatus, as well as, and significantly, the relations between 
them. 
Rather than abandoning the more familiar toolkit of methodological skills, the 
methodology developed here, following Latham, works through how more traditional 
research methodologies can be adapted and imbued “with a sense of the creative, the 
practical, and being with practice-ness”, experimenting with traditional methods in ways that 
encourage research practices that “dance a little” (2003:2000). As such this work takes 
inspiration from and draws on works that have considered the embodied and performative 
nature of practice and lived experience which, as Latham comments, “allows the researcher 
to address some novel questions about the cultures of everyday urban experience that 
more conventional, presentationally-oriented, methods fail to address adequately” 
(2003:1994; see also Dewsbury, 2000, 2003; Nash, 2000). These methods develop styles 
of empirical practice which aim to interrogate dispositifs of security and the taking-place of 
security as it is enacted and becomes part of urban life so as to bear witness to and 
describe the everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured. 
 
4.2. Research locations 
 
This research focuses on the securing of open, urban public spaces and so called 
ʻcrowded placesʼ for a number of different reasons. Firstly, appreciating that counter-terrorist 
security practices are spatially contingent, that security responses across the UK and 
indeed within named cities differ and that in spite of the apparent ubiquity of security, 
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interventions are not evenly distributed within cities, this thesis offers a case study of a 
specific form of counter-terrorism through the securing and governance of public ʻcrowded 
placesʼ (Home Office, 2009a). In part this is a response to recent works that have previously 
addressed the securing of such sites and the prevalent critiques within both academic and 
non-academic debates which cite the negative effects of security practice on both cities and 
urban life to the extent that security has come to be narrated as an instrument of ʻurbicideʼ 
(see Campbell et al., 2007; Graham, 2003). It also responds to recent UK Government 
policy that has sought to further secure such areas and the claims made to establish the 
rationales for the increased securitising of the spaces of urban life and everyday life itself. 
Secondly, and related, it is a response to understandings of the city as flows and 
circulations, aiming to examine the relationships between security and freedom. Third, this 
consideration of urban public spaces discusses the securing of and securityʼs relations to a 
milieu, understood following Foucault (2007) as both an environment (surroundings) and as 
the space of security. The aim here is to consider how security is planned and 
operationalised when there are other competing interests, practices and concerns, many of 
which often demand precedence over security. This aims to question both how security is 
brought into reconciliation with cities and the UK Governmentʼs concern for 
ʻappropriatenessʼ and ʻproportionalityʼ. Fourthly, the rationale of public space, considers 
spaces where security is heightened, but still embedded in the material fabric of the city and 
still embedded in the ordinary everyday life of the city. Fifth, and more practically, in order to 
undertake the methods detailed in the following section, a longer, more sustained period of 
involvement with spaces of security was required to carry out the research. 
It is essential that the artificiality of the sites is acknowledged, this is an imposed 
demarcation – security is understood to be centrifugal and the spatialities security produces 
are complex. For the purposes of this research, the two sites are the Victoria Line of the 
London Underground (see Figure 4.1), and the Southbank and Bankside area along the 
southern bank of the River Thames between Westminster Bridge, including the ʻriverside 
areaʼ of the South Bank, and a portion of the ʻBanksideʼ area up to the Millennium Bridge, 
including the Tate Modern Bankside area (see Figure 4.2)16. Preliminary research for this 
thesis, involving periods of intense observant participation was conducted over a one-month 
period at a number of different potential sites in London. 
 
                                                
16 Pilot research was conducted during the summer of 2007 as part of an MA in Research Methods. The study that formed the 
basis of the MA dissertation was undertaken in order to develop a variety of experimental qualitative research methods that 
could be used to examine the everyday life of security. The research was conducted daily over a one month period in 
Parliament Square, London. 
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Figure 4.1 Schematic maps showing the Victoria Line of the London Underground. Adapted from TfL schematic map. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Schematic map showing the Southbank and Bankside research areas. Adapted from Film London schematic map. 
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The Victoria Line of the London Underground and the Southbank and Bankside area 
of the Southbank were selected as they raise the issue of the relationship between freedom 
and circulation, and freedom and security, increasingly central to the UK Governmentʼs 
approach to securing the spaces of urban life. The Victoria Line and the South Bank sites 
allow this thesis to examine how new ways of securing public space function when the aim 
is to foster circulations and freedom. As such, it can then attend to questions of 
ʻproportionalityʼ and the emergent concern with sensitive and site specific security practices 
which are ʻappropriateʼ to the conditions of particular urban areas. The Victoria Line and the 
South Bank sites were taken as the areas of study precisely on the basis of them being 
open sites of circulation, but managed circulations, composed of different forms and styles 
of movements which are secured through different practices of security involving a range of 
different spatialities. The two sites both raise interesting questions of how the life to be 
secured is both the life that harbours the danger and harbours the freedom. 
The Victoria line is a deep-level London Underground line that links Walthamstow, in 
north east London, with Brixton in south London, covering 21 km (13.25 miles), serving 
sixteen stations (see Figure 4.1). It is the only line on the London Underground, except for 
Waterloo and City, that is entirely below ground: the only above ground section is from 
Seven Sisters to the Northumberland Park depot. The line opened between 1968 and 1971 
equipped with an Automatic Train Operation system: the train operator closes the train 
doors and presses the start buttons, if the track is clear the train runs automatically to the 
next station, responding to coded impulses transmitted through the track (TfL, 2011). There 
are forty-three trains, of which thirty-seven of eight carriages are required to run in each 
direction, every two minutes, for scheduled peak period service. The original fleet, known as 
1967 tube stock, was designed for the opening of the line, these were refurbished between 
1991 and 1995. A new fleet, part of a £90m upgrade of the Victoria Line, began operating 
from July 2009 (see TfL, 2009). Trains travel at speeds of up to 50 mph, carrying an 
estimated 630,000 passengers a day, and 183 million passengers each year (footfall differs 
markedly station to station), making the Victoria Line the fourth most heavily used line on 
the Underground network in absolute figures, in terms of the average number of journeys 
per mile it is considered the most intensely used (see Metazone, 2011; TfL, 2011). 
No two stations on the Victoria Line are alike. The majority of stations are 
interchanges for other London Underground and overland lines (see Figure 4.1), Pimlico is 
the exception where there is no form of interchange. At each of the sixteen stations there 
are different numbers of booking halls, ticketing counters, self-service machines, cash 
points, stairways, escalators, lifts, concourses, lights, dot-matrix, CCTV cameras, London 
95 
Underground staff, etcetera. The proximate environment, the area around the entrance | exit 
points, are considered part of a station. The walls of the booking halls, concourses and 
platforms are adorned with an assortment of posters and advertisements as well as London 
Underground maps, TfL information notices and policing statements. In addition, there are 
signs on the walls indicating the presence of CCTV, cameras of various shapes and sizes 
are positioned throughout stations. Regular announcements acknowledge the presence of 
CCTV, as well as issuing security warnings and providing service updates – these do not 
have a set format and so differ in each of the sixteen stations. Signs featuring the name of a 
station run along the platform-side walls, along with arrows indicating the exit and routes to 
other London Underground lines. On the track-side wall, at regular intervals, the station 
name is featured within the London Underground symbol. Light blue colour codes the 
Victoria line, representing it on the Tube Map and features prominently in the platform and 
train design. All Victoria line platforms were originally tiled in blue and grey, each decorated 
with tiled motifs in seating recesses to give an individual character and help identify the 
station. Smooth paving covers the platforms with blister/tactile paving toward the edge, part 
of this is painted yellow to designate a safety line, a further white painted line highlights the 
very edge (see Metazone, 2011; TfL, 2011). 
 
Travelling from one end of the Victoria Line to the other, an approximation of the 
journey time, not factoring in interchange times and times when the train is stopped: 
thirty-five minutes*TfL (2011) suggest an average journey time of thirty-two minutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Observant participation, Victoria Line, 24.11.08) 
 
The Southbank research site runs along the riverside footpath, Queens Walk, from 
Westminster Bridge, including the ʻriverside areaʼ of the South Bank, and a portion of the 
ʻBanksideʼ area immediately adjacent to the River Thames, up to the London Millennium 
Walthamstow Central Start 
Blackhorse Road 2 minutes 
Tottenham Hale 4 minutes 
Seven Sisters 7 minutes 
Finsbury Park 11 minutes 
Highbury and Islington 13 minutes 
King’s Cross St. Pancras 17 minutes 
Euston 19 minutes 
Warren Street 20 minutes 
Oxford Circus 22 minutes 
Green Park 24 minutes 
Victoria 26 minutes 
Pimlico 29 minutes 
Vauxhall 30 minutes 
Stockwell 33 minutes 
Brixton 35 minutes 
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Footbridge, including the Tate Modern Bankside area (see Figure 4.2) (see Farrell, 2009; 
SOUTHBANKLONDON, 2011, SBEG, 2011). The site forms a long section of ongoing riverside 
development that is within the London borough of Lambeth and partly in the London 
borough Southwark, however, many parts of the Southbank are divided up by the private 
organisations and agencies that own and manage the land. Within the site, a series of 
central London bridges connect the southern bank to the northern bank of the River 
Thames, which is used as a means of transport, with piers situated at the London Eye, 
Royal Festival Hall and Bankside. This research site is an eclectic area that includes 
residential locations, commercial office buildings, businesses, art, media and entertainment 
organisations, tourist attractions and two open green spaces, Jubilee Gardens and Bernie 
Spain Gardens. One of the most prominent sites in the area is the Southbank Centre, 
comprising the Royal Festival Hall, the Queen Elizabeth Hall and the Hayward Gallery. Part 
of the South Bank Centre, an architectural ʻdead spotʼ known as the under-croft, is used by 
skateboarders and bikers, the under-croft is a designated graffiti space. The Royal National 
Theatre and the BFI Southbank are located adjacent to the Southbank Centre, but are not a 
part of it. Near the southern end of the London Millennium Footbridge, the Tate Modern is 
housed in the former Bankside Power Station. Close to Westminster bridge, County Hall is 
no longer used by the London County Council and has been converted for use as a hotel, 
also housing the London Sea Life Aquarium, the London Film Museum, the London Eye 
offices and a series of eateries. Additional businesses are located along the walkway, as 
are a number of shops, for example the boutiques situated in the OXO Tower and those in 
Gabrielʼs Wharf. In addition, there are numerous cafés, bars and restaurants as well as 
further tourist attractions, the most prominent of which is the London Eye. Along sections of 
the tree lined footpath, most notably the stretch of Queens Walk adjacent to Jubilee 
Gardens, there are normally a miscellany of street performers. Situated beneath Waterloo 
Bridge on the riverside walk by BFI Southbank is the South Bank centre book market, an 
established open air second hand, antique and vintage book market. There are a number of 
annual and other more infrequent events, performances and exhibitions hosted across the 
site. 
The Victoria Line and the South Bank sites provide a case study of a particular 
security apparatus and provide a distinct and in many ways a deliberately artificial spatial 
formation, a milieu. The milieu, as Foucault (2007) explains, is understood as both a distinct 
environment and as the space of security. As with Perecʼs texts, this case study, the 
reflections of participantʼs through their involvement and my own observant participation are 
accounts of everyday life and lived experiences which are themselves exceptional: “the 
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residue of a singular expérience” (Sheringham, 2006:265). The case, as it enables thinking 
and presenting the singularity of dispositifs of security and of everyday life, is an appropriate 
means of thinking the constellations of different things which come together in any dispositif 
in and through the taking-place of everyday experience. As Flyvbjerg writes, the case study 
is not always appropriate or relevant as a research method, it “should always depend on the 
problem under study and its circumstances” (2001:75). The recent double issue of Critical 
Inquiry (2007), ʻMaking the caseʼ, investigates the epistemology of the case study. In 
volume one, authors consider how cases work within a variety of disciplines with a legacy of 
utilising ʻthe caseʼ. Through examples of ʻmetacasesʼ authors discuss how certain norms of 
making a case came to be in a given domain of expertise. The second volume, ʻMissing 
personsʼ, considers how through case studies certain cases of ʻsingled out personhoodʼ are 
made, focusing on “on what happens when the substance of caseness is provided by the 
ʻpersonʼ - an idea of a person, a kind of person, a norm of personhood” (Berlant, 2007b:2). 
The method assemblage and the case approach animate judgment, which 
“unavoidably produces not only truths and non-truths, realities and non-realities, presences 
and absences, but also arrangements with political implications. It crafts arrangements and 
gatherings of things – and accounts of the arrangements of those things – that could have 
been otherwise” (Law, 2004:143). The case acknowledges the processes of ʻcraftingʼ and 
ʻbundlingʼ, proposed in the notion of method assemblage. These ʻcasesʼ are not intended to 
be representative, they present a ʻproblem-eventʼ that animates a set of judgements and are 
examples and not exemplars, shaped by the practice or expression of a particular method 
assemblage. Nor should they be read as completed and closed accounts – these cases are 
events which are hoped, following Berlant, to do more: “it disturbs, creates a louder noise 
that opens up a field of debate about expertise, modes of description, narration, evaluation, 
argument, and judgment” (2007a:671). Whilst the thesis emphasises the singularity of the 
case, it remains committed to offering critical accounts that highlight relations to the wider 
context of urban security and the securing of the everyday life of the city. 
 
4.3. Methodological strategy 
 
The research involved a series of qualitative research methods which experiment with 
and develop more traditional methods. These methods are practiced and work together in 
ways that inform each other in order to intervene in and engage with the dispositifs and 
processes of securing, and to consider how security is enacted and experienced through 
the messiness of everyday practices. The following sets of methods together form the 
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method assemblage which intends to “wrap the representational, haptic, emotional and 
discursive around each other” (Crang, 2005:231). Following Dewsbury, (2009) this is about 
questioning how we configure the world, and in particular, how our methodological choices 
have implications for the management of meaning that we are making. 
This responds to the call to be more sensitive than we have been to the partial-ness 
and moment-ness of the accounts we present (Latham, 2004). As Law states, method 
assemblages “detect, resonate with, and amplify particular patterns of relations in the 
excessive and overwhelming fluxes of the real” (2004:14). A method assemblage includes 
“not only what is present in the form of texts and their production, but also their hinterlands 
and hidden supports” (Law, 2004:144), whilst some elements are foregrounded and present 
within this chapter and this thesis, other “relations, processes and contexts that are 
necessary to presence” (Law, 2004:54) are necessarily excluded. Method assemblages are 
generative and performative practices, which take place in and through a number of 
interconnected empirical encounters, these not only offer different perspectives, but also 
produce different and particular realities. 
 
4.3.1. Dispositifs of security 
 
The first set of methods engage most explicitly with the processes of securitising the 
city, as well as the urbanisation of security. In so doing these methods are tailored to 
address the rationalities for the specific counter-terrorist security apparatuses that now 
operates within cities in the UK, London as a named example and within the two research 
sites. As well as investigating the presence of security and surveillance interventions within 
cities and the two research sites, these methods also address the enactment of terrorism as 
a named threat. As such they move to question the ways in which the city and everyday 
urban life have become a ʻreferent objectʼ of security. 
 
4.3.1.1. Discourse analysis 
 
The research involved discourse analysis of relevant security documents as well as 
the assertions and claims made regarding the existence of different enactments of threat 
and danger, as well as security responses, in publicly available security strategy 
documents. Discourse analysis was conducted of UK government policy documents along 
(e.g. Cabinet Office, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010; CPNI 2010a, 2010b, 2011; HM 
Government, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g, 
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2010h, 2011a; Home Office, 2009a, 2009b) with policies specific to London (e.g. London 
Emergency Services Liaison Panel, 2007; London Resilience, 2011; Metropolitan Police, 
2011) and other documentation specific to the two research sites (e.g. BTP, 2011a, 2011b; 
House of Commons, 2005, 2006; SBEG, 2011; TfL, 2010, 2011). In addition to public 
statements made by politicians and security professionals, and other relevant information 
from drawn from newspaper and website sources collected and analysed throughout the 
research, the areas focused on include: central government acts; government policy 
documents; documents produced by particular government related departments; security 
documents produced by the local authorities responsible for specific sites; security 
documents produced by private land owners; specific threat assessments. Acknowledging 
the complex and changing nature of security landscapes, these documents were collected 
and analysed throughout the duration of the research. 
The analysis of these documents provided a means of establishing the relations 
between security processes, techniques and technologies, as well as the more instrumental 
and technical issues regarding distinct security practices operating within the research sites. 
Discourse analysis also focussed on examining the emergence of named threats and 
dangers, as well as specific practices intended to manage and secure named events. This 
is a focus on how defined threats and dangers are identified, comprehended, and described 
and how they perform specific imaginative geographies. This helps to identify how the city is 
understood as threatened, as well addressing the different enactments of threat and danger 
specific to the two research sites. Discourse analysis explores the rationale for embedding 
security techniques and technologies into the everyday life of cities, to follow Foucault, the 
establishment of a dispositif of security and how a milieu is then imagined, planned and 
ultimately practiced. Questions of scale are significant here and formed a focus within the 
discourse analysis itself. This is a move to consider how the different enactments of threat 
or danger are imagined and governed with respects to the UK context, an identified city, 
here London, to account for the ways in which general securitisation of urban public spaces 
are imagined and governed through the metaframing of urban space as a problem of 
governance. And also to particular sites or cases within the city, in order to establish and 
examine local governance and security architectures. Examining these security discourses 
offers insight into the types of everyday practices and experiences that are intended to be 
engineered, stimulated and avoided, and explanations of how such affective and emotive 
management and engineering is practiced through the instrumental design of space and 
security practices, architectures and technologies. 
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4.3.1.2. Semi-structured and walking interviews 
 
The research also involved in-depth interviews with those identified as being involved 
in the practices and processes of securing the two research sites, as well as additional 
interviews with institutions who provided an insight into wider urban security practices and 
impacts (see Appendix A. for complete list). Identifying such actors utilised the information 
generated through the discourse analysis, this was limited to some extent by those who 
were contacted but opted not to be involved. After initial contact had been made, a detailed 
overview of the research was provided via email and assurances made regarding 
confidentiality and sensitivity given the nature of the research. 
The interviews took two forms, semi-structured interviews and walking interviews. For 
each interview a set of specific questions were prepared and emailed to interviewees in 
advance. These questions were conditioned and informed by the document analysis and by 
the observant participation. Rather than allowing these to act as a strict order to dictate the 
interview, interviewees were able to focus on particular questions and themes for more 
extended discussion. 
The interviews provided the opportunity to discuss and interrogate how discourses of 
security are practiced and the different security architectures and governance practices that 
operate within either of the two sites. These provide insight into how the threats performed 
through the documents are perceived and responded to by those groups responsible for 
implementing the strategies for securing specific sites. The interviews also helped to identify 
and to map the range of techniques that embed various security measures into the 
everyday life of cities, identifying and addressing site specific processes of security – the 
walking interviews were invaluable in this regard. As the Crime Prevention Design Advisor 
(CPDA) for Lambeth remarked, “itʼs probably best and easiest if I show you some of the 
things that we do and then we can talk about them”. The interviews are also utilised in order 
to question how the everyday city (as a site of flows, encounters etcetera) is known and 
imagined by security professionals, urban design specialists as well as those directly 
responsible for the more day-to-day processes of securing, such as police officers and 
private security personnel. Additionally, the interviews addressed issues concerning the 
practice of security through techniques and processes which are required to reconcile 
security with other interests, some of which take precedence over security. This directly 
addresses issues of ʻappropriatenessʼ and ʻproportionalityʼ with respects to site specificity. 
Importantly the interviews also provided a space in which to discuss how everyday practices 
and experiences are or are not accounted for. This addressed how everyday encounters 
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and experience were accounted for in the processes of securing the two sites. As well as 
questioning expectations regarding how security interventions were or might be 
encountered, issues regarding attention, distraction and (in)visibility, it was also possible to 
discuss the types of affective and emotive reactions that are intended to be stimulated and 
avoided, questioning how such management and engineering is designed and practiced. 
 
4.3.2. Everyday life 
 
The research also involved carrying out periods of observant participation within the 
two research sites and a set of participatory methods. Participants were recruited who 
regularly used either of the two research sites, based on the snowballing approach whereby 
contacts were made with people known by colleagues, family members and friends. In total 
forty-seven participants were involved in this study – fifteen of whom frequent the South 
Bank and thirty-two who travel regularly on the Victoria Line (see Appendix B. for complete 
list). Given the aims and objectives of the research, it did not attempt to recruit a cross 
section of individuals. The thesis is interested with the presence and practice of a specific 
form of counter-terrorist security apparatus, and then the nature and conditions of the 
specific encounters between participants as they enact the form of counter-terrorist security 
that is present within either research site. Whilst acknowledging that an attention to, race, 
ethnicity, age and so on is important with respects to debates concerning counter-terrorist 
and other security practices, this thesis is an attempt to attend to moments when difference 
emerged as important or as problematic in and through an encounter, without prejudging 
what these differences may be. 
Prior to committing to taking part, participants were provided with an overview of the 
research and assurances were made about confidentiality and anonymity, they were also 
told that they could withdraw from the research at any time. With regards the work carried 
out with participants, as Latham observes, “each of the different elements of the method is 
designed to lead us into the world of the [participant] in different and broadly complementary 
ways, while not claiming to fully capture or exhaust the meaning of that world” (2004:127). 
As such, the researcher “appears not as an individual creative scholar, a knowing subject 
who discovers, but more as a material body through whom a narrative structure unfolds” 
(Bruner, cited in Finlay, 2002:211). 
Central to the participatory work and the periods of observant participation is a 
consideration of the method strategies that are understood, following Perec, grasp the 
everyday in its ceaseless émergence (emergence): “itʼs not always clear where you are, nor 
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where you are going and, sometimes, not even when you are” (Battista et al., 2005:431). 
These methods were explicitly concerned with the presence of security within urban spaces 
and how a variety of interventions are encountered and enacted through the day-to-day use 
of the two research sites. Importantly these methods, like Perecʼs (2008a) ʻpractical 
exercisesʼ, are self-conscious, artificial and experimental. The methods aim to cultivate 
encounters through obsessive forms of attention, immersion, processes of exploration and 
chance encounters, as well as through those more formal and stylistic events. 
 
4.3.2.1. Observant participation 
 
The use of observant participation follows from a recognition within this research, of 
the need for a move towards describing the practice of the world through an engagement 
with and a theorising of the enactment of the everyday that also attends to the circulations, 
flows and encounters within urban space and security. This method allows an interrogation 
of the researcher, of the researcherʼs experience: 
 
A way of marking out my space, a slightly oblique approach to my everyday activities 
… an attempt to grasp something that belongs to my own experience, not at the level 
of its distant reflections, but at the core of its ongoing emergence (Perec, 1985:23, in 
Sheringham, 2006:263) 
 
This, as Dewsbury rightly suggests, “comes with the side-effect of making us more 
vulnerable and self-reflexive” (2009:326). As Dewsbury explains, the idea is to get 
embroiled in the site and allow ourselves to be “infected by the effort, investment, and craze 
of the particular practice or experience being investigated” (2009:326). This is a practice of 
immersing ourselves in the space, to acknowledge its ongoing emergence, whilst gathering 
a “portfolio of ethnographic ʻexposuresʼ” that can act as “lightening rods for thought” 
(Dewsbury, 2009:327). Dewsbury suggests that it is in those key ʻtimes outʼ as we set upon 
“generating inventive ways of addressing and intervening in that which is happening, and 
has happened, as an academic, that such a method produces its data: a series of 
testimonies to practice” (2009:327). Following Thrift (2000a), this is of course the flipping 
over of ʻparticipant observationʼ where the witness becomes involved in ʻobservant 
participationʼ in order to emphasise the serious empirical involvement involved in non-
representational theoryʼs engagement with practices, embodiment and materiality: “You 
must be in it” (Thrift, 2000a:556). 
103 
Observant participation took place over a period of six months, visiting the sites daily, 
at different times of the day to account for differing practices, and changes in security 
processes. The observant participation began with work that reflected Perecʼs enumerative 
investigations identifying, inventorying, classifying, mapping and then describing security 
presences. Then a method of ʻthick descriptionʼ was used to document the practices of my 
encounters, as well as paying particular attention to the diversity of those practices through 
which other people engaged with security either passively or more actively, and their bodily 
comportments – practices of interacting and reacting, practices of attending and of being 
attentive (where possible distractions), descriptions of practices of looking, descriptions of 
practices of hearing, descriptions of the practices of security professionals, descriptions of 
how these processes of securing, are habitually (or otherwise) encountered by people using 
these spaces. The focus of this method is not therefore on specific bodies, instead it aims to 
describe bodily practices and experiences as people move through and interact with the 
materially present security processes within the research sites. This method also provides a 
means of focusing on encounters with security materialities, on how certain security 
practices and technologies become taken for granted. Following Perecʼs example, this 
method sought to describe without, for the most part, analysis. 
Through periods of observant participation a similar approach was adopted to that 
developed by Stewart (2007), the action of “listening-in, of observing, of passing-by, and 
taking-part” inquisitive practices which are “aphoristic, descriptive, and evocative” 
(Highmore2010:6, 5). Inspired also by Perec (1985, 2008a, 2010), these were more artistic, 
playful and experimental encounters which involved modes of witnessing, interrogation, 
inventorying, and describing. Some were attempts to describe the ʻrest insteadʼ, 
emphasising the infra-ordinary background, of practices and encounters that would normally 
go without saying. At other times these were more directed, involving focusing on particular 
facets of security apparatus, particular practices and encounters capturing these in as much 
detail as possible; standing and sitting for a duration, or moving with purpose, to witness 
practice as the everyday unfolds. Experimental styles of writing were at times adopted and 
adapted, inspired by Perec these included lists, catalogues, diagrams and vignettes ranging 
in length from an isolated word or two, a few sentences to three or four pages. Interspersed 
with rudimentary sketched schematic maps and diagrams of security practices and 
locations. Notes were composed in two separate notebooks and at times on a mobile 
phone, later transcribed in full. These were supplemented with photographs, newspaper 
cuttings and other information prudent to the task. Learning from Perec, and in keeping with 
practices of ethnography more generally, it was important to reflect on the practices of 
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observation; the diaries became a record of the research as well as an experiment in 
witnessing, observing and describing the everyday life of security in these two sites. 
 
4.3.2.2. Participatory diaries 
 
Each participant was invited to produce a diary, detailing their daily experiences of 
security over the course of two consecutive weeks (more if they chose). Twenty-three 
participants provided diaries (see Appendix B. for complete list), others gave assurances 
that they had completed a diary but they did not make these available and due to time 
constraints I proceeded with these interviews. As with Lathamʼs (2003, 2004; see also Meth, 
2003; Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977) ʻdiary-interviewʼ methods, the aim of the diaries, 
which are then discussed in an interview, is to provide detailed account of the writers daily 
routines, practices and experiences in public, here with a specific focus on security. As 
Latham notes, what is important is that it is not the role of the researcher to corroborate 
reflection, as if the diary were an unproblematic representation, but to “create a framework 
in which my research subjects could indeed meditate on - or at least be more actively aware 
of - the routine and ordinary events of their day” (2003:2002). 
Participants were provided with a series of questions or guidelines that were intended 
to act as a starting point. These prompts, following Battista et al. are understood as 
“activating a certain way of looking”, this involves “asking the participants to pursue 
object(s) or information through clues … a tactic for mobilizing them, pushing them into 
unfamiliar terrain or terrain that becomes unfamiliar through searching” (2005:448; see also 
Bassett, 2004; Fenton, 2005; Pile, 2005; Pinder, 2005). The participantʼs varied in how they 
approached their diaries, some stated that they had set themselves questions or had 
developed tasks and games through which to focus and then compose their descriptions 
and reflections. Some made daily entries, others less frequently, one participant admitted to 
scribbling notes on “receipts and tickets, whatever I had” and then posing a more thorough 
and thought through series of accounts which were emailed to me. Through the process of 
undertaking the diary, participants were asked to observe security and their encounters and 
reflect on these. Firstly participants were asked to locate and describe the various forms of 
security present within the research site they move through. Participants were then asked to 
provide detailed descriptions of their everyday practices and enactments as they 
encountered security presences through their day-to-day activities. Diarists were asked to 
describe such encounters, their thoughts, feelings and how these encounters were 
experienced, also to reflect on how their attentions were enrolled. As such the diary-method 
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is explicitly performative as it encourages participants to consider security in ways that they 
would perhaps not normally. It is also a method that is deliberately designed to encourage 
the breaking of habits and asked participants to try where possible to reflect on what 
happens when their habituated practices and ways of not noticing are broken, in those 
moments, and how this changes the dynamics of how they engaged with a space and with 
security. As Latham observes, the reframing of the research process as a performance 
allows for a “more experimental and flexible attitude towards both the production and 
interpretation of research evidence”, providing a means of engaging “with how individuals 
and groups inhabit their worlds through practical action” (2003:1993). 
The participatory diary method aimed to provide the research with a focus on the 
movements and experiences of participants in and through the two research sites. The diary 
offered a technique which was designed to allow participants a means of presenting their 
daily encounters with security interventions and to describe how the various security 
measures are enacted and experienced as background and more intensified presences. 
The diary intended to slow people down and was designed to provide a space of reflection 
where participants could describe everyday practices, embodied perceptions and 
experiences of place and security. At the same time the method was intended to question 
styles of attention and the formation and the disruption of awareness. The aim of the 
composition of the diaries by participants is to attempt to encourage reflection on their 
everyday practices and undo the ways that security becomes taken for granted, 
acknowledging that the efficacy of many, but not all, processes of securing is dependent on 
either the secrecy of techniques or the invisibility of materialities. Encounters with forms of 
embedded security are often performances of absence whereby security processes, 
securitisation spaces have already happened, already becoming part of bodies. The infra-
ordinariness is built through everyday encounters, practices and relations, until an event, 
incident or happening redresses the relationship. The diary artificially manufactures 
engagement and events, inviting, encouraging and making available forms of attention and 
ways of orientating ourselves, that actually produce the conditions necessary for engaging 
with security. This of course foregrounds the security measure, and importantly the 
experience, rather than being a background experience, the experience itself is considered. 
 
4.3.2.3. Semi-structured interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with each of the forty-seven participants. 
The interviews took place away from the research site and were arranged at the 
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convenience of the participants. It was hoped that interviews would proceed soon after 
receiving diaries, or notification from participants that they had undertaken their own 
observant participation, in some cases this was not possible and as a result some of the 
interviews took weeks and months to arrange. If participants had completed and provided 
me with diaries, these were annotated and questions were then developed from their 
reflections and then used at different points through an interview as prompts. This allowed 
the interviews to be, in part, organised around the participants own narratives about their 
experiences of security. As Latham writes, this bricolage of text and talk “opens up a wide 
range of possibilities for narrative peopleʼs movements through time-space and something 
of the sensation, style and productiveness of that movement” (2004:126). 
Following Rapley, the methodological rationale of using semi-structured interviews is 
that they allow “rich, deep and textured pictures … through the ʻsimpleʼ method of producing 
topic-initiating and follow-up questions” (2001:315). These interviews are understood to be 
collaborative and, following Latham (2003), a kind of performance between interviewees 
and interviewer, which are co-fabricated and where “interview participants do not entirely 
know what they are doing and neither do interviewers” (Sinding and Aronson, 2003:111). An 
interview does not lead to a “single unified truth”, it is a presentation, “an account in the 
making” (Latham, 2003:2005). In this context, semi-structured interviews offer a space for 
further reflection on everyday experiences and on the presence of security as both a part of 
the infra-ordinary background and through encounters as a range of more intense 
presences. 
The semi-structured interviews were based around a series of questions that were 
intended to discuss the presence, or indeed absence, of security and then more explicitly on 
participantʼs experiences of the various security interventions. Whilst the interview utilised 
information generated through the diary method, discussion revolved around a series of 
prepared questions, which were organised thematically and uniform for each participant. As 
Dewsbury acknowledges, a set of well conceived research questions can be “effective at 
capturing the tension of the performing body, as witnessed by the body of the interviewee” 
(2009:325). Each of the questions was intended to elicit how security interventions were 
encountered and enacted in order to provide descriptions of how the mechanisms that are 
present within the two sites and experienced as both a background as a more intensified 
presence.  The interview is seen as providing a structured context in which to discuss and 
revisit events described within a diary as well as other emergent themes, in the context of 
the interview these can be discussed in more detail. Through the interviews the 
interviewees were allowed to dictate the length of their responses, and to reiterate Lawʼs 
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point, this includes gatherings that are manifestly “allegorical, ambiguous, indefinite, unclear 
or tacit” (2004:145). Each interview was recorded, using a digital voice recorder, permission 
to record was always requested beforehand and participants were free to ask for this to be 
switched off at any time. The interviews were transcribed in full at the earliest possible 
convenience. 
 
4.3.2.4. Go-alongs 
 
The go-along method worked in a similar way to the diaries, following a similar 
rationale, but provided the opportunity to prompt as a participant passed through a site. This 
method involves the researcher accompanying a participant and “actively explore their 
subjectsʼ stream of experiences and social environment” (Kusenbach, 2003:463). This 
approach potentially allows for a more active engagement with the site, and one 
encouraging the participant to reflect as they go, on practices, emphasising chance 
encounters and events as they happen, getting at that moment when a form of security is 
encountered and what this means, does, or perhaps where security is passed by, 
encountered and enacted as part of the background through distraction. It is important to try 
and get at the moment of engaging, how dramatic or ordinary that is, how intense it is, 
which is something that the diaries and the interviews can only partially explore. With the 
go-along the moment is there, it happens and is experienced and can then be reflected on, 
and the relative conditions of that. It had been hoped that a greater number of participants 
could be encouraged to take part in a go-along, however due to reluctance, timings and a 
variety of other issues only four were agreed. Rather than forcing the issue, and at the risk 
of losing or discouraging participants, four go-alongs took place with those who expressed 
an interest in doing so. These were conducted at the convenience of the participants and 
were followed directly by the semi-structured interview. The go-alongs and the interview 
were recorded using a digital recording device and brief notes were made which, along with 
the diaries, were used during follow up interviews – each of which took place immediately 
after the go-along. 
This method provides a means of intervening in and describing what is directly felt 
and experienced both by participants and myself, as the knowledge, the experience of the 
space and of security is produced in a “collage of collaboration: an unstructured dialogue 
where all actors participate in a conversational, geographical and informational pathway 
creation” (Anderson, J. 2004:260). As Kusenbach suggests, the go-along permits the 
researcher to “take a more active stance towards capturing their informants actions and 
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interpretations” (2003:463), practices and encounters are witnessed and described as they 
take-place. The go-alongs also provided a context in which to discuss and revisit events 
described in the diaries, discussing the presence, or not, of security measures as well as 
encounters with the materially present techniques of securing. Anderson suggests that the 
go-along, or what he describes as ʻtalking whilst walkingʼ can be utilised in order to “harness 
place as an active trigger to prompt knowledge recollection and production” (2004:254). As 
with the diaries, this method encourages disruptions, and considers attentions and the ways 
in which security is encountered and enacted. The aim is to focus on practices as they 
happen, the ways of engaging and encounters with the space, with a specific focus on their 
own encounters with the techniques and technologies of security, these were used as 
prompts for conversation. There are problems with the diary and the interview with getting 
at the immediacy, the taking-place of practices, at that moment, how something, an 
encounter is happening, and what is involved in that, the go-along provides a means of 
trying to address these issues. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To write: to try meticulously to retain something, to cause something to survive; to 
wrest a few precise scraps from the void as it grows, to leave somewhere a furrow, a 
trace, a mark or a few signs (Perec, 2008a:91-92) 
 
As Dewsbury (2009) acknowledges, as academics we mediate most things in text, 
and so is the case here. These modes of presenting are made in mediation and are, as Law 
reminds us, “condensed at best with difficulty into textual or pictorial form” (2004:147). As 
with Perecʼs experimental writings, and the texts of non-representational geographies (see 
Anderson and Harrison, 2010a), this acknowledges that when apprehending, interpreting 
and presenting empirical material, “we need to be more sensitive to the partial-ness and 
moment-ness of accounts offered”, our methodological interventions do not provide “a 
definitive account of an event, place or individual” (Latham, 2003:2005). The point is now, 
as Dewsbury observes, to engage in the research and move towards creating 
“presentations of the experience that we encounter and create” (2009:328), before the rush 
and compulsion to explanation. Perecʼs work is invaluable as an example of the patience, 
skilfulness and the struggle of description as well as for the authorʼs recognition that his 
texts document witnessing and the task of description as a “process rather than a static 
ʻsnapshotʼ of objects in space” (James, 2009:207). This is attuned with the involvement in 
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the processuality of the urban and the excess of the everyday for as Highmore writes, the 
everyday is “a field of experience constantly in flux” (2010:1). These are not abstract 
discussions, borrowing from Highmore, they provide understandings of practical action, “the 
material actuality of everyday life as it is lived out” (2010:17), practices in the making. 
How then to respond, to write, a furrow, a trace, a mark or a few signs? This is to 
accept that whilst it is true that “experience doesnʼt need to be coded to be appreciated and 
understood, it needs to be presented and treated as being just what it is” (Dewsbury, 
2009:325), these re-presented events will importantly “sound differently” in the 
presentations than in the “experiencing of them” (Phelan, 1997:12): 
 
Representations do not have a message; rather they are transformers, not causes or 
outcomes of action but actions themselves. Not examples but exemplary. In this 
sense representation is perhaps most usefully thought of as incessant presentation, 
continually assembling and dissembling, timing and spacing; worlding (Dewsbury et. 
al, 2002:438) 
 
At the same time, as Law notes, many realities craft themselves into “materials other 
than – or as well as – the linguistic” (2004:147). He suggests that at times some other 
approach a more allegorical mode might be better, re-presented through “Some other kind 
of gathering. One that stutters and stops, that is more generous, that is quieter and less 
verbal” (Law, 2004:147). Perecʼs approaches acknowledge and embrace the fact that they 
are incomplete, the ʻvoidʼ becomes an important theme and stylistic device throughout 
Perecʼs oeuvre. The world does not add up. As Dewsbury explains, “it is not a transparent 
representation that we are after, nor is it about the representation being a true reflection of 
the empirical experience or event being investigated” (2009:332), it is a modest attempt at 
articulation, to present just some of this complexity. The question becomes, following Law 
(2004:110) how best to bundle this together and create a story? 
The following three empirical chapters present a story of how security moves from 
being a set of mechanisms to something lived, and how everyday life shifts from being an 
object of security to that within which security lives. In Chapter 5 I examine how cities and 
everyday urban life become the referent object of security and in particular counter-terrorist 
security. This chapter begins to extend the analysis of urban security to develop an account 
that is more concerned with the relations between security and everyday urban life. Chapter 
6 and Chapter 7 then describe and bear witness to security as it is lived, in order to further 
develop understandings of the urban geographies of security. 
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5. The Everyday City as a Referent Object of 
Security 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter situates specific forms of counter-terrorist security practices and a 
distinct apparatus of security in the context of the securing public spaces and ʻcrowded 
placesʼ within cities in the UK in response to the threats of terrorism (see Cabinet Office, 
2008, 2009a; HM Government, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a; Home Office, 
2009a)17. This chapter will discuss how a form of counter-terrorist security apparatus is 
emerging in the UK that is increasingly guided by rationalities that aim to ensure 
ʻproportionateʼ protection whilst at the same time being ʻappropriateʼ to urban spaces in the 
context of biopolitical aims: enabling, promoting and regulating circulations and protecting 
different but coexisting problematisations of life. 
 It is contended here that debates concerning this shift in processes of counter-terror 
security within the UK have so far been rather circumscribed, as such through this chapter I 
discuss the complex urban geographies of security that are emerging and in particular the 
rationalities that have given rise to a particular form of counter-terrorist security in the UK 
and its translation into practice within urban spaces. This is a form of security apparatus 
which is designed and embedded into the infra-ordinary spaces and happenings of 
everyday life, where the processes of security and the interventions through which they are 
enacted are primed to occur in the event of an event. The interventions of this apparatus 
involve geographies of absence and presence, organised in certain and very specific ways 
through the ordering processes of what is referred to here as ʻinvisible securityʼ (see Briggs, 
2005). Anticipating Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, where I discuss the conditions of everyday 
encounters in greater depth, it is essential that this chapter provide an account of the 
rationales for this specific form of security apparatus as well as the interventions that 
populate the two research sites where the aim is to ʻgovern terrorʼ (Dillon, 2007). This 
chapter provides an examination of an urban security project that aims to “achieve more 
                                                
17 Whilst the focus of this chapter rests with counter-terrorist security, I acknowledge that security inevitably, and importantly in 
the context of securing the everyday city, overlaps, interacts, communicates, and so on, where practices to secure a specific 
named threat may in fact secure against different threats. In this way, whilst the thesis is concerned with the threat of terrorism 
and counter-terrorist security practices, it understands there to be degrees of relational resonance between various forms of 
security and different enactments of threat. Rather than there being distinct forms of counter-terrorist security, often these 
become more complicated, blending and multiplying relations. 
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secure cities … in a more livable fashion” (Dudley, 2007: no pagination) and asks how such 
a project is enacted where the aims of security are biopolitical. It does so via an account of 
the turn to site specificity and a consideration of the different ways that security becomes 
present within the spaces of urban life. 
The chapter begins by introducing the NSS of the UK (Cabinet Office, 2008, 2009a), 
the UKʼs strategy for countering international terrorism, known as CONTEST (HM 
Government, 2006, 2009b, 2011) and related documents, informed by a series of 
interviews. Here I examine counter-terrorist security strategies within cities in the UK, with 
reference to London as a named example. I am less concerned with the UKʼs security policy 
as a whole, and more interested with the ways it finds expression in securing cities and 
given an increasing focus on site specificity, particular named urban spaces. This section 
will consider the ʻevent of terrorʼ as a specific enactment of threat which poses the problem 
of the aleatory, where a future becomes the cause for action in the present. It also explores 
how forms of life are constituted in biopolitical security practices, as well as how security 
interacts with forms of urbanism through the planning and staging of milieus, thinking cities 
as means of movement and circulations. The second and third sections of this chapter then 
move to explore how counter-terrorist security practices have been translated into action, 
and the material implications in the context of the two research sites, the Victoria Line of the 
London Underground and the South Bank and Bank Side area of the South Bank. The 
second section demonstrates the application of CONTEST strategies in urban spaces. This 
examines questions of how counter-terrorism might be ʻappropriatelyʼ and ʻproportionatelyʼ 
incorporated in the spaces of urban life, describing the role of context and site specificity. 
The third section is divided into two parts, focusing on the two research sites, to consider 
how, in relation to the particular problematics identified in the first two sections of this 
chapter, security becomes present within specific urban spaces. 
 
5.1. CONTEST: Security in the United Kingdom and the urban problem 
 
In early 2003 the UK Government developed its first comprehensive counter-terrorism 
strategy. It was described as “an attempt to coordinate the pan-Governmental response to 
the emerging terrorist threat in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington, 
DC, in September 2001” (House of Commons, 2009a:4). This strategy cited a nascent and 
emergent threat, whose methods and tactics are “novel, innovative and increasingly 
focused on mass casualty strikes” (Coaffee et al., 2008:104). It warned that events of terror 
are ʻinevitableʼ and, in the words of the former UK prime minister Gordon Brown, could take 
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place “anywhere and from any place” (cited in Cleland, 2007: no pagination, my emphasis). 
As the UK government has noted, the “current international terrorist threat is quite different 
from the terrorist threats we faced in the past”, many “[c]ontemporary terrorist groups … 
seek mass civilian casualties and are prepared to use unconventional techniques (including 
chemical or radiological weapons); they conduct attacks without warning” (HM Government, 
2009a:11). As a response to this, the city and the spaces of urban life have been redefined, 
drawn into discourses of threat and counter threat in a situation where the everyday city, the 
spaces of civil life and urban life itself are increasingly becoming a ʻreferent objectʼ of 
security (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008): 
 
The threat level to the UK is currently assessed as ʻSevereʼ. This means that a 
terrorist attack is highly likely and could take place without warning. Crowded places 
remain the preferred target for international terrorists and the most likely target for an 
attack is a crowded place which is easily accessible, regularly available and offers the 
prospect for an impact beyond loss of life (HM Government, 2010f: no pagination) 
 
The threat posed by terrorism to the spaces of urban life has established significant 
new challenges for how we understand security and the very means by which it can be 
provided (Dillon, 2005b). Since 2003 the UK Government has begun to implement its long-
term strategy for countering international terrorism, known as CONTEST (HM Government, 
2006; 2009a; 2011a). In March 2008, the Government published the UKʼs inaugural 
National Security Strategy (NSS) (Cabinet Office, 2008a; updated 2009a; HM Government 
2010a), to set out how it would: 
 
address and manage [the] diverse though interconnected set of security challenges 
and underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the 
nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our way of life (Cabinet Office, 2008a:3, my 
emphasis) 
 
The fundamental objective of national security as stated in the NSS is “Protecting our 
peopleʼs freedoms” (Cabinet Office, 2009:27). This is retained in the most recent edition of 
the NSS, entitled A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty (HM Government, 2010a), where 
the new coalition Government state, “Our security, prosperity and freedom are 
interconnected and mutually supportive. They constitute our national interest” (HM 
Government, 2010a:22). 
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National security had been reconfigured and broadened to include a set of new 
security challenges, including “threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, as well as 
to the interests and integrity of the state” (Cabinet Office, 2008:3-4, my emphasis). In light of 
the publication of the inaugural NSS, the UK Government announced its intention to 
ʻrefreshʼ CONTEST to reflect the changing security situation at home and abroad: 
 
The terrorist threat and the risks we face are always changing. We have updated our 
strategy to take account of this changing threat, the lessons we have learned and the 
new challenges which we face” (HM Government, 2009b:4)18 
 
In March 2009, an updated version of the Governmentʼs counter-terrorism strategy 
was published, “based on principles that reflect our core values, the lessons we and others 
have drawn from experiences of terrorism to date, and the broader security principles set 
out in the National Security Strategy” (HM Government, 2009a:10-11). The revised and 
updated CONTEST II, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdomʼs Strategy for 
Countering International Terrorism (HM Government, 2009a), aimed to build on the existing 
policy “to reduce the risk to the UK and to its interests overseas from international terrorism, 
so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence” (HM Government, 
2009a:6, my emphasis). The latest iteration of CONTEST is focused around four ʻstrandsʼ, 
the four ʻPsʼ: 
 
− Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks; 
− Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; 
− Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attacks; 
− Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact (HM 
Government, 2009a:10-15; 51-125) 
 
                                                
18 The last decade has seen comprehensive changes to the way that the UK Government approaches counter-terrorism. 
Including, but not limited to the reorganisation of the Home Office since 2007 to focus on policing, security, and counter-
terrorism. In March 2007, various elements of the Governmentʼs counter-terrorism apparatus were consolidated in the Office 
for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OCST) (House of Commons, 2009a:5-11). OSCT is responsible for: exercising the UKʼs 
response to a terrorist incident; developing legislation on terrorism here and overseas; providing security measures and 
protection packages for public figures; ensuring that the UKʼs critical national infrastructure is protected from attack (including 
electronic attack); ensuring the UK is prepared to deal with a chemical, biological, or nuclear release; and liaising with 
government and emergency services during terrorist incidents or counter-terrorism operations. Ministerial oversight of 
CONTEST rests with the Home Secretary and the National Security and International Relations and Development Committee. 
Official oversight of delivery rests with the CONTEST board chaired by the Director-General of the OSCT which supports the 
Home Secretary and other Ministers in developing, directing, implementing and evaluating counter-terrorist strategy across 
Government; delivering aspects of the counter-terrorism strategy directly; and facilitating oversight of Security Service and 
police counter-terrorist operations (Home Office, 2009a; HM Government, 2009a:59-60; House of Commons, 2009a:EV63-67). 
Responsibilities in CONTEST are summarised at ʻAnnex A. Departmental Roles and Responsibilities in CONTESTʼ (HM 
Government, 2011a). 
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 Each of these strands has a series of related objectives and supporting programmes 
reflecting the aims and principles of the UKʼs strategy for countering terrorism. Through their 
interlinking, CONTEST is intended to provide a comprehensive strategy for countering-
terrorism, where “work on Pursue and Prevent reduces the threat from terrorism; work on 
Protect and Prepare reduces the UKʼs vulnerability to attack” (HM Government, 2009a:11, 
original emphasis). What distinguishes the new security problematic is the foregrounding of 
the preoccupation with global and local circulation and the protection of the ʻfreedomsʼ of 
liberal-democratic life. Freedom is a fundamental objective to the Governmentʼs broadened 
national security, for national security this includes  “protecting peopleʼs freedoms” and “vital 
elements of our way of life” (Cabinet Office, 2009a:27). Freedom is also central to 
Governmentʼs “wider vision” which aims for the protection of the “liberal, market-oriented 
vision of a free society championed by the UK and our key allies” (Cabinet Office, 2009a:5): 
 
to create a strong, fair, prosperous and secure society, in which everyone has the 
opportunity to live their lives and make the most of their abilities, with fair chances for 
all, and governed by fair rules (Cabinet Office, 2009a:27) 
 
 In the UK, as elsewhere, a new security problematic is emerging concerned with 
enabling and governing unfolding circulations. As Anderson states, security functions to 
“enable the circulations that define the personal and commercial ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-
democratic life” (2011:7, original emphasis). In this context, as Dillon contends, circulation 
“means every conceivable kind of circulation or flow of peoples and things”, for “in a 
systemically interdependent world everything is connected or, in principle, is able to be 
connected, to everything else” (2005b:2). The key issue has become how to differentiate 
between good and bad circulation, for “[n]o system of circulation is free of the possibility of 
being employed for means other than those for which it may have been initially or primarily 
intended” (Dillon, 2005c: no pagination). 
Increasingly the threat posed by the ʻevent of terrorʼ is characterised as dynamic, low 
probability/non-probabilistic, high consequence and ʻinevitableʼ. Notwithstanding the 
differences in the contested concept of ʻthe eventʼ, as Anderson notes, “the relation between 
security and ʻthe eventʼ has for the main been posed in a particular way; the assumption is 
that to think ʻthe eventʼ is to think an open future that cannot be secured” (2010a:228). In 
this context, security discourses in UK counter-terror policy emphasise uncertainty (the 
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aleatory), resilience and an ability to adapt to an ever changing security environment19. The 
aim of security is increasingly that of protection and mitigation, capable of “ensuring a 
secure and resilient UK” (HM Government, 2010a:11) and “prepared to respond effectively 
to any attack and to mitigate its consequences” (HM Government, 2009a:56)20. The NSS 
demands work to improve resilience at national, regional and local level to ensure measures 
are in place “for a terrorist attack and able to mitigate its consequences and return to normal 
life as quickly as possible”, this aims “to absorb whatever harm does occur and then return 
to normality as soon as possible” (Cabinet Office, 2008a:26, 15). Little, citing the events of 
September 11th 2001, notes that a context has arisen for security where there are some 
scenarios for which “direct defence is neither practical nor realistic and that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to prevent destructive acts by persons unconcerned with their own safety or 
survival” (2004:57). 
Security, in the context of the UK Governmentʼs response to counter-terrorism, has 
become a project that seeks to act on ʻthe futureʼ in the present (see Anderson, 2007, 
2010a, 2010b; Aradau, 2010b; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007, 2008; Lakoff, 2007, 
Massumi, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Rice, 2010). What are required are anticipatory logics that 
allow security to open onto futures that are “not exactly controllable, not precisely measured 
or measurable” (Foucault, 2007:20). In the UK, anticipatory logics emphasise the reduction 
of vulnerabilities and the mitigation of threat, “to an acceptable and proportionate level” (HM 
Government, 2011a:82). Here a security apparatus and the deployment of the technologies 
of security take place within a context marked by the impossibility of eliminating insecurity 
altogether (see de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2010; de Goede and Randalls, 2009), due to the 
indeterminate and incalculable nature of the threat of terrorism and the ʻevent of terrorʼ, 
there can be no proportionate response. This is said to give rise to “a state of alertness, 
without foreseeable end” (Cooper, 2006:120). In this context, where security is required to 
open onto and act on futures, the ʻevent of terrorʼ revolves around the problem of the 
aleatory (Foucault, 2007) and radical contingency (Dillon, 2008), “problematised as 
                                                
19 Note the criticisms of The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee in their report on The Home Officeʼs Response to 
Terrorist Attacks. The committee are critical of the Home Officeʼs reluctance to change and to adapt to meet ever-changing 
threats, contra to the claims of the Government, the report condemns an unwillingness to be future orientated: “those involved 
in counter-terrorism may be willing to settle for existing sub-optimal solutions rather than proactively reforming to meet ever-
changing threats ... While the structures that we now have in place may be suitable for combating the terrorist threat as 
currently constituted, but we are not confident that government institutions have the desire to constantly adapt to meet ever-
changing threats” (House of Commons, 2010a:25; see also Edwards, 2007a, 2007b). This is refuted by the Government in 
their reply to the Sixth Report from the Home Affairs Committee Session: “We welcome the Committeeʼs conclusions that the 
structures now in place are suitable to address the current terrorist threat. However, we strongly dispute the suggestion that 
they are unable to adapt as that threat evolves in future” (House of Commons, 2010b:21). 
20 The passing of the Civil Contingencies Act in 2004 (Home Office, 2004b) was intended to “deliver a single framework for civil 
protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty first century” (Cabinet Office, 2006: no 
pagination). 
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unpredictable in occurrence, characteristics, and effects” (Anderson, 2010a:228). As a 
consequence, the future ʻevent of terrorʼ will always exceed attempts to predict it. 
The future problematised as uncertain or indeterminate has been met with attempts to 
render anticipatory action possible, with the aim of securing unknown and often the 
ultimately unknowable futures. These logics seek to convert future uncertainties into 
possibilities for action in the present, opening up futures in order to govern and secure on 
the basis of possible or potential futures that threaten some form of disruption to an existing 
social-spatial order. In the UKʼs counter-terrorism strategy, threat is increasingly assessed 
and governed via calculations of risk. Indeed, since 2005, the Government has carried out a 
classified assessment of the risks facing the UK: this is the National Risk Assessment 
(NRA), and it is the basis for the public National Risk Register (NRR) (Chatham House, 
2010). Aradau and Van Munster suggest that governing terrorism through risk “involves a 
permanent adjustment of traditional forms of risk management in light of the double infinity 
of catastrophic consequences and the incalculability of the risk of terrorism” (2007:90). 
Aradau and Van Munster argue that it is precautionary risk which has emerged in the 
governing of terrorism: “the precautionary principle does not target all risk situations but only 
those marked by two principal features: a context of scientific uncertainty on the one hand 
and the possibility of serious and irreversible damage on the other” (Ewald, 2002:283-284). 
As Ewald explains, precautionary logic “applies to what is uncertain – that is, to what one 
can apprehend without being able to assess” (2002:286, my emphasis). The ʻevent of 
terrorʼ, Dillon suggests, presents an ʻintended catastropheʼ which sees the return of 
Descartesʼ ʻevil demonʼ, signalling the limits of calculable knowledge, wrecking “the best risk 
calculations of probability that promise us a way of governing security” and “in the face of 
whose machinations”, he concludes, “you have to imagine the very worst” (2005a:3). As the 
UK Government concedes: 
 
Since September 2001 there has seen a significant shift of Government resources 
into the business of gathering and analysing information on the threat and configuring 
departments and agencies in the most effective way to address it … our 
understanding of the threat still remains inevitably imperfect (HM Government, 
2006:16) 
 
 The question of calculability is not so straightforward, for whilst it is claimed that the 
threat of terrorism is low probability/non-probabilistic and at the edge of calculable 
knowledge, there remain intense efforts to assess and to render them calculable, to ʻexpect 
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the unexpectedʼ and to ʻknow the unknownʼ, often the ʻunknowableʼ. In 2008 the UK 
Government published its first NRR, setting out the Governmentʼs “assessment of the 
likelihood and potential impact of a range of different risks that may directly affect the United 
Kingdom, and the safety and well-being of its citizens” (Cabinet Office, 2008a:43). The 2010 
update stated that the NRR and NRA are intended to: 
 
[C]apture the range of emergencies that might have a major impact on all, or 
significant parts of, the UK … events which could result in significant harm to human 
welfare: casualties, damage to property, essential services and disruption to everyday 
life (Cabinet Office, 2010:2-3) 
 
 Risks are assessed on the basis of probability and impact, via a three stage analytics: 
“identification of risks; assessment of the likelihood of the risks occurring and their impact if 
they do; and comparison of the risks” (Cabinet Office, 2008a:43). These are mapped onto a 
risk matrix, to provide a broad indication of the relative likelihood, and the relative impact, of 
each of the main groups of risks in the UK (risks will differ in likelihood and impact within the 
country). The stated aim is that of calculability, rendering the future actionable in the 
present: “Once their likelihood and impacts are assessed, the risks may then be prioritised, 
which enables the government to establish an effective response strategy” (Chatham 
House, 2010:4). These efforts to calculate threat are intended to then allow action via the 
enactment of prevention, protection and resilience strategies commensurate with the 
calculated risk and in accordance with the risk matrix: 
 
Putting a lot of effort into preparing for risks that are either very unlikely to happen, or 
are likely to cause relatively minor damage, is unlikely to be the best use of the time 
available to prepare. Priority is instead given to high risks: risks that are both relatively 
likely and could have a serious impact (Cabinet Office, 2008b:44) 
 
 International terrorism has been identified as the principal immediate security threat 
facing the UK (HM Government, 2010a). Furthermore, the UK Governmentʼs risk 
assessment is stated as reflecting the “types of terrorism attack we judge to be most likely 
in this country” (HM Government, 2009a:14, my emphasis). The relative likelihood and 
relative impact of ʻMalicious Attacksʼ (attacks on crowded places and attacks on transport), 
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are stated by the Government as high (Cabinet Office, 2010:26-35) (see Figure 5.1)21. The 
matrix suggests that impact in the case of the ʻMalicious Attacksʼ, is not assessed in terms 
of loss of life or injury (statistics on deaths and injury would place major transport accidents 
and attacks on critical infrastructure differently on such a matrix). Instead, impact is 
measured in terms of the biopolitical aims to protect confidence, freedom and the governing 
of circulations and interdependencies, in keeping with the stated aims of the NSS and 
CONTEST. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Illustration of the high consequence risks facing the United Kingdom (Cabinet Office, 2010:5). 
 
 The Government assesses the likelihood of terrorist and other malicious attacks more 
subjectively than other risks: “The willingness of individuals or groups to carry out attacks is 
balanced against an objective assessment of their capacity – now and, as far as possible, 
over the next five years – and the vulnerability of their intended targets” (Cabinet Office, 
2010:54). Briggs (2005) suggests that the complexity posed by a threat such as terrorism, 
                                                
21 It is stated that impact is assessed by taking account of the following effects: the number of fatalities directly attributable to 
the emergency; human illness or injury over a period following the onset of an emergency; social disruption – the disruption to 
peopleʼs daily lives (an inability to gain access to healthcare or schools to interruptions in supplies of essential services like 
electricity or water and to the need for evacuation of individuals from an area); economic damage – the effect on the economy 
overall, rather than the cost of repairs; and psychological impact emergencies may have, including widespread changes to 
patterns of behaviour or anxiety, loss of confidence or outrage as a result of an emergency (Cabinet Office, 2010:54-55). 
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and attempts to render anticipatory action possible, involve styles of foresight based on 
judgements rather than probabilistic measurements and prediction. The aim of judgement is 
to develop a better understanding of a future threat precisely at the edge of calculable 
knowledge in order to render it actionable. As Briggs contends, whilst these threats may be 
beyond measure, “information is a means to an end – better and more confident judgement” 
(Briggs, 2005:57; see also Adey and Anderson, 2011). It results in what Aradau and van 
Munster call “an insatiable quest for knowledge” in the form of, for example, “profiling 
populations, surveillance intelligence, knowledge about catastrophe management, 
prevention, etc” (2007:91). These judgements, as well as forms of calculative knowledge, 
are understood as attempts to ʻexpect the unexpectedʼ, as such they form a somewhat 
paradoxical relation to the future. The future is characterised by uncertainty, yet the desire is 
to negotiate, to govern and to secure in the face of perceived radical uncertainty, it is thus 
an indefinite future tense: “what may yet come” (Massumi, 2005b:4). Security maintains its 
efforts to render the unknown (often ultimately unknowable) future known and actionable 
with the ultimate aim of asserting control over the aleatory, and so to control and manage 
the future, ensuring that an event does not come to pass (Anderson, 2010a; Aradau, 
2010b). 
The threat posed by aleatory terrorism, and the problem of the aleatory ʻevent of 
terrorʼ have become the UK Governmentʼs stated priority. It has been assumed and indeed 
then asserted by the Government that preparing for the event of terror, imagined as the 
worst case scenario, is key to other forms of future disruption: “If your plan enables you to 
cope with a worst-case scenario, it will also help you deal more easily with lower impact 
incidents” (NaCTSO, 2003:11). In this way, it is understood that there will be degrees of 
relational resonance between various forms of security, preparedness planning and 
resilience. Rather than identifying and isolating particular and distinct forms of threat, they 
become more complicated, blending and multiplying relations. As is explained in the NSS: 
 
[T]he overall objective of this National Security Strategy is to anticipate and address a 
diverse range of threats and risks to our security ... [These threats and risks] are real, 
and also more diverse, complex, and interdependent than in the past. The policy 
responses ... are, therefore, not only individually vital to our future security and 
prosperity, but also wide-ranging, complex, and, crucially, interdependent. They reflect 
an integrated approach to developing policy and building capability, intended to 
deliver results against a number of linked objectives (Cabinet Office, 2008a:55) 
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In this context, as Evans contends, “[r]easonable strategic commonality can be 
established” (2010: no pagination). As such, according to these rationalities of security and 
governance, it does not really matter whether one is confronting a terrorist attack, a natural 
disaster, or an accident, these events all hold the potential to unsettle normal circulations 
and freedoms of liberal-democratic life. 
The Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) (2009) are dissatisfied with such an 
approach, reminding the Government that ʻproportionalityʼ to risk and therefore to threat can 
only be judged as that which is “appropriate when taken as a whole alongside other risks of 
a scheme that need to be met, such as flooding or fire … other risks to their businesses, 
which may occur more frequently than a terrorist attack” (RIBA, 2009: no pagination). These 
concerns are echoed by the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), who argue that the risk 
assessment process should “be broadened and layered to consider risks/vulnerabilities/key 
usage attributes which it is important to protect”, they maintain “the key is in proportionate 
balance between risks, vulnerability and usage attributes” (2009: no pagination). These are 
attempts to draw attention to those things that fall away when attention is focused on the 
threat of terrorism. Rather than the unknown unknown of terror, RIBA and the RTPI indicate 
the necessity of thinking about other events, higher frequency events such as fire or flood, 
as well as thinking more in terms of how the life of everyday urban spaces is lived. 
Traditional counter-terrorist strategies were rethought in light of the newly emergent 
threat posed by new and unpredictable styles of attack that are “tactically aimed at soft 
targets such as hospitals, schools, shopping promenades, and more generally crowded 
places” (Home Office, 2009a:11). The landscapes of threat and counter-threat have 
changed, as a member of NaCTSO explained in an interview: 
 
Well what we do know is that theyʼre interested in crowded places because theyʼre 
intent on mass casualty attacks … there was a real paradigm shift in the way that we 
had to deal with these types of attacks post 9/11 and it was a real challenge about 
how do we protect now this wide range of potential targets. 
 
Protective security in urban spaces has become an increasingly important part of 
CONTEST, delivered through the Protect and Prepare strands. The strategy is holistic, both 
in how it is conceived and implemented. Practically, the inseparability of the ʻProtectʼ and 
ʻPrepareʼ strands of CONTEST is understood to be “vital to ensuring a more integrated 
counter-terrorism strategy that encompasses both a range of ʻhardʼ engineering and design 
solutions and ʻsoftʼ governance and management arrangements” (Coaffee: 2010:950). 
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CONTEST stresses the importance of enacting ʻholistic securityʼ, acknowledging and 
responding to the interdependence of physical measures with other electronic and 
procedural security measures to ensure that overall security is enhanced rather than 
compromised. In 2007, Lord West, parliamentary under-secretary of state for security and 
counter-terrorism, was tasked with undertaking a review of how the government could best 
protect ʻsoft targetsʼ, “crowded places, transport infrastructure and critical national 
infrastructure from terrorist attack” (Smith, 2007)22. CONTEST II aims to secure and protect 
civil spaces figured as ʻvulnerableʼ, ʻpreferredʼ, ʻlikelyʼ and ʻhigh profileʼ targets for terrorist 
attacks (HM Government, 2009a:16-17), including “places where people live and work” (HM 
Government, 2009a:56, my emphasis): 
 
Crowded places will remain an attractive target for international terrorists, who have 
demonstrated that they are likely to target places which are easily accessible, 
regularly available and which offer the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life 
alone (for example serious disruption, or a particular economic/political impact). While 
there have been attacks against well protected targets around the world, the trend is 
for terrorists to attack crowded public places, which represent targets with little or no 
protective security (Home Office, 2009c:3) 
 
The review was completed in November 2007, and highlighted the need to protect 
and improve the resilience of “strategic national infrastructure (stations, ports and airports) 
and other crowded places” (Brown, 2007a, my emphasis)23. It is conceded that the working 
definition of ʻcrowded placesʼ is widely drawn, however, these spaces are defined by the 
Home Office as a “location or environment to which members of the public have access 
that, on the basis of intelligence, credible threat or terrorist methodology, may be considered 
potentially liable to terrorist attack by virtue of their crowd density” (HM Government, 
                                                
22 On 25th July 2007 then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, asked Lord West (Home Office Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Security and Counter-Terrorism) to review how best to protect crowded places (and transport infrastructure and 
critical national infrastructure) from terrorist attack (Brown, 2007a; 2007b; Smith, 2007). The results of the review identified that 
new efforts to ʻdesign inʼ counter-terrorism protective security were required. These included publishing, after further 
consultation, guidance on a new strategic national framework to encourage greater partnerships at the local level and doing 
more to protect buildings and urban spaces from terrorism. The documents: Working Together to Protect Crowded Places and 
Safer Places: a Counter-Terrorism Supplement were published for public consultation on 20th April 2009, setting out the 
Governmentʼs approach to reducing the vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack. The consultation ran for 12 weeks 
and concluded on 10th July 2009. For results of the consultation see Crowded Places: A Response to the Consultation (HM 
Government, 2010g), the full list of consultation questions is provided in Annex A of the same document. The three 
documents, Working together to protect crowded places (HM Government, 2010c), Crowded places: the planning system and 
counterterrorism (HM Government, 2010d), and Protecting crowded places: design and technical issues (HM Government, 
2010e), were published as a result. 
23 NaCTSO have produced and distributed tailored guidance on counter-terrorism protective security for the sites listed and 
state that crowded places can include the public realm (HM Government, 2010e:4). Specialist programmes have been 
developed for the transport network (land, aviation, maritime, and rail – including underground systems) (NaCTSO, 2010c). 
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2010e:4). ʻCrowded placesʼ can include the public realm (HM Government, 2010e:4), 
transport networks (land, aviation, maritime, and rail – including underground systems) 
(NaCTSO, 2010c), and the following ʻsectorsʼ: sporting venues; shopping centres/high 
streets; bars and clubs; stadia and arenas; visitor attractions; cinemas and theatres; hotels 
and restaurants; major events; commercial centres; higher and further education 
institutions; healthcare sites; religious sites/places of worship (NaCTSO, 2010a; CPNI, 
2010a). There are concerns regarding definition and the ambiguity of the ʻcrowded placeʼ as 
the referent object in this context. RIBA warn that confusion risks adequately setting out the 
nature of the threat and explaining why counter-terrorism measures are needed. They 
suggest that greater clarity as to what a ʻcrowded placeʼ is and is not would “go some way 
to address Counter Terrorism ʻcreepʼ scepticism over the extent to which counter-terrorism 
measures are needed and will be implemented” (2009: no pagination). However, and in 
contrast to this, a member of NaCTSO warned of the dangers of ʻover definingʼ what is a 
complicated and multifaceted problem: 
 
If you over engineer a definition of what a crowded place is, youʼre in danger of 
defining out potential targets, so there is a real danger of over engineering a definition, 
so the definition of what a site is, thatʼs the first thing. 
 
Whilst ʻcrowded placesʼ share certain characteristics, each site is different and 
approaches to securing urban spaces and particular sites must therefore be spatially 
contingent and therefore in many respects unique. As the member of NaCTSO continued to 
explain: 
 
What is a crowded place? Absolutely fascinating question, it seems so simple on the 
surface, but beneath that itʼs full of complexities … Not all crowded places are the 
same, or subject to the same level of risk – ʻcrowded placesʼ serves as a means of 
describing at risk sites which share certain characteristics, but they should not all be 
treated the same … just because somewhere is a public space, a crowded place, it 
doesnʼt mean that automatically itʼs a target, because there are other factors that 
make it attractive as a target to terrorists, not just the fact that it is a crowded place. 
This is the other thing that we have to get away from, is that there is this 
misconception that because somewhere is crowded, itʼs automatically going to be a 
target, itʼs not. 
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A ʻcrowded placeʼ presents an object of security, an ʻinsecureʼ and ʻthreatenedʼ space 
which is rendered governable and where security can be enacted. It is definable and thus 
the threat to such a site and the distinct vulnerabilities can be rendered actionable. In 
contrast, the ʻurbanʼ is too broad an analytic and presents a problem which is almost always 
impossible to capture, it will always exceed any attempt to render it a place. These spaces 
of urban life are incredibly difficult to capture through an actionable definition, and so here 
security cannot specify what it attempts to secure24. As the member of NaCTSO concedes: 
 
You need to apply the elephant test, and the elephant test is, you know one when you 
see one, and thatʼs what weʼve got crowded places at the other end, we all 
instinctively know what a crowded place is, you know and I know what a crowded 
place is, we can imagine it in our minds, try and define that and itʼs very difficult, 
especially when you think youʼve got a crowd, you have a geography, infrastructure, 
vehicles and they interact and itʼs a very complex matter then, these things arenʼt 
independent of each other, and itʼs very dangerous to treat a crowded place as if itʼs 
people and environment, and separate the two. 
 
This vagueness and ambiguity is arguably necessary for the counter-terrorist security 
guidance. It then follows that more acute, bespoke and site specific security is emphasised 
in the context of particular enactments of threat in distinct urban cases. Guidance is more 
an attempt at shaping conduct, a device for the conduct of conduct that marks out the limit 
points and sets out what is possible. At the same time guidance evokes a future state, an 
ideal that will stand apart from and pre-exists any actual case (see Anderson, 2010b). 
Where policy makers and security services perceive protection against attacks on crowded 
public places as one of their key priorities, this has not been written in the statute, for whilst 
“local planning authorities must have regard to this guidance when preparing local 
development documents”, and where Government guidance is “capable of being a material 
                                                
24 RIBA (2009) insist on the importance of further differentiation and suggest distinguishing between a series of distinct 
typologies of crowded places. Otherwise, they write, “there is risk of scepticism towards the risk being unidentifiable and 
therefore counter-terrorist threats in general are not worth responding to”. RIBA maintain that guidance could be considered 
both by “occupancy (ranging from several hundred in a place of worship or small music venue, up to several hundred 
thousand at an outdoor festival or multiple sports event)” and also “density (where the activity/focus encourages close 
proximity of significant numbers of people)”. They suggest this could be sub-divided via two categories of physical attributes 
“Permanent places of assembly, including but not limited to - Outdoor venues (stadia, racecourses, racetracks, spectator 
sports complexes) Indoor venues (arenas, theatres, cinemas, concert halls, exhibition and convention centres, shopping 
centres, nightclubs, places of worship)”; and “Temporary places of assembly – generally short duration outdoor events overlaid 
to otherwise public domain or private land, including but not limited to - Temporary ticketed event venues: festivals 
(Glastonbury), annual shows (Chelsea Flower Show), exhibition events (Red Bull air race), golf competitions, trade shows and 
exhibitions. Temporary open access event venues: parades (Lord Mayorʼs Show), road races (London marathon), exhibition 
events (Red Bull air race). These types of events may have localised ticketed facilities for particular groups, but otherwise 
attract a transient audience”. RIBA also contend that the broad outlines should distinguish between “public (all the above) and 
private crowded places (for example offices)” (2009: no pagination). 
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consideration in the determination of planning applications”, it “does not however set out 
new policy or specific legal requirements” (HM Government, 2010d:3, my emphasis). In an 
interview, a senior advisor from CABE stated the importance of guidance not being allowed 
to become a diagram of power: 
 
When you are thinking about security in public space it is about having a set of 
sensible principles to how you are governing and how you design, operate and 
manage a space, rather than having a set of rules, and there is a big difference. 
 
Although not written into the statute, the heightened threat of terrorist attack to cities 
and everyday urban spaces has certainly been acted on. The results being that there are 
many examples of political and securitisation ideologies are materially inscribed on the 
urban landscape and reflected in governance and management practices throughout cities 
in the UK. However, importantly in the context of the UK Governmentʼs response, and in 
contrast to many existing debates concerning the urbanisation of security agendas, it is 
explicitly stated that ʻproportionalʼ counter-terrorist security is to be achieved in the context 
of the Government strategy to create ʻWorld Class Placesʼ (HM Government, 2009c). As 
RIBA (2010a) maintain, and in keeping with the NSS and CONTEST, cities must reflect that 
“we are an open and inclusive society, and that in interpreting these new guidelines, our 
buildings do not convey that we are driven by security measures”. The Government states 
that ideally security “should contribute towards creating places … that are well designed 
and maintained … and that are sensitive to their surroundings” (HM Government, 2010d:5). 
It is expected that counter-terrorism security will be both ʻproportionateʼ and ʻappropriateʼ, 
designed and managed against the Governmentʼs own expectations and guidelines for 
good and successful public space (see HM Government, 2009c; DETR, 2000; ODPM, 
2005a, 2005b). 
Crucial here are the emerging rationalities of ʻproportionalityʼ and ʻappropriatenessʼ, 
for as I have suggested, CONTEST and counter-terrorist security practices in cities function 
to enable the circulations that define urban life. Circulation, as Dillon contends, “is the 
spatial configuration that characterises the biopolitics of security” (2007a:11). Elsewhere 
Dillon states that circulation “appears to pose a seamless web of interdependent problems”, 
where systematic interdependence means everything is connected or, in principle, is able to 
be connected, to everything else, the “smallest perturbations or anomalies in one system of 
circulation have the potential to cascade rapidly into large-scale crises affecting very many 
other local and global systems of circulation” (2005b:2). Counter-terrorist security in the 
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urban landscape must find ways to reconcile security with circulations. The more traditional 
territorial logics of counter-terrorism and practices of ʻfortress urbanismʼ (see Coaffee, 
2003a, 2004b, 2009a) involving ʻurban militarismʼ and the (overt) ʻmilitarisationʼ (see 
Graham, 2002b, 2004c, 2011) of spaces are no longer appropriate, and indeed these are, in 
most cases, considered largely inadequate to the current enactment of threat. There are of 
course exceptions, as will be discussed in the next section. Announcing the completion of 
Lord Westʼs review, then Home Secretary Jacqui Smith (2007) observed, “we need to 
ensure that individuals and businesses are free to carry on our normal social, economic and 
democratic activities”; although and as Smith herself concedes, “as a result, there will 
always be some vulnerability to terrorist attack”. Whilst it is accepted that vulnerabilities are 
inevitable, CONTEST seeks to ensure that “risk is maintained at a tolerable level” (House of 
Commons, 2009a:EV59). 
This raises the key issues: how to differentiate between good and bad circulation 
(Foucault, 2007). Security must understand how these complex urban systems of circulation 
operate and “how to manage them in ways that will avoid the potential for disaster stored up 
within them” (Dillon, 2005b:2). Security must not only reconcile the demands of cities as 
means of movement and encounter, but also exploit circulation in order to secure; enabling 
and then regulating circulation by intervening, thus securing, in and through movement. This 
involves “devising means of preventing bad circulation without collapsing circulation as 
such”, a problem of regulation, of “governing too little or governing too much” (Dillon, 
2005b:3): too little, and security may fail, too much, and circulations may halt. Approached 
thusly, the UK Governmentʼs counter-terrorism security policy ensures the overall aim of 
CONTEST and the NSS, to “to reduce the risk to the UK and to its interests overseas from 
international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence” 
(HM Government, 2009a:5). This is a security strategy which targets freedom and 
circulation. For the NSS and for CONTEST this involves the protection of different versions 
of ʻlifeʼ, enacted within these strategies broadly in terms of human species being; a way of 
life; and through the very circulations and interdependencies that make up a valued life. In 
broadening the NSS agenda to include threats to ʻindividual citizensʼ, and in recognising the 
vulnerability of ʻcrowded placesʼ, security becomes tasked with protecting the population, 
ʻspecies lifeʼ itself. This is routinely figured with respects to “protecting the public”, and 
“protecting people going about their daily lives” (HM Government, 2006:2). 
The protection of species life is intimately bound with notions of ʻdaily lifeʼ, itself 
threatened by terrorism, along with the everyday spaces of civil society, and a particular 
rendering of a ʻway of lifeʼ, liberal-democratic life: “Above all, we act to maintain our way of 
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life: to protect our people and the freedoms we have built for ourselves, and the values of 
our society and institutions” (HM Government, 2010a:22). However, within the NSS and 
CONTEST ʻspecies lifeʼ and ʻour way of lifeʼ are most frequently figured through processes 
of deferral, where the life of the population, the public and civil society, are supported and 
enabled by other things, in particular via the expression of a ʻvalued lifeʼ of circulations and 
interdependencies. Where this is the case, increasingly life is understood in terms of the 
infrastructures that support businesses, normally figured through the vocabularies of ʻcritical 
infrastructure protectionʼ or ʻbusiness continuityʼ (see Cabinet Office, 2006; Home Office, 
2004b). Critical national infrastructure includes “those key elements of the national 
infrastructure which are crucial to the continued delivery of essential services to the UK” 
without which “the UK could suffer serious consequences, including severe economic 
damage, grave social disruption, or large-scale loss of life” (CPNI, 2011:50). The emphasis 
is then on security mitigating the effects of an event in order to enable certain processes to 
continue and a valued life to be sustained. ʻLifeʼ as ʻspecies existenceʼ and as a distinct 
ʻway of lifeʼ becomes inseparable from ʻbusiness continuityʼ and from ʻcritical infrastructure 
protectionʼ. The protection of life, which is central to the objectives of the NSS and to 
CONTEST comes to be enacted through the protection of a valued life, where “intervention 
aims to stop the effects of an event disrupting the circulations and interdependencies that 
make up a valued life” (Anderson, 2010b:791). 
The threat of terrorism, and in particular the ʻevent of terrorʼ, is no longer considered 
as selective as was the case in the past. The threats posed by the ʻevent of terrorʼ are 
considered wide and unpredictable in variety and form, posing the problem of the aleatory. 
Additionally, and as is highlighted through CONTEST, the threats of terrorism are always 
changing: 
 
New groups emerge and terrorists continue to develop new methods and make use of 
new technologies, the 2008 attacks in Mumbai are a reminder that cities are 
vulnerable. Learning from our experience over the past few years, we have updated 
all aspects of our strategy to take account of this changing threat (HM Government, 
2009a:7) 
 
As the House of Commons Transport Committeeʼs 2007 report on UK transport 
security states, the nature and form of the attacks against Londonʼs mass transit system on 
7th and 21st July 2005 raised new concerns associated with managing and mitigating 
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terrorism-related risk and concomitant threat. The report states that in contrast to earlier 
terrorist experiences, the July 2005 attacks were launched by a ʻbreed of bomberʼ who: 
 
− Deliberately selected target-rich environments (i.e., crowded tube trains, in tunnels, 
between stations) with the intention of committing mass murder. 
− Was not deterred by any of the target hardening measures deployed against 
opportunistic attack. 
− Appeared unconcerned by the prospect of capture or compromise. 
− Intended to die during the attack. 
− Did not issue threats (House of Commons, 2007:90) 
 
The Government and security professionals emphasise that “malicious intent is creative, 
and will aim to circumvent known counter-terrorism measures” (RIBA, 2009: no pagination, 
my emphasis). The life of threat, the figure of the terrorist, is posed as a sophisticated and 
creative aggressor. The dynamism and manifold form of this threat, indeed the uncertainty 
of what is constitutive of this threat, combined with the different methods of attack so far 
used and predicted have meant that it has come to be characterised as difficult to detect, to 
prevent and to protect against (see HM Government, 2009a, 2011a; MI5, 2011). 
Interestingly this form of threat is in many senses invisible and will also appear as part of 
normal circulations, these are in many respects indeterminate dangers which are harboured 
within the everyday and require radical rethinking of security in cities as they have the 
potential to erupt with considerable consequences potentially without warning, to restate, 
anywhere and at any time. As the member of NaCTSO conceded: 
 
We have the problem of the intelligent bomb, which moves into the crowded place and 
then can move around in there and itʼs very difficult to prevent. 
 
The Government has somewhat ominously warned that for any counter-terrorist 
security strategy, a counter strategy will inevitably be developed, highlighting the ongoing 
threat posed by hostile reconnaissance, the attack planning process where potential targets 
are studied and reconnoitred. Accordingly, the Government has taken steps to address and 
mitigate, as far as possible the threats posed by hostile reconnaissance. As well as 
securing against hostile reconnaissance, significant work is ongoing to address the threat 
posed by ʻradicalisationʼ (the process by which people become terrorists or lend support to 
violent extremism), a malicious and threatening life which is conceived as incubating within 
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the present and one which lives and indeed circulates with and amidst the life to be 
protected and secured (HM Government, 2009a). 
Successful attacks serve to highlight the need for further flexibility to be present within 
counter-terrorism security strategies, so as to take into account the mutable and 
miscellaneous nature of the terrorist threat. Similarly, the ever advancing dynamism and 
sophistication of terrorist operations and the novel tactics and ever changing target 
selections are taken to be the hallmarks of international terrorism in the future. The threat of 
the future attack from chemical, biological, or radiological, or an attack similar to those in 
Mumbai 2008, leads to constant reassessments25: This was reinforced in an interview with 
the member of NaCTSO: 
 
The other thing that we have to be very mindful of is that terrorists tactics change, 
they evolve, at the moment the biggest threat we face is from terrorist borne attacks, 
that could change very quickly, weʼve already seen evidence of non-suicide attacks 
where items are left and then detonated remotely, so that threat is still there and we 
have to respond to this in different ways. 
 
However, and as Body-Gendrot has observed, whilst the potential threat posed by 
chemical, biological, or radiological attack remains, all the attacks so far have been 
performed with conventional tools on specific urban territories” (2005:5). Notwithstanding 
Body-Gendrotʼs observation, ultimately in this context the life of threat “becomes a constant 
and immanent threat which needs diffusing or extinguishing” (Packer, 2006:381). 
Whilst the threat from terrorist operations is identified as sophisticated, wide, 
unpredictable in its tactics and target selections, within CONTEST, the life of threat is 
identified via three main figures: “person borne (suicide devices on the person) vehicle-
borne (which may be suicide or non-suicide devices) or hand-delivered (non-suicide devices 
initiated typically by timer or remote control)” (HM Government, 2010d:5d)26. The 
                                                
25 The emergence and dynamism of the threats of terrorism is demonstrated through the updated NaCTSO website where 
terrorist use of firearms (NaCTSO, 2010f), and warnings of the threat from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
(CBRN) weapons (NaCTSO, 2010g) have been recently added: “Contemporary terrorist organisations aspire to use chemical, 
biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons (CBRN). We have created ʻThe Model Response to CBRN Eventsʼ, a 
classified document which sets out an ideal response to a CBR attack to guide responding agencies and the emergency 
services” (House of Commons, 2010b:2). NaCTSO warn of the importance of considering these and other methods of attack 
and. The 2010 annual report of the UKʼs strategy for countering international terrorism states: “We continue to absorb the 
lessons arising from recent terrorist attacks” (HM Government, 2010g:20). Further evidence is provided through the recently 
published and updated ʻNational Risk Register of Civil Emergenciesʼ (Cabinet Office, 2010). 
26 The threat posed by the figure of the ʻsuicide bomberʼ is multifaceted. It is warned that suicide bombers “may use a lorry, 
plane or other kind of vehicle as a bomb or may carry or conceal explosives on their persons” ((NaCTSO, 2010d: no 
pagination). There is also seen to be a significant risk from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which can be delivered to a 
target and then initiated by a timer or remotely detonated. Vehicle Borne Improved Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) are 
increasingly considered as the likeliest style of future attack. VBIEDs may be borne by a variety of vehicles “capable of 
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governance of mobility and circulations then needs to be understood “in terms of this new 
problematic, mobility as immanent threat” (Packer, 2006:381). In classifying the threat in 
accordance with general types, the ʻwideʼ and ʻunpredictableʼ threat becomes actionable. 
The threat remains essentially indeterminate, but the figures coalesce with other factors, 
such as site, risk and vulnerability assessments, etcetera, to render action possible. The 
ultimately unknowable future that security seeks to secure can be acted on. There have 
been concerns raised regarding the Government over-emphasising one type of threat and 
response, in particular a disproportionate emphasis on vehicle-born attacks. For example, 
responses to the 2009 consultation questioned whether certain enactments of threat had 
been exaggerated, others stated that the Government “disproportionately focused on 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices 
(VBIEDs) and that more advice should be given about other threats and their design 
response principles” (HM Government, 2010g). Additionally, the terrorist tactics deployed in 
Mumbai in November 2008 raised questions regarding whether urban areas were prepared 
for similar style attacks, highlighting the limited capacities to prevent and indeed protect 
against or to mitigate certain styles of attack. 
 The counter-terrorist security strategy set out above is a response to what is 
considered by the UK Government to be its most significant immediate security threat. 
CONTEST and the broader security principles set out in the NSS have altered the 
relationship between security, cities and everyday urban spaces, indeed urban life, in the 
context of the UK. This has certainly had an impact and has resulted in the increased 
materialising of counter-terrorist security within the spaces of civil society, however as the 
following two sections of this chapter will demonstrate the manner in which this has been 
achieved in the UK context is significantly different to how it has been previous maintained. 
In the next section of this chapter I move to consider how the strategies documented above 
and the practices advocated enact versions of life, freedom and circulation within urban 
spaces themselves. 
 
5.2. Integrating security 
 
The UK Governmentʼs stated aim for promoting counter-terrorism in cities is to 
“reduce both the probability of an attack” and “the impact of any attack that may occur” (HM 
                                                
delivering a large quantity of explosives to a target and can cause a great deal of damage … the bomb can be delivered at a 
time of the terroristʼs choosing and with reasonable precision, depending on defences” (NaCTSO, 2010e; see also HM 
Government, 2010e:23-24). 
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Government, 2010f: no pagination). As Fidler contends, the need for protection strategies 
“flows from the realization that prevention will be impossible or only partially effective”, 
protection works “to ʻharden the targetʼ against such events and, thus, to mitigate the 
resulting damage” (2007:262). Security is to be achieved alongside the Governmentʼs 
overall vision for cities and in the context of specific named sites, to “create high quality 
places that work for everyone” (HM Government, 2010c:5), and biopolitical concerns 
regarding the “ability of individuals and businesses”, and indeed cities, “to carry out their 
normal social, economic and democratic activities” (HM Government, 2010g:7). The 
objectives of this security apparatus therefore involve the ʻhardeningʼ of urban spaces 
understood as possible terrorist targets, but in ways that integrate security ʻappropriatelyʼ 
and ʻproportionallyʼ into cities and urban life itself. 
Following the Lord West review, the UK Government concluded that for cities, security 
should be ʻproportionateʼ to the risk faced and ʻappropriateʼ to differing urban contexts. In 
accordance with CONTEST this aims for “a greater emphasis on local delivery” (West, 
2008), “for the purposes of prioritising of counter-terrorism protective security activity” (HM 
Government, 2010c:26). In light of recent terrorist incidents, as Coaffee and Wood have 
documented, “organizations have reviewed and re-evaluated their individual risk 
assessment” (2006b:8), however the UK Government has argued that the risk faced within 
ʻcrowded placesʼ should be assessed in a standard way via a ʻrisk assessment matrixʼ (HM 
Government, 2010c:25-26)27. Briggs (2005) rightly contends that the complexity of low 
probability/non-probabilistic, high consequence future terrorist threats makes it difficult to 
predict the incidence of events of terror, and the impact that security interventions will have. 
Briggs has suggested that the orientation of security to the future “tends to be about intent”, 
as such, counter-terrorism as a project that seeks to act on ʻthe futureʼ in the present 
requires “judgements rather than measurements” (Briggs, 2005:63). Where the UK 
Government has stated that the ʻrisk assessment matrixʼ is based on “the threat of terrorist 
attack, the vulnerability in the event of a terrorist attack and the impact if it should occur” 
(HM Government, 2010d:5), arguably these are judgements of futures and not in fact  
assessments, for assessments and measurements “cannot tell us enough about the threat 
to help us to predict the future” (Briggs, 2005:63). 
                                                
27 The standardised ʻrisk assessment matrixʼ was developed through a conjunction of the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(Terrorism and Allied Matters), the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office, the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the Department 
for Communities and Local Government. It was issued by NaCTSO in 2008 to CTSAs (HM Government, 2010c:18). To assist 
those crowded places that are not prioritised for assessment by CTSAs, NaCTSO has devised a web-based Vulnerability Self-
Assessment Tool (VSAT), an online assessment (HM Government, 2010c:20; NaCTSO, 2010j). 
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It is stated by the Government that the risk ʻassessmentsʼ are generated in order to 
prioritise counter-terrorism activities, based on the severity of the risk posed to sites from a 
terrorist attack. However, it is worth noting that the ʻrisk assessmentʼ approach has proved 
controversial in the UK, especially outside London where, and in accordance with the ʻrisk 
assessmentʼ approach, “the likelihood of terror attack is deemed by many to be low” 
(Coaffee, 2010:952). This is a persistent trend in spite of the warnings from counter-terror 
specialists that attacks targeting public places could occur ʻanywhereʼ and ʻat any timeʼ. It is 
suggested that there is then a danger that counter-terror features in ʻcrowded placesʼ will 
remain largely restricted to London. Importantly the Lord West review concluded that the 
work of CONTEST must “avoid being London-centric” (West, 2008); increasingly it is seen 
as important to build security into “the design and management of more provincial cities” 
(Coaffee and Wood, 2006b:7). The Government concedes that its ʻassessmentsʼ are 
ʻrelativeʼ and so “[do] not reflect a view of the chances of one particular site being targeted 
by terrorists” (HM Government, 2010c:18). The standardised risk assessment is applied in 
order to assess the attractiveness of site/threat, vulnerability and impact assessment all use 
a five point scale, ranging from ʻVery Highʼ to ʻVery Lowʼ, which are brought together to 
produce one of four risk severity ratings (HM Government, 2010c:25-26) (see Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The four levels of risk of terrorist attack (HM Government, 2010d:5). 
 
 This forms part of the Governmentʼs national framework for urban counter-terrorist 
security, with the aim of delivering a sustained and noticeable reduction in vulnerabilities 
within urban spaces over a number of years. The approach emphasises that counter-
terrorism measures, contingency plans and monitoring arrangements should be 
ʻproportionateʼ and ʻappropriateʼ, these principles are to be judged on the basis of threat 
assessment and other associated factors that present a range of competing demands such 
as cost, aesthetics, convenience and how such measures might change the nature of public 
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space. These necessary ʻtradeoffsʼ between conflicting requirements are assessed 
according to priorities of the specific site and against the rationalities of ʻappropriatenessʼ 
and ʻproportionalityʼ in the context of the site that security is being designed for. A senior 
space advisor from CABE space articulated this complex in an interview: 
 
Often the problems in public spaces are a myriad of interleaving, complex issues most 
of which have very small outcomes. As such youʼre not talking about a bomb event or 
a mass suicide attack, or dramatic situation, youʼre just talking about managing little 
incremental problems day by day and that is what public space management is about, 
dealing with all of the different things that arise through people using space, but a lot 
of it is about trying to find positive experiences for people using these spaces, and itʼs 
a mind set, do you really think that public space is used positively? 
 
 The advice presented within the Government publications presents a somewhat 
idealised and artificial situation and is unlikely to be the case when security is translated to 
action. RIBA (2009) remain dissatisfied with this approach, suggesting that the Government 
should more explicitly explain that counter-terrorism is one of many issues to be considered 
within planning, developed in proportion to other issues, such as sustainability or inclusive 
design, not as a separate technical issue. In addition, although CONTEST takes the spaces 
of urban life and lived urban life as its referent object, it risks rendering lived experiences 
invisible, or present by means of deferral, supported and enabled by other things. A 
situation arises where life is targeted and yet forgotten, present but simultaneously absent. 
As the member of NaCTSO concedes: 
 
I think a lot of the government documents donʼt look at people who are in these 
spaces as if they are leading lives, itʼs about spaces and structures, but people are 
often absent. Theyʼre the elephant in the room, we talk about structures, spaces, 
environments, the sorts of measures we will use, how weʼll intervene, but actually we 
often forget that people will be leading their lives in these spaces. But actually having 
said that, we talk about all of that because weʼre trying to protect the people and allow 
them to go about their daily lives, so it is right that we very rarely actually make that 
concrete link, but we do need to do this, from a Home Office perspective we need to 
do what weʼre doing because weʼre saving lives and protecting people and that is the 
core reason why we do all this, the research, the training and introducing the counter-
terror security in public space and around buildings, itʼs all done to protect people, we 
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may rarely say it explicitly, but that is absolutely the fundamental core of what we do, 
itʼs always left as an implicit assumption. 
 
In order to develop ʻproportionateʼ and ʻappropriateʼ counter-terrorist security in a 
variety of urban settings, the Government has highlighted the importance of working 
collectively to reduce vulnerability: “The vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack 
can only be reduced through coordinated work by a range of organisations within a common 
strategic framework” (HM Government, 2010c:11)28. As well as aiming for approaches that 
are ʻappropriateʼ and ʻacceptableʼ, this principle suggests that in order to enact effective 
counter-terrorist security, greater coordination and better relations are essential, this 
inevitably involves and encourages the ʻresponsibilisingʼ of various actors. As Coaffee et al. 
suggest, the UK Governmentʼs policy for countering the terrorist threat against everyday 
urban spaces has involved adopting a less overtly hierarchical response, “focusing more on 
governance interaction than on governmental interventions” (2009:490, original emphasis). 
This shift has led to the ʻresponsibilisingʼ of a range of non-state and civil society actors. 
Security and the reduction of vulnerabilities are no longer considered the exclusive 
responsibility of the state. The Governmentʼs ʻcrowded placesʼ strategy thus seeks to draw 
on existing expertise within local areas to reduce vulnerability and to render security 
actionable (HM Government, 2010c). This is important given the shift to an approach that 
emphasises site specificity, ʻappropriatenessʼ and ʻproportionalityʼ, it also again concedes 
the spatial contingency of counter-terrorist security. Local ʻcritical sitesʼ to be assessed are 
based on the local police Counter-Terrorism Security Adviserʼs (CTSA) knowledge of their 
locality, as well as information from other sources (crime figures, details of licensed 
premises, reports from Special Branch and other police colleagues, members of 
organisations such as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and local authorities) 
(HM Government, 2010c:25). CTSAʼs conduct the assessment in consultation with key local 
partners; conducting annual re-assessments and in-year reviews29. CTSAʼs, and where 
necessary other specialist advisers, working with key stakeholder, will recommend a range 
                                                
28 Chapter two ʻRoles and Responsibilitiesʼ in Working Together to Protect Crowded Places sets out the responsibilities of 
relevant national and local organisations. Chapter two of Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention (ODPM 
and Home Office, 2004) provides advice on how local planning authorities, police, local partners and developers can work 
together on matters of crime prevention, this advice is deemed equally relevant when considering counter-terrorism measures. 
29 Since 2002, NaCTSO has established, co-ordinated, trained and tasked a national network of police CTSAs. NaCTSO and 
CTSAs have recently been delegated responsibility by the Home Office for dealing with protective security for ʻCrowded 
Placesʼ. The core role of the CTSA is to identify and assess local critical sites within their force area that might be vulnerable to 
terrorist or extremist attack; then devise and develop appropriate protective security plans to minimise impact on that site and 
the surrounding community (NaCTSO, 2010h; 2010i). 
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of measures, contingency plans and monitoring arrangements aimed at mitigating the level 
of risk identified30. 
In line with CONTEST, the Government has argued that urban counter-terrorist 
security should be adaptable and holistic, as well as appropriate to the everyday spaces 
and happenings of urban life. In the context of everyday urban spaces, these measures are 
not enforceable by law and the desirability of their inclusion presents the “challenge of 
blending counter-terrorism protective security measures with urban design principles” (HM 
Government, 2010d:9), to respect “locally distinctive places which involves … sensitive 
responses” (HM Government, 2010e:9). These challenges further demonstrate the 
increased centrality of ʻproportionalityʼ and ʻacceptabilityʼ, rationalities now guiding counter-
terror policy. As Coaffee et al. note, counter-terrorist security “must not only be effective but 
must also be acceptable to the owners, inhabitants and users of particular places, this 
acceptability encompasses complex financial, social and aesthetic considerations” 
(2008:108): 
 
The advice that is set out is generic and cannot address the plethora of varying 
circumstances and degrees of risk which apply to different facilities. Consideration 
should first be given to the relevance of such measures and whether or not they can 
be appropriately achieved … If so, the measures should be appropriate, proportionate 
and balanced with other relevant material considerations (Home Office, 2009c:2) 
 
These same principles apply to ʻhardʼ physical measures and ʻsoftʼ governance and 
management arrangements where it is recognised by the Government that finding a 
balance between discrete measures and safety is a central guiding principle (CPNI, 2010a, 
2010b 2010c, 2011). This demonstrates the tension between the freedom to circulate and 
security as refracted through the city, keeping things moving, keeping cities circulating. As 
was stated in the 2009 Home Office Report on Contest, security was seen to have 
succeeded in its response to the events of July 2007 as “London did not come to a stop” 
(House of Commons, 2009a:EV4). ʻHardʼ and ʻsoftʼ security cannot disproportionately 
disrupt the circulations, interdependencies and connections of distinct spaces. Resilience 
                                                
30 CTSAs distinguish between those measures needed to mitigate risk in the two highest risk categories (high and medium-
high) and those in the lower two categories (medium and low) (HM Government, 2010d:9). Advice for retrospective fitting and 
designing measures into new developments will differ, although common principles apply. Examples of good practice are 
provided in ʻReducing vulnerabilities: what works?ʼ in Working Together to Protect Crowded Places, and in the table ʻTypical 
counter-terrorism protective security measuresʼ, in Crowded Places: The Planning System and Counter-Terrorism. For 
examples of how projects have included such principles, see Annex C: Case studies in Protecting Crowded Places: Design 
and Technical Issues (HM Government, 2010f). 
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and planning for recovery and continuity in the event of the ʻevent of terrorʼ are precisely 
designed to get things moving and circulating again. The Government acknowledges that 
avoiding disrupting the interdependencies and circulations that make up life in cities 
concedes vulnerability, as urban spaces can only then be “secured against some types of 
terrorist threat” (HM Government, 2010e:9, my emphasis). In short, “events with 
catastrophic potential will occur” (Fidler, 2007:262). Security does not seek to preclude 
access or to halt movements. On the contrary, security deploys movements, and needs 
them. Returning to Foucaultʼs (2007) contention regarding the sifting of good and bad 
circulation, it is through movements and circulations that security comes to know life. In the 
absence of movement, security would not be able to differentiate between the life that 
threatens and the norm. 
 Security in this context takes into account the connections and circulations which 
make up different urban spaces, this is figured through “the needs of key stakeholders and 
people that live, work and visit a place or building”, and in open public spaces includes 
“transport and pedestrian movement around an area” (Home Office, 2010c:8). As the 
Government have stated, “we must make it more difficult to attack crowded places, with 
minimal inconvenience to the public” (HM Government, 2009e: no pagination). Security is 
required to respond to the challenges of circumstance, again it is the tension between the 
freedom to circulate and security, and as the Government recognises, “different sites 
present unique challenges and considerations that will result in bespoke solutions”, there is 
“no ʻone size fits allʼ solution (HM Government, 2010e:9). Security, in this context, is 
required to be bespoke, so as not to undermine the normal social, economic and democratic 
activities of specific urban contexts, nor the interdependencies and circulations of cities. In 
order to avoid disruption, it is suggested that recommendations will be holistic and combine: 
 
some standardised components, some invisibly integrated components based on 
conventional traffic management and streetscape designs (such as structurally 
enhanced bus shelters, lamp columns, benches or cycle racks) and often some 
elements of purpose-designed solutions, for example incorporating public art or locally 
important features (HM Government, 2010e:9). 
 
 The advice advocated for both ʻhardʼ and ʻsoftʼ security, contra to many academic and 
popular critiques, emphasises ʻproportionateʼ and ʻappropriateʼ solutions, specific to the 
conditions of individual and distinct sites. 
 The everyday spaces of urban life are now, as Massumi (in Rice, 2010) observes, 
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increasingly primed to the possibilities of attack, to the extent that they are becoming 
saturated with security and surveillance mechanisms. Massumi claims that this saturation is 
aimed “at surprising a surprise in the making, before it has fully emerged” (in Rice, 
2010:35). Whilst there is evidence of this, it is not always the case and does not account for 
the coalescing of different logics that enact safety and security. In the securing of the 
everyday city, anticipatory action and logics that seek to negotiate the unknowable future 
mix with logics of protection, detection, prevention, deterrence, delay, preparedness, 
mitigation, etcetera. It is the coalescing of these multiple logics that “deal politically, militarily 
or in the civil sphere with a danger which has not yet fully emerged, that is, a threatʼ 
(Massumi in Rice, 2010:34). The goal of each logic, is to enable and “to care for a valued 
life by neutralising threats to that life” (Anderson, 2010b:788), or to stop and mitigate the 
effects of a threat or event disrupting the circulations that define the personal and 
commercial ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-democratic life. The space of urban life is itself then 
transformed, arranged according to a variety of different, sometimes competing security 
logics, techniques and technologies. Massumi explains that a security apparatus and its 
design are “spatial to the extent that these techniques and technologies are not simply 
innocent elements, dormant before they are called upon” (in Rice, 2010:35). It is then of 
course hoped that these interventions will come into play in the operative moment of 
reaction. 
 In terms of ʻhardʼ protective security, creative practices are recommended by the 
Government, which are ʻappropriateʼ in the context of the needs of particular sites and 
sympathetic to aesthetic and cosmetic considerations to avoid “bland and standardised 
places” (HM Government, 2010e:11), and by extension, to attempt to avoid atmospheres of 
insecurity. As one commentator contended, “We might live in dangerous times, but they 
donʼt have to be ugly ones too” (Bayley, 2007, no pagination). The strategy recommends 
avoiding intrusive measures where possible (as with the case of US Embassy in Grosvenor 
Square and the Palace of Westminster): 
 
When considering appropriate protection against terrorist attack, a challenge for 
designers and planners is the application of urban design principles whilst at the same 
time incorporating counter-terrorism protective security measures … to retain and 
attract people to places, which are also safe and secured against some types of 
terrorist threat, will always involve a combination of approaches tailored to local 
conditions and special features (HM Government, 2010e:9) 
 
137 
Far from signifying the turn to a ʻbunker mentalityʼ (Coaffee, 2003), ʻfortress urbanismʼ 
(see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004b, 2009a) and the progressive and aggressive ʻmilitarisationʼ of 
urban space (Graham, 2002b, 2004c, 2011), this emerging counter-terrorist strategy, 
developed on the basis of what might, or might not, happen, encourages the reconciliation 
of security with the function, aesthetics and with the lived life of everyday urban life itself: 
 
the building or place should be attractive, accessible and work for those that will use 
and visit it. Counter-terrorism protective security measures should not impose upon 
the overall style and intention of a place” (HM Government, 2010e:10, my emphasis). 
 
In so doing security is integrated with the spaces of urban life and with the everyday 
itself, bound up with a notion of a way of life as stated in CONTEST. However, there are 
and will be cases where there is an imperative for demonstrable visible protection. As a 
member of NaCTSO explained in an interview: 
 
One of the key features for terrorists is how successful their attack is going to be, and 
if you look at this building and it is attractive to you because of itʼs iconic status and all 
the rest of it, but then you think itʼs got barriers, and big blocks of concrete, and you 
canʼt pass Parliament without seeing them theyʼre so obvious, whether itʼs effective or 
not isnʼt necessarily the issue, itʼs the perception, they look impressive and they look 
like theyʼre going to work, they look effective which is going to discourage terrorists 
from selecting that building … it deters them from targeting that location. So in those 
sites, it maybe their intention … where you have those very high profile targets, that 
slightly more brutal looking security, that more overt, in your face security is a 
deliberate and effective means of deterring people, it engenders into anyone who is 
thinking of attacking it that this is just difficult. 
 
Demonstrable visible protection is effected for a variety of reasons, the aims in these 
instances however, as is described in the above extract, remain those of protecting and 
promoting circulations bound up with notions of valued urban life. 
In relation to the particular problems encountered within distinct urban sites, security 
becomes present as a range of absences and presences. Repeated concerns have been 
raised concerning forms of ʻurban militarismʼ, involving “the violent reorganisation of the city” 
(Graham, 2011:12) and the explicit militarisation through the “aggressive restructuring” 
(Graham, 2011:12) of urban spaces, such counter-terrorist security practices stand accused 
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of leading to visibly unattractive architecture and urban landscapes. These rationalities of 
ʻsecuring public spaceʼ are also condemned for increasing control and access to public 
space, meaning “securing space from the public, rather than for it” (Vale, 2005:41). As has 
been demonstrated, the importance of counter-terrorist features being ʻproportionateʼ, whilst 
at the same time ʻappropriateʼ and ʻacceptableʼ has led to measures being increasingly 
embedded within the urban landscape, this is not without issue. Briggs, for example, has 
suggested that ʻinvisible securityʼ may “change the relationship between counter-terrorism 
and the built environment. It will bring many benefits … [but] also raises a number of 
challenges for urban governance” (2005:69). There are attendant concerns that the very 
invisibility of security means that it may become an uncontested element of political and 
public policy. In addition, and as the Government have acknowledged, there are associated 
costs to privacy: “as protective security measures become more common, they will become 
more normalised, and the public will accept them more readily. It can be argued that this 
may have an impact on public acceptance of measures affecting privacy” (HM Government, 
2010f: no pagination). As will be demonstrated in the course of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 
everyday encounters and attempts to govern perceptions also contribute to the complex 
absences and presences of security. 
In accordance with the overriding aim of CONTEST, urban counter-terrorist security 
should “as far as possible enable individuals and businesses to carry on with their daily lives 
freely and with confidence” (HM Government, 2010c:7, my emphasis). Whilst encouraging 
urbanism which rethinks urban development strategies on the basis of ʻworst case 
scenarioʼ, this is to be practiced alongside the notions of personal and commercial 
ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-democratic life and the circulations which are at the heart of CONTEST 
are reworked in urban contexts alongside other versions of life, centring the practices of 
biopolitics “to maintain the balance of security and liberty, and above all to maintain normal 
life” (Cabinet Office, 2008a:28, my emphasis). The ʻcrowdʼ emerges as a way of thinking 
about collective life within ʻcrowded placesʼ. ʻLifeʼ is refracted and translated into terms such 
as the ʻcrowdʼ, enacting a particular form of coexistence that is rendered actionable. This 
involves attempting to understand and intervene in the ʻcrowdʼ, where different types of 
crowd are understood to behave in different ways (see Cabinet Office, 2009b, 2009c, 
2009d). It is suggested that different crowd types emerge within different ʻcrowded placesʼ: 
“shoppers in a crowded mall, each with their own interests, make up a different crowd from 
spectators at a sports stadium” (HM Government, 2010c:22). The ʻcrowdʼ becomes a 
particular way of rendering life knowable and actionable. Government advice states the 
need to “anticipate probable behaviour and make appropriate arrangements for it” (HM 
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Government, 2010a:22). Security seeks to enhance capacities to intervene in, and to 
regulate the crowd as a particular enactment of threat, where threat and the life to be 
secured are copresent: “we need to identify the individuals or items of luggage that are a 
threat among the crowd” (HM Government, 2009e: no pagination)31. 
As Dillon and Lobo-Guerra (2009) have argued, the subject of security is both that 
which must be secured and the source of threat, life has become both the potentially 
threatening subject and the object of intervention for biopolitics. There are different notions 
of life coexisting within the ʻcrowdʼ, where the figure of the terrorist, suicide bomber, 
aggressor, hostile reconnaissance, hostile vehicle, etcetera, circulate along with the public, 
innocent, casualty, victim and so on. Martin has described this as a complex and 
problematic situation where there emerges a “deep ambiguity about the ʻsecuritised 
subjectʼ” precisely because the “ʻnewʼ subject of security is contingent, continually changing, 
and possibly becoming dangerous” (2010:19, my emphasis). 
 The securing of the crowd cannot be divorced from the protection of the circulations 
and interdependencies of urban spaces and the way of life as established through 
CONTEST. Security must assume that ʻcrowded placesʼ will be places of use, and so it 
becomes a question of securing the sites themselves and then securing the life within them, 
establishing a relation with the milieu. The advisor from CABE explains the problems of 
integrating counter-terrorism in public spaces and into the life of urban life: 
 
You have to look at what the public realm is there for and itʼs there for the public and I 
think you want to have measures any measures that do end up in the public realm 
have to be appropriate and discrete and well designed and relevant, and in no way 
affecting peopleʼs practical and psychological enjoyment of the space. There are ways 
and means in which you can manage and maintain space without it appearing 
oppressive … People need to think much more carefully about those such measures 
and those sorts of very crude measures have no real place apart form on an 
extremely temporary basis … You have to accept that space is used by everybody 
and you should as such be facilitating that rather than obstructing that, creating safe 
and pleasant spaces, and these will inevitably have security elements designed into 
them. 
                                                
31 The Government provides advice for what action to take if it is suspected that hostile reconnaissance is taking place. The 
Government has also sought to develop and utilise understandings of the behaviours and activities of individuals involved in 
hostile reconnaissance or intent on suicide bombings, aiming to “develop methods and approaches that might facilitate the 
detection of terrorist research, reconnaissance and attack planning, or help frustrate and deter such activities”, and “improve 
systems and human processes to automate the detection of these indicators” (HM Government, 2010i: no pagination). 
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 Different notions of life coexist here, extending beyond life figured purely as biological. 
Security within UK cities must protect these, reducing the probability of an attack and 
mitigating the effects if one were to take place, whilst responsive to context of different 
urban sites. The final section of this chapter focuses on how, in relation to the problems of 
reconciling security and the freedom to circulate, counter-terrorist security measures 
become present within the distinct spaces of the Southbank and Bankside area of the South 
Bank and the Victoria Line of the London Underground, the two sites that provide the case 
study of the specific form of counter-terror security apparatus traced through this thesis. 
 
5.3. Security and urban life 
 
The Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank on the River Thames and the 
Victoria Line of the London Underground provide examples of everyday urban environments 
that, through the UK Governmentʼs processes of evaluation, can be identified as examples 
of ʻcrowded placesʼ. Figured as ʻinsecureʼ spaces of civil life these two sites are then ʻtarget 
richʼ, difficult to protect and potentially vulnerable to terrorist attack. In both sites, security 
architectures become present in different ways with the same aim, that of mitigating the 
threat from, and limiting the damage caused by, the event of terror. In the contexts of both 
the South Bank and the Victoria Line sites this is a security project that must be rendered 
actionable in light of the biopolitical aims and rationalities that insist on the maintenance and 
where possible the promotion of the democratic, economic and social functioning of cities, 
and the circulations and interdependencies that make up urban life. In an interview the 
CTSA for Lambeth summed the delicate situation that is found within both sites, where 
freedom and security are reframed with respects to cities: 
 
The problem you have there is you donʼt have many options, you can completely 
enclose an area and have access points, but how are we going to work as a city if we 
do that? Itʼs got to be proportionate and itʼs got to be commensurate … You canʼt shut 
everything down or start fencing places off because you canʼt then effectively work as 
a city, it has to be proportionate and thatʼs they key word … and itʼs got to be 
reasonable, weʼve all got to go about our lives and thatʼs why it has to be on those 
levels. 
 
There has been a shift in the rationalities of urban security, as the previous two 
sections of this chapter have demonstrated, in cities in the UK security and urban life are 
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expected to be brought into novel forms of reconciliation. Here I highlight this situation and 
discuss how in relation to the tensions between the circulations that define the personal and 
commercial ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-democratic life and security, security becomes present in 
different ways within the two sites. 
 
5.3.1. The South Bank 
 
The Southbank and Bankside of the southern bank of the River Thames is a 
patchwork of different sites, spaces and movements, described by the South Bank 
Employers Groupʼs (SBEGʼs) Security Coordinator in an interview as an “aggregated 
crowded area”32. This mosaic produces complicated and multifaceted security architectures, 
as the CTSA illustrated: 
 
Itʼs not just to the South Bank, itʼs to the whole of Lambeth … weʼll try to incorporate 
all the various aspects of crime prevention design that we can, which includes 
counter-terror work, and try to protect the area as a whole … although the different 
areas and buildings and sites within South Bank have different requirements. Ideally 
we want to aggregate the whole of that area and have all the stakeholders there 
working together as one unit … We work very closely with all of the security managers 
and stakeholders along here, and with the local police, and with the local authority, itʼs 
very much a multi-agency approach, working together, thatʼs the way to achieve the 
success that weʼre looking for. 
Whilst it is important to think beyond ones site, area or location of interest, collective 
security responses are by no means uniform, nor are they necessarily cooperative or 
compatible. As the CPDA for Lambeth commented, “here we have the additional problems 
of competing interests and having to work with different businesses or land owners, which 
isnʼt always a big problem, but you do have to get people to communicate and make some 
                                                
32 The South Bank site is composed of a variety of sites and spaces which NaCTSO advice designate as ʻcrowed places 
sectorsʼ, including but not limited to: public realm; residential; restaurants, cafés and bars; business/commercial centres; 
retail/shopping areas and units; theatre; visitor attractions; major events; historic building. The area mixes public and privately 
owned and regulated sites. In close proximity to the area demarcated as the research site, in addition to further examples of 
the above sectors, there are: clubs; cinemas; hotels and restaurants; higher and further education institutions; healthcare sites; 
places of worship. The site is adjacent to Waterloo Station a major transport intersection, and is situated across the River 
Thames from the Government Security Zone (GSZ). The GSZ covers the majority of the UK Government Offices and consists 
of a linked series of projects to enhance security within the area of central London containing major government and public 
buildings which the metropolitan police consider obvious targets for terrorism (Unnamed source (2008) ʻHouse of Commons 
Hansard Ministerial Statement, 7 March 2008, Security: Greater Londonʼ, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080307/text/80307w0003.htm [accessed 11/10/10]). In addition to the day-to-day 
security, temporary ʻstage-setʼ security arrangements are put in place when necessary for events. 
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sacrifices which theyʼre not always happy with, itʼs not easy to come up with a compromise 
thatʼs effective and that everyone is happy to go with”. 
In this area, security is expected to be ʻproportionateʼ without compromising the 
function and aesthetics of differing site contexts. SBEGʼs Security Coordinator explained the 
significance of acceptability and ʻappropriateʼ responses within this area and with respects 
to the different concerns and interests: 
 
Weʼre very aware that along here there are a lot of quite open and permeable sites 
that the public are in and want to be able to cut about within them. What we donʼt want 
to do is lose what we think South Bankʼs already got, we want to enhance that, that 
experience … We want to build in resilience and build in security, whether itʼs a 
building, a business space, or a public space, consumer space, visitor attraction, and 
keep our standard, our quality that we had before we introduced these things, so the 
ambience and the quality stay the same … We want most of what weʼve got here to 
be designed in and to be less obvious … I want to know all that, but I donʼt want the 
people living here, working here or coming here knowing that, I want people just to go 
about and enjoy themselves … it is particularly challenging to get the right sorts of 
security, weʼre pretty close to it, I think we can do more, but only time will tell. 
 
What is being produced here is an environment explicitly, emphasising openness, 
circulation and the protection of different enactments of life. The CTSA stated that whilst 
attempting to “create a hostile environment not just for terrorists to operate in, but also 
criminals”, the most important considerations here are “the operational requirements … to 
ensure that anything that you recommend or put in there is one, pedestrian permeable and 
friendly, two it allows the building or space to work as it would normally, and three to ensure 
that emergency access can still be gained from a number of different points”. Operational 
and functional considerations, as well as concerns for aesthetics and acceptability 
demonstrate the tensions between the freedom to circulate and security within this area. 
Each of the three named concerns addresses the valued life of circulations and 
interdependencies within the area. As the CTSA continued, “Business continuity is 
essential, and allowing people to move freely and enjoy themselves in public spaces is the 
same, youʼre not going to put in anything that is going to impair the operational 
effectiveness of that building, or obstruct people in public spaces, theyʼre day-to-day 
necessities”. This is achieved at the expense of some vulnerability, as the CPDA conceded, 
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“Thereʼs a risk and thereʼs always going to be a risk, and itʼs a case of having to work with 
what weʼve got”. 
Aesthetic considerations cannot be divorced from questions of ʻfunctionʼ and 
ʻoperationʼ. As the CPDA suggests, “we need to give the impression that they do have 
security, but itʼs got to be the fine balance that doesnʼt disrupt the public or disrupt the 
revenue, the business here. For an embassy absolutely you can make it look like a fortress, 
an airport and what youʼve got there … but you canʼt do that here, so you find another way 
and you work with that fine line”. The CPDA explained the importance of achieving this 
through appropriate forms of security, compatible with the South Bank area and with 
respects to particular sites and contexts within the wider locale: “We have to be subtle, if it 
looks like a fortress then it will put people off. So we have to make it as open and welcoming 
as possible, or seemingly as open and accessible as possible, whilst at the same time 
thinking of the worst case scenarios, whether that be criminal or terrorist, or whatever and 
doing as much as we can to respond to that in a proportional and careful way. That balance 
is important, we donʼt want to be too soft, and we donʼt want to be too hard”. As the CTSA 
suggests, in this context measures “blend into the background, and theyʼre another part of 
the environment that people walk past that everyday unaware that itʼs there, and thatʼs how 
it should be, thatʼs when we know weʼve done our job”. These are explicit attempts to 
manipulate perceptions and everyday encounters, the blending of security with an 
environment through an engineering of the infra-ordinary. This applies for both ʻhardʼ 
security and surveillance mechanisms and ʻsoftʼ governance and management 
arrangements and as the CPDA stated, “Itʼs all site specific, crime prevention work and 
counter terror work has to be site specific. The ground differs”. 
ʻHardʼ engineering and design solution have been developed to protect individual sites 
and as part of ongoing efforts to secure the wider area. In part this is achieved through 
ʻbetter blast resistanceʼ, where various measures are used to mitigate blast effects, such as 
laminated glass in strengthened frames to reduce fragmentation. It is also achieved by 
maximising ʻblast stand-offʼ. As the CPDA explained when interviewed, “One of the big 
things at the moment, with the crowded place work … is stand off distance, so we try to 
create a barrier as far away from critical area as we can to minimise impact”. A range of 
hostile vehicle mitigation measures populate the South Bank. The CPDA described how 
these have been combined with aspirations to pedestrianise the area: “Weʼve got protection 
from vehicles at either end, so you shouldnʼt be able to get a vehicle down here … and 
thatʼs all bollard protected with lifters and they are rated, PAS 68 and 69 rated, it forms an 
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external cordon”33. Within the perimeter, further layers of hostile vehicle mitigation protect 
individual sites, for the most part these are subtle, unobtrusive and sensitive to the 
particular conditions of the individual sites they protect. Such measures permit regulated 
circulations, however they are a form of bounding which changes the relationship between 
different sites and spaces within the broader area. As the CTSA explains, “youʼll find that 
they allow, or they should allow pedestrian access … the whole thing is permeable, people 
can walk past and think nothing of it, but it stops vehicles”. Circulation extends to access 
requirements for authorised vehicles (emergency, delivery and utility services), as SBEGʼs 
Security Coordinator acknowledges, “weʼre dealing with loads of different types of land 
owners, and some people do need access … so weʼre very conscious of that and designing 
in the hydraulic bollards that need to be access controlled by the relevant land owner”. The 
CTSA suggested that ʻaccess control pointsʼ can be problematic, explaining that “they 
should be managed”, as ʻactive measuresʼ are known to be vulnerable to duress and 
deception techniques, he added “we need them to work as blockers and they need to do a 
job, for the continuity and operational aspect itʼs got to work, and that can be a problem you 
canʼt really get away from”. 
The problems of circulation are posed as different and distinct problem given the close 
proximity of roads and the threat posed by VBIEDs. This raises the issue of security and 
controls being implemented at a range of scales and producing distinct spatialities. Here 
exclusion, or authorised access is not an option and so the issue becomes that of regulating 
movements close to the South Bank area, with the aim of providing a negligible speed 
reduction against vehicle-borne attacks. The CPDA explained that the application of traffic 
calming measures “changing the road environment, chicaning where we put angles in the 
roads so that you canʼt get up to fifty-five, or even thirty-five [miles per hour]” would reduce 
the potential and effectiveness, and therefore the threat posed by a penetrative hostile 
vehicle accessing the area. In implementing such measures hostile vehicle security in the 
South Bank is put into effect on a number of geographic layers. Whilst the threat of a 
vehicle-borne attack is well known and documented, the threat posed by water borne 
vehicles poses a distinct problem in the South Bank. The River Thames is figured as a 
potential vulnerability, as the CPDA concedes, “there is a threat that someone could use a 
boat to attack”. However, and interestingly, as the CPDA continued, “in future if the threat 
                                                
33 CPNI has published impact testing and installation guidance documents, in the form of British Standards Institution Publicly 
Available Specifications (PAS). The two documents are: “PAS 68 entitled ʻSpecification for Vehicle Security Barriersʼ which 
covers the manufacture and testing of vehicle security barriers. It is strongly recommended that all vehicle security barriers be 
specified to comply with PAS 68 at an appropriate performance level; and PAS 69 entitled ʻGuidance for the Selection, 
Installation and Use of Vehicle Security Barriersʼ provides guidance on the selection and installation of vehicle security 
barriers” (HM Government, 2010e:27). 
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changes, we might look to do something about the waterfront as well”. This is an example 
that demonstrates the problematics of the continual extension of threat, and the continual 
assessment of threat and vulnerability necessitated by mutable, evolving and shifting 
terrorist tactics. 
These ʻhardʼ security measures are developed alongside a range of ʻsoftʼ governance 
and management arrangements. The CPDA stated the importance of a ʻcapable guardianʼ, 
explaining, “CCTV is the predominant capable guardian here, there are police officers, 
PCSOs some of the businesses have their own security, and there are the patrols”. The 
idea of the ʻcapable guardianʼ acknowledges and responds to the interdependence of 
physical measures with electronic and procedural security producing an integrated and 
holistic security strategy. As with the physical measures, the ʻcapable guardianʼ must be 
ʻappropriateʼ to the context of different sites, as the CPDA explained, CCTV ensures that 
“there is a capable guardian all the time long here, but itʼs subtle and there are reasons for 
that, we think it can risk sending out the wrong message if we flood the place with police or 
with too many obvious security personnel so we try to limit that where we can”. The 
ʻcapable-guardianʼ thus entails the blending of security with environments and the 
engineering of the infra-ordinary in the context of security being appropriate to a sites 
conditions, and ʻproportionateʼ to and therefore commensurate with threat. 
When interviewed, SBEGʼs Security Coordinator described the breadth of CCTV in the 
area: “each business have got their own external cameras … theyʼre looking after theyʼre 
patch of land, so we identified a couple of years ago a couple of blind spots, vulnerable 
areas and SBEG installed sixty four of itʼs own cameras around the area … they feed into 
the nearest business, so at least weʼve got coverage of those areas”. Subtle in some areas, 
more prominent elsewhere, CCTV depicts the strategic use of regimes of visibility and the 
attempts to structure attention. The presence of CCTV systems is highlighted in compliance 
with the Data Protection Act 1998. In addition to signalling the presence of CCTV, other 
signage is present, although as SBEG Security Coordinator explained in an interview, this is 
strategic, “weʼve got to be very conscious of where we place that signage, because we donʼt 
want to draw attention to the fact that if you come here thereʼs quite a bit of crime and thatʼs 
why weʼve got this signage … we donʼt want to alarm the public or put them off, but we do 
want the criminals to see them”. Again this is an example of balancing security 
requirements with the operation and aesthetics of sites and the area. 
Management practices of individual sites and the presence of trained personnel is 
considered central to security practices. The CPDA stressed the importance of staff 
presence and diligent daily management, “a lot of pressure was put on to make sure that 
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the environment is well maintained, good housekeeping sends out the right message”. The 
SBEGʼs Security Coordinator stated that many sites had personnel who had been “project 
Griffin trained, so we know that in the event of a critical incident, weʼve got people whoʼve at 
least got an understanding of how to respond to a critical incident or who are trained in 
counter terrorism”. Several sites operate private security, with an additional presence 
provided through the South Bank Patrol service. Policing practices, as a member of 
Lambeth Police Security Desk explained when interviewed, involve “playing that game 
between attracting people to an area because itʼs safe, but you donʼt want to risk people 
seeing police all over the place all the time and being put off by that”. SBEGʼs Security 
Coordinator believes the approach successful: “we have the relationship with the police that 
we can talk with them and highlight issues, and there are certain times where you need a 
certain type of patrol, i.e. the high visibility … you need to have intelligence led and targeted 
patrolling … plain clothes operations … some days theyʼll be out and some days theyʼll be 
sat in the control room somewhere monitoring”. 
The relation of personnel with the environment, and particularly the relation with the 
habitual were considered integral to enacting security. The member of Lambeth Police 
Security Desk stated the importance of ʻlocal knowledgeʼ, “using local cops who know the 
area and what we do …what we will tell to the officers who are on the South Bank all the 
time, you are the experts on this area … if a box is out of place, or if a planter is on its side 
then they will notice it, see it and think thereʼs something wrong, and we will encourage 
them to notice what is different, out of the ordinary”. This sense of the habitual extends to 
individual and crowd behaviours, “Itʼs about trying to spot suspicious behaviour and knowing 
what that is, and it is a difficult skill to master … Weʼre trying to look for abnormal 
behaviours, spot something that stands out and looks irregular and thatʼs what we tell our 
officers. If you look at a crowd, then you know if something looks wrong to you, from 
personal experience you know what is normal in certain situations or what people do”. This 
attention to detail and the relation with the habitual applied to private security personnel, to 
the South Bank patrol, and those involved in the day-to-day management of individual sites. 
In addition, here as elsewhere, it is anticipated that ʻresponsibilisedʼ citizens will be vigilant 
and act on their suspicions. 
 
5.3.2. The Victoria Line 
 
 What we see in the case of the South Bank research site is the development of new 
rationalities of security, where counter-terrorist security and the city are drawn into novel 
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forms of reconciliation. Security becomes folded into the South Bank in particular ways, 
however there, as with the Victoria Line, the aims and how these are achieved are 
remarkably similar. In the following section I turn to the Victoria Line to continue this 
discussion of the securing of urban public spaces and further develop how the urban 
security project increasingly involves the negotiation of the tensions between the freedom to 
circulate and security as it is refracted through the city. 
 The Victoria Line is a line which forms part of the London Underground, which and by 
virtue of its size, scale and importance, is considered a vulnerable and likely terrorist target. 
Indeed, as the Home Affairs Committee report on CONTEST concluded, “It is so much a 
part of this countryʼs identity that I think in that respect it will never drop off the radar” 
(House of Commons, 2009a:EV1). Security in the context of a mass transit system such as 
the London Underground must be understood in terms of multiple spaces and circulations, 
as Nick Agnew, TfLʼs Safety and Contingency Planning Manager, explained in evidence 
presented to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2009 report on CONTEST: 
 
Maintaining the utility of the rail services in the face of the latent threat from terrorism 
requires a thorough understanding of how the different aspects of mass transit rail 
combine to operate as a system. In the rail environment, any ʻlocalʼ decision may 
affect hundreds of thousands of people and train services nationally. Precipitous 
action to close a station, without first considering how passengers and train 
movements will be affected, could lead to a number of adverse (and from the 
perspective of a Public Inquiry, perhaps entirely foreseeable) consequences (House 
of Commons, 2009a:EV61) 
 
 The London Underground presents a distinct challenge, where “the need is to have a 
security response that is proportionate and is not self-defeating. You have to be able to 
travel if the purpose is to travel” (House of Commons, 2007:Ev6). As the Home Affairs 
Committeeʼs report on CONTEST concluded, the “benefits of open mass transit rail travel 
are obtained only at the expense of tolerating some exposure to terrorism-related risks” 
(House of Commons, 2009a:EV61): 
 
The railway, by virtue of its core-function (i.e. to move millions of people each day 
safely, with the minimum of impediment; but not to provide a ʻcitadelʼ against terrorist 
attack) is not a risk-free environment. The societal and individual benefits of rail travel 
involve exposure to a range of interrelated potential hazards; both foreseeable and 
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unforeseeable. With direct reference to terrorism, allowing the relatively unhindered 
movement of four million people each day around the iconic London Underground – 
without checking first their identity or belongings – is a risk. The absolute benefit (and, 
arguably, the primary purpose) is that because of the availability of mass transit rail 
travel, London works. The potential cost is that the population to whom the railway 
remains ʻopenʼ may, at some point, include terrorists; who may, at some point, attack 
it (House of Commons, 2009a:EV59, original emphasis) 
 
The openness of the system, the same circulations and freedoms that define this 
system of mass transit exposes its vulnerability to this enactment of threat: 
 
One has only to buy a ticket to secure largely unrestrained access to the public areas 
of the rail network – 500 trains, 270 stations on the LU network, and 115 vehicle sets 
and 129 stations/stops on the London Rail networks – along with millions of fellow 
passengers operates (House of Commons, 2009a:EV37) 
 
As the Operational Security Manager for the London underground stated in an 
interview, as well as protecting the travelling crowds, security must protect the infrastructure 
itself:  
 
With our security, the first thing is that itʼs about people, itʼs about the people of 
London and allowing them to move freely, and itʼs about our own people … The other 
side of it in terms of site security, obviously we do that around things like station 
design and refurbishments and so on, but also where weʼve got critical infrastructure, 
weʼll put additional measures in there. 
 
The London Underground adopts a ʻlayered approachʼ to security, acknowledging 
“that no single security measure is either fool-proof, or capable of mitigating every type of 
threat. The aim, therefore, is to reduce the risk rather than seek to eliminate it entirely” 
(House of Commons, 2007:EV115). The BTP Crime Reduction Manager explained in an 
interview that a ʻlayered approachʼ involves security ʻsolutionsʼ which are tailored to differing 
contexts and problems: 
 
Using whatʼs available to us in terms of security and making the judgment to say well 
here we need this, this and this, some of that will be obvious and some of it will be 
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quite discrete, and itʼs having that knowledge, we develop layers of defence … itʼs sort 
of an onion style principle, the outside and peel of the layers to what your problem is, 
or what you think the target is likely to be. 
 
Each of the sixteen stations on the Victoria Line presents different vulnerabilities and 
security challenges. The design and spaces of stations on the Victoria Line and the 
extended system has to be taken into account, as does the design of trains and the variable 
passenger footfall. As the Operational Security Manager for the London underground 
explained, “The whole thing is trying to get this balance right really … With a lot of the 
security that we use … you basically want to make people know that theyʼre there without it 
hitting them in the face”, he continued, “none of that happens by mistake, thatʼs all part of 
the overall design standards, and security is a part of that, ensuring weʼve got what we need 
and that itʼs been well designed, incorporated into our plans, either at the redesign phase, 
or when youʼre doing a new build”. This approach is similar to that adopted on the South 
Bank, where again security must be reconciled with differing spatial contexts and with the 
function, aesthetics and with the lived life of the Victoria Line. The Operational Security 
Manager for the London underground also described efforts to design out vulnerabilities, 
“the idea there is good levels of lighting, not providing areas where it would be easy to 
conceal something, designing what are essentially flat landscapes with good site lines, 
make sure that any horizontal surfaces are slopes so itʼs very difficult to leave something 
and conceal it, and that whole concept is built into station design, rolling stock design”. The 
key with security, as TfLʼs Crime and Disorder Partnership Manager stated, “is business 
continuity, and how can we make this as normal as possible for the travelling public”. This is 
echoed by the Operational Security Manager for the London underground, “Whatever we 
do, we donʼt want to prevent or restrict people as theyʼre moving through our stations and 
through the system”. 
As with the South Bank, in this context, target hardening as a concept, “acquires a 
new significance. It cannot, for example, be assumed safely that any assets deployed to 
reassure the public (i.e. high-visibility duties performed in crowded locations) would also 
fulfil a deterrent function. Nor, that any established measures would necessarily deter 
someone willing to take his or her own life during an attack” (House of Commons 
2007:Ev92). Protective security measures are retrospectively fitted and included in upgrade 
works, including ʻbetter blast resistanceʼ in building and station design, as well on trains. 
Additional ʻhardʼ security measures address vulnerable areas adjacent to, but outside 
underground stations, including hostile vehicle mitigation measures to provide ʻstand-offʼ 
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and mitigate the threat posed by VBIEDs. As the BTP Counter-Terrorism Risk Adviser 
explained during an interview, ʻhardʼ engineering and design solutions involves “looking at 
the claims of different bits of kit … and establishing whether there is sufficient benefit to do 
it, or whether we are invoking the law of unintended consequences. Itʼs just trying to make 
sure that in terms of explosives and explosions as an attack, that we are doing the right 
things for the right reasons”. 
Integrating ʻhardʼ measures with ʻsoftʼ governance and management is central to day-
to-day security practice: “CCTV and policing, together with the vigilance of our own staff, 
provide a controlled environment which is hostile to criminals and those planning possible 
terrorist attacks” (House of Commons 2009a:Ev38). CCTV is considered “vital to managing 
security on the Underground” (House of Commons 2009a: Ev37). More than 8,500 cameras 
currently operate throughout the London Underground, covering stations, ticket hall areas, 
walkways, platforms and some trains: “Whilst they may have a deterrent effect, CCTV 
cameras are primarily used for crime reduction and investigation and general operational 
purposes rather than as a key plank of TRANSECʼs protective security regime. We require 
CCTV coverage of certain locations where an item may be secreted” (2007:EV136). As is 
the case with the South Bank, here the figure of the ʻcapable-guardianʼ is considered 
invaluable. Again this emphasises the interplay of physical security with electronic and 
procedural security which here, as with the South Bank, produces a holistic security 
strategy. 
BTP are responsible for the day-to-day policing of the Victoria Line34. As the 
Operational Security Manager for the London Underground explained when interviewed, 
“The fact that weʼve got the dedicated Policing is absolutely critical, because they know the 
environment, they understand the impact of taking the wrong sorts of decisions and stalling 
our trains in the tunnels”. He continued, “weʼve got around about seven hundred uniformed 
police … I think weʼve got the balance just about right now, weʼve got enough to provide a 
reassurance … if there is an incident, an assault or an unattended item thatʼs been declared 
suspicious, we know that there will be a good response to that”. The police understand the 
operation of the system and are familiar with the environment itself, the role of habit again 
considered in the enactment of security. As well as the importance of being familiar with and 
ʻknowingʼ an environment, the BTP now use Behavioural Assessment Screening System 
                                                
34 Policing services include a wide-range of ʻspecialistʼ policing functions unique to the requirements of the railway in addition 
to more generalist policing activities. Terrorism-related threats (and a range of broader safety implications associated with the 
fear of terrorism) are managed by BTP via a risk management based approach. In addition to intelligence-led activities, 
railway-specific procedures are in place to address the vulnerabilities associated with open, mass-transit, rail transport (House 
of Commons 2007:EV84). 
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(BASS), as Transport for London Crime and Disorder Partnership Manager explained, “the 
British Transport Police are the only force in the country that are actually training their 
officers in a system called the Behavioural Assessment Screening System, BASS, but what 
thatʼs about is about looking at behaviours”35. This behavioural pattern recognition aims to 
identify body language displayed by potential suicide bombers and those undertaking 
hostile reconnaissance. Explosivesʼ search dogs are regularly deployed, as the House of 
Commons Transport Committee review concluded: “The use of dogs in a reassurance role 
is a measure that, in comparison to some other developments (the overt use of firearms 
officers, for example) has been universally well received by the travelling public” (House of 
Commons, 2007:91). 
It is the judgment of TfL that a high level of customer service improves security (TfL, 
2010). The role of maintenance is recognised as important: “A clear, well maintained, with 
managed access points and reception facilities set in tidy grounds, presents an image of 
professionalism and offers less opportunity for an intruder to go unnoticed” (HM 
Government, 2010d:29). Every station is staffed throughout when trains are running, the 
majority staffed at all times. The underground network is compartmentalised, with staff 
dedicated to a particular zone, and safety and security practices are built into daily working 
practices enacting habitual knowledge. As the Operational Security Manager for the London 
underground explained, “our staff know the environment, that is absolutely key to part of 
providing what we call a controlled environment, because weʼre managing that public 
space, itʼs not just being left to itʼs own devices, so thatʼs quite key”. As well as training to 
help to recognise suspicious behaviours, as the Operational Security Manager for the 
London underground continued, the familiarity of staff with a particular environment is 
enrolled in the security architecture, “they know whatʼs not right and theyʼll deal with it and 
thatʼs key”. Staff are trained via exercises (see Anderson, 2010b) as a means of anticipating 
and preparing for potential terrorist incidents, exercises both virtual and ʻreal timeʼ. These 
range from drills involving only London Underground or TfL staff to major exercises staged 
with the involvement of a number of agencies (see House of Commons, 2007:108). As the 
Operational Security Manager for the London underground explained, “our staff regularly 
                                                
35 BASS is a system whereby officers are trained to identify suspects through indicators such as behaviours, body language, 
expressions and signs of deception, amongst other things which may indicate involvement in terrorism or other criminality 
(House of Commons, 2008): “Behavioural Awareness Screening System (BASS)—Since 2005, over 1200 police officers have 
been trained to incorporate BASS into their daily policing duties. This has greatly assisted police activity associated with 
screening and stop and search of people under the provisions of the Terrorism Act” (House of Commons, 2009a:EV59). 
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deal with operational incidents … they know how to do evacuations and regularly practice 
them is really important”36. 
The crowds that circulate within the Victoria Line are enrolled in the securing of the 
system. As the Operational Security Manager for the London underground contends, “weʼve 
got three and a half million people who use the system everyday, and are everywhere, so 
theyʼre the people that will also add to this, telling us when something is out of the ordinary, 
when something is wrong”. Along with staff, ʻhelp pointsʼ, of which there are more than 1500 
across the network, provide a mechanism to pass on information regarding risks, 
“unattended packages or suspicious activity and to summon help in emergencies” (TfL, 
2010): 
 
[W]e believe that the eyes and ears of the millions of daily users of Londonʼs road and 
rail networks are a vital resource. Passengers must continue to be given every 
encouragement and opportunity to report suspicious objects and patterns of 
behaviour, and their alertness should be regularly reinforced by appropriate 
announcements, posters, etc. This campaign should be coupled with one reminding 
them of the need to ensure that they do not inadvertently cause alarms and delays 
through innocent actions which could be capable of misunderstanding, e.g. by leaving 
bags unattended (House of Commons 2007, EV93) 
 
The London Underground is an example of an environment where the 
responsibilisation of citizens and vigilance to suspicions is vigorously encouraged. Regular, 
repeated announcements combined with a variety of posters, signs and stickers aim to raise 
awareness of potential threats, encouraging ʻawarenessʼ and ʻsuspicionʼ. The Operational 
Security Manager for the London underground stated that this is achieved “through 
customer awareness campaigns and we try to change them regularly … So we do take into 
account that it can become part of the background and we donʼt want that to happen so 
refreshing it helps to keep the message going”. These aim to raise awareness, however the 
threat is not clearly defined, loose graphical images are displayed on posters, recent 
schemes have called for the use of all senses to be aware of anything suspicious. 
 
                                                
36 TRANSEC circulates advice known as the ʻHOTʼ Protocol, devised by the BTP in the early 1990s as a ʻmental promptʼ to 
assist underground and overland railway staff in evaluating the risk associated with unattended items (House of Commons, 
2006). The BTP Counter-Terrorism Risk Adviser described the ʻHotʼ Protocol in an interview “what weʼre saying is that if what 
youʼve found hasnʼt been hidden (H), if it doesnʼt look obviously (O) suspicious, and if it is typical (T) of what you encounter 
regularly, itʼs lost property, deal with it. If one of those factors is different, reconsider your options, so in terms of characterising 
suspicion, our three factors are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and Typical of the environment”. 
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Conclusion 
 
In summary, this chapter has situated and forwarded a discussion of a specific 
counter-terrorist security apparatus in the context of the securing of cities, and in particular 
within public spaces, in the UK, and in London as a named example. Through the course of 
the chapter I have discussed how the everyday city and urban life itself are increasingly 
becoming a ʻreferent objectʼ of security in response to the enactment of emerging and 
shifting threats of terrorism and in particular the ʻevent of terrorʼ. It has also begun to 
demonstrate how this specific apparatus of security moves from a set of processes and 
techniques that aim to counter the threats of terror to become present as a range of 
interventions within the spaces of urban life and as something that is lived, this will be 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
This chapter has demonstrated that biopolitics is central to the UK Governmentʼs NSS 
and CONTEST where the preoccupation with enabling and securing the circulations and 
ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-democratic life are primary concerns. Attending to this claim, this 
chapter has demonstrated the tensions that emerge between freedom, circulation and 
security, within everyday urban settings and the different ways in which these problematics 
are then reconciled in and through the emerging geographies of everyday securing. Security 
in the context of urban spaces involves the securing and protection of the biological of the 
individual and of the population especially in relation to ʻcrowded placesʼ where spaces are 
defined, albeit arguably poorly, in terms of population itself, that is a place defined by 
density, by its crowdedness. The biological cannot be separated from other expressions of 
life, the elements and processes which enable a valued life to be sustained, the enabling 
and fostering of a distinct way of life in the context of urban spaces. This is a conception of 
life to be secured which is supported and enabled by a whole series of processes and 
circulations that have come to define the personal and commercial ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-
democratic life. The combination and reconciliation of security, freedom and circulation 
enacts a form of security which is necessarily spatially contingent. As such, the rationales 
for security and the interventions deployed with the aim of countering the threats of terror 
are characterised by a rationality of site and case specificity. The threats posed by terrorism 
to the city spaces and to urban life has established significant new challenges for how we 
understand security and the very means by which it can be provided. These new 
geographies of urban security require spatially contingent interventions to ensure that the 
valued life of cities and distinct urban sites is fostered, maintained and ultimately secured. 
154 
The everyday spaces of urban life are, therefore, increasingly primed to the 
possibilities of attack, saturated with a range of security and surveillance mechanisms. In 
relation to this, a range of different logics of security coalesce and mix in accordance with 
different urban spaces and contexts, producing different environments of threat and 
counter-threat. In the securing of the everyday city traditional logics of security coalesce 
with anticipatory action, protection, detection, prevention, deterrence, delay, mitigation, 
etcetera. These are not stable, as Foucault (2007) contends, security is changeable, 
continually altering to incorporate new elements. Whilst Massumi (in Rice, 2010) is correct 
to state that cities spaces are primed to render anticipatory action possible, and where 
Dillon (2005b) is right in his assertion that contingency drives contemporary security, in the 
context of the everyday city and the securing of the everyday, security involves a mixing of 
these and other logics. At the same time, these measures are increasingly tensed to act on 
the future in the present. Events of terror, whilst signalling the limits of calculable knowledge 
are subjected to risk calculations, judgements and other anticipatory logics which seek to 
ʻsurprise the surpriseʼ, to render it actionable and so to act in order to prevent these events 
or to mitigate their consequences. In terms of how security is enacted and made present 
within cities, geographies of absence and presence are becoming central to the everyday 
practice of security. These new forms of security, and the examples taken from the two 
research sites, are primed to become part of the everyday life of urban spaces and 
everyday happenings in different ways, as will be discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
Security is expected to move from being a set of mechanisms, understood as technical and 
instrumental, to become something which is itself lived and everyday life shifts from being 
the ʻreferent object; of security to that within which security itself lives. 
In the context of urban security there is a need to consider how the range of security 
and surveillance mechanisms that saturate urban spaces, are encountered as a range of 
absences and presences, once they becomes part of the everyday life of cities, an everyday 
urban geography of security is thus imperative. As this chapter has argued, a specific 
apparatus of security has emerged that comes to be organised in certain and very specific 
ways, primed to be part of the everyday life of urban spaces through the ordering processes 
of ʻinvisible securityʼ. In this chapter I have argued that counter-terror security interventions 
in public spaces within cities in the UK are increasingly primed to be a part of everyday life 
and primed to emerge from this background in the event of an event. This is a dynamic of 
invisibility and response which is central to how new ways of securing public space operate 
where the aim is to foster circulations and enable the enable the personal and commercial 
ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-democratic life of London. 
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In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 I will discuss how the measures located in the two 
research sites become part of urban space and urban life itself. With reference to the 
security interventions that populate the two research sites and through witnessing and 
describing the conditions of everyday encounters I will argue that there are two generic 
ways in which security takes place within urban life. Firstly, in Chapter 6 I discuss security 
as an absent presence, this questions both the design of these spaces and of security 
interventions of different kinds, and also the conditions of encounter where security as it is 
encountered as background, sunken and infra-ordinary. In Chapter 7 I then turn my focus to 
the ways in which counter-terrorist security changes form and emerges from this 
background as a heightened presence. Through these two chapters I will show how the 
specific mechanisms discussed here in relation to the two research sites become part of 
everyday life in particular ways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
6. The Infra-Ordinary Background of Security 
 
Introduction 
 
Theresa: I think it is true, people just wont think about security most of the time, it just 
wont cross their mind, I donʼt think it really bothers people. It didnʼt bother me. Before I 
did this for you I canʼt think of a time when Iʼve been aware of security, or thought 
about it, I just wouldnʼt think about it, so it just goes to show. Itʼs taken for granted that 
things are there, but people just wont think about security, they certainly arenʼt 
worrying about it being there or not, wherever they are, unless there is something 
happening, or they need it for whatever reason, then I donʼt think people are that 
bothered about it. 
 
In this passage, Theresa describes security as part of the ʻrest insteadʼ: that which is 
generally not taken not of, that which is known but rarely acknowledged, that which has no 
importance. She describes security as a part of the infra-ordinary spaces and happenings, 
as set out in Chapter 5. Looking back to the previous chapter, I argued that security is 
increasingly being ʻdesigned intoʼ infra-ordinary spaces and happenings. With respects to 
the specific form of security apparatus discussed in Chapter 5, invisibility is central to how 
these new ways of securing public space function where the aim is biopolitical, is to ensure 
a set of ʻfreedomsʼ and to foster ʻgoodʼ circulations. Bearing this in mind, what I do in this 
chapter is show how these security mechanisms become part of everyday life in particular 
ways. So, security moves from being a set of mechanisms to something lived, and everyday 
life shifts from being an object of security to that within which security lives. But I am not just 
interested in security in general. I am interested in how the specific mechanisms discussed 
in relation to the two research sites become part of everyday life. As such it contributes to 
works that focus on the imbrications of counter-terrorist security and the city, of how a 
particular form of security comes to be organised in certain and very specific ways, as well 
as questioning everyday experience with the aim of further developing accounts of the 
everyday life of security. 
Firstly, this is a concern for the infra-ordinariness of security and in particular the 
ordinariness of many encounters with security interventions as these become embedded in 
urban spaces and take place as part of the background of urban life. Whilst little has been 
written about how security is encountered and enacted, work that has considered the ways 
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security is experienced as a part of the everyday life of cities has tended to focus on it as 
somehow present within urban life (see Boddy, 2008; Katz, 2007; Marcuse, 2006). I am 
interested in continuing the work of the previous chapter to consider how forms of security 
are primed to be part of the everyday life of urban spaces, the ordering processes of 
ʻinvisible securityʼ (Briggs, 2005). Security as background, as a sunken part of that which is 
truly daily in our daily lives is a condition which is central to how new ways of securing 
public space function when the aim is to foster circulations and ensure a set of freedoms. 
The taken for grantedness of forms of counter-terrorist security is understood as significant 
in terms of both the efficacy of this security apparatus and its place in everyday urban 
geographies and in “the constant to and fro of movements which sustain that fabric” of 
urban life (Amin and Thrift, 2002:83). 
Secondly and related, this chapter is concerned with attending to the familiarity and 
neglect that accompanies the ordinariness of the everyday. In the context of the form of 
security described in Chapter 5, this seeks to bear witness to and to describe how, through 
everyday encounters, security can come to be both significant and insignificant; foreground 
and background; present, but not present. At the same time, this aims to consider security 
as it is assembled and participates as part of background feeling and affective 
atmospheres. These are the problematics that this chapter addresses and my focus rests 
with the largely neglected everyday practices and movements through which bodies enact 
security as a range of presences and absences. 
Thirdly, an interest in the practice of everyday life within geography has highlighted 
the importance of embodiment and everyday practice, which as I have contended have 
remained largely neglected in urban security studies. Here everyday practice is central to 
understanding the everyday life of security and its place as part of the infra-ordinary 
background. In particular it draws attention to routine movements and habitual gestures, 
embodied copings through which human and non-human bodies participate in active and 
ongoing assemblages, some of which are related to security, some of which are not. The 
different modes of encounter that people have with different forms of security offers an 
explanation of how security becomes a part of a background everydayness. For security, 
this forwards a concern for the ways assemblages, which are composed of elements which 
are present and absent, take place. 
The chapter begins by developing the idea of security as a part of the infra-ordinary 
background of the city and the ordinary ways security is encountered and enacted through 
everyday practice. It is demonstrated here how security comes to be relatively free from our 
attentions, a largely taken for granted part of what goes without saying, absent 
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simultaneously. Of interest here are the ways through which people enact security as a 
range of presences and absences. Second, I consider the implications of this infra-
ordinariness and the expectation that urban spaces will always be somehow secured. Here, 
a general and vague structure of expectation emerges as it is assumed that urban spaces 
must be secured, by default, because they are part of contemporary cities. This expectation 
is often, but not always, separate from actual encounters with specific security interventions. 
The presence of security comes to be uncertain. Third, I explore the ambiguous role of 
security within the everyday life of cities. Where security is often a background presence 
and an uncertainty, the actual forms and practices of security are often encountered 
ambiguously. Although security becomes increasingly normalised, the processes of 
normalisation make security an ambiguous presence. Fourthly, I explore the ways in which 
security as a background presence is experienced as a background feeling, thinking 
through the relations between security and affective atmospheres. This moves to examine 
the conditions of ʻbeing-secureʼ, where it is not so straightforward as security producing the 
affect that it names. Taken together, these four aspects help us to think through and to 
better understand the imbrications of security and the city, whilst describing how security 
can be experienced through daily practices, and encountered as part of the infra-ordinary 
background of the city. 
 
6.1. Becoming background 
 
SERVICE 10:38; SECURITY 10:42; SERVICE 10:48; SERVICE 10:51; SERVICE 10:55; 
SECURITY 10:57; SERVICE 10:59; SERVICE 11:03; SERVICE 11:07; SERVICE 11:11; 
SECURITY 11:12; SERVICE 11:15; SERVICE 11:19; SERVICE 11:23; SECURITY 11:27; 
SERVICE 11:31; SERVICE 11:35; SERVICE 11:39; SECURITY 11:42; SERVICE 11:43; 
SERVICE 11:47; SERVICE 11:51; SERVICE 11:55; SECURITY 11:57; SERVICE 11:59; 
SECURITY 12:12; SECURITY 12:27; SERVICE 12:34; SECURITY 12:42; SERVICE 
12:54; SECURITY 12:57; SERVICE 13:04; SECURITY 13:12; SERVICE 13:14; SERVICE 
13:24; SECURITY 13:27; SERVICE 13:34; SERVICE; 13:38; SECURITY 13:42; SERVICE 
13:48; SECURITY 13:57; SERVICE 13:58; SECURITY 14:12 
 
“Ladies and gentlemen, this is a security announcement. Please remember to keep all 
of your personal belongings and luggage with you at all times. Any unclaimed articles 
will be removed or destroyed”. Preceded by a single chime toning, the duration of a 
security announcement at Kings Cross St Pancras underground station is 
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approximately fourteen seconds. Iʼve begun to recognise the different chimes 
heralding security and service calls. Security announcements take place regularly, at 
fifteen-minute intervals. The oration is artificial, a mechanical female voice 
synthetically sounding out precisely enunciated words – slowly and clearly delivered. 
(Observant participation, Kings Cross St Pancras, 11.02.09)37 
 
The security measures identified in Chapter 5 are so often part of the everydayness of 
cities which goes unnoticed, an argument that should be extended to security interventions 
found throughout cities. Drawing on Perec, in Chapter 3 I described this realm as the ʻinfra-
ordinaryʼ, by which I meant the things that we do everyday and the spaces that we do them 
in without giving them so much as a momentʼs thought. Without an excessive attention 
these security and surveillance interventions become part of the infra-ordinary and are all 
too easily overlooked, even as they are encountered and enacted. Indeed, in an interview 
with a member of the BTP Crime and Disorder Partnership Unit, it was acknowledged and 
expected that security measures often “just become part of the wallpaper”, as security and 
surveillance interventions after a time will become something that “people wont take notice 
of”. Security measures, as Daniel writes in his diary, can become overlooked: 
 
As I travel on this line regularly, I donʼt think about security anymore. Iʼm familiar with 
my surroundings, and the context of my exposure to relative insecurity, and this 
familiarity breeds complacency. Iʼm only on the route for 20 minutes, and nothing 
changes, so I just make my way to work (Self-completed diary, Daniel, 21.04.10). 
 
To begin this section, I am interested in what Adair (2009), following Perec, has 
referred to as the ʻquotidian invisibilityʼ of the infra-ordinary and how security comes to be a 
part of the background of urban life. We might think of Danielʼs reference to familiarity and 
complacency with respects to the manifold ways that we come into contact with security 
interventions as they receive our ʻdaily inattentionʼ (Highmore, 2010). This movement, or 
change, is significant, as are the different and dynamic ways in which it occurs: 
                                                
37 At different stations on the Victoria Line although the content of security announcements is essentially the same, the delivery 
(manual or automated), composition of the message and frequency of announcements differs. The Operational Security 
Manager for the London Underground offered the following explanation when interviewed, “Interestingly enough what we used 
to do is not legislate for it, we used to let staff make the announcements that they thought was right, but one of the things that 
we introduced about two years ago was a consistent message, that this is the words that we want you to say, and itʼs the first 
time weʼve succeeded, and now what they should do is at bigger stations itʼs every thirty minutes that they make 
announcements and at the smaller ones it should be once an hour. And the idea is that youʼre going to hear one of these 
announcements at least once on your journey, thatʼs the concept behind it”. 
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Marie: In some stations you can see yourself in the screen when you are being 
CCTVʼd and I donʼt like that, that makes me aware that there are cameras there. But 
at first that really shocked me when I arrived here, I felt angry about it actually, that I 
didnʼt understand why they had them there, but over the past four years I suppose I 
have got used to it, I donʼt notice it at all, so from the shock of knowing that 
everything is filmed Iʼve forgotten and now wont think about it. Itʼs there and for a 
month, maybe I was annoyed but now, itʼs just there. 
 
For Marie, the presence of CCTV was initially shocking, having moved to London from 
Grenoble, she states that she reacted angrily to its presence, and yet, over time she has 
grown used to it and now it is a largely unthought of background presence. A stark example 
of this is provided by Lene, a participant who had, at the time of the interview, worked on 
the South Bank for eighteen months and had walked along the South Bank to her place of 
work in Gabrielʼs Wharf daily during that time. At the beginning of the interview Lene 
admitted that she had forgotten about completing the diary and the prompts that I had 
provided. Consequently she had walked her journey as normal: 
 
Lene: I donʼt think, um … well like I say, it, it didnʼt make me think a lot, I mean, I have 
to say I didnʼt really think about it really, apart from when you came and spoke to us 
and asked me to, so I donʼt know how much help I can be, um I … I donʼt know, um … 
I have to say, err I havenʼt noticed anything really, but Iʼve not necessarily been 
looking out for it … I donʼt really pay attention to anything like that. 
 
Admitting that she had not considered nor noticed the presence of security any more 
than usual, Lene stated that she remained largely unaware of the presence of security 
interventions, uncertain of their presence and unsure of how to begin to describe how she 
enacted and experienced security. The uncertainty described here by Lene is revealing and 
is a more acute example of the uncertainty and difficulties expressed by other participants. 
 
Robert: It takes quite a bit of effort to think about it, itʼs not as easy as, well, itʼs not 
there in front of you, so it does take some effort to take the time to slow down and look 
around … It is quite amazing when you do stop and realise whatʼs there, the amount 
was the thing that really got me the amount actually of stickers, posters, and the 
cameras, the police. The cameras, I canʼt remember how many I wrote, but there 
were like twenty before I even got onto a train and I hadnʼt noticed them before, 
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because I wasnʼt looking or paying attention, and you donʼt notice them, you think, 
maybe theyʼre hidden or there arenʼt any, or Iʼm not aware, then actually when I 
thought I donʼt really know I hadnʼt noticed them. 
 
For this participant, the effort involved in apprehending and describing the forms of 
security he encounters daily through his commute on the Victoria Line is a reflection of its 
place as part of the infra-ordinary background and the ways in which he encounters security 
interventions day-to-day. What is interesting about Robertʼs admission in the above 
example is that whilst he admits that the security presences are numerous, he 
acknowledges that rather than security being somehow always already present, the security 
and surveillance interventions he now cites as plentiful are most often a part of the 
humdrum, the nonevents of the infra-ordinary, part of “what happens,” as Perec put it, 
“when nothing happens” (2010:3): the rest instead. Whilst security is increasingly ubiquitous 
in the everyday spaces of urban life, it is certainly not omnipresent in the ways in which 
these spaces are lived and experienced. In the following extract, Margaret recounts this 
situation, describing how the security and surveillance measures she regularly encounters 
at Finsbury Park Underground station are a largely neglected part of the environment – in 
short, the background infra-ordinary fabric of everyday life that is so often unnoticed: 
 
Margaret: you donʼt need to look up or think about what youʼre doing so you donʼt 
notice whatʼs around. I couldnʼt tell you whatʼs in the stations, I couldnʼt even tell you 
the colour of the walls in the stations I use. Itʼs like when you go in someoneʼs house, 
unless youʼre really observant or youʼre really interested in interior design [laughs], I 
donʼt know the colour of my brothers living room walls are and how many times have I 
been in my brothers house? Iʼm just not interested, and Iʼve got other things Iʼm doing. 
A lot of the time youʼre switched off, thereʼs a lot going on that youʼre not really aware 
of … Thereʼs those things youʼre interested in, well, maybe not interested, but things 
you think about and pay attention to and the rest gets blocked out. 
 
What Margaret describes here is security as a part of the environment which does not 
attract her attention, a part of the infra-ordinary “which is generally not taken note of, that 
which is not noticed, that which has no importance” (Perec, 2010:3). This of course does 
not suggest that for Margaret, nor indeed for other participants, that security is accepted, 
rather it reflects the form of the security apparatus described in the previous chapter, an 
apparatus involving practices of embedding security into the spaces and happenings of 
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everyday life. These security measures are primed to be part of the everyday life of cities; 
security becomes something which is lived. As the previous chapter demonstrated, many of 
the forms of security and the techniques present within both sites are required to be 
ʻappropriateʼ and ʻacceptableʼ, specific to the conditions of and requirements of the two sites 
(for example police officers; CCTV cameras; security announcements; bollards and barriers; 
security posters, signs and stickers). These interventions are not as purposefully 
demonstrable as other styles and arrangements of security which are more visible and 
obvious presences (consider the security in airports, for example)38, many of these 
techniques are enacted in one way or another precisely with the intention that they remain 
largely unnoticed. The presence of security within the two research sites therefore often 
becomes an absence simultaneously: 
 
Theresa: I think it goes to show how easy it is to just walk past things without noticing 
them, or thinking about them. The number of times Iʼve walked along here and never 
noticed the cameras, but I suppose itʼs because I donʼt think about security, not just 
along here, I would never normally think about it. And thinking are you aware? And do 
you feel safe? I certainly wouldnʼt, normally think about that. I feel, I feel safe, but Iʼm 
not normally aware of the security thatʼs here, I wouldnʼt think about it normally, no …  
well, I wouldnʼt usually be thinking about feeling safe or whatever either. 
 
In this passage Theresa concedes that as well as overlooking the presence of the 
various security interventions, she encounters daily whilst walking on the South Bank, the 
conditions of (in)security, and the associated positive or negative affects of such conditions, 
are not commonly everyday concerns. I will return to and discuss these background feelings 
more fully in the final section of this chapter, but for now I am interested in Theresaʼs 
example as being suggestive of the condition of ʻanaesthesiaʼ, the ʻdreamless sleepʼ, as 
described by Perec (2008a). In this way security is enacted as an absence, or perhaps 
more accurately as a range of absent presences. This suggests that whilst the presence of 
security is already-known it is rarely acknowledged (Sheringham, 2000). The ordinariness of 
this form of security, and the ordinary ways through which it is encountered and enacted 
render it both absent and present simultaneously. It is precisely “what happens every day 
and recurs every day” (Perec, 2008a:210), as Perec put it, which is significant here. As 
such, security comes to be encountered and enacted in much the same ways as other 
                                                
38 For examples of works that have discussed security in airports see Adey (2004a, 2004b 2008, 2009) and Salter (2004, 
2006, 2007, 2008). 
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presences that constitute the infra-ordinary background of the daily life of the two research 
sites, and indeed other urban spaces: simultaneously absent and present: 
 
Shanthi: It becomes part of your surroundings. I think everything slowly changes into 
things that you donʼt recognise or notice, I think then itʼs got to be drawn to your 
attention and even then you might notice, you might not … it becomes like anything 
else, like you donʼt think why theyʼre there or what theyʼre doing after a while, you just 
walk past … itʼs there but you donʼt know itʼs there [laughs]. I donʼt know though, like if 
they started to change the security, moving the cameras or whatever I donʼt think Iʼd 
really notice that either … It shows how easy it is to walk past it and not realise. 
 
Here, Shanthi has suggested that in her experience of using the Victoria Line 
regularly, the presence of security interventions, far from being already present, are 
encountered and enacted as an absence, becoming something that she does not notice. 
This is an example of how security has often already happened, already becoming part of 
bodies (for instance, passing underneath a CCTV camera). In such instances, although an 
encounter takes place, there is never necessarily a moment of origin, it is absent. The 
presence of a materially present security process may thus be an absence simultaneously, 
as a security presence may not necessarily ever become present to a body. Habitual 
practices and habitual engagements are important here. As a part of the infra-ordinary 
background of everyday life, security measures can be understood as being enacted and 
engaged with primarily through a range of everyday habitual practices (see Harrison, 2000; 
Thrift, 2000c): 
 
Iain: I think itʼs far removed from your consciousness, itʼs all a bit of a blur when youʼre 
commuting isnʼt it, itʼs true of most things that are repetitive, if I drive some places 
literally anything could happen, after Iʼve made a few journeys to the same place, 
anything could happen next to the car and I would have been blissfully ignorant, I 
wouldnʼt be able to recount a single moment of the journey and itʼs the same on the 
tube, Iʼd say, even if they donʼt change the adverts enough on the tube, Iʼll stop 
noticing them, you know even if you see, you look up and think oh Iʼve seen all that 
before and you donʼt register anything, then if you see something new you think oh 
right Iʼll read that. 
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Iain travels on the Victoria Line twice a day each day of the week for work, his journey 
on the line beginning at Kings Cross and departing at Victoria, near to his place of work. 
Having made this journey for over four years he describes a situation where security is 
mixed with the background fabric of the different spaces he passes through. It is through 
various everyday practices and embodied dispositions, in particular those of routine and 
habit, that security becomes part of the everydayness described as infra-ordinary. The 
security interventions within the two research sites are importantly enacted as part of what 
Sheringham (2007:205), following Nancy, has referred to as the ʻinappearanceʼ of the 
quotidien, as opposed to the ʻspectacleʼ of the event. To turn back to the concerns of the 
previous chapter; there I argued that a discourse of security has emerged that emphasises 
its appropriateness, acceptability and the way in which it is bespoke and fits into different 
urban conditions. Here we could say that it ʻfits inʼ because of how it becomes one set of 
objects amongst others in everyday life. Perhaps security is no different to other 
materialities encountered everyday. However, this would be too simple. In the following 
section I want to emphasise the specificity of how security becomes present: through a 
structure of uncertainty. 
 
6.2. Expecting security 
 
It has increasingly come to be expected that a range of security and surveillance 
interventions will be present within the spaces of urban life. This expectation is however 
often generalised and uncertain and is not reliant on actual encounters with specific security 
presences. We are interested in so many things above and beyond security. Where it is 
emphasised that counter-terrorist security must be ʻappropriateʼ and ʻacceptableʼ given a 
variety of different urban conditions, a structure of uncertainty is intimately linked to the 
specific form of security described in the previous empirical chapter. It is also often unclear 
what role security mechanisms play in the everyday life of the city and the securitisation of 
urban life, one amongst many other (possible) referent objects. This form of security is 
made present within the spaces of contemporary urban life as an uncertainty: 
 
In general, I had expected to see more security; I had anticipated more types and 
incidence of security to record. I feel that I noticed only the most obvious indicators of 
security; cameras hanging from the ceiling, bright signs and markers, people and 
barriers. I donʼt feel that even with me searching, I saw much that I hadnʼt noticed 
before (noticed, but not taken on-board particularly, as I hadnʼt deemed them worth 
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consideration). Where I didnʼt see security measures, it did largely concern me. I did 
expect to see more security signs, particularly on the trains themselves. There 
absence made me assume that they were there anyway, and that I simply couldnʼt 
see them. But their absence did make me believe that they might be hidden which 
was a) insidious and b) more likely to be ineffective, because if they were hidden then 
they would be limited in their scope. In essence, this meant that whether they were 
actually there or not, if I couldnʼt see them, then I was less comforted (Self completed 
diary, Daniel). 
 
Whilst regular claims are made that security and surveillance technologies and 
measures are becoming ever more ubiquitous in the spaces of contemporary urban life, as 
Daniel notes in this diary entry, it is often difficult to identify and to describe the presences of 
various techniques now employed to secure the everyday city. Participants acknowledged 
that they were uncertain of and often unable to locate the security which they expected to 
be present within either of the two research sites, admitting that they were uncertain of the 
particular measures: 
 
Marie: I watch people, I always watch people, but I donʼt really, I donʼt think I ever look 
for security, I know I donʼt do that. I think I watch more if I take a regular commute, I 
think I notice more and more also, but not really security which is strange, I think, I 
know there are some cameras, but I couldnʼt draw a map and show you where, and I 
think that I know the area quite well, know the stations I mean. 
 
In spite of Marie making the same journey to and from work daily, she admits that she 
is uncertain of the security which is present in the spaces of her commute. Marie claims that 
she gives little thought to the security measures that she encounters everyday, a common 
admission amongst participants. Although admitting that she is uncertain of specific security 
presences, Marie hints at a generalised expectation that particular security measures, in 
this instance CCTV cameras, will be present. This structure of expectation is suggestive not 
only of the increasing normalisation of security measures within the everyday spaces of 
urban life but also the specific form of security discussed in the previous chapter. Whilst this 
was the case, when asked to reflect on measures that they already knew to be present, or 
those interventions they expected to be part of either site, participants conceded that the 
practical exercise was difficult: 
 
166 
Patrick: It does appear that security is largely forgotten about. 
Robert: No, thatʼs probably very true, you canʼt live in London and not expect that 
thereʼs going to be a lot of police, CCTV and what have you, but youʼre right most 
people arenʼt really aware of it, not anymore than being able to say that itʼs there. 
Patrick: The specifics of it. 
Robert: Yeah, yeah exactly, I think thatʼs what the diary did for me and I consider 
myself to be quite an observant person, or I like to think that I take an interest in my 
surroundings. 
 
For this participant, there is a clear expectation that security must be somehow 
present, he cites examples of forms of techniques which are readily encountered within 
urban spaces, gesturing that he expects these and additional security interventions to be 
found on the Victoria Line. Even with direction, participants are uncertain about the 
presences, or absence, of security in different ways. Participants stated that locating the 
security was often challenging and as such they conceded that they remained uncertain of 
the presence, or not, of security within the site, and uncertain of the specific forms of 
security which are there: 
 
Nilukshi: Not actually that useful necessarily, because sometimes, most of the time I 
thought that I couldnʼt find things because Iʼm not looking for them, like I donʼt notice 
things because Iʼm not looking or because Iʼm preoccupied. I actually went out of my 
way to try and find stuff though and it still wasnʼt that much easier … so even though I 
was actively looking I didnʼt find anything. So I was no more aware than if I just not 
even noticed it. In fact I suppose I am more aware, Iʼm more aware of the fact that I 
still donʼt know where it is. 
 
These are expectations that are not necessarily supported by evidence of security, 
they are often independent of encounters with specific security and surveillance 
mechanisms. They represent a far more generalised and vague structure of expectation. 
Andrew, for example, conceded that he remains uncertain of the particular techniques and 
security arrangements that may or may not be present within the South Bank: 
 
Andrew: I wouldnʼt even say I was more aware, um … probably only a bit more, only 
because I knew it was there anyway, now I might be looking for it more than I was so 
Iʼm seeing it more. Itʼs usually in places like this, so itʼs obviously going to be there. 
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This and similar interview experiences are significant. Participants acknowledged that 
they were largely unsure of whether security is present or not. They stated that they had 
assumed that security would be present, without certainty of the specific measures they 
expected to encounter. So we have a distinction between, on the one hand, security in 
general and, on the other, specific mechanisms of security. Security in general is expected 
even in the absence of any specific security measures (this has important implications for 
the affects of security that I will discuss in the final section of this chapter): 
 
Robert: When you see the police or notice a camera, the thought inevitably crosses 
your mind, for me itʼs not a serious thought or I donʼt start debating whether itʼs a good 
or a bad thing, but people are aware of it, I certainly knew it was there, but Iʼm not 
sure I was aware of it in the same way that youʼve asked me to be aware of it, and I 
think unless something happens to make you think about it, or youʼre in one of those 
instances where you see the police talking with someone, then I think you forget about 
it. If I do think about it I quickly revert. 
Patrick: You knew there was security, but not in an engaged sense. 
Robert: No, exactly, not in any way engaged, and I wouldnʼt think about it, and I have 
to be honest thatʼs how I am now, well I was up until a day or so ago and I only really 
thought about it again because I knew I was going to be interviewed, that shows how 
quickly it slipped my mind. And youʼre moving though arenʼt you so you donʼt have the 
time to think about it. 
 
For this participant, the presence and absence of particular security and surveillance 
interventions is again an uncertainty. Robert outlines a vague and general understanding 
that security is present through his journey on the Victoria Line, but was unable to recall 
moments of encountering specific forms. Participants stated that prior to involvement with 
this research, they had assumed security would be present in the two research sites, but 
admitted that they would not have given a great deal of thought to this, if any, citing security 
events as occasions when security becomes a more intensified presence (I will return to this 
in Chapter 7). The forms of security present within the two research sites, and the 
uncertainty regarding their presence on the part of participants, is in marked contrast to 
other forms of security techniques and arrangements found elsewhere. The spaces of the 
airport provide a classic example of highly visible demonstrable security. Iain, who had 
recently returned from holiday, compared his experiences of security as uncertain and as 
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largely absent on the Victoria Line with the prominence of the security apparatus he had 
experienced whilst in Heathrow airport: 
 
Iain: when youʼre in an airport, the security you get there and, the amount of security 
and how intense it is … you canʼt escape it there … airports are really really security 
conscious and really obvious about it too but people still carry on donʼt they? And 
most people donʼt complain, they donʼt care, theyʼre not going to stop flying because 
of it. I think they accept it, itʼs just part of travelling by air now, you expect that sort of 
security to be there … I think that shows itʼs a normal part of it now, you expect it 
there and you accept that when youʼre in London youʼre going to find a lot of security, 
but I donʼt think thatʼs a problem for most people. And you donʼt interact with the 
security in somewhere like the underground or anywhere else in London really unless 
you need it for some reason … you donʼt have to put your bag through an x-ray and 
you donʼt get stopped and searched and thatʼs whatʼs going to make a difference to 
people I think. 
Patrick: A difference to your experience? 
Iain: Yeah, and to you knowing if itʼs there or not, if youʼre using the diary to get 
people to look for them, I thought thatʼs because they usually donʼt, I donʼt and I think 
that shows something doesnʼt it? 
 
As Iain admits, he would not normally consider the presence of security, and would be 
unable to identify or describe the various security measures that he encounters during his 
daily journey on the Victoria Line, although he states a generalised expectation that security 
will be somehow present. This is in contrast with the very obvious demonstrable form of 
security that he concedes has become an expected part of airports. 
Whilst the presence of security within the two research sites is often expected, as the 
examples in this section have shown, the presence of specific security measures often 
remains an uncertainty. Returning to the specificity of the forms of security described in the 
previous chapter we can see how this uncertainty folds into the particular form of security 
that has been described there. Counter-terrorist security within urban spaces has sought 
novel ways of protecting and managing the everyday life of civic spaces where the aim is to 
foster circulations. These measures are primed to be a part of the infra-ordinary 
everydayness, a form of security that works by being embedded into the city, and in the 
everyday life of urban spaces within which security itself then lives. This will inevitably lead 
to a degree of uncertainty. However, this uncertainty must be considered in light of the 
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particular structure of expectation that we see emerging within contemporary cities. It is 
expected that urban spaces will always be somehow secured. There is an expectation that 
security will be present, however this expectation is often separate from actual encounters 
with specific security mechanisms. 
 
6.3. Security as an ambiguous presence 
 
As the Chapter 5 demonstrated, counter-terrorist security within urban spaces has 
required a variety of new and specific ways of protecting and managing cities. Where the 
aim is to foster circulations and to ensure a set of freedoms that define liberal democratic 
life, these forms of security work by being embedded into the city and in the everyday life of 
urban spaces. Whilst it is right to contend that the spaces of everyday urban life are 
increasingly saturated with security and surveillance mechanisms, these interventions are 
considered with respects to the particular form of life which is being produced. Security, in 
this context, is required to be invisible, to be background, in short to become normal. As the 
previous section of this chapter demonstrated, there is uncertainty as to how and where 
security is present. As security becomes an increasingly normal part of the everyday life of 
the city, measures which are primed to become part of the infra-ordinary background of 
cities are often encountered ambiguously. As security becomes increasingly normal, this 
normalisation paradoxically makes security an ambiguous presence: 
 
Owen: In terms of expectations, not with being surprised or shocked by it, it was 
almost what youʼd expect nowadays in terms of security, so it met with what Iʼd expect 
to be there, but obviously Iʼve not thought much of it before. But like anywhere, youʼd 
expect a good deal of security to be there. 
Patrick: So itʼs almost a condition of cities, to have security of whatever type present, 
thatʼs a normal, expected part of city life? 
Owen: Yeah, thereʼs an, an inevitability about it, thatʼs how it is, so I would have been 
more surprised if it wasnʼt there. I donʼt think anyoneʼs unaware of it, I donʼt think you 
could be. Maybe Iʼm oblivious of it, I think the diary showed that I donʼt think about it 
most days or in most situations, but Iʼm not ignorant to it because itʼs part of our lives 
now and you know, even if youʼre not thinking about it, you know that itʼs going to be 
in cities. Itʼs a fact of modern life that these things are necessary. 
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Owen hints to the normalisation of security and surveillance measures, suggesting 
that security is expected to be present in contemporary urban life. This is not security in 
general as such, but security and a form of counter-terrorist security apparatus which has 
been discussed in the previous empirical chapter. It is therefore not the normalisation of 
security per se, but specific apparatus in the context of securing everyday urban life and 
indeed the lived of the everyday. There is a passage from the confusions of uncertainty to 
ambiguity in the ways that security is present. Whilst there is an expectation that security of 
some form will be present, what we find is that actual forms or practices of security are 
encountered ambiguously. That is the increasing normalisation of security, paradoxically 
makes security an ambiguous presence, always encountered with other things, people, 
intensities etcetera. An encounter with security will always be an encounter with something 
else as well. In part, this is a function of a form of security that works by being embedded 
into the city. Compare with airport security which involves a defined period of time set up for 
security, and the crossing of a threshold (see Adey 2009b). Security in the city is different. 
Within security spaces, and with an encounter with any security presence, there is always 
more happening, people are always doing more than just encountering security, this means 
that it is difficult to discern quite what is happening in an interaction. There is always more 
than security going on: 
 
Eat; walk (briskly, slowly); read a book, a newspaper, a magazine, a comic, a poster, 
a dot-matrix, a guide book, a letter, a laptop, a receipt; pause; laugh; stare; daydream; 
sleep; strain to drag luggage; cough; trace a route on a map; kiss; argue; talk on a 
phone; listen; order coffee; calm a crying child; be a child crying; wait; listen to music; 
remove and return the contents of a bag; complete a crossword; photograph; move 
sharply to avoid a bag; hug; ask a question; stumble; sort coins in a palm for correct 
change; smile; yawn; take a photograph; talk; run; write a list … 
(Observant participation, Victoria, 03.12.08) 
 
Security is an ambiguous presence, and although a normal part of cities, and a 
normalised part of what it is to be in the everyday life of urban space, there is a degree of 
ambiguity regarding encounters with security. The life of security is bound up with the 
ambiguities, with the excesses, and with the life of everyday life. It is then understood that 
each encounter with security can then be interpreted in more than one mutually exclusive 
way. As such the role of security, and the ways in which security presences within both sites 
are enacted is always somewhat ambiguous. The role of security as an ambiguous 
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presence is complicated by the other happenings, taking place, and encountered at the 
same time as security: 
 
Standing in the ticket queue, I watch the people around me as the chime sounds and 
the security announcement begins – repeating the message which has become all to 
familiar to me. Elsewhere, close to me, a discussion regarding possible routes; the 
faint traces of a tune seeping from the headphones of a personal music player; an 
indecisive customer speaks with a member of underground staff to make a decision 
regarding ticket type and pricing; various conversations; a shuffle forwards; the 
movements of people some slow, some quick; pointing and tracing a line on a map 
whilst discussing a route; a melody bursts from a pocket as a phone rings and is 
attended to; the sorting of payment and change. 
(Observant participation, Kings Cross St Pancras, 11.02.09) 
 
We see from this passage how in this situation much more is going on than just an 
encounter with security. This is very different to how security has been discussed in relation 
to everyday life previously. For example, Katz (2007) describes a situation where it is 
assumed that security measures are a constant presence within everyday life. Rather than 
being encountered and enacted as one set of objects amongst others in everyday life, Katz 
describes the prominence of urban security and describes a situation where it appears that 
security is encountered in isolation. Her account of security acting as a constant reminder of 
the presence of threat, oversimplifies the unstable position whereby security interventions 
simultaneously partake in more than one set of relations. Security measures can, as Katz 
contends, act like daily ʻremindersʼ and ʻreinforcersʼ of a war on terror, however as Rose 
(2002) suggests, in an overdetermined world, the objects and identities we engage with are 
never defined by their inherent properties. This research argues that security and 
surveillance measures are better understood as determined by the contexts within which 
they are encountered and enacted, determined by the multiplicity of overlapping of contexts. 
Therefore, security measures are considered through their associations and how they are 
enrolled in experiences, as well as the outcome of encounters. In the two research sites 
there is so much more happening, and happening at the same time as security more 
generally, that any an encounter with a particular security measure risks being 
overdetermined: 
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Helen: Whilst I walk I normally [laughs] daydream, and think of all of the things that I 
need to do each day and look at people and clothes and normally just kind of just, itʼs 
weird because I live in East London and in East London everybody is very 
interestingly dressed, lotʼs of different people and itʼs all very exciting. And then I 
come across here and I think itʼs funny because whenever you walk across Blackfriars 
bridge in a big petticoat or something you always get really stared at so itʼs really 
interesting and I just find this area very funny because itʼs very business based and 
then tourists, you get a lot of those two things, but not where I am itʼs a very different 
group, so thatʼs what I do, quite often look at people and what theyʼre wearing, 
daydream about and looking around at those things, and all of the people in their grey 
suites which you get around here a lot. But itʼs nice. 
 
Security is encountered whilst people are doing a variety of other things. As Helenʼs 
example demonstrates, security is encountered in the midst of things and is therefore less 
somehow stable and fixed in its status as security. As a range of materialities, we encounter 
security objects as absences and presences, knowingly and unwittingly, through day-to-day 
practices, habitually or otherwise. It is important to consider the materialities that constitute 
security practices and the spaces in which they are found through a focus on objects, 
materials, intensities and their organisation. To continue the theme of ambiguous 
encounters, consider how Sam, who regularly uses the Victoria Line, explains in the 
passage below how he normally occupies himself whilst travelling: 
 
Sam: Iʼll listen to music on my iPhone, or iPod, or Iʼll read the free London papers, Iʼll 
read a book if I have one. 
Patrick: Youʼre usually doing something. 
Sam: I keep busy, I do something. If I donʼt have any media instruments at my 
disposal I will normally stare at other people until they look at me and then look away. 
Normally Iʼll stare at attractive women pretty much, I think weʼve all done it, if a hot girl 
gets on then that gets my attention, maybe try and flirt a bit [laughs]. 
 
As discussed above, each encounter inevitably involves security with an addition. This 
adds a degree of ambiguity to the situation. However, we can be more specific than this. 
From the point of view of the infra-ordinary, there is no such thing as security. This is 
intensified when we consider how the infra-ordinary is mediated through a whole range of 
materialities (iPods, newspapers, advertising, etcetera) that stretch out there here and now 
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into various elsewheres and elsewhens. Thinking back to the previous chapter, we can say 
that a security that attempts to enable freedom and circulations is one that will only ever be 
encountered whilst people are doing a variety of other things, and rarely in isolation. 
Consider the below example from my research diary: 
 
A young woman is sitting with her friend on a train that has just left Green Park. She 
turns her head slightly to the right, staring at the window as the train departs. She 
uses the darkened tunnel and enhanced mirror effect to ensure that her hair is in 
place. Looking at her reflection I can see that her eyes are focused only centimetres 
from a sticker affixed onto the window of the train warning passengers against leaving 
luggage. When satisfied with her appearance, she turns, her eyes moving jerkily from 
the window before becoming fixed once again on her friend. 
(Observant participation, Victoria Line, 28.01.09) 
 
Of course, and as with all ethnographic research, there is ambiguity when witnessing 
and describing peoples movements. In the above example, the young woman could be 
observing, or engaged with and aware of the form of security described. Yet at the same 
time there are many alternatives, many possibilities for what she is doing in this instance. 
My belief is that she was using the window as mirror, although this in its self is a 
speculation. This, and other moments, indicate how an experience of security could be an 
encounter with something else entirely, attentions are as such, are overdetermined (see 
Crary, 2001). This is central to normalisation. It means that security becomes part of the 
normal, submerged within everyday spaces and everyday happenings, ceasing to exist as a 
fixed thing ʻin itselfʼ: 
 
Iain: Youʼve got to think about doing this while youʼre thinking about whatever else is 
going on at the time, I think thatʼs what was important for me, not just for your work 
with security but if youʼre thinking about your environment more generally. If youʼre in 
the tube youʼre going to be bustled and butted around, youʼve got to keep an eye out 
for people with bags, youʼve got adverts that you might want to look at and read, and 
thatʼs before youʼve thought about your Oyster card or where you need to go, or if 
youʼve got what you need for work, or I might be making a big deal out of it. 
 
It is significant that security has been described as an expected, indeed normal 
presence within the two research sites, and cities more generally. This must be understood 
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in the context of the form of security described in the previous chapter and a new urban 
normality where security measures are becoming increasingly normalised characteristics of 
urban spaces. The ways in which security measures are encountered day-to-day and the 
increased ubiquity of security measures reduces them from extraordinary features to being 
an expected and normal part of what it is to be in cities. As security becomes an 
increasingly normal part of urban landscapes and the everyday life of the city, measures 
that have been described as primed to become part of the infra-ordinary background of the 
city are often encountered ambiguously. As such, as security becomes increasingly normal, 
this normalisation paradoxically makes security an ambiguous presence 
 
6.4. Background feelings 
 
As the previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated, the spaces of urban life 
have required a variety of new and specific ways of protecting and managing cities where 
the aim is ʻgovern terrorʼ at the same time as they aim to foster circulations and protect and 
enable the personal and commercial ʻfreedomsʼ of the liberal-democratic life of London. The 
security interventions that are enacted as a result of this specific form of counter-terror 
security apparatus work by being embedded into the city and in the everyday life of urban 
spaces where, as the previous sections have shown, security and surveillance mechanisms 
are often encountered as background, absent presences. There is a degree of uncertainty 
as to how and where security is present, and whilst security measures increasingly saturate 
the spaces of urban life, these are required to become largely invisible and as I have 
discussed, become normalised. Respondents were unanimous in their feeling of the 
potential presence of security as a vague, generalised and uncertain structure of 
expectation. Here, for example, I discuss with David his expectations regarding security 
measures on the Victoria Line: 
 
David: Um, sort of, well thereʼs always security everywhere, but I donʼt really actually 
consider it being there, I donʼt stop and think about it, I expect that thereʼs security 
there, but I donʼt really expect, I donʼt really care that much, well, no not care, I donʼt 
really give it much thought, I know things are there but I donʼt consider it. 
Patrick: You have an understanding that certain things might or will be present in 
London, or on the Underground. 
David: Yeah, thereʼs security all over now, so itʼs subconscious that itʼs there, but Iʼm 
not consciously aware, thinking about it. There are things, like the police if theyʼre 
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there that you see, but I wonʼt think about them or anything, but if theyʼre there, or if 
you look up and thereʼs a camera you obviously notice it, but thatʼs it, I donʼt start 
thinking about it or anything. 
 
In this extract David claims that he expects security to be a constant presence 
throughout urban space. His certainty that security will be somehow present is typical of 
participants and is largely independent of encounters with specific security presences. In 
fact, David admits that the act of reflection on the presence and absence of security is 
unusual. There is a generalised feeling that urban spaces must be secure, by default, 
because it is part of a city. This is a vague and unspecified feeling of potential presence 
based on a set of loosely defined and malleable expectations that presume that 
contemporary urban life must always be secured. Davidʼs response was not uncommon and 
is suggestive of what is in effect a shared background atmosphere, that is, the presence of 
security and its ambiguous presence within the everyday life of the city. 
Feelings of being-secure are expressed as part of the background of everyday life. As 
Nicholas, for example, stated in an interview, “Your safety and security is just what you take 
for granted most of the time and you donʼt even think about it”. Participants described 
background affective atmospheres of being-secure which are present yet absent 
simultaneously. This is significant given the ambiguous relation to security described in the 
previous section. We might think this with respects to the sensed, but also, and here 
following Amin and Thrift, “that whole realm of human life that is outside consciousness” 
(2002:28). This is an attunement to embodied practice or the ʻunseenʼ in the everyday (see 
Harrison, 2000; Thrift, 2000c), the “reflexes and automatisms which make up the cityʼs 
ʻunconsciousʼ, and which account for the bulk of its activity” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:28). 
Following Massumi, this background feeling “belongs to perception, a bodily feeling 
organised environmentally before cognitive apprehension” (in Rice, 2010:35): 
 
Andrew: Just say you were walking with someone, like anywhere, just talking to 
someone, you donʼt exactly feel unsafe or safe, because youʼre not thinking of being 
safe or unsafe are you? Itʼs like itʼs unconscious, youʼre not even conscious of it. Itʼs 
not subconscious, it is unconscious, because unconscious means itʼs there but itʼs 
not, it only comes into kind of life, into action when somethingʼs happening. I think 
subconscious would mean itʼs always there, but itʼs not really. 
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In this extract Andrew describes a feeling which is not quite a feeling, a shared 
collective background which is rarely reflected on and difficult to narrate. It is an ambiguous 
feeling, a background hum which is an absent presence commonly felt through something 
which is diffuse in its form, ambiguous in its boundaries, which surrounds everyone, but 
often can not really pinpoint, through ʻaffective atmospheresʼ (see Anderson, 2009a; Bissell, 
2010; McCormack, 2008; Stewart, 2011): 
 
Laura: No, normally Iʼm not aware of it at all, I donʼt think about it. Itʼs sort of like the 
temperature, you never walk around thinking about the temperature, do you? And itʼs 
like that, normally youʼre not aware of your personal safety, not really, you know, I 
donʼt go around thinking Iʼm safe, Iʼm safe, Iʼm safe all the time [laughing]. 
Patrick: Thatʼs a nice analogy, a nice way to describe it. 
Laura: I donʼt know how to explain it though, itʼs like, like how youʼre not aware of the 
temperature because it feels right, itʼs normal, unless youʼre too hot or cold, or 
whatever, and your personal safetyʼs like that, so youʼre not aware of it, then if 
something changes thatʼs when youʼre aware of it, because you feel nervous and you 
get scared, like when you think somewhereʼs dodgy, or someone looks at you funny. 
 
Lauraʼs description of a feeling that is never quite a feeling, is suggestive of an 
experience of an ambiguous background affective atmosphere which, as Böhme suggests, 
“seem[s] to fill the space with a certain tone of feeling like a haze” (1993:114; see also 
Böhme, 2006). The uncertain tone of Lauraʼs description certainly resonates with a sense of 
an atmospheric haze which is felt yet, and at the same time, is disordered and contingent, 
remaining indefinite (Anderson, 2009a). McCormack provides a useful description of an 
affective atmosphere as being “something distributed yet palpable, a quality of 
environmental immersion that registers in and through sensing bodies whilst also remaining 
diffuse, in the air, ethereal” (2008:413). As such an affective atmosphere can be said to defy 
possession and description. This is significant, for as Anderson contends, “thinking affect 
through the ephemerality and instability of meteors reminds us that intensities may remain 
indefinite even as they effect” (2009a:78). Lauraʼs final comments here are important as 
they hint that this background affective atmosphere is “perpetually forming and deforming” 
(Anderson, 2009a:79). These vague, indefinite affective atmospheres of (in)security are 
interesting because although they are felt, they are before cognitive apprehension and are 
potentially subject to so many different descriptions when they are reflected upon. The 
bodily feelings and the shared background affective atmospheres of being-secure may as 
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Anderson maintains, “be momentarily qualified in specific emotions, in which feelings of 
being-secure are named, reflected on and narrated” (Anderson, 2010a:228). Respondents 
described a variety of states through which they expressed bodily feelings of being-secure – 
safe, secure, comfortable, at ease, assured, to name just a few. Here I will provide three 
brief examples but would suggest that these represent interruptions to the ambiguous 
background affective atmosphere – remembering that participants were prompted and when 
prompted stressed that the act of reflection is somewhat artificial. Firstly, participants spoke 
of being-secure in the absence of threat: 
 
Adam: In a normal day, I mean, I donʼt think it bothers me really, itʼs just not 
something that would cross my mind, unless there was a reason, like something that 
was obviously going to threaten my safety, something thatʼs obviously dangerous or 
made me feel intimidated, then my personal safety, um it doesnʼt cross my mind, no. I 
know that Londonʼs a target, but itʼs not something Iʼm like aware of all the time, I just 
think I donʼt think about it, it doesnʼt bother me. 
 
Consider Adamʼs description, this not a positive specification of something in the 
future, he is describing the absence of fear that something unpleasant will happen. The 
feeling of being-secure is not itself necessarily specified as something which is positively 
felt. In the following example, Rosa speaks of a different affective state, that of being 
reassured: 
 
Rosa: It is reassuring to see them around, when thereʼs more police, when itʼs more 
visible I mean, having them around and seeing them anywhere really, then it is 
reassuring. 
Patrick: The police providing a more visible presence? 
Rosa: Yeah, I mean everyone recognises the police donʼt they, and I think you do feel 
better when theyʼre around …  Seeing the police will always make me feel better, and 
I think thatʼs the same with most people, people know what the police can do and why 
theyʼre there so, well for me I feel better. They donʼt have to be doing anything, I find 
them being here is reassuring. 
 
For Rosa it is the presence of a particular security intervention which can enable and 
indeed support her feelings of being-secure. For other participants feelings of being-secure 
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are often only contingently connected to actual security measures. Take for example 
Samanthaʼs account of travelling on the Victoria Line: 
 
Samantha: I suppose it makes me feel safe … thereʼs something quite comforting 
about being packed in, a closeness to others, because, you know how some people 
are claustrophobic? Iʼm claustrophilic, as in I enjoy being in small, confined spaces, 
and I quite like it when lots of people cram in together, into a train … Being taken 
along by the crowd, thereʼs something I feel safe about that. I donʼt really think much 
about the train announcements or the CCTV cameras, or the police or whatever 
anyway, so no, it doesnʼt have anything to do with them. 
 
Samantha suggests that being part of the crowd and being with others is comforting, it 
has a positive affect on her and can shape her experience of travelling on the Victoria Line. 
The absence of security as a direct referent object can thus be filled by other things. People 
may not need police officers, cameras and so on to ensure their feelings of being-secure. 
Indeed, participants were careful not to overstate the force of security and given that 
security has been described in this and the previous chapter as an absent presence, this is 
significant. However, and returning to the opening of this section, there is an expectation 
that security will be present within urban spaces and that security as a process will be 
primed to act. This is an expectation of intervention, where there is a promissory relation 
between processes of security and futurity in the context of everyday life: 
 
Nilukshi: Ordinarily I would have felt safe, like I still do, but I would have assumed that 
there was security in place to respond to emergencies. I wouldnʼt have considered it 
because I knew that there were mechanisms, like I knew that there were security 
cameras there, I knew that there were police there and my feeling was that that was 
sufficient to prevent another terrorist attack, as an extreme example. In a way, this 
might sound a bit random, but like the Jean Charles de Menezes incident, in a way 
filled me with more security, more than it did concern, in the sense that obviously it 
was a dreadful mistake that the police had made, but I had assumed that the police 
were on that level of alertness. So they made this one dreadful mistake, because of 
bad intelligence or, but I thought itʼs because they are on this level of alertness that if 
they do notice anything suspicious then theyʼll deal with it. 
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In Nilukshiʼs example there is a sense that the securing process is primed to act over 
a range of future events, and an expectation that security will manage and control a future 
terrorist incident, security thus generates a promissory supplement to the present (see 
Anderson, 2010a). The bodily feelings and shared affective atmospheres of being-secure 
which are part of the background of quotidien experience are a response to this promise, 
that security will be primed to the possibilities of threatening futures. For the feelings of 
being-secure to recede into the background, we must be sufficiently convinced that security 
will be delivered and the promise actionable. This priming and the promise of security must 
not be thought solely in terms of its relation to threatening futures, the promise that security 
is primed to act enables the conditions through which the circulations and the personal and 
commercial ʻfreedomsʼ of liberal-democratic life of London take place. The judgement of 
whether or not this is successful can only be made on the basis of whether people will allow 
it to recede into the background and are prepared to continue their everyday lives as 
normal: 
 
Robert: When I leave home in the morning I donʼt think I might be in a terrorist attack 
today, Iʼve got too much else to worry about, Iʼve got to get to work on time for one 
thing, Iʼve got to work out what Iʼm doing for the rest of the day, and you inevitably 
have all of those stupid thoughts and worries that everyone has, but I donʼt think about 
crime or terrorism, and I donʼt think Iʼve even got it subconsciously. 
 
In this passage Robert explains how the threat of terrorism falls away from view and 
rarely registers. What is more prominent for Robert are more prosaic concerns which are 
precisely about the everyday itself, these are more immediate to him and the threat of 
terrorism falls away from view. Interestingly this appears to invert the Governmentʼs (HM 
Government, 2010a) prioritising of terrorism as the principle immediate security threat 
facing the UK, although it is suggestive of the Governmentʼs overall aim; to secure a way of 
life and to enable the circulations that define the personal and commercial ʻfreedomsʼ of 
liberal-democratic life so that we can continue to live it (HM Government, 2009a:5). In the 
following passage Helen describes the conditions of the milieu of the South Bank which 
produce and enable her to feel ʻsafeʼ without necessarily reflecting on this named affective 
state: 
 
Helen: I am more aware of it [security], I donʼt really know if it makes me feel more, 
any safer at all because I feel pretty safe around here so itʼs not, I donʼt need to feel 
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safer, I think this is a nice area to be in, so I donʼt think that itʼs made me feel any 
safer at all. 
Patrick: But not necessarily because of the security? 
Helen: No, itʼs because of the area and reputation, and because I know people here 
and I know the places I can kind of trust along here, like I know the people in Eat and 
the shops and I know I can go to the toilet, there are people I know, itʼs a pretty 
friendly place really, and tourists are nice and friendly and make it feel a bit holidayie 
here, and I just think itʼs nice, that could just be my optimistic view of it and it might be 
this really big crime spot [laughs] and I havenʼt noticed at all. 
 
The examples that Helen gives provides a sense of the stitching of security measures 
into a particular space of familiarities and into specific affective atmospheres, which as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, is important to the form of security discussed and to the 
life of everyday life. The presence and absence of security, along with other facets of 
respondentʼs experiences mesh and fold to produce the conditions where feelings of being-
secure are most often experienced as a background affective atmosphere. As the previous 
chapter demonstrated, the forms of security present within the two research sites are 
primed to be a part of everyday life itself, seeking to produce secure subjects who are not 
necessarily aware of the conditions of being and feeling secure. The assumed affect of 
security does not necessarily take place, and as this section has shown, unless it is subject 
to explicit reflected, it is often difficult for security to have a presence in some ways, at the 
same time it is a part of the environment and a part of peoples experiences nonetheless. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through an attention to the ordinariness of security and the ordinary ways in which it 
is encountered and enacted, I have suggested that one of the generic ways in which 
security is present within the everyday life of cities is as part of the infra-ordinary 
background of urban life. As the previous empirical chapter demonstrated, within these two 
research sites, the particular forms of security and the apparatus of security operating are 
primed to be part of the everyday city – the problem of presence and absence of security 
when the promise of security is precisely to secure and be absent. More specifically, 
security is present as an expected but overlooked part of the everyday. It has been argued 
here that security is becoming increasingly normalised, however and somewhat 
paradoxically, the processes of normalisation make security an ambiguous presence. 
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Security is often encountered as a background presence and the actual forms and practices 
of security are frequently encountered ambiguously. My question in this chapter was 
therefore: how is the apparatus of security encountered and how through encounters does it 
become part of everyday life? Security moves to be a part of the environment and of 
everyday happenings which is expected and yet oft accepted and taken for granted. Such a 
condition is the result of the design of these spaces and of security interventions of different 
kinds, but also the conditions of encounter – where bodies enact security as it becomes part 
of everyday life. 
In focusing on the processes through which security is encountered and enacted, we 
see how it is not only that security becomes all pervasive. Rather, the geography of security 
is a geography of absences and presences. Far from being always already present within 
cities, security is often encountered and enacted as a part of the taken for granted ʻinfra-
ordinaryʼ of urban life. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, steps are taken to embed security within 
urban environments, at the same time security becomes a normalised, background 
presence. This condition seeks to enable the city to function, and to protect and foster the 
freedoms, circulations and interdependencies of urban life. Everyday encounters with 
security will often go unnoticed, the presence of security becomes a generalised 
expectation, and one that persists as uncertainty even in the absence of specific security 
measures. Indeed, so pervasive has this structure of expectation become, that for my 
respondents it was difficult to imagine urban spaces without security, these features which 
must be present somewhere, somehow, somewhen, are an absence simultaneously. 
Whilst there is a general expectation that security of some form will be present, what 
has been described in this chapter is a situation where the actual forms and practices of 
security are encountered ambiguously. As security becomes increasingly normal, this 
normalisation paradoxically makes security an ambiguous presence. The various forms of 
security will only ever be encountered with something else as well. In part this is a function 
of a form of security that works by being embedded into the city, and in the everyday life of 
urban spaces within which security itself then lives. It is also a situation arising from forms of 
security which attempt to enable the freedoms and circulations outlined in Chapter 5. This 
adds a degree of ambiguity to everyday encounters and is central to normalisation. 
A certain background affective atmosphere has been described through the course of 
this chapter, where participants described a vague and indefinite feeling of being-secure. 
This is a condition which, in the course of this chapter, I have shown is most often a part of 
the background of everyday life, where participants express a feeling which is never quite a 
feeling, felt before it is cognitively apprehended, and rarely reflected on nor narrated. The 
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form of security of which this background feeling is associated attempts to avoid the 
ambience of insecurity of which security is oft charged with articulating, contributing to and 
even sustaining. Rather, this apparatus of security is an attempt to produce secure subjects 
who are not necessarily aware of the conditions of feeling so. The bodily feelings of being-
secure have been described here as an indefinite affective atmosphere of (in)security which 
is, at times, momentarily named and qualified. 
In this way a security apparatus designed to enable life to be lived becomes part of 
the everyday life of the city. However, and as I argued in Chapter 5, contemporary security 
apparatuses are designed to oscillate between invisibility and response to events. With this 
in mind the thesis moves from the infra-ordinary focus of this chapter, to explore the second 
generic way in which security is found within the everyday life of cities, as the mechanisms 
of security are encountered and enacted as a range of more intensified presences. The 
following chapter will thus now move to describe and discuss the tearing of the infra-
ordinary, as something happens, an event takes place, and security is made present. 
Importantly in the context of an account that describes the everyday life of security, this 
something that happens, this event, need not be the traditional security event, nor the ʻevent 
of terrorʼ. As a part of the everyday life of the city, security becomes present in different 
sorts of ways, through a range of encounters, transactions and events. Through this range 
of ways, it can change form and move from the background to the foreground. In Chapter 7 
I describe how this takes place and how the forms of security described in Chapter 5 
become more intensified presences. 
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7. The Intensified Presence of Security 
 
A British transport police officer stands facing and addressing three other officers. 
Having ascended the escalator I was drawn by the collection of luminous glossy 
veneers – their fluorescent yellow high visibility jackets covering the barely visible 
coarse black fabric of heavy stab-vests. Their assembly takes place near to the ticket 
barriers but to the side, close to a wall. The swarming crowd bustles, flowing easily 
past them. The talking officer is closest to the wall, his back to it – they stand in an arc 
around him, focusing on him. I walk towards the ticket barriers, choosing the gate 
closest to them I feed and retrieve my ticket, slowing to an awkward pace as I pass 
through. I strain to hear him: 
 
… we all know why weʼre here, weʼre doing random stop and search on people, 
because of the heightened terrorist … 
 
I am struck by these words and the austere tone of their delivery – mirrored in an 
expression which appears stern and sure. His eyes dart restlessly. A rush of 
excitement and a nervousness accompanied my noticing the group, it swells now as I 
draw closer: 
 
His words are lost amidst a sudden rise in the disordered clamour of the station. 
The din grows thicker, louder. The speed and force of the crowd surges around 
me, its number increasing. I cannot slow further or I will have stopped awkwardly. I 
see that he pauses, brief are spoken by the assembly, he continues then. I am 
unable to hear more. 
 
I am past them now. A cautious glance back sees the officers still assembled. I walk 
on. I am pulled by the movements of the crowd. Pushed by my desire not to arouse 
suspicion: to be enrolled in their activity, to be stopped and searched, the thought 
thrills and unnerves me in unequal measure. 
 
(Observant participation, Kings Cross St Pancras 30.09.08) 
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Introduction 
 
In the example from my research diary, a form of security was momentarily present: 
my sense of being in the underground station changed, if only for a moment, as I 
encountered a group of police officers about to undertake a series of ʻrandomʼ ʻstop and 
searchesʼ. Everyday life is full of these moments when security becomes an intensified 
presence. To extend the analysis of how security becomes part of the background that I set 
out in the previous chapter, here I will focus on the particular mechanisms through which 
forms of security take on a heightened presence to disrupt the life of everyday life. My aim 
here is to develop the analysis of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 in order to examine how an 
apparatus of security which takes the everyday as its ʻreferent objectʼ moves from a set of 
security mechanisms to something which is lived and experienced. Here my concern is with 
how security changes form and becomes present, this chapter also moves to consider how 
security interventions are encountered and enacted as more intensely present within the 
everyday life of urban space in different ways. 
This chapter develops my account of the everyday life of security in the previous 
chapter through a focus on how the security interventions discussed in Chapter 5 become 
more intense presences within everyday life and how this affects the life of the everyday. If 
security is increasingly ʻdesigned intoʼ infra-ordinary spaces and happenings, as set out in 
Chapter 5, then it is important to ask what happens when events or potential events do 
happen? And how does the presencing of security relate to the aim of fostering ʻgoodʼ 
circulations and a particular set of freedoms that I have argued is now central to 
contemporary efforts to secure urban public spaces? To address these questions, I discuss 
the second generic way that security becomes present within the everyday life of urban 
spaces, focusing on how, following Perec (2010), this infra-ordinary fabric can rip as the 
specific security mechanisms discussed in relation to the two sites change form and emerge 
as they become heightened presences. The aim here is to discuss how it is that security 
comes to presence, as well as the consequences of this with respects to the ʻbecoming-
noticedʼ of the unnoticed of everyday life (Highmore, 2011:52). In this sense this chapter 
complements and extends the analysis of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 through a focus on 
forms of everyday presence that follow the specific mechanisms of counter-terrorist security 
that this thesis is interested in. 
This chapter provides a contribution to and extends the analysis of works that have 
sought to discuss and describe the imbrications of security and urban spaces (see Coaffee, 
2003, 2004a; 2004b, 2009a; 2010 Coaffee, et al. 2008, 2009, Graham, 2004a, 2004b, 
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Graham, 2006; Murakami Wood, 2010; Nemeth, 2010; Nemeth et al. 2008). Where these 
works have focused on the presence of security interventions in cities, it has come to be 
assumed that security is always somehow already present within everyday life. There is a 
further issue, as there is a tendency to then assume the relations between security and 
everyday life. It has been argued, often without a sustained focus on everyday life or 
everyday encounters, that the presence of security pertains to a generalised, if often largely 
unspecified, insecurity. This situation has been variously described, for example it is 
asserted that security leads to the ʻdangerisationʼ of society through the generation of 
“environments of risk” (Coaffee, 2004b:277) and a “foreboding atmosphere” of threat 
(Habermas, 2003:26). Here I develop an account of how security interventions are, or might 
be, encountered once they are a part of urban life, considering how they emerge as present 
and how security is then experienced. As such it develops work that has focused on the 
complex interrelations between security and lived everyday life, and in particular work 
engaging with affect and security (see Adey, 2008, 2009b; Anderson, 2010a, 2010c; 
Anderson and Adey, 2011; Massumi, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Rice, 2010). Attention to these 
instantiations offers an escape from the traditional focus on security solely understood as a 
presence to secure, towards a fuller appreciation of the where and how of security. 
In order to explore security as it changes form and becomes present within the 
everyday life of the city, the chapter is structured around two sections: the birth to presence; 
and the presence of presence. It is important to acknowledge that these divisions are 
artificial and do not suggest that this process follows the logic of a linear series. As such the 
two sections of this chapter explore the coming to presence, the presence of presence and 
also the movement of presence as a process and should not be thought of as isolated. 
Instead, the distinctions are pragmatic and designed to draw attention to differences that 
might otherwise be effaced. The first section of this chapter will investigate the birth to 
presence of security; it will discuss the rips to the fabric of the infra-ordinary as security 
changes form and becomes present. In so doing it will consider the focusing of attentions 
and moments where respondents describe becoming more aware of the presence of 
security. Given my argument in the previous chapter that forms of absence are central to 
the new ways of securing public spaces, it is vital to discuss the transactions between 
absence and presence. The second section describes how security can become an 
intensified presence and how these changes in its form are experienced (see Ophir, 2005). 
Here I am concerned with experiences of ʻsecurity eventsʼ, when security operates explicitly 
as a presence to secure, as well as the often overlooked and more ordinary encounters and 
transactions whereby security is present as another type of thing, where encounters are 
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spontaneous, unplanned and unexpected (see Stewart, 2007). The section closes with a 
reflection on the motility of these intensified presence and in doing so it returns to Perecʼs 
work on the infra-ordinary as we witness the return of security as a background presence. 
Here the chapter loops back into the discussion of the infra-ordinary fabric of the everyday 
found in the previous chapter. 
In this way this chapter will develop the analysis of the previous chapter in order to 
show that biopolitics of security is not only a matter of how the everyday becomes the 
ʻreferent-objectʼ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerra, 2008) of security, but also about the living and the 
experiencing of security itself, and how it is that security gets woven into the fabric of the 
everyday as it becomes part of urban life in different ways. 
 
7.1. Births to presence 
 
Samantha: I think you only look out for security cameras and things unintentionally, by 
accident, or when you want to make sure that youʼre safe. So yeah, when I see the 
security itʼs rarely on purpose, Iʼm not looking for them. 
 
For Samantha, the security measures that I have argued are now primed to occur in 
the event of an event become present slightly differently: through chance, and ʻrarelyʼ 
although still occasionally when aiming for a specific feeling (ʻsafetyʼ). Someone happens to 
be looking in a particular direction and may notice a camera, someone else may be rushing 
to work and notices a huddle of police officers, for someone else a machine gun stands out 
amidst the ordinariness of the commute. Chance encounters are not the only way in which 
security is made present – I will also focus on disruptions of the ordinary; being on the 
lookout for security; and security events. But it is worth focusing on chance encounters to 
begin with as they demonstrate how security becomes present in ways that exceed the 
aims and intentions of the security planners and practitioners that I discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Outline of an inventory of accidental encounters: 
− Drilling. “Iʼm starting to hate this thing” – two contractors work on a CCTV camera 
fixed onto County Hall. The camera is upright, the casing open, wires exposed 
− Four security guards walk by. They wear black coats – three with ʻSGʼ and a gold 
crest on the breast pocket. One talks, loudly swearing. The other three laugh. A 
woman walking close by turns, tuts and glares disapprovingly “foul language” 
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− A yellow sign, thin white boarder. The graphic of a camera. Black text: “These 
premises are under CCTV surveillance”. Smaller black text, same font: “Images 
are being recorded for the purposes of crime prevention and public safety” 
− A row of eight marble effect stone hostile vehicle mitigation bollards and two 
metal bollards. Four stone bollards, then two metal bollards, cylinders – an 
ʻaccess control pointʼ – then four more stone bollards 
− To the right of the footpath a security guard purchases an ice cream from a van. 
High visibility vest ʻHEADLINE SECURITYʼ printed in black. A second is stood 
close by, he wears a similar fluorescent vest 
− “Warning CCTV in operation” – set in the middle of Golden Jubilee Bridges 
information. The dirty grey, tacky remnants of a sticker, since removed, covers 
the writing 
− The sharp glare from a lens reflecting the sun. The silhouette of a camera, black, 
shrouded in shadow beneath Waterloo Bridge [I know there to be three more 
cameras, I did not notice those on this occasion] 
− Two police officers go by. Black uniforms. Both wear peaked caps trimmed with 
black and white squares 
− A piercing siren. A police car moving speedily on the other side of the river 
− A South Bank Centre Security guard stands 
− Three translucent black orb shaped cameras set into greyish casings 
− A black and yellow sign – the loose graphic image of a camera: “This is private 
property; security policies including the use of CCTV apply. This scheme is 
controlled by the South Bank Centre. For further details contact xxx-xxxx-xxxx” 
− A police patrol boat goes by. Three officers on board. Two wave. Disturbed water 
marks its passage 
− A CCTV camera – ʻMETROʼ and a telephone number on a sticker affixed to the 
side 
− A security guard by. Orange high visibility jacket, ʻSECURITYʼ written on the back 
− Seven CCTV cameras, different shapes and types, all attached to the overhang 
which covers the footpath 
(Observant participation, South Bank, 09.12.08) 
 
In this example from my research diary, I describe the security interventions that I 
encountered as I walked along the South Bank. This list is an account of a series of 
unplanned and unexpected incidents where security was momentarily present. The 
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enumeration provides a sense of the processes of attention and how “things surge up in 
[oneʼs] perceptual field” (Sheringham, 2006:269). The emergence of security through 
chance encounters is perhaps therefore best posed as a question of attunement and 
engagement involving a movement of attentions and the contingency of the everyday: 
 
Alex: I saw two policemen today at Kings Cross actually [laughs]. Obviously Iʼve seen 
police at Kings Cross and other stations at other times too and thereʼs cameras, but I 
donʼt really look for them, just might see them when Iʼm going down to get a train or 
back out of the station. 
 
Here Alex describes his encounters with police officers and CCTV cameras in Kings 
Cross St Pancras underground station. In his account Alex emphasises the contingent 
nature of moving through an underground station at a particular moment and encountering 
the police and CCTV cameras there through chance. Another example of chance 
encounters with CCTV cameras is offered by Nicholas whose position on the platform at 
Finsbury Park leads to the following reflection: 
 
Nicholas: One of the notes I made for the diary was, I hadnʼt really thought about it 
before, but thereʼs certain, thereʼs certain positions you can stand in at Finsbury Park 
and oddly enough itʼs the position where I normally get on the carriage … and you 
canʼt see the indicator board for the CCTV and I never realised before. 
Patrick: Is that that it used to obscure your view but youʼd never thought about it? 
Nicholas: Yeah, I must have looked at the board to check it, not been able to see it 
and moved so I could, but never stopped and thought itʼs because of that bloody 
camera, and I suppose Iʼve never been irritated by it before either, just automatically 
took a step so I could see. 
 
 Contingency is important here as at other times the police, CCTV cameras, or indeed 
other security presences may be present, but overlooked, or may not be present when one 
is moving through an urban space. As Katie concedes in relation to her commute on the 
Victoria Line: 
 
Katie: Iʼm usually so preoccupied, listening to music and thinking about work so I donʼt 
really pay attention. When I walk into the station in the morning thereʼs usually a 
couple of policemen standing there, sometimes I see them, sometimes I donʼt. And I 
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really think about, like the police, you know, you just think, oh, thereʼs a policeman, 
and carry on donʼt you? But you canʼt miss them especially now with their bright 
jackets. 
 
In this extract Katie considers chance encounters, as she states there are times 
where she is aware of the presence of police officers and other times where she admits 
they may still be present but she has no recollection of encountering them. We might 
consider how security can be encountered accidently though reference to Perecʼs concerns 
with chance and attention, in particular how it is that attention is invariably directed along 
specific channels, away from any sense of totality. When Perec undertakes An Attempt at 
Exhausting a Place in Paris he at times pauses to reflect on the act of noticing and 
attending. In the example below taken from my research diary, it is a chance happening 
which causes me to turn and in so doing see the presence of a police officer on the South 
Bank: 
 
Shortly after leaving the covered walkway of the OXO tower, I overhear a man in front 
of me when he comments to the person he is walking with: 
 
Thereʼs always police down there 
 
I look up from the ground and glance first forward and then left where I see a police 
officer in black uniform turn from the footpath into Gabrielʼs Wharf 
(Observant participation, South Bank, 11.12.08) 
 
As Sheringham contends, in his writings on attention and everyday life Perec “is 
conscious of how chance determines what he may or may not see” (2000:198). This is 
important in the context of the form of security which has been described as increasingly 
ʻdesigned intoʼ infra-ordinary spaces and happenings. It is not necessarily that a security 
presence is doing anything in particular, these are chance encounters that are a part of 
contingent everydayness. Take for example Davidʼs description of a range of encounters 
with security interventions: 
 
David: You donʼt walk along looking up all the time, if you saw a sign, or a plane flew 
over or a helicopter or something happened, like loud music from that direction, or 
something dropped on your head like, then youʼd look up, or if it was raining, then 
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youʼd look up. Or you might glance up for no reason one time and see one and 
remember it, or maybe if youʼre further away then you might see them because then 
youʼre looking in that direction when youʼre walking, like thereʼs some that are like 
that. 
 
David describes a range of moments where he has and indeed how he might 
encounters CCTV cameras through chance. In this passage David claims that often he will 
encounter CCTV cameras as a result of his attention being drawn by a ranger of other 
things. In Davidʼs descriptions we can see how these chance encounters emerge through a 
material arrangement and a sense that these are characterised by their fleetingness, they 
are rendered, fleetingly, present. It is difficult to assign a cause to these exchanges, often 
as David suggests they just happen, in the same way that we encounter other things within 
everyday life. As with the previous chapter, this raises the issue of overdetermination and 
ambiguity in our encounters and experience of security. These accidental encounters and 
chance exchanges provide examples of how paying attention to security and the 
movements of security from the background to the fore involve comportment in different 
ways (see Ingold, 2000). In particular, it highlights the turning and returning attentions. 
Andrew talks of how he has noticed CCTV cameras during his commute on the South Bank: 
 
Andrew: Most cameras are right there, just above where youʼre walking, so if you look 
up then youʼre going to see them … Some you see because youʼre looking, others 
you notice before by chance. Like some of them you canʼt, you always see them donʼt 
you? But, like others I only saw them because you got me to look for that sort of thing.  
I might not have thought about them much, not like Iʼve done for this, but you canʼt just 
walk past them, theyʼre right next to you when youʼre walking, or like you look up and 
you remember youʼve seen one, so I donʼt think you can miss them. But others arenʼt 
very obvious, like some are more hidden, Iʼve seen more along there because of this. 
 
In the above extracts we see the turning and returning of attention and how the 
coming to presence of security involves bodily movements and the comportment of bodies 
in different ways. These everyday births to presence are of course not received in isolation, 
rather, in these instances security is an everyday occurrence, one exceeding the aims and 
intentions of the security planners and practitioners discussed in Chapter 5. 
In the below example I witness and describe a moment where a group of film makers 
pause from their filming on the South Bank to look up at a police helicopter: 
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The violent sound of the thrashing blades of a police helicopter cutting through the air 
distracts group of film makers. All look up but the helicopter, which had hovered for a 
moment, has now disappeared behind a blanket of clouds. A man holding a boom 
microphone continues to stare, gently scratching his earphones. A few seconds more 
and the helicopter reappears, he turns, his attention now on the groupʼs discussion. 
(Observant participation, South Bank, 19.12.08) 
 
For Perec in An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris, of great significance is the 
shifting the angle of his vision as he moves around the place Saint-Sulpice. These 
“provisional frames of attention” (Sheringham, 2006:269) involve practices of spatial 
orientation and bodily comportment, as attentions are drawn, fixed and redrawn. In these 
practices the whole body is brought together in the action of its attending (see Ingold, 2000). 
Whilst security is attended to here in a more engaged and connected state, these are 
accidental moments and I would argue are more fleeting instances, where the birth to 
presence does not endure. Attention reaches a threshold at which point the life of the 
presence breaks down (see Crary, 2001). This raises the issue of how security as an 
intensified presence can change and how it can move. In the above examples, whilst the 
encounter will change how security is related to, the rip in the everyday fabric is a more 
ordinary disturbance (see Stewart, 2007). In and through them we witness the reemergence 
of security as a background presence. 
It has been suggested that the form of counter-terrorist security described here is 
increasingly ʻdesigned intoʼ infra-ordinary spaces and happenings, so as to become part of 
the background of urban space and urban life. In this context we witness the second form of 
birth to presence, where security becomes a more heightened presence through disruptions 
of this established ordinariness. Here, Thomas provides an example of the second birth to 
presence, disruptions of the ordinary where security increasingly ʻdesigned intoʼ infra-
ordinary spaces and happenings is somehow out of place: 
 
Typically I walk down the escalators and barely pause at the ticket barrier and being in 
Brixton there is generally a train sitting in platform as itʼs the end of the line so I must 
take about 90 seconds between entering the station and sitting down on a seat. Itʼs 
probably more noticeable when something out of the ordinary happens, like a few 
months ago when there was a heavy presence of police at Brixton in the evenings 
(Self-completed diary, Thomas, 24.02.09). 
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Thomas begins and ends his commute in Brixton, in the above extract from his diary 
he suggests that the presence of security which he describes as being ʻout of the ordinaryʼ 
intrudes into his expectation of the space of the station. Contrast the above entry with one 
he made previously, where he reflects on the infra-ordinary “it was hard to keep consciously 
aware of security that I pass everyday” (Self-completed diary, Thomas, 16.02.09). Thomasʼs 
description reflects Perecʼs (2010) work on attention and on his belief that we tend to notice 
“the singular and easily nameable” (Sheringham, 2006:268) more readily, at the expense of 
the more featureless. When something appears ʻout of the ordinaryʼ, for Perec (2010) there 
is a transaction between absence and presence as it ʻripsʼ the texture of the “expected order 
of things” (James, 2009:205): 
 
Owen: Iʼve also seen the police on the escalators before and that was fairly recently 
as well, at Kings Cross and that did make me think because you donʼt generally 
expect to see the police anywhere on the actual underground except for at either end, 
um at a station when youʼre going through or coming out of the ticket gates. I 
generally donʼt see them, unless theyʼre at either end waiting at the gates. 
 
The form of security is primed to be a part of the everyday life of urban space and 
designed to become part of the background of the environments we inhabit, variations to 
security are at once changes to the rhythms of urban space and to the infra-ordinary: 
 
Robert: I think familiarityʼs important, itʼs like if you always walk past number 42 and 
theyʼve got a red post box, and then one day you walk past and theyʼve got a blue one, 
you suddenly notice it. And you think, oh I never noticed that. 
 
Here Robert reflects on the role of familiarity and how through disruptions to the infra-
ordinary security interventions come to presence. Perec asks, “What difference is there 
between a driver who parks on the first go and another (ʻ90ʼ) who only manages to do so 
after several minutes of laborious efforts? This provokes attention, irony, the participation of 
an audience” (2010:33). Robert speaks of being attuned to the rhythm of things, the 
rhythms of dailiness and then to the disruption to these rhythms caused by changes in a 
security apparatus. Through Robertʼs example we also witness the stitching of the infra-
ordinary, the blue post box, or the security intervention, will itself become normal, as we get 
used to the new rhythm so the infra-ordinary fabric is again woven. The changes to security 
which throw the rhythms of security out of order are often apprehended, until a new rhythm 
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develops and security gradually recedes into the background. Maintaining the ʻexpected 
orderʼ is one which Chapter 5 has shown is central to the aim of fostering ʻgoodʼ circulations 
that I have argued is now central to contemporary efforts to secure urban public spaces. It is 
important that when a new form of security ʻemerges as presentʼ, it can be stitched into the 
iterative rhythms of an urban space and so become a background presence. This 
demonstrates the capacities for new rhythms to come about within a security apparatus. In 
the following example, Iain speaks of the unruliness of security being some how out of the 
ordinary: 
 
Iain: Iʼll definitely notice it if itʼs abnormal, if itʼs something out of the norm, if theyʼve 
changed the security arrangement, I donʼt know how, but if they did something that 
changed the station to make it safer then I think Iʼd notice that, but otherwise Iʼm not 
interested in it or my surroundings so I donʼt have a reason to notice it. 
 
In this passage Iain claims that he will notice security during his journeys on the 
Victoria Line if it is somehow different, if something has changed. Whilst he readily admits 
that he is disinterested in his surroundings, a gesture to the infra-ordinary background 
environment, Iain claims that he notices things that are out of the ordinary, including 
changes to security which he suggests that he would expect to be present but would 
normally overlook. Again this is suggestive of apprehending daily experience in its flow, its 
rhythm, and how the rhythms of the everyday and the expected presence of security 
interventions described in Chapter 6 can come to be become disrupted. Note the subtle 
difference between this claim and that of Shanthi below. Whilst both Iain and Shanthi 
suggest that they will notice security when it is ʻout of the ordinaryʼ, Shanthi suggests that 
the difference must be more obvious for her to notice and so attend to it more deliberately: 
 
Shanthi: If they started to change the security, moving the cameras or whatever I donʼt 
think Iʼd really notice. So I think it would have to be quite obvious. You notice when itʼs 
really different to what youʼre used to, if, because it stands out and itʼs strange if you 
see what I mean? If theyʼve really changed things, you notice that, but I think itʼs, like 
even thatʼs got to be really different and even when things do change, it doesnʼt make 
a big difference to me, itʼs just something there thatʼs new. 
 
What Shanthi and Iain share is a sense that it is not necessarily something that a 
security intervention is doing which means that it is considered to be out of place, rather it is 
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its presence as out of order with the rhythms of urban space. However it is important that in 
these examples security is not encountered as a presence to secure, there is something 
else happening. These measures may be recognised as security and it may be that they are 
primed to act in relation to the future event of terror, although as Shanthi tellingly observes 
“itʼs just something there thatʼs new”. It is suggested that what is being disrupted here is the 
ordinary itself in one way or another, a disruption to the rhythm of space and the rhythm of 
security that participants within the two research sites have grown accustomed to. At times 
these disruptions of the ordinary where security is born to presence are a disruption to our 
lines of orientation, of our habitual ways of being in the space, or to our normal 
representations of what a space should be, or perhaps something else entirely. Here 
Michael provides two examples of security being out of the ordinary on the South Bank: 
 
Michael: I guess we do notice them because of the infrequency of them, the police, 
when they do crop up I think you do notice them just because weʼre not used to them 
being here. Even the patrol because weʼre used to not seeing them if we see a 
couple of police officers walk past itʼs almost like a bit of a novelty. And then when 
there are those days when thereʼs quite a lot of them wandering around, a massive 
police presence, then weʼll notice those as well, I suppose they stick in your mind 
more … Every now and again we do see a policeman with a machine gun walking 
past, every now and again which isnʼt, well itʼs out of character here I think, itʼs not 
necessary. Not so much this year, but definitely last year and the previous one weʼd 
see them walking along here and across that bridge over there. There certainly 
wasnʼt a direct need for them to be here, it was always a bit of a surprise. Maybe it 
was intelligence, but for whatever reason it was probably needed, you donʼt send out 
armed police for no reason. 
 
In this example it is the iterative rhythm of security that is broken. Michael suggests 
two examples of change, firstly the infrequent police presence and secondly the presence of 
armed police officers. Whilst he recognises these to be unusual, his suggestion is that these 
presences are short lived. This is an acknowledgement that reflects the capacities of people 
to live in these spaces even as security comes to presence in different ways. This is about 
the living and the experiencing of security, demonstrating that it is woven into the fabric of 
everyday life so that when a new mechanism emerges, there is a change and a new rhythm 
develops. 
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These changes bring us to the next example of a birth to presence, what I will call 
being on the lookout for security. At other times the transactions between absence and 
presence involve encounters with security where the observer is “looking at”, indeed looking 
for “what is there” (Becker, 2001:71). Here it is something that subjects are doing which 
enacts births to presence in different ways, take for example Samʼs account in the following 
passage: 
 
Sam: Yeah, itʼs just what Iʼve become used to, itʼs normal for me to notice them, Iʼd 
probably be surprised if one day I didnʼt see any maybe Iʼm more observant than most 
people, I donʼt know, I take an interest in whatʼs around me, and obviously securityʼs 
going to be part of that. 
 
In the above example Sam claims that there is a degree of inevitability in his 
encountering and noticing security presences. He suggests here that in the process of 
being ʻmore observantʼ, a habitual practice of being in the spaces of the Victoria Line and 
elsewhere, he will encounter and notice security. He claims that he has a tendency to be 
observant and that as a part of the environment of his commute on the Victoria Line, he will 
encounter and attend to various security presences. In the extract below, Tolu also 
describes an attentiveness to her surroundings. In this example though she explains that 
she makes an effort to familiarise herself with her surroundings because of the need to 
suppress feelings of claustrophobia whilst travelling daily from Brixton to either Kings Cross 
St Pancras or Euston and making the reverse journey each weekday evening: 
 
Tolu: Iʼm naturally claustrophobic, I therefore have to keep busy by doing a lot of stuff, 
keep thinking about things so Iʼm not aware of where I am almost … So Iʼm more 
vigilant and I get nervous so I will look around more looking around and doing 
something to take my mind off where I am and some of that will mean I see the 
security. Iʼm observant and attentive so I do just look around and security is definitely 
something Iʼve noticed and thought about before, definitely so I will make sure that I 
listen out, or that Iʼm looking around wherever I am. Itʼs just my nature. 
 
For both Sam and Tolu, being on the lookout for security for security is, in different 
ways, described as an inevitable effect of their practices whilst on their daily commutes. 
What follows is another example of how security becomes present through it becoming the 
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object of attentions. In this extract from my field diary I observe as a security sticker and 
CCTV cameras are enrolled as the subject of a group of children at play: 
 
A child on a train leaving Green Park station noticed a sticker on the windows 
notifying passengers that security cameras operate on the London underground. He 
read the sticker out loud “security cameras”, looking around the train carriage 
inquisitively, suggesting to the other children that they could play “spot the camera”, 
exclaiming excitedly, “thereʼs loads”. After a short time, a younger child scowled and 
expressed her discontent with the game, “there arenʼt any here, I canʼt see any”. The 
game did not last long after that as each childʼs attention slips to other activities. 
Their actions drew my attention to the stickers, this is the first time I have noticed 
such signs on the windows of trains on the Victoria Line. 
(Observant participation, Victoria Line, 01.01.09) 
 
The childʼs game animates the security sticker, and the potential presence of 
cameras, in an entirely unplanned and novel way through which security comes to 
presence. Animated in this way, security takes on another form, as another type of 
presence, the object of play, of wonder and becomes radically different through this. 
Returning to the methodology and the practical exercises of Perecʼs (2008a, 2010) own 
work on the everyday, security came to presence in different ways through the course of my 
observant participation and through the work undertaken by my participants. The aim was to 
undo the narrowness our habitual modes of seeing and encountering security and to move 
security from the background. Take for example Helen, a participant who walked to work on 
the South Bank daily and used different techniques to encourage look out for security: 
 
Helen: Yeah, I do that to help to have, to give myself something to carry on looking. 
My mind drifts quite a lot so I have to kind of give myself a bit more of a strict kind of 
thing like can you remember the sign today? Did you see these ones? Have you 
seen the same ones again? Like those kinds of questions and quizzes that I would 
set myself because it would make me remember to do it, and focus me and hopefully 
it would mean Iʼd do it better than oh I must look for CCTV cameras today, or I must 
look for, to see if I spot a policeman, or is there anything from security that I notice. 
 
Having considered the intensification of security through examples of different 
transactions between absence and presence, this section itself has built in intensity, starting 
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with a discussion of chance encounters it has progressed through a discussion of 
disruptions of the ordinary and being on the lookout for security. Now it turns its attention to 
the fourth example of a movement to presence, that of the security event. In the context of 
this thesis I am of course most interested in counter-terrorist security practices and with how 
security can be born to presence as it is responds to real and perceived threats. In such 
incidents security which I have described as being primed to occur in the event of an event 
are born to presence as it changes form and coalesces around an event. In the following 
example I encounter two police officers in Victoria underground station involved in a ʻstop 
and searchʼ operation: 
 
There are two police officers in conversation, stood to the side near an entrance/exit. 
Both are wearing all black uniforms. Both are replete with a cumbersome looking 
array of issue paraphernalia – stab vests, radios, handcuffs, mobile phones, etcetera. 
I see on their vests, on what appears to be a detachable Velcro strip, the words 
ʻCounter Terrorism Pro-Active Unitʼ printed in white. Having walked past them I leave 
the underground station. In the overland rail station, a dispersed crowd of similarly 
attired police officers are undertaking a stop and search operation. I descend the 
steps through a different entrance/exit. The two officers have not moved. They talk, 
appear to share a joke whilst watching people pass through the gates. 
(Observant participation, Victoria, 08.01.09) 
 
The birth to presence through a security event is here posed as a rent in the fabric of 
the infra-ordinary, disrupting the life of everyday life as changes for and coalesces around 
an event. The form of counter-terrorist security that is primed to be part of the infra-ordinary 
background is thus made ready to emerge, and so to act, in the event of an event. In the 
bellow passage, Amiraʼs example illustrates this situation, where she describes a security 
event and the evacuation of Victoria underground station: 
 
Amira: Once … um … a while ago, they had to evacuate us all out, we had to go 
outside, outside an exit there and they never told us what happened or how long weʼd 
have to wait, I mean I canʼt even remember why we were allowed to go back in, or 
who said that we could go back in. They announced that you had to leave, you 
werenʼt allowed to be on the platform, umm, and then we were allowed to go back in 
again. Thatʼs the only time thereʼs been a bit of a security thing. 
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In this example there is a security event, the intensified event where the apparatus of 
security coalesces and defines it. In the evacuation of Victoria underground station here 
described by Amira, security becomes an exceptional element in and through its coming to 
presence. Her description of the evacuation will enrol those in Victoria underground station 
into the security event, where it becomes difficult not to be aware of security and its 
presence as a presence to secure. This is of course not to claim that everyone involved in 
this intensification will attend to security as a more intense presence or indeed experience it 
in the same way. Whilst many of the examples discussed so far in this section are moments 
where security is present and encountered as another type of thing, through spontaneous, 
unplanned and unexpected encounters, here it is security itself which defines the way that it 
is born to presence and provides definition to the event itself: 
 
A cordon of temporary steel barriers has been erected, forming an area of exclusion 
that extends from County Hall to the Royal Festival Hall, surrounding and enclosing 
the footpath and Jubilee Gardens. Police officers and private security personnel are 
stationed at either end of the footpath where there is an entry/exit point, they permit 
access to police officers and private security personnel, as I watch two police dog 
handlers walk near me and then pass through into the gated area. Members of the 
public approach and are advised by police officers to find an alternate route – 
resulting in complaints, questions and confusions. I can see a number of police 
officers moving slowly about inside the cordon. It appears that their movements are 
coordinated and that they are conducting a search, some have sniffer dogs, others 
shine torches as they stoop, sift and sort. Along the rest of the South Bank footpath 
there are police patrolling in pairs and threes, intermittently and without any apparent 
order others stand and talk or quietly observe, giving the impression of alert 
readiness. Close to the carrousel where the fencing begins here, there are four 
officers in conversation, after a time two walk on in the direction of the South Bank 
Centre. One of the two officers still standing is holding a map and a small black book, 
I overhear him, “I like it when a good plan comes together” he remarks. 
(Observant participation, South Bank, 31.12.08) 
 
In the example drawn from my research diary, the structure of security on the South 
Bank is radically altered in response to a security event. Areas of the footpath have been 
closed off as part of temporary security arrangements to secure the New Yearʼs events that 
take place annually in this area of London. For a time these temporary arrangements are a 
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form of security presence which is unavoidable, it is a contrast with the what is usually 
found on the South Bank. Security can come to presence in response to a security event in 
ways which disrupts what is normally expected. In such instances where security responds 
to an event, this dynamic involves forms of security primed to be part of everyday life 
emerge as they respond to an event, coalescing as they become present. In these 
examples, security becomes present and takes on a heightened presence to disrupt the life 
of everyday life in relation to the event. 
In this section I have focused on four examples of births to presence. In addition to the 
examples of security events described in the last part of the section, I have discussed 
chance encounters; disruptions of the ordinary; and being on the lookout for security. These 
are of course are not the only ways in which security can be born to presence and these will 
of course interact with and are intertwined with one another and may occur at different 
points and with different outcomes. These four examples have shown how security can be 
encountered as it becomes a more intense presence in the everyday life of cities. It is 
important to note that they follow on from the particular form of security and the security 
apparatus described in Chapter 5. It is the aim of this form of security to be primed to be 
part of the everyday life of cities. It follows that there will be moments where security 
interventions are encountered through chance and as a more ordinary presence, as another 
type of thing, different to what we would identify as being about security. There are other 
times where it is through a change in the security architecture, or as security changes form 
and coalesces around an event, that security becomes present to secure. Importantly this 
counteracts the tendency to assume that security is somehow always already present within 
urban life. Security interventions become lived as they are folded into urban space and 
everyday happenings, and stitched into the fabric of the everyday city so as to allow that life 
to live whilst also aiming to secure it. 
Returning to Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the form of security described in this thesis 
aims to become a part of the everyday life of urban space, for the mechanisms of security to 
become lived. The aim is biopolitical, to foster and protect the circulations and freedoms 
and for security itself to become a part of that life where security is then involved in a range 
of transactions between absence and presence. Whilst this is a form of security that is 
primed to respond in the event of an event, as this section has demonstrated, it comes to 
presence in different and in what are unplanned and often unexpected ways. This is further 
evidence of its everydayness, for whilst these interventions do indeed become present in 
response to security events, there are many other ordinary and often unanticipated 
happenings in and through which security can be born to presence. The everyday life of 
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security and the securing of the everyday city involve much more than merely the protection 
and securing of the everyday from the threats of terrorism, and more than administering a 
series of interventions to urban spaces. It is a question of the relations between security and 
urban life and the capacities for people to live in the ʻsecure cityʼ. 
 
7.2. The presence of presence 
 
The focus of this section falls on how the presence of security is experienced as it rips 
the fabric of the infra-ordinary and becomes a more intensified presence within the life of 
everyday life. We have had hints of the affective presence of security in the examples in the 
previous section. Here I am interested in the experience of the encounter itself and the 
experience of security as a range of intensified presences in which, following Ophir, “the 
presence of something acts upon one-who-is-present such that the encounter with that 
thing is shifted from background to foreground … the presence of the encounter 
overshadows the presence of what is encountered” (2005:211). 
Focusing on how security is encountered and enacted in everyday life and how it is 
then experienced as a more intensified presence requires a more specific focus on the 
emergence of affect and feeling in relation to the materialities of security. Elsewhere 
Massumi (2005a, 2005b; see also Adey, 2008, 2009b) alerts us to the possibilities of the 
relationship between affect and security interventions by arguing that security measures 
work by creating dispositions of bodies towards action, that is to say they work to circulate, 
and distribute, certain intensities before they produce representations. Focusing on a case 
study of threat assessments, and the anticipatory logic of pre-emption, Massumi (2005a; 
2005b) argues that the sign of threat channels and mobilises fear, thus without necessarily 
all acting alike, bodies come to exhibit a ʻshared central nervousnessʼ. However, here as 
elsewhere, Massumiʼs account is for me too concerned with a generalised state of 
insecurity which he suggests emerges in relation to the materialities of security. In this 
section I will show how security presences affect and can be experienced as intensified in 
multiple and often contradictory ways. Taken together with the previous chapter, security 
interventions as intensified presences are shown to touch and resonate with bodies in 
different ways (see Seigworth, 1999). Through a focus on affect and on descriptions of how 
security is felt, this section develops the everyday life of security through a focus on how 
different security mechanisms within the two research sites are enacted as part of the life of 
everyday life. Ultimately this develops an understanding of security as lived, as living and as 
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lively so that it will always exceed its initial presence within urban life as a somehow always 
doing the work of security. 
In spite of my raising concerns with works which have focused on the emergence of a 
generalised insecurity in relation to the presence of security, it is important not to overlook 
the more negative affective capacities of security interventions. As such, to begin this 
section consider how in the following passage Christopher describes how he is affected 
through encounters with security measures that I argued in the last chapter are primed to be 
part of the background of everyday life and to then come to presence in the event of an 
event: 
 
Christopher: There is a, in a slightly strange way, almost a resentment at having the 
security forces around because they are an actual kind of, they are a, a sign, a kind 
of footprint of the fact that we have a need for them and itʼs that need for them that I 
have a resentment for. If we didnʼt have the terrorist threat, thereʼd be no need for the 
police officers, so the police officers in many ways index the threat. So I, in as much 
as to say in a rationalist sense, you can rationalise that they are there to help, or to 
deter, or to help by deterring … I think if there are these things here then there must 
be a need for them, otherwise why would they be there? And I do resent that, and 
that it makes me worry about why theyʼre there. And the reason for that is due to the 
indexical association made between the images of the underground and the 
immanent terrorist attacks that have happened and will probably occur there. Seeing 
the underground induces the feelings associated with terrorism, namely terror, albeit 
terror mediated by a need to get on with my life and therefore not become too 
irrational about the whole thing. 
 
In this passage Christopher explains how encountering different security interventions 
is intensely felt as a range of negative affectivities. Here he describes how feelings of 
insecurity, the unpleasant feelings of fear, worry, terror and the apprehensions he 
experiences emerge through a particular set of relations between himself and the presence 
of a range of different security and surveillance interventions whilst he travels on the 
Victoria Line. He states that his encounters with these measures act as daily reminders of 
the threat of terrorism, and the event of terror that are present as a possible futurity posing a 
threat to a valued life. In these encounters the future is brought into the present affectively, 
as an intensified presence, it is experienced as a present condition (see Massumi, 2005b). 
Note though how Christopher also concedes that in spite of these feelings of insecurity he 
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must get on with his life, in part this suggests that these affects are mobile and that they 
fade and so are not always so intensely present. In the following example Emma speaks of 
anticipatory affects in relation to a future terrorist event, as she describes how she can be 
affected by the presence of what she describes here as encounters “when the police are out 
in force”: 
 
Emma: Seeing the police can be quite exciting but itʼs more disconcerting really, I 
know that might sound odd. I get worried when the police are out in force, when that 
happens then it looks like itʼs something serious. Itʼs really frightening because you 
just donʼt know do you? You never get told whatʼs happening and inevitably, because 
you canʼt explain it, irrational thoughts get in your mind that maybe this time itʼs 
something serious again. 
Patrick: So in those cases itʼs the presence of the police, or security, which is 
unsettling, alarming even? 
Emma: Yeah, absolutely, it can be exciting, I have that curious streak and I get 
caught up in the moment, but then itʼs really really scary, especially when you think 
about the recent bombings, with that in the back of your mind itʼs really frightening. 
 
Here Emma begins by suggesting that the presence of the police can be experienced 
as exciting, although she follows this directly by stating that it is more ʻdisconcertingʼ. She 
then describes an intense affectual response, qualified here as feelings of insecurity which 
sees the future brought into the present, in effect, as Massumi contends, the event remains 
virtual “but is real and present in its effects” (2005b:8). As with Christopher, Emmaʼs 
narrative is suggestive of a relation to the future event of terror, and also to past events 
which have an affective life. Emma makes reference to the London bombings of July 7th 
2005 and fears, admitting in the interview that she at times worries “maybe this time itʼs 
something serious again”. In these two examples we see what Massumi describes as “the 
looming uncertainty of ill-defined threat”, where there is the sign of threat, “its most feared 
effects have already begun to materialize” (2005b:8). Emma and Christopher have 
described the presence and experience of encounters which intensify a series of negative 
affects characterised by insecurity. However and as I stated in the opening of this section, I 
am interested in how security presences may affect bodies in different ways and the 
affective outcomes that arise in encounters with various security interventions as more 
intensified presences. In the same interview Emma reflects on other moments where she 
encounters security as a more intensified presence. In the following extract, again Emma 
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provides an example of her encounters with the police, however note her claims that at 
different times she is affected in different ways: 
 
Emma: I feel unreasonably guilty. Even though, um, even though Iʼm not doing 
anything wrong. Yeah, I, er, I do feel guilty and I noticed actually because it 
happened, in, um, in the two weeks of watching, over the last month, that people tend 
to, go, um sort of, make them equi, make themselves equidistant from all police, so 
that theyʼre as far from all policeman as they can be, as they filter out of a station. And 
I do that, thatʼs a conscious effort, itʼs because Iʼm feeling, I feel unreasonably guilty. 
Itʼs not that Iʼm doing anything wrong. 
 
Here Emma describes a compulsion to change her route through a station, so as not 
to pass police officers. In these different instances she suggests that she experiences the 
encounter through guilt. The presence of the police, and indeed other security and 
surveillance interventions, encountered at different times and in different situations, 
engender different affective responses. In another interview Thomas spoke of how at times 
he is aware of the affect of being captured by guilt when he encountered police officers or 
security officials during his daily commute on the Victoria Line: 
 
Thomas: Iʼm one of those people who always feels like theyʼre under suspicion so I 
suppose thereʼs that, I just try not to look shifty and I probably just look shiftier than 
ever, so yeah I react in a sort of a guilty way probably [laughs]. I just always feel 
guilty around policemen, always feel like Iʼve done something wrong or, I donʼt know 
why though, I donʼt know what it is. But apart from the Police I donʼt react, I donʼt 
think I really change what I would normally do. Iʼd just, Iʼm pretty nonplussed by them 
really, you just sort of carry on, like I say, I think itʼs become normal to see certain 
things, um certain security wherever you are. So no, I wouldnʼt say that I react to 
them specifically. 
 
In this passage Thomas claims that he experiences encounters with police officers 
and other persons he associates with security through feelings of unease and guilt. He 
describes situations where he will actually alter his behaviour due to the intensity of the 
encounter. Interestingly Thomas then considers his encounters with other forms of security 
and suggests a continuing indifference to them, an almost but not quite, a claim to a nothing 
response. This is important as it again demonstrates the different ways in which the 
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relationship between subject and security technology is shifted and the different forms in 
which the shift occurs. Although in these instances a form of security is only momentarily 
present, I suggest that for Thomas and for Emma, their sense of being in the spaces of the 
underground changes, impacting on what a body can do and its capacity for being affected. 
Where Thomas suggests an indifferent relation to a range of security presences, in the 
following example Nicola suggests that the presence of security as an intensified presence 
can have a profoundly negative affect on her: 
 
Nicola: I did think about how ugly a lot of it is, really unattractive and uninspiring, 
especially because I think of the underground, I really like the underground. How the 
security is designed, it doesnʼt make people likely to interact and why donʼt they want 
people to interact, whatʼs wrong with interacting, they put all these adverts up and 
weʼre supposed to sit there reading about bloody terrorist bombs, whatever. And then 
thereʼs all these ugly robot eyeballs looking at us when we get out, itʼs horrible. 
 
Kraftl and Adey have written about this affective connection when they write about 
what they term ʻthe pushʼ that the “particular relationship between a body and a building 
could bring about: an affect” (2008:216-17). In Nicolaʼs narrative she describes a particularly 
intense relationship between herself and security interventions of different kinds, describing 
ʻthe pushʼ of these presences as “horrible”. The presence of what she deems “ugly” security 
mechanisms is unsettling, and Nicola describes an intense aversion to these features. Her 
dislike for the security interventions is completely at odds for her affective experience of the 
tube, as she stated elsewhere in the interview, “I really love the tube, itʼs like another world”. 
These examples are important as they have begun to describe a variegated affective 
landscape, where security interventions as intensified presences can touch or resonate with 
bodies in different ways. Most notably the above examples have described a range of 
negative affectivities qualified as anxieties, fears and insecurities, as well as guilt and 
unsettledness that can emerge through different encounters with security presences and in 
the examples to follow the place of the presence of security as reassuring is also apparent. 
Adey highlights this, citing Buchanan, writing that “different combinations of bodies 
assembled in a complex environment for Buchanan (1997:77), ʻprompts us to act differently 
according to the object encounteredʼ” (2008:448). For Adey these encounters “constitute 
relations, or manifold compositions that impact upon what a body can do, its capacity for 
moving, or being affected” (2008:448). These descriptions of encounters necessitate a 
move away from understanding of the presence of security exclusively as an aggravating 
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and disquieting presence which gives rise to and produces a generalised insecurity felt as a 
range of negative affectivities. Such accounts also go someway to disrupting the all too 
common claim that western societies are subject to a ʻpermanent anxietyʼ (Graham, 2006) 
and are dominated by a ʻculture of fearʼ (Robin, 2002). To continue this sense of 
variegation, consider the following example from my research diary where I observe as 
interest, excitement and joy accompany the swirling blades of a hovering police helicopter 
on the South Bank: 
 
Amongst a group staring towards the sky a mother points at the hovering police 
helicopter, ʻlook at the big helicopterʼ, she crouches, her child shrieks excitedly, 
kicking his legs gently. His excitement grows, reaching out with an arm he extends a 
finger, ʻooohʼ, looking now at his mother. His mother looks back, scrunching her nose 
before smiling ʻyes!ʼ Both watch as the blades thrash, the helicopter slowly slicing 
through the sky. The childʼs hand has lowered, his mother looks on, her eyes following 
the helicopter, but he has lost interest, still kicking he now busily looks around. 
(Observant participation, South Bank 10.12.08) 
 
Here the presence of a police helicopter attracts and enrols attentions differently. As 
the mother and child watch the hovering helicopter their interest is accompanied by 
excitement. Witnessing the delight of both the mother and the child is a reminder of how the 
presence of security interventions enacted as intensified presences gives rise to all manner 
of different affectivities, and also significantly, how security mechanisms are enrolled in the 
everyday life of cities in different and unpredictable ways some of which have everything to 
do with security, whereas others do not. There is a sense from this example of how the 
police helicopter exceeds its place in urban life as a presence to secure. In another example 
from my research diary, as I entered Kings Cross St Pancras underground station I 
witnessed a group of children interacting with two police dog handlers: 
 
Two British Transport police officers with dogs (a type of spaniel?) are stood talking to 
a small group of excited young school children and their teacher. The children take 
turns to stroke the dogs, their smiles and laughter shared by the officers. Whilst one of 
the officers talks with the teacher the other is photographed by the children, who then 
show him the photographs. The excitement only seems to grow as the children then 
enjoy taking turns to pose with the police officer and the dog. People stood close by 
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smile, talking about the happy group. Some walking slow their stride, a couple holding 
hands break into grins as they pass ʻawww, thatʼs so cuteʼ. 
(Observant participation, Kings Cross St Pancras, 03.12.08) 
 
These two examples are significant for demonstrating the different ways that security 
can affect, but also how the life of security as an affective presence exceeds the presence 
of various mechanisms within everyday life to secure. The presence of the police helicopter 
is enrolled in spectatorship, a source of excitement for a child. The presence of police 
officers with police dogs becomes, for a moment, a source of joy for a group of children and 
then enrols and affects other passengers in different ways. To consider the everyday life of 
security it is not nor can it ever be enough to maintain that security is always present as a 
presence to secure, it can and is enrolled in everyday life in so many different ways. 
In the following passages we see a different range of intensities of feeling and 
embodied affective responses to security as an intensified presence as it changes form and 
becomes present in response to a ʻsecurity eventʼ. We should not make the mistake of 
thinking that when security does actually come to presence that it is just experienced 
through fear, or that it is simply present as security. In the following examples witness as 
security is born to presence as it coalesces and responds to a security event: 
 
Amira: And even then, nobody seemed to care that ʻoh we might be blown upʼ, or 
anything, it was just we need to get home. So no one was thinking or you know, 
saying, whatʼs going on? Whatʼs happening? It was people concerned about their 
own journeys. 
Patrick: So rather than necessarily security or safety, it was people wanting to get 
going? 
Amira: Yeah, definitely, people just wanted to get home. So it was an, it was irritating 
for me and then for other people, the thought crosses your mind, they wouldnʼt make 
us leave if there wasnʼt something wrong, but more than anything itʼs annoying 
having to stand around and wait and you donʼt know if you should get the bus, or 
when youʼll get home, itʼs not what you want at the end of a day, maybe thatʼs being 
naïve. 
 
Amira describes the closure and evacuation of a station as security acts, comes to 
presence and coalesces around an event. Note how Amira talks of this experience, she 
claims that in this situation her feelings of insecurity are short-lived, stating, “the thought 
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crosses your mind”. Amira suggests that as security becomes present and coalesces 
around the event, security and the evacuation of the station are experienced as an 
annoyance, an irritating interruption. Amira recognises the distilling and transmission of 
affect through a palpable collective annoyance which manifests here as an edgy mood, this 
is then expressed differently by those assembled. Amiraʼs account is a reminder that 
security is not experienced in isolation, security never comes alone it is always mediated, 
this changes how we receive it. This is an example of how the living and the experiencing of 
security is woven into the fabric of everyday life. In another interview Ling spoke of how the 
coming to presence of security can disrupt the circulations of urban life: 
 
Ling: When I got to Victoria, there was just basically policemen there and I just 
thought something had happened and it transpired that, the next day that um that 
Sutton Trust guy was found on the bench [laughs], in Victoria Station, so that was a 
bit weird, but that did explain why the police were there … but there wasnʼt an 
explanation, we were just told it was closed. But because there were a lot of 
policemen around I thought something must be happening, because it was just out of 
the blue, just not usual, not a usual part of my day. There were just so many, and 
when you see more all around, at every station, you do start to worry a bit, especially 
when youʼre told to take a detour but no one explains why. There were just so many 
of them so I thought, whatʼs happened, whatʼs wrong. I did think, as I saw them I 
wondered why it could be that theyʼre there, but I was more annoyed by the 
inconvenience, I thought, Iʼm going to be late, like get out of my way I want to go to 
work, stop obstructing me. 
 
The event that caused the station closures, requiring Ling and other passengers to 
find alternative routes, was at the time an unknown incident. In this extract Ling claims that 
she thought little of the potential for this to have been caused by an ʻevent of terrorʼ, 
suggesting that her most immediate response to the security presence was annoyance as it 
inconvenienced her and disrupted the circulations that she relies on. For both Ling and 
Amira the presence of security is an interruption to the circulations that security aims to 
foster and protect. In these instances it is this, rather than the ʻevent of terrorʼ, which is 
experienced in the presence of the encounter. When security does become present as a 
more heightened presence, it is not just through fear and it is not simply present as security: 
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Adam: Iʼve walked past before and there were loads of police vans parked up outside 
the station, and like I couldnʼt see the police so I assumed that they were either in the 
underground or in the train station. It was some, um, something was happening that 
needed the police, but not like, I didnʼt think it was like a bomb, or an attack, like I 
didnʼt really give it that much thought … itʼs kind of strange, like clearly thereʼs a 
reason for them being there and you canʼt place why, like is it a training exercise, is it 
a raid, is there some intelligence that theyʼve got? Like you know that somethingʼs 
going on. 
Patrick: Yeah, so thereʼs the norm, and then something, like that, unusual. 
Adam: Yeah, it sort of confuses it. I wonder if it would stop me, I havenʼt been in a 
situation where Iʼve not been, I was going onto the underground, like Iʼve never been 
there when thereʼs been a large amount of police for some unexplained reason, but I 
wonder if that happened, like if that would stop me, or make me think twice about it, 
how that would make me think … I donʼt even know if Iʼd think, like you know, youʼd 
know somethingʼs not right? 
Patrick: Make the connection to a potential attack of some sort? 
Adam: Yeah, or if Iʼd explain it another way. 
  
Although the future event of terror can be and is brought into the present affectively, in 
these examples it is not present as an immediate, significant and terrifying future. It appears 
that for the three respondents the future which is brought into the present is non-security 
related. These descriptions are in contrast with Massumiʼs (2005a, 2005b) account of the 
possibilities of the relationship between affect and security interventions. Massumi (2005a; 
2005b) has argued that the sign of threat channels and mobilises fear, take for example his 
case of the confusion of flour for anthrax at Montreal Airport in May 2005: 
 
… quick, close the airport! The airport must be closed just in case, to assuage the 
fear. The closure of the air- port induces fear. Men in white decontamination suits 
descend. Police swarm in for crowd control. Far-flung airports with originating flights 
due to land are affected. The media amplify the alarm in real-time with live news 
bulletins. The fear of the disruption has become the disruption (Massumi, 2005b:9) 
 
In the examples that have been presented in this section, when security is 
encountered, and when events or potential events do happen, the life of security exceeds its 
presence to secure. Security and surveillance measures as heightened presences are 
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enrolled in different ways in the everyday life of cities, only some of which are doing the 
work of security. This says much of the ways in which security can come to be so 
imbricated in urban space and in our everyday lives. The accounts of fear and insecurity 
that have come to dominate reflections on the relations between security and everyday 
urban life is in danger of overlooking the presence of security as it is a present condition, 
that of being secure: 
 
Iain: In terms of why I would expect security on the underground, this is mainly, 
recently itʼs been around the information we see about terrorism in the media, and 
also on the back of the 7th July attacks. I think it's the old thing of wanting to see 
some high visibility policing and having that as a psychological reassurance. I 
appreciate that it may well be slightly simple, but a visible presence infers that one is 
safer on the tube network or anywhere else. 
 
In the following set of examples, participants reflect on how security is experienced as 
it is intensified and produces the affect that it names. This affective condition of being-
secure is expressed through a range of bodily feelings which participants have suggested 
emerge through their encounters with security as a more intense presence. Take for 
example Marieʼs account: 
 
Marie: I think the only time I would look for security really is if I was scared for some 
reason, because that is when I need it, or think I need it, it hasnʼt happened but I can 
imagine if I was frightened then I would look for security to feel better, to feel like 
there was something there for me. Otherwise I wouldnʼt look at it, I wouldnʼt have a 
reason to. 
Patrick: For the reassurance it offers, that knowledge? 
Marie: Yes, exactly, you know they are there to protect you and it does make me feel 
better if I am scared of something it will help. 
 
For Marie, security measures are not always experienced or qualified as intensified 
presences nor does she consider them to be enrolled directly in her being-secure. She 
claims that she will look for security to become present when aiming for a specific feeling. 
This is an account of being somehow protected from danger and security affecting Marie in 
such a way that she can then be reassured, and so more confident. Whilst it does not 
necessarily mean that she would be free from fear, it is a relation to security which is 
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expressed in the bodily feelings of being-secure. In the following diary extract Daniel reflects 
on the presence of different security and surveillance interventions and changes in bodily 
affectivity: 
 
On balance, the physical and visible presence of human security enforcers is more 
comforting than any other. Even though they may not be the most efficient or 
effective form of security provision, they inspire a different reaction in me — and I 
imagine most people — from ʻrobotic securityʼ (Self-completed diary, Daniel, 
06.04.10). 
 
Here Daniel considers how the presence of different security mechanisms have 
different capacities to affect him when he encounters them through his daily commute on 
the Victoria Line. He observes how he relates to different security presences in different 
ways and claims that the presence of these gives rise to different affective states in which 
different felt relations with security as an intensified presence emerge. In the passage below 
Nimali also reflects on the presence of the police, this time on the South Bank: 
 
Nimali: I do, I always do feel better with the police, with police uniforms, not these, 
these South Bank Patrol … Yeah, no I do feel safer, [laughs], I do sometimes think 
that maybe it was because my dad was a policeman [laughs]. It just automatically 
makes me feel safe, when I see a uniform, a police uniform, you know, it makes me 
feel safer, I have to be honest, you know it might have nothing to do with my security. 
 
Nimali differentiates between how she relates to the presence of different security 
interventions and suggests that there are important differences within the presence of the 
encounter itself. Nimali describes how it is that she is affected by the presence of police 
officers. Whilst this does not necessarily specify a relation to an immediate or future threat, 
Nimali claims that in the encounters with police security is felt as a present condition, the 
condition of being protected, of feeling safe. Importantly these examples have demonstrated 
moments where the life of security is experienced affectively as a presence to secure in 
ways which security as a condition is intensely felt. These feelings of being secure are 
qualified in different ways by participants as they emerge through encounters with security 
interventions as intensified presences. 
In closing this section I would like to consider how the life of these and other security 
presences is finite. Their duration will differ; some lasting a second, a minute, an hour, 
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perhaps longer. Just as everyday life is constantly ongoing, so the life of security is 
constantly ongoing: 
 
In discussion, three PCSOs walk underneath Waterloo Bridge, one points and they 
walk to a black box used by street entertainers as a platform. The PCSO who pointed 
taps the box with his foot before crouching next to, gently pressing a hand against 
the top. He looks concerned. He stands and  all three look anxiously around. One of 
the PCSOs asks those close by if the box belongs to them, growing louder with 
impatience. He attracts attention, heads turn, paces slow and a small crowd begins 
to gather. 
Yes 
 
A young man replies, the PCSO glares and admonishes him: 
 
You should not leave it there unattended, itʼs a security concern 
 
The man had been confused, the box is not his. Further enquiries. A larger crowd 
has formed now, a ripple of agitated murmurs, there is a palpable and growing sense 
of an uneasy tension, the exchanging of worried looks, concerns are voiced. The 
commotion caused by the PCSOs and the nervous exchanges of the gathered crowd 
alerts a man working on the carrousel. He apologises to his queue, before running to 
the box shouting, the queue watch, the assembly quietens, the PCSOs turn. His 
hands raise:  
 
Donʼt worry, itʼs one of them [entertainer], heʼs coming back! 
 
He pushes the box onto its side, revealing empty space: 
 
Should really be left like that 
 
He returns to his booth. Different voices now, laughter and easiness distilling as they 
overwhelm the previous feeling of worry, the tension dissipates with the crowd. The 
PCSOs take their turn to quietly examine the hollow – bystanders peer around them 
doing the same. Two PCSOs walk slowly on, the one who had pointed, stands and 
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glares around, muttering to himself. A slight shake of the head, he walks briskly to 
join his colleagues. The box is left, now empty and on its side. 
(Observant participation, South Bank, 31.12.08) 
 
In this example we see the emergence of a potential threat, a concern which grows in 
its intensity, an unease and concern born, then magnified and transmitted as it passes 
between bodies, ultimately lost – although the PCSOs remained clearly irritated by the 
event as they walked away. The event is contagious, agitation and unrest emerge, those 
assembled are drawn in and contaminated through the direct contact between the PCSOs 
and others: raised voices appeal, nervous looks are exchanged, a definite sense of unease 
is transmitted and begins to circulate. These looks, gestures, anxious tones exchanged 
through this encounter come to mediate this experience explicitly. As the box is revealed to 
hold little mystery the unease moves, the intensification of security slipping away. This 
fading, for most sees the return of security as little more than a background concern. People 
come to be captured by the event, enrolled in different ways, highlighting different forms of 
motility and different processes of change, and so we witness how fears or anxieties may 
grow, wane and subsist for however long, being transmitted or lost, as the background 
atmosphere gradually returns (see Bissell, 2009b). 
What this draws our attention to are the ways that security as an intensified presence 
can move on or change, and the dampening or fading which sees the reemergence of the 
vague atmospheric background described in Chapter 6. Stewart (2003:4) provides a 
beautiful description of this dynamic: 
 
We go along with ways of sensing and feeling, of relating and exercising power, of 
suffering impacts and claiming agency. Then something happens to cull things into a 
form both more potent and suddenly tentative. Then things get vague and diffuse 
again or drop back onto a track that makes particular, unhesitating, sense of them. 
 
What I think Stewart expresses so well here is that to begin from the life of the 
everyday is to focus on a dynamic between the vague and definite, the particular and 
general. In short, security oscillates between both background and foreground. More 
specifically, we could say that the movement to become background is differentiated: an 
intensified presence can dull or fading; movements to absence can involve transmission, 
dispersal and movements which lead to an eruption elsewhere; and movements to absence 
may involve a loss of presence or immediacy. This acknowledges and extends the account 
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of the ʻbackgroundʼ given in Chapter 6. This may of course not be immediate, and so it is 
useful to think of this change in terms of a movement involving the dampening of the 
background sense of life (see Anderson, 2009a; Stern, 1998). 
This section has offered a discussion of moments where security is present as an 
intensified presence and how the life of security as a range of more heightened presences 
is experienced. Importantly, the life of these presences and the ways in which they are 
experienced differ and are far more complex than have previously been theorised. Security 
presences are felt in multiple, often contradictory ways, the affective landscapes when 
security is present is more variegated than just a generalised insecurity. Following Adey, 
these encounters “summon up feelings, which in turn may interfere with one another, 
aggravate, supplement or supplant” (Adey, 2008:440). It is therefore important to account 
for complex ways the security as a range of intensified presences might affect bodies in 
different ways, altering their capacities to act and how security as an intense presence is 
experienced. These mesh with one another, interfere with one another, and resonate with 
one another and have consequences for what people do, which feeds back into how they 
engage with the space. As the final part of this section showed, these affective presences 
have a strange durability, they come and go, they are fleeting and they are transitory. The 
life of an intensified presence is mobile, and as such these presences are only more or less 
durable: moving on, changing, and often becoming part of the background once more. 
Rather than a concern for the ʻlifeʼ of everyday life becoming the referent object of security, 
this accounts for the living and experiencing of security itself, as it becomes part of urban 
life. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through this chapter I have discussed how, through a closer attention to encounters 
with counter-terrorist security interventions, a form of security that I have thus far suggested 
is primed to be part of everyday life changes form and becomes a more intensified 
presence. As such it has attended to the ripping and the rips in the infra-ordinary 
background that was described in Chapter 6 and so addressed security as a heightened 
presence within the life of the two research sites. Everyday life is full of these moments, 
instantiations when security becomes an intensified presence and this chapter has moved 
from the traditional focus on understandings of security characterised exclusively as a 
presence to secure, towards a fuller appreciation of the where and how of security. Attention 
to these instantiations has sought to consider the emergence of affect in relation to the 
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materialities of security and the range of bodily feelings through which security encountered 
and enacted as a more intensified presence is experienced. 
In discussing security as an intensified presence within the life of everyday life, this 
chapter has extended previous accounts that have presumed that the presence of security 
interventions leads to an incoherent background fear and the saturation of urban life with a 
generalised insecurity. This approach thus poses an important challenge to works which 
have suggested that the saturation of urban space with security mechanisms as an element 
of the ʻsecurity driveʼ “is the production of permanent anxiety around everyday urban 
spaces, systems and events” (Graham, 2006:261). Whilst fear, anxiety, insecurity, terror 
and other negative affects certainly emerge through encounters with security presences, 
security presences affect and are felt in multiple, often contradictory ways. This chapter has 
described the experience of the intensified presence of security within everyday life through 
safety, guilt, annoyance, confidence, excitement, fear, to name just a few. In focusing on the 
processes through which security is encountered and enacted, we see how it is not only 
ʻinsecurityʼ, but a more variegated affective landscapes when security is present. The focus 
on encounters allows for thinking about and attending to how security interventions, of 
different kinds, may affect in ways not prescribed in advance. 
Taken together this chapter, along with Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, have shown that the 
biopolitics of security is not only a matter of how the everyday becomes the ʻreferent-objectʼ 
(Dillon and Lobo-Guerra 2008). I have demonstrated here that the urban geography of 
security is not about securing life, and in the biopolitical sense securing in and through life, it 
is about the living of security itself. Here security is understood as lived, as living and as 
lively so that it exceeds its initial design and its remit in urban life as a presence to secure. 
Often security emerges as present and is then experienced as an intensified presence in 
ways which are different to anything that we would identify as being about security. It is not, 
nor can it ever be the case that there is life and then there is security, security itself is 
nothing unless it is lived. This chapter, along with Chapter 6, has demonstrated how this 
specific form of security apparatus takes place and how it is woven into the fabric of the 
everyday as it becomes part of urban life in ways that will always exceed the intentions set 
out in Chapter 5 and always be more experienced as more than a presence to secure. In 
offering examples of the more nuanced everyday life of security as an intense presence, 
this chapter has demonstrated the complex ways that forms of biopolitical security can 
come to presence, and the life of these different presences. It has shown that it is not 
enough to assume that security is always somehow present, rather the chapter has 
suggested that where invisibility is central to how these new ways of securing public space 
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function, security apparatuses are designed to oscillate between invisibility and response to 
events. 
The life of security as a range of intensified presences within the city is a complex, it is 
not enough to consider the life of security as a presence to secure, as to do so overlooks 
the accidental, unexpected, often ordinary ways that people can come into contact with and 
enliven security daily. These daily encounters, these everyday enactments give life to 
security, call it into being for what may only be a fleeting moment, although they may be 
more stubborn, enduring before moving on in ways that demonstrate the everyday life of 
security and a sense of the motility of affects. Importantly, and as argued in Chapter 5, 
contemporary security apparatuses are designed to oscillate between invisibility and 
response to events. For security to achieve its aims of fostering ʻgoodʼ circulations and 
ensuring the sets of ʻfreedomsʼ that have come to define liberal-democratic life, this 
presencing must be finite. These movements involve a folding back into the infra-ordinary 
background, a loss which sees a movement to absence, and the return of the vague, 
indefinite background atmospheric feeling described in the previous chapter. In this chapter, 
as in Chapter 6, I have demonstrated the importance of exploring how security is 
encountered and what happens to a security presence, how these presences take on a life 
of their own as they emerge, intensify, cease, and otherwise move. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
In this thesis I have sought to discuss the everyday life of security and to attend to 
how the everyday is secured. This final chapter draws together the research findings and 
the implications of this thesis, as well as providing a consideration of some of the 
possibilities that this thesis raises for future work. In this concluding chapter I offer an 
overview and an evaluation of the research project as a whole and detail its contribution to 
current debates concerning urban security, in particular through its focus on the relations 
between security and lived everyday urban life. 
 
8.1. Summary 
 
This thesis has developed an account of an emerging security apparatus within cities 
in the UK, addressing the ways in which a variety of counter-terrorist security mechanisms 
become present within urban spaces in order to attend to how these measures are then 
encountered and experienced as part of the everyday life of cities. In doing so I have thus 
questioned both the processes through which the everyday city is secured and have 
developed a more in depth account of how the various materialities that make up those 
processes of securing are encountered, enacted and experienced as they become part of 
lived urban life. To this end I have offered a conceptual vocabulary for describing the 
everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured. 
I have argued through this thesis that in order to better understand the urban 
geographies of security we must move to witness and describe how security becomes part 
of urban life. This calls attention to both the efficacy and operation of security techniques, 
with regards to technical and instrumental dimensions of security practice, and addresses 
the life of security in greater depth. Extending existing debates, this conceives life both as 
that which is secured and governed as the referent object of a security apparatus, and as 
that which is lived and everyday. In this respect whilst it is to be accepted that where 
biopolitical security projects take (multiple) expressions of life as their referent object, in the 
securing of the everyday city and the governance of urban life itself, life will always exceed 
those strategies of governance in one way or another. As I have argued through this thesis, 
it is essential that an account of the everyday life of security and the securing of the 
everyday acknowledge that there can never be life and then security; security is nothing 
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unless it is lived. In order to attend to these concerns, the theoretical framework developed 
through this thesis has offered a conceptual vocabulary that necessitated the drawing 
together of a reading of biopolitics and specific literatures that have engaged with and 
theorised everyday life, most prominently the work of Georges Perec and non-
representational theories. 
The theoretical framework and conceptual vocabulary were used to examine the 
specific context of the securing of urban public spaces and the UK Governmentʼs category 
of ʻcrowded placesʼ in order to trace the emergence of a specific counter-terrorist security 
apparatus and to then attend to how interventions become part of that which is lived and 
everyday. Through a case study of this specific security apparatus, this thesis has argued 
that central to the counter-terrorist security enacted in public spaces in cities in the UK are 
aims to secure and to enable a set of ʻfreedomsʼ and to foster ʻgoodʼ circulations and 
interdependencies that sustain a particular form of valued life. The concerns for freedom 
and circulation are intimately bound with different expressions of life that then coalesce and 
coexist as the city and everyday urban life become the referent object of security. In the 
context of the securing of contemporary urban spaces, the biological life of species 
existence cannot be separated from other expressions of life, including the elements and 
processes which enable the valued life and the processes and circulations that define that 
liberal-democratic life to be sustained, alongside the fostering of a distinct way of life and 
lived everyday urban life itself. Thus, to equate the life that is to be secured with biological 
species-being, as some work on security does, is a mistake. 
The processes of securitisation through which this form of counter-terrorist security 
apparatus attempts to secure public places renders a range of materialities a visible and 
invisible part of urban life. Whilst I am in agreement with many of the arguments that 
contend that the spaces of civil life are increasingly saturated with forms of security, this 
thesis has demonstrated that the mechanisms of security are far from somehow always 
already present within cities. It has been demonstrated here that in fact the geographies of 
urban security are complex geographies of both absence and presence. These reflect 
rationalities of counter-terrorist security which are centred on ʻproportionalityʼ and 
ʻappropriatenessʼ and the practice of security with the spaces of civil life where invisibility is 
central to how new ways of securing public space function. These rationalities are 
developed in relation to different urban contexts and as such spatial contingency is 
understood to be integral to the imbrications of security and cities where concerns for site 
specificity and bespoke solutions are embedded in the everyday in different ways. 
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The UK Governmentʼs CONTEST counter-terror strategy states that these 
arrangements should be developed and delivered through threat assessments and Chapter 
5 discussed how security is then enacted with respects to a range of different and site 
specific considerations, one of which is security. The aims here are to ensure that counter-
terrorism is ʻappropriatelyʼ and ʻproportionatelyʼ designed into the built fabric of cities and 
into urban life itself. The apparatus of security traced through this thesis is expected to 
respond to the challenges of providing security interventions that offer ʻproportionateʼ 
protection, addressing sites specific vulnerabilities and mitigating the effects of an attack 
should one take place, ʻappropriateʼ to site specific conditions, designed into the spaces and 
happenings of urban life. There emerges a situation of ʻtradeoffsʼ between all manner of 
different requirements and aspirations within public spaces, these will inevitably and 
importantly be conditioned by specific sites and spaces and are subject to change over 
time. This applies as much to the ʻhardʼ engineering and design solutions as to ʻsoftʼ 
governance and management arrangements, and in practical terms such an approach 
necessitates more holistic strategies for urban security. 
Through the course of this thesis it has been demonstrated how this specific counter-
terror security apparatus becomes part of and embedded in the everyday in a number of 
different ways, some of which are specific to this security apparatus and some of which are 
more generic. This specific apparatus of security and the various interventions that are 
deployed to counter the threats of terror are primed, in different ways, to be part of everyday 
life and so to have a particular mode of presence in the everyday. Importantly it has been 
argued that this form of security is primed to be part of everyday life so as not to disrupt the 
circulations and interdependencies that make up the life of the cities. It is then intended to 
emerge in the event of an event, primed to act and to change form as it coalesces around 
an event. Invisibility and submersion in the infra-ordinary background spaces and 
happenings of everyday life is thus central to how new ways of securing public space 
function when the aim is to foster circulations and to secure urban life. 
Extending the discussion of how security is primed to be part of everyday life, Chapter 
6 discussed how this involves a certain background expectation of security and the 
normalisation of security. Where security is often a background presence within urban life a 
situation emerges where the actual forms and practices of security are then encountered 
ambiguously. Although security is increasingly ubiquitous and is becoming normalised, the 
processes of normalisation somewhat conversely are making security an ambiguous 
presence. Questioning how this new normality is experienced, an account of security as a 
background presence experienced as a background feeling and through affective 
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atmospheres has been discussed. Where it is expected that security is present somehow 
somewhere, and where the interventions of security are enacted as an ambiguous 
presence, these expectations and the conditions of being-secure are described through 
indefinite characteristics which are close to something like an atmosphere. The thesis 
demonstrated that security is so often enacted as a background presence within everyday 
life, however this is not the only way that security is present. Through the messiness and 
unpredictability of everyday security will inevitably be encountered and experienced as a 
more intensified presence in ways that exceed its presence to secure as well as when 
emerge in the event of an event. Everyday life is full of moments when security becomes an 
intensified presence and Chapter 7 demonstrated the need to develop the traditional focus 
on security solely understood as part of an apparatus that is then imbricated with the city as 
a presence to secure, to an account which attends more fully to the where and how of 
security in everyday life. In discussing security as it is enacted as an intensified presence 
and as a part of the infra-ordinary background, this thesis has shown how security can be 
experienced in ways that challenge the set of assumptions regarding the presence of 
security interventions leads to an incoherent background fear and the saturation of urban 
life with a generalised insecurity. This is also a move to disrupt the common claims that 
western societies live in an ʻage of anxietyʼ or are dominated by a ʻculture of fearʼ. 
Much of the emphasis on the more technical and instrumental dimensions of security 
in both scholarly work and with regards the practical matters overlooks the everyday and so 
overlooks the ways that security becomes present in everyday life as well as neglecting how 
security is itself lived as it secures the everyday city. Here, through attending to the ways 
that security is encountered and enacted as part of urban life, and so to how security is 
experienced, this thesis has attended to the relations between security and everyday life 
and has developed a better understanding of both the everyday life of security and the 
everyday as secured. In doing so it witnesses and describes how security becomes part of 
urban life in different, often unexpected ways. This has attended to security as it is lived and 
so better understands the urban geographies of security in ways that exceeds security 
simply being plans, procedures, processes, mechanisms and so on of the security 
apparatus, this work shows the life of it. 
 
8.2. Implications and contributions 
 
The focus of this research on witnessing and describing the everyday life of security 
and investigating how the everyday is secured, raises a series of implications for 
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geography, for the ways security is understood and theorised, as well as for more practical 
matters regarding security interventions in urban environments. 
This thesis, through its development of a case study of the urban geographies of 
counter-terrorism, extends the analyses of work within geography and elsewhere that has 
considered contemporary counter-terrorism post September 11th 2001. This is a substantive 
work on counter-terrorism in the city which argues for a more nuanced set of geographies 
that can be more attentive to spatial variations and more attuned to difference within the 
practice of counter-terrorism and security more generally. It is crucial that we reject the 
persistent gestures toward ʻfortificationʼ (see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004b, 2009a) or the urban 
ʻmilitarismʼ and the ʻmilitarisationʼ of urban space (see Graham, 2002b, 2004c, 2006, 2009, 
2011) and appreciate that processes of urban securitisation are multifarious. Rather, for a 
more comprehensive discussion of the rationales for and contexts of urban security, we 
need to consider the specific implications of a form of security that takes up a rationale of 
site specificity. Additionally, and related, the form of security that has been traced through 
this thesis is primed to be part of everyday life in different ways, to then change form as it 
emerges and acts in the event of an event. Invisibility and the embedding of interventions 
into the spaces and happenings of everyday life is central to how these new way of securing 
public space function when the aim to foster circulations and to secure urban life. There are 
certainly cases where more overt mechanisms are enacted and so it is important to 
question the geographies of absence and presence and to then question how the range of 
security mechanisms deployed throughout cities become part of the everyday in different 
ways. 
This thesis has demonstrated how for researching the life of security it is not enough 
to focus solely on the rationales for and contexts of urban security nor to conceive life 
exclusively as that which is secured, as the ʻreferent objectʼ of security. Through this thesis I 
have discussed how security within everyday life moves from being a set of mechanisms to 
something lived, and have also attended to everyday life as it shifts from being an object of 
security to that within which security lives. Central to the account presented here has been 
the contention that as well as investigating specific expressions of ʻlifeʼ as they become 
referent objects of security, it is essential to account for and find a means of theorising the 
life of the everyday. The life of security should always be recognised as exceeding security, 
always more than just the expression of life as an object target. It is not possible to take one 
without the other, it is essential that the complex relations that emerge between security and 
life are acknowledged and attended to. This is essential so that security does not come to 
be seen as somehow dominating life. Life will always exceed security in ways that are 
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overlooked and lost when it is expressed solely as an object target and when focus is 
placed exclusively on the processes and techniques of security. As such it is crucial for both 
understandings of the efficacy of security and the relations between security and lived 
experience that neither security nor life should be conceived in isolation. 
There are also implications for work on everyday life itself and for security as a 
phenomena within everyday life. If there cannot be security and then everyday life, we also 
have to consider how security does become enrolled in the everyday and how it is then part 
of and so is inseparable from the everyday. It is crucial that greater attention is paid to the 
presence of security within the everyday and that it is accepted and indeed acknowledged 
more widely that the everyday is not a pure space where things happen, the everyday takes 
place through security. It is therefore important that greater attention is paid to the presence 
of security in everyday life and then a more thorough questioning undertaken of what this 
then means for topics like ambiguity, or contingency, or the aleatory in the context of work 
on everyday life. This then acknowledges that more sustained focus must consider how 
what security does, and how security is enacted, becomes enrolled in the everyday, part of 
the everyday and is ultimately inseparable from the everyday. This is not to suggest that the 
everyday is somehow structured by security, but that it happens through that security. 
The work presented through this thesis goes against many of the critiques that have 
developed concerning security and the securing of the everyday city. As argued in Chapter 
2, a set of well established accounts of security are predominantly framed in a negative 
manner, and whilst not wholly opposed to their conclusions, this thesis demonstrates and 
considers the possibilities for other critical accounts. The work of Perec is useful here and I 
believe can be aligned with affirmative modes of critique that are concerned with opening up 
new possibilities and potentialities for the future (see Anderson, 2006; Bennett, 2001; 
Connolly, 2002). It would be easy to assume that Perec, his practical exercises and his 
writings are resolutely apolitical. As Chapter 3 explained, much of Perecʼs work on the 
everyday and his modes of witnessing everyday life deliberately fashion uncritical, politically 
and sociologically neutral descriptions (see Adair, 2009). However, Perec (who remained 
faithful throughout his life to his self-definition as a socialist (Bellos, 1999:145)) was 
certainly politically motivated, as is demonstrated throughout his literary career through a 
range of critical accounts of politics, economics, society and culture. Although these 
positions and commitments are at times so entwined in the subtleties of his writings that 
they do not present a clear message (see Bellos, 1999; Walker and Virilio, 2001). In Perecʼs 
work we see the possibilities of a form of critique that begins with the acts of witnessing, 
attention and description. As James notes, the power of Perecʼs quixotic investigation, is in 
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its capacity to “both uncover and potentially threaten the foundations of social and cultural 
life” (2009:198). The most striking example of this is found in the essay Approaches to 
What? a piece that is at once a practical exercise for the infra-ordinary and a critique of 
politics, society and culture. Perecʼs strategy in this essay is political in origin, “ʻSocial 
problemsʼ”, he writes, “arenʼt ʻa matter of concernʼ when thereʼs a strike, they are intolerable 
twenty-four hours out of twenty-four, three hundred and sixty-five days a year” (2008a:209). 
For Perec witnessing, seeing more flatly and going about things more slowly are critical 
methods that draw attention to “the truly intolerable, the truly inadmissible” (2008a:209), 
wresting these from the dross in which they were mired so as to make change possible. In 
revealing his socio-political frustrations and in demanding the answers to the “questions I 
ask or would like to ask” (2008a:209), I feel that Perec mobilises a style of affirmative 
critique and an optimism that reveals the possibilities for change and the potential for 
opening up of new futures. 
In the context of work on security and specifically in the account of the everyday life of 
security developed within this thesis, Perec provides a useful position to both question and 
offer critical accounts of the presence and work of security, its operation and its relations to 
lived experience. The established critique of security is overwhelmingly posed in negative 
terms, security is routinely demonised and unhelpfully characterised as always somehow a 
problem. Security is commonly condemned as intrusive and described as omnipresent in its 
techniques, processes and affects. A further issue, and one that I have reflected on within 
this thesis, is the tendency to pose security and freedom as always opposed. The very 
ambiguity at the heart of this thesis and its insistence that security can be reconciled with 
freedom demonstrates the need to consider how to undertake critical work on security that 
does not imply that security per se is always a problem. The approach developed through 
this thesis does not start with the assumption that security is good or bad, rather I propose 
that it is more useful to begin by thinking what and how security might be, indeed what it 
may become. Critical accounts must begin from such positions, not having already made 
conclusions. And so I propose a critical account of security and of the securing of the 
everyday city following Perec, one that moves more slowly in its witnessing and description, 
rather than rushing to question, critique and conclude. This is allied with the mobilising of a 
politics of potentiality that forwards a broader concern for the promises and provocations of 
affirmative modes of being-critical that can cultivate and open up new possibilities and 
potentialities for the future (see Bennett, 2001; Connolly, 2002; Foucault, 1997b). 
The work of this thesis also has implications for practice and policy. In security 
practice the emphasis on technical and instrumental issues has occluded questioning how 
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the increasing urbanisation of security agendas and the securitisation of everyday life takes 
place within the life of the everyday. It has been argued that everyday life is central to the 
rationalities of the form of counter-terror security apparatus traced through this thesis, 
however, it has also been maintained that a troubling dimension of security practice is the 
lack of satisfactory means of conceiving how security will take place within lived everyday 
life. There emerge a series of issues here regarding the persistent bypassing of the 
mundane and the everyday. In addition, appeals to public vigilance assume a level of public 
awareness and responsibility which, as this thesis has demonstrated, are so often 
exceeded by the experiences and affects of boredom, confusion, hurry, and so on. Whilst 
absence and presence are increasingly central to the geographies of urban security practice 
it is never so simple as more overt or ʻhigh visibilityʼ interventions nor embedded security 
becoming part of everyday life as is planned, nor anticipated. There is a greater need to 
attend to the landscapes of presence and absence and regimes of (in)visibility that emerge 
through the everyday life of security. 
Ultimately, questioning and attending to the relations between security and everyday 
life should be deemed as inseparable from the established and ongoing debates concerning 
the processes of the securitisation of cities and the urbanisation of security agendas. These 
different dimensions should be approached in order to understand better the multiple and 
complex ways the everyday is secured and the everyday life of security. 
 
8.3. Future research 
 
As with any research project, the account of the everyday life of security presented in 
this thesis is by no means complete. Rather, it should be read as a modest contribution and 
a starting point for a focus on the securing of the everyday city and the everyday life of 
security. Thus, it is acknowledged that there are numerous dimensions concerning the 
complex processes of securing cities and the everyday life of security that are absent from 
this study. In this section I suggest three potentially significant avenues that this thesis 
opens up for future research, it is believed that these concerns can further this study directly 
and develop potential avenues in researching the geographies of urban security more 
broadly. In particular, and in keeping with this thesis, this section focuses on furthering 
works that are more attentive to the relations between security and everyday life. 
An important area of future research would necessarily attend to the issue of 
difference in everyday life and within the everyday life of security, which has not been 
addressed directly within this research project. The question of difference runs alongside a 
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number of issues regarding the presence of security within cities and concerns are regularly 
raised regarding counter-terrorism security and policy with respects to issues of difference. 
It has been the subject of ongoing debates in both academic and non-academic circles, 
however surprisingly little work has been undertaken with respects to how difference 
emerges and is enacted through everyday encounters with security. Questioning difference 
and security, in particular the ways in which forms of security differentiate, has been the 
subject of ongoing debates in both academic and non-academic circles, however 
surprisingly little work has been undertaken with respects to how difference is emerges and 
is enacted through everyday encounters with security and the everyday practices of 
security. As such it is suggested that a focus on difference in relation to the enactment of 
security would form an important development of this research. In such a study, not only 
would race, gender and age be considered as potentially problematic, there are also 
interesting and significant questions concerning criminality and encounters with different 
forms of security apparatuses. Attending to and questioning the issue of difference in 
everyday life would go some way to providing an even more nuanced account of the 
everyday life of security and its enactment as part of lived experience. Not only would such 
an extension of this research be interesting with respects to the everyday life of security, it 
potentially has important implications regarding the violence of forms of security. Utilising 
the conceptual approach adopted in this thesis could offer a significant contribution to 
debates regarding the violence of security, in particular the ways in which forms of security 
differentiate between a threat and a non-threat. Different forms of security, including the 
counter-terrorist security apparatus that is addressed here, have been subject to 
widespread and longstanding critiques on the grounds that the processes of differentiation 
are based on forms of racial, or class, or gender codings and classifications. 
This thesis offers an account of a particular security apparatus and is limited in the 
respect that it addresses the emergence of a distinct form of counter-terrorist security in the 
context of the UK and then within the two research sites in London. Acknowledging this, it 
would therefore be necessary and indeed interesting to extend the analysis and approach 
that has been developed through the course of this research in order to address how other 
forms of security, counter-terrorist or otherwise, are enacted and become present within 
urban life in particular ways and the everyday life of different apparatuses of security. This 
would further develop a more nuanced account of how different forms of security are 
experienced as part of everyday urban life. It would also further challenge the established 
conventions that claim the ubiquity of security, offering a more fine grained analysis attuned 
to multifarious security interventions and different landscapes of security. Additionally, it has 
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been contended that the practice of security in the context of the securing of the everyday 
city, invariably and importantly will involve degrees of relational resonance between different 
security apparatuses. Therefore, to further extend analysis of the processes through which 
cities are secured and how security becomes part of urban life, it would be relevant to 
investigate how this takes place. Such an addition to current discussions would go some 
way to addressing how security apparatuses respond to different, perhaps multiple, 
enactments of threat within urban life and how these different forms of security become part 
of everyday life through the blending and multiplying relations. 
Throughout this thesis I have insisted on the spatial and temporal contingency of this 
form of counter-terror security, a conclusion that I believe should be extended to other forms 
of urban security. Following this it is important that calls to develop more spatially nuanced 
understandings of the processes of securing cities and the presence of different security 
interventions within a range urban contexts are heeded. As this thesis has called for a more 
fuller appreciation of the variation that arises within the different urban environments of 
named cities, continuing this investigation in different urban contexts would also seem a 
logical and important next stage of research. This applies as much to addressing differing 
counter-terrorist responses within different cities within the UK as it does to examinations of 
the responses to the threats of terrorism to different cases internationally. There have been 
repeated calls insisting on the need to investigate and address the issues of spatial 
contingency in urban security and such work is certainly underway, however in both 
research and security practice there are persistent inferences made which then go on to 
generalise the means of securing space and the outcomes with respects to the imbrications 
of security with the city and on urban life. Whilst it is accepted that extrapolating from a 
narrow range of cases is bad practice, it has endured. It is thus vital that these new, 
emerging and indeed shifting geographies of counter-terrorist security and urban security 
practices more generally are subject to more sustained scrutiny. Following, this and related, 
terrorism and counter-terrorist security responses have and will change with time. As well 
as a focus on past change, the anticipatory logics of security necessitate further 
explorations of the futural orientation, to the ʻyet to comeʼ of both security and terror. Along 
with an appreciation of the spatial complexity of forms of security and the threats of and 
vulnerabilities to terrorism, questioning how these change over time in the context of the 
securing of cities would provide an important addition to ongoing debates. 
The approach presented here does not claim to be definitive and there are many 
dimensions of urban security that are not addressed here. Rather, this research represents 
a starting point for future works that are more concerned with witnessing and describing the 
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everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured. Extending discussions of urban 
security through more explicit attention to the everyday life of security provides a means of 
moving beyond exclusively conceiving security as imposed on urban spaces in relation to 
ʻprinciplesʼ of state formation. Investigating both how security takes the everyday as its 
ʻreferent objectʼ and how security is then lived addresses debates concerned with the extent 
to which security has become a driving factor in contemporary urbanism. In doing so this 
questions the rationales for and contexts of urban security and then moves to consider how 
security moves from a set of interventions to something which is lived and experienced. 
There are then important implications for both scholarly research and practical matters 
concerning security interventions as they become part of urban environments and how 
security becomes present within everyday life in different ways. Ultimately, in order to better 
understand the urban geographies of security and the ways in which the everyday city is 
secured, it is necessary to further develop the work undertaken in this thesis, and to 
continue to move beyond the already established debates concerning the more technical 
and instrumental dimensions of security. Doing so would help to foster a broadened 
discussion that can better understand and bear witness to the urban geographies of 
security. 
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Appendix A 
 
List of interviews completed with research informants. 
 
Association of Train Operating Companies Police and Security Liaison Officer 
British Transport Police Counter-Terrorism Risk Adviser 
British Transport Police Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser for the London Underground 
British Transport Police Crime Reduction Manager 
British Transport Police and London Underground Crime and Disorder Partnership Unit 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 
The Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment 
Lambeth Borough Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser 
Lambeth Borough Crime Prevention Design Adviser 
Lambeth Council Town Planning Division 
Lambeth Borough Police Security Desk 
London Underground Operational Security Manager 
National Counter Terrorism Security Office 
South Bank Employers Group Security Coordinator 
Transport for London Crime and Disorder Partnership Manager 
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Appendix B 
 
List of interviews, diaries and go-alongs completed with participants. Participantʼs names 
have been changed to protect anonymity. 
 
Victoria Line 
 
Carol 12/03/09 Diary  
Amira 25/03/09   
Samantha 06/04/09 Diary  
Emma 07/04/09   
Katie 09/04/09 Diary  
Emily 13/04/09 Diary Go-along 
Paul 14/04/09 Diary  
Owen 17/04/09 Diary  
Ranisha 19/04/09   
Sanath 19/04/09   
Ling 26/04/09 Diary  
Adam 27/04/09 Diary  
Mike 27/04/09 Diary  
Tolu 27/04/09   
Nicholas 27/04/09 Diary  
Daniel 29/04/10 Diary  
David 29/04/09   
Alex 30/04/09   
Thomas 30/04/09 Diary  
Nilukshi 08/05/09 Diary Go-along 
Shanthi 10/06/09   
Christopher 01/07/09 Diary  
Henry 03/07/09 Diary  
Sam 14/07/09   
Jenny 14/07/09   
Nicola 16/07/09   
Iain 22/07/09   
Marie 22/07/09   
Robert 22/07/09 Diary  
Margaret 09/09/09   
James 10/09/09   
Catherine 23/09/09   
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South Bank and Bankside 
 
Lene 05/03/09   
Nimali 01/04/09 Diary  
Anne 01/04/09   
Sarah 07/04/09   
Allan 08/04/09   
Theresa  09/04/09 Diary  
Mary 14/04/09 Diary Go-along 
Helen 17/04/09 Diary  
Rosa 19/04/09 Diary  
Alistair 26/04/09   
Laura 02/05/09   
Andrew 07/05/09   
Michael 09/09/09 Diary  
Amy 22/09/09   
Natasha 23/09/09 Diary Go-along 
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